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* This is part two of a two-part article providing a survey and critical commentary on the
provisions of and caselaw interpreting Section 2412(d) of the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA),
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). The Essentials of the Equal Access to Justice Act: Court Awards of Attorney's
Fees for Unreasonable Government Conduct (Part One) was published at 55 La. L. Rev. 1 (1994).
Part one provided an introduction to and overview of the EAJA (section I); addressed the scope of
EAJA Subsection (d) (section II); and discussed eligibility for a fee award under the EAJA (section
III). References in this second part to earlier discussions are made by supra citations to sections I
through Il, which were published in part one.
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IV. ENTITLEMENT TO A FEE AWARD
The heart of the Equal Access to Justice Act and the focus of most of the
litigation concerning the statute is the provision for a mandatory award of
attorney's fees unless the "position of the United States was substantially
justified."' If the government fails to establish that its position in the case was
substantially justified, then the party engaged in litigation with the government
is entitled to an award of attorney's fees, unless "special circumstances make an
award unjust."2 The phrasing of the statute, stating that an award "shall" be
made "unless" the court finds that the government was substantially justified,3
suggests that "substantial justification" is in the nature of an affirmative defense
upon which the government bears the burden of proof. This understanding is
reflected in the legislative history." The courts of appeals have uniformly
concluded that the burden of proof on this issue rests with the government.'
The question of entitlement to a fee award requires a determination of the
nature and contours of the "position of the United States" and the meaning of
"substantial justification" as the measure of validity for the government's
position. In order to put the "substantial justification" inquiry in context, this
section of the article begins with a discussion and evaluation of the "position of
the United States" that is evaluated in the "substantial justification" inquiry.
Then, the section proceeds to a study of the standard of "substantial justifica-
tion," both in the abstract and as applied to particular cases. Finally, the section
concludes with an exploration of the concept of "special circumstances" as the
1. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1988).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. H.R. Rep. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4984, 4989:
[T]he strong deterrents to contesting Government action require that the burden of proof
rest with the Government. This allocation of the burden, in fact, reflects a general
tendency to place the burden of proof on the party who has readier access to and
knowledge of the facts in question. The committee believes that it is far easier for the
Government, which has control of the evidence, to prove the reasonableness of its action
than it is for a private party to marshal the facts to prove that the Government was
unreasonable.
See also S. Rep. No. 253, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1979).
5. Community Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Garrett, 2 F.3d 1143, 1145 (Fed. Cir. 1993);
Federal Election Comm'n v. Political Contributions Data, Inc., 995 F.2d 383, 386 (2d Cir. 1993),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1064 (1994); Hanover Potato Prods., Inc. v. Shalala, 989 F.2d 123, 128 (3d
Cir. 1993); Lundin v. Mecham, 980 F.2d 1450, 1459 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Oregon Natural Resources
Council v. Madigan, 980 F.2d 1330, 1331 (9th Cir. 1992); Thompson v. Sullivan, 980 F.2d 280, 281
(4th Cir. 1992); Gutierrez v. Sullivan, 953 F.2d 579, 584 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
3064 (1993); Cummings v. Sullivan, 950 F.2d 492, 495 (7th Cir. 1991); Moseanko v. Yeutter, 944
F.2d 418, 427 (8th Cir. 1991); De Allende v. Baker, 891 F.2d 7, 12 (1st Cir. 1989); Jankovich v.
Bowen, 868 F.2d 867, 869 (6th Cir. 1989); City of Brunswick v. United States, 849 F.2d 501, 504
(11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1053, 109 S. Ct. 1313 (1989); Baker v. Bowen, 839 F.2d
1075, 1080 (5th Cit. 1988).
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narrow exception to the statutory directive of an award of fees when the position
of the government lacks substantial justification.
A. The "Position of the United States " for Purposes of Determining
"Substantial Justification"
"[Plosition of the United States" means, in addition to the position
taken by the United States in the civil action, the action or failure to act
by the agency upon which the civil action is based; except that fees and
expenses may not be awarded to a party for any portion of the litigation
in which the party has unreasonably protracted the proceedings ....
(EAJA § 2412(d)(2)(D)) 6
1. The Statutory Definition of the "Position of the United States"
Prior to 1985, the federal courts were divided on the question of what
"position" of the government was to be evaluated for purposes of the "substantial
justification" analysis." Because the EAJA, as originally enacted, did not
expressly define the nature of the position to be scrutinized, the courts were left
to choose between two alternatives: (1) reviewing the government's position
taken in the lawsuit in terms of its legal theory and litigation strategy in court
(the government's "litigation position"),' or (2) evaluating both the government's
6. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(D) (1988) (emphasis added).
7. On the division of courts regarding the interpretation of the "position of the United States"
prior to 1985, see generally Louise L. Hill, Equal Access to Justice Act-Paving the Way for
Legislative Change, 36 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 50, 71-73 (1985). This previous disparity in
interpretation as to the nature of the government's position, whether it includes pre-litigation conduct
or only the litigation position, continues to have some lingering effect. There is confusion among
the courts regarding the relationship between the basis for the court's decision on the merits of the
case (which necessarily includes a review of the government's underlying conduct) and the
"substantial justification" analysis in the attorney's fee proceeding. Some courts insist that the merits
stage and the "substantial justification" inquiry in the fee stage must be kept entirely independent.
This insistence on keeping the merits stage and substantial justification inquiry separate may reflect
continuing discomfort by some courts in considering the reasonableness of the government's
underlying conduct, as well as its litigation posture, in ruling upon a request for fees under the EAJA.
See generally infra Part IV.C (discussing the relationship between the "substantial justification"
inquiry under the EAJA and the prior court decision on the merits).
8. Pre-1985 decisions interpreting the "position of the United States" as referring solely to the
government's litigation position included Russell v. National Mediation Bd., 764 F.2d 341, 349-52
(5th Cir.), withdrawn, 775 F.2d 1284 (5th Cir. 1985); White v. United States, 740 F.2d 836, 842
(11 th Cir. 1984); Amidon v. Lehman, 730 F.2d 949, 952 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1034, 105
S. Ct. 507 (1984); Morris Mechanical Enters. v. United States, 728 F.2d 497, 498-99 (Fed. Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1033, 105 S. Ct. 503 (1984); United States v. 2,116 Boxes of Boned Beef, 726 F.2d
1481, 1487 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 825, 105 S. Ct. 105 (1984); and Spencer v. NLRB, 712
F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 936, 104 S. Ct. 1908 (1984).
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litigation position and the government's underlying conduct that gave rise to the
lawsuit.' The government's underlying conduct may include the enactment of
a statute or promulgation of a regulation, the rendering of an administrative
decision, the initiation of an enforcement measure, or the taking of other action
by an agency or federal official (the government's "pre-litigation position').
Thus, "some courts required only that the government's litigation position be
substantially justified while other courts required both that the government's
litigation position and the government's action or inaction which led to the
underlying conflict be substantially justified."'"l
This question of the meaning of the "position of the United States" proved
to be a centerpoint of controversy, and even a temporary stumbling block to final
approval, during the legislative process leading up to the re-enactment of the
EAJA in 1985." In its 1984 passage of re-enactment legislation, Congress
came down squarely in favor of a broader understanding of the "position of the
United States" which required the government to establish "substantial
justification" for both its litigation and pre-litigation positions.' However,
President Reagan vetoed the 1984 legislation, noting in particular his strong
objection to the altered definition of the government's position for purposes of
the substantial justification inquiry. 3 President Reagan "believed this to be an
unwarranted extension of the 'position of the United States' definition, which
would result in wasteful litigation over a subsidiary issue and 'undermine the free
exchange of ideas and positions within each agency that is essential for good
government."
4
In the final re-enactment legislation of 1985, Congress did not retreat to the
litigation position definition preferred by the President. The President's narrow
approach would have allowed the government to escape fee liability whenever
government lawyers made a reasonable legal argument in court, irrespective of
the validity of its pre-litigation conduct. However, Congress made an important
step to accommodate the President by addressing the concern that the broader
pre-litigation position definition "would lead to extensive discovery on how the
Government's action was formulated" with "fishing expeditions" into the
motivation and collateral activities of government decision-makers."
9. Pre-1985 decisions interpreting the "position of the United States" as referring to both the
government's litigation position and the government's pre-litigation position included Keasler v.
United States, 766 F.2d 1227, 1231 (8th Cir. 1985); Miller v. United States, 753 F.2d 270, 274 (3d
Cir. 1985); and Rawlings v. Heckler, 725 F.2d 1192, 1195-96 (9th Cir. 1984).
10. Dawn C. Bradshaw, Note, EAJA: An Analysis of the Final Judgment Requirement as
Applied to Social Security Disability Cases, 58 Fordham L. Rev. 1269, 1271 n.18 (1990).
11. On the legislative clarification of "position of the United States" in the 1985 re-enactment
of the EAJA, see generally Louise L. Hill, An Analysis and Explanation of the Equal Access to
Justice Act, 19 Ariz. St. L.J. 229, 237-41 (1987); Hill, supra note 7, at 79-83.
12. 130 Cong. Rec. H12,172 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1984).
13. 20 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1814-15 (Nov. 8, 1984).
14. Hill, supra note 7, at 80 (quoting 20 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. at 1814-15).
15. 131 Cong. Rec. S9,992 (daily ed. July 24, 1985) (remarks of Sen. Grassley); see also H.R.
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Accordingly, Congress included two interconnected provisions in the 1985
version of the EAJA. First, Congress adhered to its earlier broad view by adding
a definition of the "position of the United States" as meaning, "in addition to the
position taken by the United States in the civil action, the action or failure to act
by the agency upon which the civil action is based." 6 Second, the statute was
also amended to provide that the determination of whether the government's
position is substantially justified must be made "on the basis of the record
(including the record with respect to the action or failure to act by the agency
upon which the civil action is based) which is made in the civil action for which
fees and other expenses are sought." 7 Thus, the EAJA expressly provides for
an expansive reading of the "position of the United States," but simultaneously
restricts the evaluation of that position to the record established in the lawsuit on
the merits and the record created in the agency that served as the basis for
judicial review of the agency's action or failure to act.' Moreover, to prevent
a party from dragging out the process and thereby expending excessive legal fees
in challenging a manifestly invalid government decision or action, the new
definition provision excludes from any EAJA award those fees attributable to
"any portion of the litigation in which the party has unreasonably protracted the
proceedings." 9
Under the amended 1985 version of the EAJA, the "substantial justification"
inquiry must address both the governmental action that precipitated the lawsuit
and the posture assumed by the government in the litigation.20 This approach
is most consistent with the underlying purpose of the EAJA, which is not only
to ensure that the government articulates a colorable legal position once its
actions have been challenged in court, but also to encourage the government to
weigh the reasonableness of its conduct when formulating policy or undertaking
another action.2 ' The government is properly held liable for a fee award when
it was "at fault--either in [its] primary conduct or in the course of litigation-in
forcing the winner to spend money on legal services."' As with an unreason-
Rep. No. 120, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1985), reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 132, 135 (explaining
legislative changes designed to limit discovery in response to concerns raised in the President's veto
message).
16. Pub. L. No. 99-80, § 2(cX2), 99 Stat. 183,185 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(D) (1988)).
17. Id. § 2(b), 99 Stat. at 184-85 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B) (1988)).
18. See Hill, supra note 11, at 240 ("Congress specifically sought to clarify that courts should
evaluate the 'position of the United States' based on facts the parties would necessarily air during
the course of litigation or agency adjudication.").
19. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(D) (1988).
20. See id.
21. H.R. Rep. No. 120, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1985), reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 132,
141 ("Interpreting the EAJA so as to restrict its application to mere litigation arguments and not the
underlying action which made the suit necessary, would remove the very incentive for careful agency
action that Congress hoped to create in 1980."). See generally supra section I.B.3 (discussing the
purposes of the EAJA).
22. See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical Overview,
1982 Duke L.J. 651, 658 (discussing the "make-whole rationale" for fee-shifting as a general theory).
[Vol. 56
EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT
able posture in court, an unreasonable decision or action by the government
leading to litigation unjustifiably imposes an improper legal expense upon the
party challenging or resisting that government position.
In most instances, the focus of the "substantial justification" inquiry will be
upon the pre-litigation position of the government, because a reasonable litigation
defense made in court will not save the government from liability for EAJA fees
if its underlying conduct was unjustified.' Even justifiable pre-litigation
conduct, however, may be insufficient to avoid an EAJA award if the govern-
ment proceeds to adopt an untenable litigation strategy or continues to prosecute
an action after the government's position loses legitimacy.' Moreover, even
when the underlying government position is substantially justified, government
misconduct during the course of the litigation could rise to such a level as to
overshadow the pre-litigation position and result in a finding of lack of
substantial justification upon an evaluation of the case as a whole.' In sum,
the government must be reasonable before and after litigation proceeds; in other
words, "the entirety of the conduct of the government is to be viewed."'
In this manner, the government is held accountable for the reasonableness
of its conduct both in and outside of court. However, the statutory phrase
"action or failure to act by the agency upon which the civil action is based"27
"does not include unauthorized acts of employees which would not be subject to
judicial review. Similarly, the position of the United States "does not
23. See Marcus v. Shalala, 17 F.3d 1033, 1036 (7th Cir. 1994) ("[T]he fact that the
government's litigating position was substantially justified does not necessarily offset prelitigation
conduct that was without a reasonable basis.'); Wilderness Soc'y v. Babbitt, 5 F.3d 383, 388 (9th
Cir. 1993) (stating that the fact that the government's "procedural litigation defense" may have been
substantially justified is not sufficient because the underlying government action must also be
considered). As the House Report accompanying the 1985 re-enactment legislation states, the
clarifying definition of the "position of the United States" "is not meant to preclude government
attorneys from asserting jurisdictional or technical defenses (e.g., statute of limitations or mootness)."
H.R. Rep. No. 120, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1985), reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 132, 140. If
such a defense is successful, then the action will be dismissed and the party in litigation with the
government will not have met the threshold requirement of being a "prevailing party" to apply for
an EAJA fee award. See generally supra section II.A (discussing the "prevailing party" requirement
for eligibility for an EAJA award). However, if a jurisdictional or technical defense fails in court,
the reasonableness of that defense will not prevent an award of fees if the underlying government
conduct was not substantially justified.
24. See United States v. $12,248 U.S. Currency, 957 F.2d 1513, 1516-19 (9th Cir. 1991)
(holding that while the government may have had probable cause to seize currency found at the scene
of a drug arrest, the government's undue delay in instituting the forfeiture lawsuit and failure to
investigate and verify whether the currency had an innocent source destroyed the continued
reasonableness of the government's position).
25. See infra section IV.A.2 (discussing the evaluation of the "position of the United States"
based upon the case as a whole).
26. Chiu v. United States, 948 F.2d 711, 715 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
27. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(D) (1988).
28. Chiu, 948 F.2d at 716 (holding that a supervisor's unlawful motivation in recommending
elimination of the plaintiff's government position was deemed the action of the agency where the agency
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include mere preliminary or procedural decisions of the agency which would not
be subject to judicial review."29  When a government employee or official
acting in official capacity takes action or makes a decision that is amenable to
judicial review, and thus serves as the basis for a civil action within the scope
of the EAJA, that action or decision is properly the subject of scrutiny as part
of the "position of the United States" for purposes of determining entitlement to
an EAJA fee award.0
2. The Holistic Approach-Evaluating the "Position of the United
States" in the Case as a Whole
By its plain terms, the Equal Access to Justice Act directs the court to
evaluate the "substantial justification" of the singular "position," and not the
multiple "positions," of the United States in a particular case. a" The Supreme
Court confirmed this understanding in Commissioner v. Jean.32 In Jean, the
Court held that a party who has succeeded in obtaining a fee award under the
EAJA for legal work performed on the merits of the case is also entitled to
compensation for legal fees incurred in applying for and securing the award of
fees.3" The Court rejected the government's contention that the court must
make a finding that the government's position in opposing the fee award was
also without "substantial justification" before granting compensation for the fees
phase of the litigation. 4 The Court ruled that fee-shifting statutes "favor[]
treating a case as an inclusive whole, rather than as atomized line items.
35
Most significantly, the Jean Court clarified the meaning of the "position of
the United States." The Court observed that all references to the government's
"position" in the statute are singular.36 The Court therefore ruled:
official implementing the reduction-in-force decision acted on that supervisor's recommendation).
29. H.R.Rep.No. 120,99th Cong., lstSess. 13 (1985), reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 132,141.
30. The statute defines "United States" as including the agency and "any official of the United
States acting in his or her official capacity." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(C) (1988). In Kreines v. United
States, 33 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1096 (1995), the court ruled that a
plaintiff who had prevailed on a Bivens claim against two federal employees could not obtain an
EAJA award from the government because such a Bivens action "is not a civil action brought by or
against the United States: it is an action against individual federal officers." Id. at 1107.
Accordingly, an EAJA award is available only when the private party has brought or is defending
against an action brought by an agency or an official acting in an official, as opposed to a personal,
capacity.
31. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(l)(A), (dX2)(D) (1988).
32. 496 U.S. 154, 110 S. Ct. 2316 (1990).
33. Id. at 158-65, 110 S. Ct. at 2318-22. See generally Gregory C. Sisk, A Primer on Awards
of Attorney's Fees Against the Federal Government, 25 Ariz. St. L.J. 733, 764-65 (1993) (discussing
the award of "fees for fees" under fee-shifting statutes).
34. Jean, 496 U.S. at 161-62, 110 S. Ct. at 2320.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 158-60, 110 S. Ct. at 2318-19.
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The fact that the "position [of the United States]" is ... denominated
in the singular, although it may encompass both the agency's prelitiga-
tion conduct and the Department of Justice's subsequent litigation
positions, buttresses the conclusion that only one threshold determina-
tion for the entire civil action is to be made.3"
From this singular "position" analysis, we are led to the conclusion that a
"holistic" or "totality of the circumstances" approach is to be taken to the
substantial justification inquiry. Rather than breaking the lawsuit into pieces and
phases for ad seriatim substantial justification analysis, the position of the
government is "to be measured as a whole."38
As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held in Hanover
Potato Products, Inc. v. Shalala,39 this does not mean "that every argument
made by [the government] must be substantially justified." Rather, it means
that the court "must evaluate every significant argument made by [the govern-
ment]" to determine if the argument is substantially justified, and then conclude
"whether, as a whole, the Government's position was substantially justified."'
The decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in
Roanoke River Basin Association v. Hudson4 2 is an excellent illustration of the
holistic approach in action. In that case, the plaintiff insisted that it was entitled
to an award of EAJA fees for having prevailed upon one issue, notwithstanding
the district court's finding that the government's overall position in the case was
substantially justified.43 The plaintiff challenged the Army Corps of Engineers'
issuance of a permit for the construction of a pipeline, alleging numerous
deficiencies in the governmental decision-making process.' On the merits, the
district court determined that, while "on the whole the Corps' decision reflects
a careful analysis of the environmental and non-environmental factors"
implicated by the project, a remand was necessary for the Corps to reconsider
some aspects of the matter, most significantly the impact of the project on the
striped bass in the river.4" Following a reaffirmation of the decision to issue
37. Id. at 159, 110 S. Ct. at 2319; see also Anthony v. Sullivan, 982 F.2d 586, 589 (D.C. Cir.
1993) (stating that Jean stands for the proposition that "a single decision as to [substantial
justification] governs eligibility for fees for the entire action").
38. Kuhns v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 930 F.2d 39, 44 (D.C. Cir. 1991). The
author believes that the substantial justification inquiry was first described as "holistic" in the late
1980s by then U.S. Deputy Solicitor General Thomas W. Merrill, who has since returned to the law
faculty at Northwestern University.
39. 989 F.2d 123 (3d Cir. 1993).
40. Id. at 131.
41. Id.
42. 991 F.2d 132 (4th Cir.) (Roanoke River Basin Ass'n II), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 182 (1993).
43. Id. at 135.
44. Id. at 134-36.
45. North Carolina v. Hudson, 665 F. Supp. 428, 449-50 (E.D.N.C. 1987).
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the permit on remand, the district court upheld the issuance of the permit," and
that decision was affirmed on appeal."7
The plaintiff contended, and the district court agreed, that it had prevailed
on the striped bass issue and that it had succeeded in obtaining some mitigation
of the project's impact on the striped bass through added measures taken on the
remand to the Corps.48 The plaintiff contended that it was entitled to an award
of EAJA fees because the government's position on the striped bass issue had
not been substantially justified.49 The district court refused to narrow its focus
to the question of whether the government's position on "specific, isolated issues
was substantially justified," rather than evaluating the entire proceeding." The
court concluded that in light of the magnitude of the project, and the Corps'
overall careful analysis, the failure of the government to fully consider all
relevant information on one individual factor did not require a determination that
the government's position as a whole had been without "substantial justifica-
tion.""
On appeal in the Roanoke River Basin Ass 'n case, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of EAJA
fees and thoughtfully analyzed the meaning of a holistic approach to the
evaluation of the government's position. The court recognized that Jean
discouraged "an issue-by-issue analysis of the government's posture throughout
each phase of the litigation."52 Although the Jean decision does not mean that
the court looks "only at the government's macrocosmic position," it plainly does
direct "a more broadly focused analysis that would reject the view that any
unreasonable position taken by the government... automatically opens the door
to an EAJA award."53 Thus, the court must look beyond any single issue, even
the specific issue upon which the party prevailed in litigation with the federal
government, and consider the "substantial justification" question on "the totality
of the circumstances. 54
As the Fourth Circuit sensitively appreciated, a totality of the circumstances
approach does not mean the court looks only at the principal or central issue in the
case, but rather balances all aspects of the case and considers all issues in reaching
a singular, holistic appraisal of the government's position.55 In many, if not most,
46. North Carolina v. Hudson, 731 F. Supp. 1261, 1273 (E.D.N.C. 1990).
47. Roanoke River Basin Ass'n v. Hudson, 940 F.2d 58, 66 (4th Cir. 1991) (Roanoke River
Basin Ass'n 1), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1164 (1992).
48. Roanoke River Basin Ass'n II, 991 F.2d at 136.
49. Id.
50. Id. (quoting district court's decision).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 138-39.
53. Id. at 139.
54. Id.; see also Aguilar-Ayala v. Ruiz, 973 F.2d 411, 421 n.8 (5th Cir. 1992) (stating that,
while the court had "serious doubts" about the strength of some of the government's arguments, it
nevertheless had concluded that "on the whole" the government's position was reasonable).
55. Roanoke River Basin Ass'n ff, 991 F.2d at 139.
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cases, the balancing of circumstances will tilt heavily toward an analysis of the
reasonableness of the "overall objectives of the government and the extent to which
the alleged governmental misconduct departed from them."56 In such a case, even
"a totally unsupportable and clearly unreasonable position by the government on
an inconsequential aspect of the litigation" may not mandate a conclusion that the
government's overall position lacks substantial justification." By contrast, a
particularly "egregious example of misconduct might, even if confined to a narrow
but important issue, taint the government's 'position' in the entire case as
unreasonable. 58 Moreover, the court must also consider the impact of positions
taken on issues. Thus, "a broader government position that, considered in a
vacuum, would not be clearly egregious might still, in the overall context of the
case, constitute an unreasonable position because of its impact."59  "[A]n
unreasonable stance taken on a single issue" might undermine the overall
reasonableness of the government's position because of its significant effect on the
entire civil action.' In sum, where the government's overall position, as reflected
by "the center of controversy" in the lawsuit is substantially justified, minor
deficiencies on subsidiary points will not render the "position of the United States"
unreasonable.6 '
A holistic approach to the "substantial justification" question also means that
this inquiry is not coextensive with the determination of the prevailing party in the
lawsuit.62 Thus, "while a party may become a 'prevailing party' on a single
substantive issue from which benefit is derived, satisfying one prong of the EAJA,
it does not automatically follow that the government's position in the case as a
whole is not substantially justified."'63 However, a distinction must be drawn
between those cases in which a party prevails on one issue raised as part of a single
broader claim against the government and those cases in which a party prevails on
a distinct and separate claim in a case raising multiple claims against the federal
government. When a case involves what is essentially a single claim arising from
a "common nucleus of operative fact," and the plaintiff advances separate legal






61. Id. at 140.
62. See generally supra Section II.A (discussing the "prevailing party" requirement for
eligibility for an EAJA award).
63. Roanoke River Basin Ass'n 11, 991 F.2d at 139.
64. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725, 86 S. Ct. 1130, 1138 (1966)
(holding that a federal question claim and a state law claim are sufficiently related for the exercise
of pendent claim jurisdiction if they constitute a single constitutional case or controversy, that is, if
the claims arise from "a common nucleus of operative fact," such that a plaintiff would ordinarily
expect to try both claims together in a single lawsuit).
65. See Paris v. United States Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 988 F.2d 236, 240 (lst Cir. 1993)
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"position of the United States" should be evaluated based upon the totality of the
circumstances of the entire claim, including balancing the government's stance on
all legal theories and issues. By contrast, when there are "distinctly different claims
for relief that are based on different facts and legal theories, ' se such that the
lawsuit involves different "cases or controversies" in a constitutional sense,67 the
"position of the United States" should be evaluated in the context of each separable
claim joined in the single action. The government should not be able to avoid
liability for attorney's fees based on an unreasonable claim merely because liberal
pleading rules permitted joinder of that unjustified claim together with a distinct
and separate claim in the same lawsuit.
In Securities and Exchange Commission v. Morelli," a district court
recognized this distinction, although its application of the theory to the circum-
stances of that case may be questioned. In Morelli, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) brought a civil liability suit alleging (1) that the defendant had
received non-public information about an impending tender offer for stock in a
company and used that inside information to purchase options on that company's
stock, and (2) that the defendant, while in possession of that insider information,
had passed public information about the target company to two others .69 Although
the government lost on the first claim at trial,7 the district court concluded there
was "no doubt" that its position on this claim was substantially justified, albeit
ultimately unsuccessful.7 However, the second claim had been dismissed on
summary judgment.' The court found that the government had no reasonable
basis in law for its theory that a person in possession of inside information is liable
for the trading profits of those to whom he passes completely public information. 3
On the question of an EAJA award, the district court ruled that the evaluation
of the government's position should proceed on a "claim-by-claim" basis. 4 The
court stated that "[s]eparate claims that are sufficiently distinct.., will each have
its own merit determination, and, therefore, can constitute an appropriate basis for
an award of fees if the government's position on the merits of that claim is not
(discussing determination of prevailing party status for eligibility.for attorney's fee award).
66. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 1940 (1983) (holding that
a party who has failed to prevail on a claim that is distinct and different from a successful claim may
not obtain compensation in a fee award for the legal expenses incurred on the unrelated unsuccessful
claim).
67. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725, 86 S. Ct. at 1138 (defining what
constitutes the same or different constitutional cases or controversies within the meaning of U.S.
Const. art. IlH, § 2).
68. No. 91 Civ. 3874, 1995 WL 9387 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 1995).
69. Id. at * 1-3.
70. Id. at *2.
71. Id. at *3.
72. Id. at *2.
73. Id. at *34.
74. Id. at *6-7.
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substantially justified."" Having determined that the government's position on
one claim was unreasonable, the court awarded fees under the EAJA.76 Although
the court's adoption of this approach is correct in principle, the court is not correct
in its application to the facts of this case. The court appears to have engaged in a
"count-by-count," rather than a true "claim-by-claim," evaluation of the govern-
ment's position.
Although the SEC had stated two counts against the defendant in this civil
liability action, these counts do not appear sufficiently distinct to be classified as
separate "claims." Applying the operative fact standard for determining what
constitutes a "claim," both counts arise out of the same set of circumstances, that
is, the defendant's alleged receipt and use of inside information for purposes of
profiting or allowing others to profit on stock trading. The two counts were closely,
indeed integrally, connected. The government's theory on the second count, that
a person with inside information is henceforth responsible for trading profits earned
by those to whom he passes completely public information on the target company,
hinged upon the government's allegation in the first count that the defendant had
received and abused non-public information. Although there are some differences
in the underlying facts, the similarities predominate, as the predicate for both counts
was the single incident of receipt and use of inside information. Moreover, it seems
clear that the SEC would not have pursued the second count without the first, and
would not have pursued the two counts separately in different lawsuits. Under the
analysis articulated by the Supreme Court in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs,'
both counts "derive from a common nucleus of operative fact" and are such that a
plaintiff "would ordinarily be expected to try them [both] in one judicial proceed-
ing.""8 If both counts had been understood to involve a single claim, the district
court acknowledged that the government's "case as a whole" against the defendant
was substantiallyjustified, because the portion of the case involving the defendant's
own alleged insider trading "both qualitatively and quantitatively outweighed" the
count asserting responsibility for other traders.79
3. Whether the Decision ofAn Agency Adjudicator Constitutes the
"Position of the United States "for Purposes of the "Substantial
Justification" Inquiry
As the United States Claims Court (now Court of Federal Claims)'
recognized in Griffin & Dickson v. United States,8' the language of the Equal
75. Id. at *7.
76. Id. at *8.
77. 383 U.S, 715, 86 S. Ct. 1130 (1966).
78. Id. at 725, 86 S. Ct. at 1138.
79. Morelli, 1995 WL 9387, at *5.
80. The Claims Court was re-named the "United States Court of Federal Claims" in 1992. Pub.
L. No. 105-572, § 902, 106 Stat. 4506, 4516 (1992).
81. 21 CI. Ct. 1 (1990).
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Access to Justice Act "links the United States' potential liability for fee awards
to its adversarial role."82 The term, "position of the United States" "connotes
the type of advocacy present in an adversarial setting," as contrasted with the
grounds for a decision rendered by an adjudicator. 3 The focus of the "substan-
tial justification" inquiry, as confirmed by the statutory definition of the "position
of the United States," is upon "the action or failure to act by the agency,"4
rather than upon rulings made by adjudicators considering the validity of that
governmental position.
Accordingly, as the Griffin & Dickson court held, the "EAJA permits fee
awards against the United States when acting in an adversary capacity only," and
does not allow recovery of fees "for errors and omissions made by administrative
adjudicators."S The language of the EAJA is suffused with an adversarial tone.
In addition to the evaluation of the "position" of the government, which has an
adversarial connotation, the statute also provides that any award is to be made
for fees "incurred by that party in any civil action ... brought by or against the
United States," 6 and the fee award is to be borne by the agency "over which
the party prevails."87 As the Claims Court ruled, "[p]arties do not prevail over
impartial adjudicatory bodies, but over adversaries in a proceeding."'8 In sum,
when an agency tribunal or administrative law judge resolves an adversarial
dispute before the agency, the administrative decision is judicial in nature and
thus is no more part of the government's position for EAJA purposes than would
be a court decision favorable to the government.
However, an administrative decision is judicial in nature and should therefore
be viewed separately from the "position of the United States" only when the
determination is made as a judicial or quasi-judicial adjudication between
adversarial positions taken before the adjudicatory body. When an agency decision,
even if announced by an administrative law judge, is not made pursuant to an
adversarial process in which the government strikes a stance separate from that of
the decision-maker, then the government's position cannot be divorced from that
agency determination. Thus, for example, in Cummings v. Sullivan, 9 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit correctly ruled that the agency
determination in Social Security disability proceedings "cannot be considered
purely judicial in nature" and instead "is part of the agency's prelitigation conduct"
which "must be examined in determining the singular 'position' of the United
82. Id. at 4.
83. Id. at 5.
84. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(D) (1988).
85. Griffin & Dickson, 21 Cl. Ct at 4. In Griffin & Dickson, the Claims Court ruled that a
decision of an agency board of contract appeals, which is specifically identified in the EAJA as an
adjudicative entity, 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(C) (1988), is not part of the "position of the United States"
for purposes of the substantial justification inquiry. 21 Cl. Ct. at 4-5.
86. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1988) (emphasis added).
87. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(4) (1988).
88. Griffin & Dickson, 21 Cl. Ct. at 4.
89. 950 F.2d 492 (7th Cir. 1991).
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States. ' Social Security disability claims are processed in a non-adversarial
manner, even when they come before an administrative law judge.9'
Under most circumstances, there will be no practical distinction for "substan-
tial justification" purposes between a "position of the United States" advocated by
the government's representatives in a dispute and an administrative (or, for that
matter, court) adjudication in favor of that position. An adjudicator ordinarily will
grant judgment to the government on the grounds advocated by the government.
Thus, while the court considering an EAJA award may not look directly at the
errors or omissions of the adjudicator's decision, those errors or omissions
ordinarily will reflect the position adopted in the adversarial proceeding by the
government. 92 Still, there remain two ways in which the characterization of an
adjudicatory decision as separate from the government's position may be
significant:
. First, hypothetically, an adjudicator (whether administrative orjudicial) could
enter a decision in favor of the government on untenable grounds which are
different from those urged by the government. Assuming that the government's
different grounds for the same result are substantially justified, the government
should not be held accountable for an indefensible legal ruling adopted by an
adjudicator contrary to the government's own theory of the case. Similarly, an
adjudicator could engage in other forms of misconduct, such as abusive treatment
of the party litigating against the government, which might taint the validity of the
proceedings for reasons other than the government's own conduct. However, in
such cases, the government may not escape EAJA liability if it perpetuates the
adjudicator's error by defending the decision on those untenable grounds or
supporting the abusive treatment of the private litigant. If the government adopts
the adjudicator's decision as its own position, the difference between them
evaporates.
0 Second, the acceptance of the government's position as correct by an
independent adjudicator, which is not a partisan to the contest, is worthy of some
90. Id. at 497.
91. In Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877, 891, 109 S. Ct. 2248, 2257 (1989), the Supreme
Court held that Social Security administrative proceedings are not adversarial for purposes of the
administrative version of the EAJA, 5 U.S.C. § 504 (1988). Section 504 applies only to "adversarial
adjudications" conducted pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act in which the United States
is represented by counsel or otherwise. 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(C) (1988); see also Ardestani v.
Immigration & Naturalization Service, 502 U.S. 129, 134-39, 112 S. Ct. 515, 519-21 (1991) (holding
that administrative deportation proceedings are not "adversary adjudications" for which fees may be
awarded under EAJA Section 504 because such proceedings are not subject to or governed by Section
554 of the Administrative Procedure Act). See generally sections I.B.2 (outlining the Section 504
administrative version of the EAJA) and III.A.2.b (discussing prevailing party status in the unique
context of Social Security claims).
92. See, e.g., Griffin & Dickson v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 1, 4-8 (1990) (holding that, while
the decision of the agency board of contract appeals as an administrative adjudicator could not serve
as the basis for an EAJA award, the board had erroneously dismissed the plaintiff's action in
response to the government's motions to dismiss which lacked any reasonable basis in law and fact).
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(although by no means conclusive) weight as evidence that the government's
position has appeal to a reasonable person and thus is substantially justified.93
B. The Meaning of "Substantial Justification"
[A] court shall award... fees .... unless the court finds that the position
of the United States was substantially justified .... (EAJA §
2412(d)(1)(A))"
Under EAJA Subsection (d), a party is entitled to a fee "unless the court finds
that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special
circumstances would make an award unjust."'95 To state the proposition in the
negative, an award of fees is mandatory when the government's position is not
substantially justified. This is the cardinal element in determining entitlement to
a fee award under the EAJA.
The statute does not define "substantial justification." However, the standard
was directly adopted from the context of federal civil litigation discovery.9 It is
a standard canon of statutory construction that when Congress borrows a term of
art from another statute, the same construction should be placed upon it.9, Under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, sanctions may be levied against a party who
fails to respond to discovery or obey a discovery order "without substantial
justification."98 The Advisory Committee of the Judicial Conference of the
93. See infra section IV.D.8 (discussing judicial endorsement of government position as
supporting the conclusion that the position is substantially justified).
94. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(l)(A) (1988) (emphasis added).
95. Id.
96. H.R. Rep. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4984,
4997 (stating that the legislation "adopt[ed] the language in Rule 37 [of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure] on which this standard is based"); S. Rep. No. 253, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 20-21 (1979)
(same). Even aside from the statement in the legislative history, the derivation of the EAJA standard
from the civil discovery rule is confirmed by the direct parallel in the language, beyond merely the
adoption of the term "substantial justification." EAJA Subsection (d)(1)(A), which directs an award
of attorney's fees unless the position of the government "was substantially justified or that special
circumstances make an award unjust," 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1988), is nearly a word-for-word
quotation from Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(4) and (b)(2) which provides for an award of
expenses unless the party's action with respect to discovery "was substantially justified or that other
circumstances make an award of expenses unjust," Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(aX4), (b)(2).
97. Shannon v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2419, 2426 n.8 (1994) (referring to the canon of
statutory construction that when a court is interpreting statutory language "borrowed" from another
statute, the court should apply the same construction to that language that was placed upon it by the
courts interpreting the statute from which the language was borrowed); Interstate Commerce Comm'n
v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 482 U.S. 270, 284-85, 107 S. Ct. 2360, 2368-60 (1987)
(interpreting statute based on previous interpretation of same language in another statute); Northcross
v. Memphis Bd. of Educ., 412 U.S. 427, 428, 93 S. Ct. 2201, 2202 (1973) (per curiam) (stating that
the similarity of language in two statutes is "strong indication that [they] should be interpreted par!
passu).
98. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4), (b)(2).
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United States which drafted the pertinent discovery rule explained that a party
would be "substantiallyjustified in carrying the matter to court" if"the dispute over
discovery between the parties is genuine, though ultimately resolved one way or the
other by the court."" As the leading treatise on federal civil practice states,
"substantial justification" under the discovery rules is measured by whether
"reasonable people could genuinely differ on whether a party was bound to comply
with a discovery rule.' 'ito
The legislative history surrounding the original enactment ofthe EAJA in 1980
confirms that the standard of "substantial justification" was intended by Congress
to be "essentially one of reasonableness. Where the Government can show that its
case had a reasonable basis both in law and fact, no award will be made."'01
Between the period of its initial enactment in 1980 and its re-enactment in 1985,
"the almost uniform appellate interpretation (12 Circuits out of 13)" endorsed a
reasonableness approach as the basic meaning of the "substantial justification"
standard.
0 2
Notwithstanding this initial consensus on the meaning of the standard, a
contrary trend began to develop in the appellate courts after the re-enactment of the
EAJA in 1985. The impetus for this shift in course was stray language in the House
Report accompanying the 1985 re-enactment legislation. Although the 1985
legislation contained several amendments clarifying disputed questions of
interpretation regarding the EAJA,'0° Congress made no substantive alterations
to the "substantial justification" standard. Nevertheless, the 1985 House Report
purported to clarify the meaning of the unchanged standard by stating that the "test
must be more than mere reasonableness."'" Leading sponsors of the re-
99. Advisory Committee of the Judicial Conference of the United States, Proposed Amendments
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Relating to Discovery, 48 F.R.D. 487, 540 (1970).
100. 8A Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2288, at 665-66 (1994).
101. H.R. Rep. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4984,
4989; S. Rep. No. 253, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1979).
102. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 567, 108 S. Ct. 2541, 2550 (1988).
103. In 1985, Congress enacted amendments to the EAJA on, inter alia, the following points:
(1) clarifying the scope of the statute over "any civil action" as expressly "including proceedings
for judicial review of agency action," Equal Access to Justice Act, Extension and Amendment §
2(a)(2), Pub. L. No. 99-80, 99 Stat. 183, 184 (1985) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2412(dX)(A) (1988));
see generally supra section II.A.1; (2) adding a definition of "court" to include certain non-Article
III tribunals, id. § 2(c)(2)(F), 99 Stat. at 185 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(F) (1988)); see
generally supra section II.B.2; (3) adding a specific provision defining "prevailing party" in the
context of a condemnation action, id. § 2(cX2)(H), 99 Stat. at 186 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §
2412(dX2)(H) (1988)); see generally supra section III.A.5; (4) adding "unit of local government" to
the list of parties eligible for a fee award, id. § 2(c)(1)(B), 99 Stat. at 185 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §
2412(d)(2)(B) (1988)); see generally supra section III.B.3.c; and (5) defining "position of the United
States" as meaning "in addition to the position taken by the United States in the civil action, the
action or failure to act by the agency upon which the civil action is based," id. § 2(c)(2)(D), 99 Stat.
at 185 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(D) (1988)); see generally supra section IV.A.1.
104. H.R. Rep. No. 120, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1985), reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 132,
138 ("Several courts have held correctly that 'substantial justification' means more than merely
reasonable. Because in 1980 Congress rejected a standard of 'reasonably justified' in favor of
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enactment legislation took to the floor of the House and Senate during debate to
disassociate themselves from other statements in the House Report regarding the
standard of "substantial justification" as applied to review of administrative
decisions, 5 and one court later described this part of the report as "apparently
[a] staff-produced bit of 'history.,"106 Still, prompted in part by this report
language, a number of appellate courts (although still a minority) moved in the
direction of requiring the government to demonstrate that its position was supported
by something "more than mere reasonableness."' °7
In 1988, the Supreme Court in Pierce v. Underwood0 s brought a halt to the
gradual slip-and-slide by the courts away from the standard of reasonableness and
firmly rejected, as lacking authority, the House Report endorsing a more stringent
standard. In Pierce, the leading decision on the EAJA to date, the Court affirmed
a district court's determination that the Secretary of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment had not been substantially justified in refusing to implement a particular
housing program authorized by statute."° Before proceeding to the question of
whether the district court had abused its discretion in awarding EAJA fees,"' the
Court addressed the "abstract legal issue" of "the meaning of the phrase 'substan-
tially justified.'
The Court began with the actual language of the statute and insisted that the
test to be applied must be the one prescribed in the text-"substantial justifica-
'substantially justified,' the test must be more than mere reasonableness.").
105. See, e.g., 131 Cong. Rec. S9,993 (daily ed. July 24, 1985) (remarks of Sen. Thurmond);
131 Cong. Rec. H4,763 (daily ed. June 24, 1985) (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier). This legislative
history is discussed in further detail in section IV.C.2 infra.
106. Federal Election Comm'n v. Rose, 806 F.2d 1081, 1090 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
107. See, e.g., Riddle v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 817 F.2d 1238, 1241-44 (6th Cir.)
(citing the 1985 House Report in support of its ruling that "in order to be substantially justified, the
government's position must have more than a 'reasonable basis' in law and fact," but rather "must
be firmly grounded or solidly based in law and fact'), vacated for reh'g en banc, 823 F.2d 164 (6th
Cir. 1987); Gavette v. Office of Personnel Management, 808 F.2d 1456, 1467 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (en
banc) (holding that the 1985 House Report clarified that "substantial justification means more than
mere reasonableness on the part of the Government," but rather "requires that the Government show
that it was clearly reasonable in asserting its position'); Lee v. Johnson, 799 F.2d 31, 38 n.7 (3d Cir.
1986) (citing 1985 House Report as supporting conclusion that "[t]o establish that its position was
substantially justified, the government must show more than that [its] position was merely
reasonable"). Prior to the 1985 re-enactment, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, had ruled that "substantial justification" was a standard "slightly more stringent
than 'one of reasonableness."' Spencer v. NLRB, 712 F.2d 539, 558 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
466 U.S. 936, 104 S. Ct. 1908 (1984).
108. 487 U.S. 552, 108 S. Ct. 2541 (1988).
109. Id. at 568-71, 108 S. Ct. at 2551-53.
110. In Pierce, the Court also adopted a deferential "abuse of discretion" standard for appellate
review of trial court determinations of whether the government's position is substantially justified.
Id. at 557-63, 108 S. Ct. at 2545-49. See generally infra section IV.E (discussing the abuse of
discretion standard of appellate review in EAJA cases).
111. Id. at 563, 108 S. Ct. at 2549.
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tion.'  Nevertheless, the Court recognized "an obvious need to elaborate upon
the meaning of the phrase."". Next, the Court turned to contrasting dictionary
definitions of the word "substantial."" 4 The Court observed that "the word
'substantial' can have two quite different-indeed, almost contrary-connotations.
On the one hand, it can mean '[c]onsiderable in amount, value, or the like;
large'.... On the other hand, it can mean '[t]hat is such in substance or in the
main...... Then, the Court looked to similar standards in other fields of law for
guidance." 6 The Court noted that judicial review of agency action "regularly
proceeds under the rubric of 'substantial evidence,"' which has not been defined to
"mean a large or considerable amount of evidence but rather 'such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclu-
sion....t In addition, the standard of "substantial justification" as the test for
measuring the validity of resistance to civil discovery has been described as
meaning a "genuine dispute""' or that "reasonable people could differ as to [the
appropriateness of the contested action]."" 9
Based upon this textual analysis and the guidance provided by the meaning
attached to similar language in other codified sources of law, the Court concluded
that the understanding "most naturally conveyed by the phrase before us here is not
'justified to a high degree,' but rather 'justified in the substance or in the
main'-that is justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person.""
112. Id. at 564, 108 S. Ct. at 2549.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. (quoting Webster's New International Dictionary 2514 (2d ed. 1945)).
116. Id. at 564, 108 S. Ct. at 2550.
117. Id. at 564-65, 108 S. Ct. at 2550 (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197,
229, 59 S. Ct. 206, 217 (1938)).
118. Pierce, 487 U.S. at 565, 108 S. Ct. at 2550 (quoting Advisory Committee Notes on 1970
Amendments to Fed. K. Civ. P. 37(a)(4), 28 U.S.C. app. at 643-64 (1988)).
119. Pierce, 487 U.S. at 565, 108 S. Ct. at 2550 (quoting Reygo Pac. Corp. v. Johnston Pump
Co., 680 F.2d 647, 649 (9th Cir. 1982)). Justice Brennan, in a concurring opinion that disagreed with
the majority's adoption of a reasonableness standard, stated in a footnote that "[b]ecause the purposes
of the EAJA are different from those of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 and from those served
by the 'substantial evidence' test used to review agency determinations, I believe the meanings given
the term 'substantial' in those contexts do not govern here." Pierce, 487 U.S. at 579 n.2, 108 S. Ct
at 2557 n.2 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). However, Justice
Brennan did not explain how the purposes differ or why those differences should lead to a different
understanding of similar statutory or rule language. Contrary to his unexplained assertion, the
purpose of the EAJA, which mandates that the government's position be evaluated in terms of the
degree of merit, is practically the same as the purpose of Rule 37, which directs that a party's
resistance to discovery or failure to comply with a discovery order be evaluated according to its
degree of merit. Moreover, as discussed above, and as Justice Brennan fails to acknowledge, the
EAJA standard of "substantial justification" was borrowed directly from the virtually identical phrase
in Rule 37.
120. Pierce, 487 U.S. at 565, 108 S. Ct. at 2550. Professor William Eskridge has described the
majority opinion authored by Justice Scalia in Pierce v. Underwood as a "notable example of the new
textualism" approach to statutory interpretation by which the Supreme Court is more willing to find
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The Court explained that this standard is no different than the "reasonable basis
both in law and fact" formulation adopted by the majority of the courts of
appeals. "2
The Court expressly rejected the 1985 House Report, with its endorsement of
a "more than mere reasonableness" test, as neither an authoritative interpretation
of what the 1980 statute meant nor an authoritative expression of what the 1985
Congress intended.' First, the Court held, a later session of Congress, let alone
a single committee, cannot usurp the judicial function of interpreting a previously
enacted statute.'23 Second, because the 1985 Congress did not alter the standard
of "substantial justification," but merely re-enacted precisely the same language
from the 1980 statute, the House Report could not be understood as an explanation
of the intent of the 1985 Congress." The 1985 Congress did not adopt new
language requiring new construction. Rather, through re-enactment Congress made
the existing standard permanent."z
Finally, the Court provided an institutional explanation for adhering to a simple
reasonableness test for "substantial justification," rather than creating an awkward
and unfamiliar standard that measures the merits of the government's position by
something "more than mere reasonableness."' 26 As the Court ruled, "between the
test of reasonableness, and a test such as 'clearly and convincingly justified'-
a statutory "plain meaning" and is less willing to consider legislative history. William N. Eskridge,
Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 621, 657-58 (1990).
121. Pierce, 487 U.S. at 565, 108 S. Ct. at 2550. The Court did caution that to be "substantially
justified" means "more than merely undeserving of sanctions for frivolousness; that is assuredly not
the standard for Government litigation of which a reasonable person would approve." Id. at 566, 108
S. Ct. at 2550. However, the import of this caveat is less than clear, because the ordinary standard
for imposing a sanction for a frivolous court filing is that same one of "reasonable basis" adopted
by the Supreme Court for EAJA awards. See, e.g., Advisory Committee of the Judicial Conference
of the United States, Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 97 F.R.D. 165,
198 (1983) (explaining purpose of amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 on sanctions
as designed to "streamline the litigation process by lessening frivolous claims or defenses," and
further stating that the standard for certification of a pleading as well-founded under Rule 11 "is one
of reasonableness under the circumstances"); Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications
Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 533, 550-51, 111 S. Ct. 922, 932-33 (1991) (ruling that the certification of a
pleading as well-founded under Rule 11 is an objective standard "of reasonableness under the
circumstances"). See generally Jack H. Friedenthal et al., Civil Procedure § 5.11, at 261-62 (2d ed.
1993). Although an accusation of "frivolousness" may have more emotive sting than one of
"unreasonableness," the charge is essentially the same. Nevertheless, the Court in Pierce has
indicated that some distinction must be drawn between the two. One court has suggested that a
party's burden in showing entitlement to fees may therefore be slightly "lighter under the EAJA than
under" the standard of "frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation" for fee awards to defendants
against plaintiffs under civil rights cases. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Consolidated
Serv. Sys., 839 F. Supp. 1285, 1287 (N.D. 11. 1993), afd, 30 F.3d 58 (7th Cir. 1994).
122. Pierce, 487 U.S. at 566-67, 108 S. Ct. at 2550.
123. Id., 108 S. Ct. at 2550.
124. Id., 108 S. Ct. at 2550.
125. Id., 108 S. Ct. at 2550.
126. Id. at 567-68, 108 S. Ct. at 2551.
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which no one ... suggests is applicable-there simply is no accepted stopping
place, no ledge that can hold the anchor for steady and consistent judicial
behavior."'27  In other words, asking the courts to apply such a vague and
uncertain standard as "more than mere reasonableness" invites arbitrary and
subjective judgment as each court struggles to identify what qualifies as further
justification, just above and slightly more than what would satisfy a reasonable
person. In an exercise of practical wisdom, the Court settled upon the measure of
reasonableness as the proper interpretation of "substantial justification" under the
EAJA because the fixed meaning associated with this standard better assures
"steady and consistent judicial behavior."'2
Accordingly, in Pierce v. Underwood, the Supreme Court established the
general definition of "substantially justified" as meaning that the government's
position, both in its underlying conduct and in its litigation posture, must have a
"reasonable basis both in law and fact.' 29 As the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit explained in Hanover Potato Products, Inc. v. Shalala,30 the
government has the burden of showing that there is (1) a reasonable basis in truth
for the facts alleged; (2) a reasonable basis in law for the theory it propounded; and
(3) a reasonable connection between the facts alleged and the legal theory
advanced.' This inquiry requires the adjudicator to re-evaluate the merits of the
case from the standpoint, not of correctness or validity, but of substantial
justification and reasonableness.
C. "Substantial Justification" and the Merits
1. Introduction-The Relationship Between the "Substantial
Justification" Inquiry and the Court Decision on the Merits
The "substantial justification" inquiry focuses upon the merits of the
government's underlying conduct and its posture in litigation.' That the
127. Id. at 568, 108 S. CL at 2551.
128. Id., 108 S. Ct. at 2551. See also Sharon G. Cheney & Cecilia S. Howard, Pierce v.
Underwood. Equal Access to Justice Act-Standards Defined by the High Court, 40 Mercer L. Rev.
1001, 1020 (1989) (explaining Pierce v. Underwood as holding that "no other test [than reasonable-
ness] is acceptable because no other test is workable"). Justice Brennan, in a concurring opinion
joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun, disagreed with the Court's adoption of the reasonableness
standard and instead argued that "substantial justification" "connotes a solid position, or a position
with a firm foundation." Pierce, 487 U.S. at 577, 108 S. Ct. at 2556 (Brennan, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment). In response to the Court's argument about administration of a
different standard than reasonableness, Justice Brennan stated that the fact "it may be less 'anchored'
than 'the test of reasonableness,' a debatable proposition, is no excuse to abandon the test Congress
enacted." Id. at 579, 108 S. Ct. at 2556.
129. Id. at 565, 108 S. Ct. at 2550.
130. 989 F.2d 123 (3d Cir. 1993).
131. Id. at 128.
132. See supra section IV.A (discussing meaning of the "position of the United States').
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government is defeated on the merits' does not raise any presumption that the
government's unsuccessful position was without "substantial justification."' 34
The substantial justification test requires a fresh look at the case, looking through
the ruling on the merits to divine the essential reasonableness, or lack thereof, of
the government's decision to take an action and pursue or defend it in court.
However, appreciating that 'the substantial justification analysis cannot be
collapsed into the earlier ruling on the merits does not mean that the two are
separate and distinct inquiries, nor does it mean that the nature of the decision on
the merits will not sometimes lead directly to a finding of want of "substantial
justification" under EAJA. In sum, contrary to the suggestions of some circuit
courts as discussed below,' the "substantial justification" inquiry is not an
independent investigation to be held separate and apart from the earlier ruling on
the merits. The test of reasonableness necessarily begins with a review of the
court's decision on the merits and the reasons for ruling against the government.
Moreover, when the standard forjudicial review on the merits parallels the standard
of reasonableness for an EAJA award, the inquiries frequently "will overlap and the
answers coincide."' 3 6 Avoiding the error of conflating together the merits and
"substantial justification" should not lead us into the equal error of divorcing the
reasonableness evaluation from the court's reasoning on the underlying merits.
2. The "Substantial Justification" Inquiry Requires a Fresh Look at the
Merits
In an early EAJA decision, Spencer v. National Labor Relations Board,'
the District of Columbia Circuit chose a narrow interpretation of the "position of
the United States" in the EAJA, reading the statute as confining the "substantial
justification" analysis to an evaluation of the government's litigating position. The
Spencer court was concerned that identifying the government's position for the
EAJA analysis as including underlying conduct would result in an automatic award
of fees in certain categories of cases, such as rationality review of an agency
decision under the Administrative Procedure Act. 3 To illustrate its concern, the
court suggested that "a court that has just concluded that the agency's action was
'arbitrary and capricious' would be hard pressed to rule that its action was
133. See supra section Il.B (discussing eligibility requirement that party seeking fee award have
prevailed in the case).
134. United States v. One Parcel of Real Property, 960 F.2d 200, 208 (1st Cir. 1992) ("[t]he fact
that the government settles a case on unfavorable terms, or loses at trial, does not create a
presumption that it operated without substantial justification").
135. See infra section IV.C.3.
136. One Parcel of Real Property, 960 F.2d at 209.
137. 712 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 936, 104 S. Ct. 1908 (1984).
138. Spencer, 712 F.2d at 553 (stating that if the "position of the United States" were defined
as including the government's underlying conduct, then "the EAJA would... become something
approaching an automatic fee-shifting provision for a significant category of cases').
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nevertheless 'substantially justified.""'39 The court feared that in cases where the
standard on the merits is similar to the standard of "substantial justification" for
EAJA fees, the ruling on the merits would automatically lead to a fee award. The
Spencer court believed this result would "contravene Congress's intent to adopt an
'intermediate' standard for the EAJA. Therefore, the position of the United States
must be limited to the government's litigation position."'
4
In the 1985 re-enactment of the EAJA, Congress clarified the "position of the
United States" and specifically defined it to include both underlying conduct and
litigation position.' 4 ' Thus, by direct amendment of the statutory language,
Congress expressed its intent that the merits of the underlying government action
be examined as part of the substantial justification inquiry. The House Judiciary
Committee report on the bill suggested that Congress had gone further and intended
to adopt precisely the scenario that the Spencer court had so strenuously resisted.
The House report contains the following language:
Agency action found to be arbitrary or capricious and unsupported by
substantial evidence is virtually certain not to have been substantially
justified under the Act. Only the most extraordinary special circum-
stances could permit such an action to be found to be substantially
justified under the Act. 42
However, this committee report language is of dubious validity for inferring
the intent of Congress."3 During the floor debates in 1985, leaders of the
committees and subcommittees that had reviewed the bill and who were shepherd-
ing the legislation on the floor took pains to disassociate themselves from the report
statement.'" Representative Kastenmaier stated explicitly that the "substantial
justification standard is a different standard than the substantial evidence standard.
The Government may still prove that the position it took was substantially
139. Id. at 552.
140. John J. Sullivan, Note, The Equal Access to Justice Act in the Federal Courts, 84 Colum.
L. Rev. 1089, 1106 (1984) (describing Spencer decision).
141. Pub. L. No. 99-80, § 2(c)(2), 99 Stat. 183, 185 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2412(dX2)(D)
(1988)). See supra section IV.A (discussing meaning of the "position of the United States").
142. H.R. Rep. No. 120, 99th Cong, 1st Sess. 9-10 (1985), reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 132,
138.
143. One court has characterized this committee report as having "the markings of a rogue
elephant." Federal Election Comm'n v. Rose, 806 F.2d 1081, 1089 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
144. In signing the bill, President Reagan also stated:
[I]t is my understanding in signing this bill that the Congress recognized the important
distinction between the substantial justification standard in the fee proceeding and a
court's finding on the merits that an agency action was arbitrary and capricious or not
supported by substantial evidence. The substantial justification standard is a different
standard, and an easier one to meet, than either the arbitrary and capricious standard or
substantial evidence standard. A separate inquiry is required to determine whether,
notwithstanding the fact that the Government did not prevail, the Government's position
or action was substantially justified.
Extension of the Equal Access to Justice Act, 21 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 966, 967 (Aug. 5, 1985).
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justified."14 Senator Thurmond also rejected the view that reversal of an agency
decision on judicial review would lead automatically to the award of fees, saying
that "there could be cases where an agency loses on the merits," but "no attorney
fees would be awarded because the Government was substantially justified."'"
In sum, at least this part of the House Report was "apparently [a] staff-produced bit
of 'history."" ' 47 Finally, in Pierce v. Underwood,48 the Supreme Court refused
to lend weight to other language in this same House Report 49 that purported to
define "substantialjustification" as meaning something more than mere reasonable-
ness. 1
5 0
As discussed in detail below, the House Report language overstates and
oversimplifies the correlation of a court's ruling on the merits with the substantial
justification analysis. Although the justifiability of the government's position
obviously depends upon an examination of the underlying merits, the standard for
prevailing on the merits and the standard of substantial justification often diverge.
Even when the standard on the merits appears superficially to converge with a
standard of reasonableness, the court must be careful to ensure that the convergence
is real and not merely apparent.
For example, courts have explained that an adverse decision to an agency
under the arbitrary and capricious standard ofjudicial review is not invariably the
equivalent of a finding that the agency's position lacked a rational basis. In Federal
Election Commission v. Rose,' the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit observed:
Under the APA, ajudicial labeling of an agency's action as "arbitrary
and capricious" sets forth a legal conclusion. It is a standard against
which courts measure all manner of governmental actions, some of which
may represent reasonable policy choices but suffer from some defect in
crafting or execution.... For example, an agency action accompanied by
an inadequate explanation constitutes arbitrary and capricious conduct....
A determination that an agency made a decision without considering a
relevant factor leads to condemning the decision as "arbitrary and capri-
cious."... In short, the "arbitrary and capricious" label is just that, a
145. 131 Cong. Rec. H4,763 (daily ed. June 24, 1985).
146. 131 Cong. Rec. S9,993 (daily ed. July 24, 1985). However, not every leader in the effort
to re-enact the EAJA thoroughly rejected the idea that defeat for the government on the merits of an
agency review action may be suggestive of the absence of substantial justification for its position.
Senator Grassley stated that "in the case of an arbitrary and capricious finding, I believe the plain
meaning of the words strongly suggest that the Government was not substantially justified." 131
Cong. Rec. S9,993 (daily ed. July 25, 1985).
147. Rose, 806 F.2d at 1090.
148. 487 U.S. 552, 108 S. Ct. 2541 (1988).
149. H.R. Rep. No. 120, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1985), reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 132,
138.
150. Pierce, 487 U.S. at 566-68, 108 S. Ct. at 2550-51. See supra section IV.B (discussing the
meaning of "substantial justification" and the Pierce decision).
151. 806 F.2d 1081 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
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label or conclusion applied to a rich variety of agency conduct, including
sensible but legally flawed actions as well as outrageous ones. "152
However, that the arbitrary and capricious standard of review may mask a
more sophisticated or multi-faceted assessment of the merits must not blind us to
the fact that in some cases the label means what it says-that the agency has acted
in an unreasonable manner.' As Senator Grassley said during the floor debate
on the final passage of the re-enactment.of the EAJA, "where the agency action is
found by a court to be arbitrary and capricious or where there is little or no factual
support for the agency action, the Government-as a practical matter-has its work
cut out for it to prove substantial justification."'' 54  A principal purpose of the
EAJA is to effect regulatory reform and to encourage government agencies "to be
as careful as possible in the exercise of [their] regulatory powers.' An
agency's regulatory action that is set aside on the merits because it could not
withstand basic rationality review is precisely that form of unjustified governmental
conduct for which the EAJA was designed to provide a remedy in the form of
attorney's fees." 6
The requirement that the court look beyond standard of review labels to
evaluate the actual basis for the decision on the merits should work both ways. In
civil forfeiture cases, the fact that the government is initially held to have "probable
cause" to seize property may establish threshold justification.3 7 However,
152. Id. at 1087-89; see also Griffon v. United States Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 832 F.2d
51, 52 (5th Cir. 1987) (quoting Rose); Sierra Club v. Secretary of Army, 820 F.2d 513, 517 n.4 (1st
Cir. 1987) (quoting Rose).
153. See Rose, 806 F.2d at 1089 ("To be sure, other reasons for invalidating agency action as
'arbitrary and capricious' seem more likely... to signal conduct that is not 'substantially justified.').
154. 131 Cong. Rec. S9,993 (daily ed. July 24, 1985).
155. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 703 F.2d
700, 710 (3d Cir. 1983). See supra section I.B.3 (discussing the purposes of the EAJA, including
congressional intent to refine the administration of federal law and "help assure that administrative
decisions reflect informed deliberation" (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1980),
reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4984, 4991)).
156. Moreover, when the government is already shielded by a protective standard of review on
the merits, such as rational basis review of administrative decisions, there is little danger that
subsequent imposition of an attorney's fee award based on lack of substantial justification will over-
deter agencies from vigorous enforcement of the law. When an official or agency making a decision
is aware that the decision will not be set aside on the merits unless it is unreasonable, the additional
possibility of an EAJA fee award if the decision is found unreasonable is unlikely to weigh heavily
or at all upon the decisionmaker in choosing a course. See Harold J. Krent, Fee Shifing Under the
Equal Access to Justice Act-A Qualified Success, 11 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 458, 500 (1993) (stating
that, since "the substantial evidence standard creates a safe harbor" for administrative determinations
of Social Security benefits "at the margins of the statutory standards," "[o]fficials who determine
eligibility for benefits should not be chilled by the prospect of fees from making close calls because
they are protected by a deferential standard of review").
157. United States v. One 1985 Chevrolet Corvette, 914 F.2d 804, 809 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding
that, because 'substantially justified' and 'probable cause' are standards which require reasonable-
ness," when "the government established probable cause in the forfeiture proceeding, its position was
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probable cause is not necessarily conclusive on the question of whether the
government's position throughout the forfeiture proceeding remains substantially
justified. For example, in United States v. $12,248 U.S. Currency,"'8 the court
recognized that the government may have had probable cause to seize currency
found at the scene of a drug arrest, but intervening developments destroyed the
continued reasonableness of the government's position. The owner of the currency
pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance, but established that the funds
seized were not related to any drug transactions and instead were the partial
proceeds of a loan from a city program to renovate his home.159 The government
delayed unduly in instituting and prosecuting the forfeiture proceeding and failed
to investigate whether the currency had an innocent source. 6" The four year
delay by the government, without explanation, was held to be a violation of
constitutional due process because the owner was deprived of his property for an
unreasonable period of time.' 6' Moreover, after being apprised of the claim of
an innocent source for the funds, the government failed to take even minimal steps
to verify the explanation. 62 Thus, the reasonableness of the initial seizure,
confirmed by the finding of probable cause for the forfeiture, did not necessarily
mean that the government's position throughout the case remained reasonable.'63
A fresh look at the merits, including subsequent developments, is necessary to
determine whether the government's position remained continually justified or
instead whether it is subject to an award of fees under the EAJA.
substantially justified"). But see United States v. One Parcel of Real Property, 960 F.2d 200, 208
(Ist Cir. 1992) ("eschew[ing] a blanket rule that, in a forfeiture proceeding, a finding of probable
cause is necessarily conclusive on the question of whether the seizure itself was substantially
justified"). For a critical view of court applications of the EAJA to civil forfeiture cases as failing
to adequately protect the interests of innocent owners whose property has been seized by the
government, see generally Claudio Riedi, Comment, To Shift or to Shaft: Attorney Fees for
Prevailing Claimants in Civil Forfeiture Suits, 47 U. Miami L. Rev. 147, 186-89 (1992).
158. 957 F.2d 1513 (9th Cir. 1991).
159. Id. at 1515-16.
160. Id. at 1517.
161. Id. at 1517-19. In United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492
(1993), the Supreme Court ruled that a government action for forfeiture of property was timely if
filed within the statute of limitations. Id. at 505-07. Although the Court's decision was solely one
of statutory interpretation, the Court's emphasis upon the sufficiency of government compliance with
the statute of limitations, even if the government failed to comply with other statutory timing
directives, suggests that an action filed within the limitations period would not constitute a due
process violation. See id. However, the Ninth Circuit's decision in $12.248 U.S. Currency was
based not only upon the government's delay but also upon the government's failure to investigate
the innocent source of the seized funds. $12,248 U.S. Currency, 957 F.2d at 1517-19.
162. $12,248 U.S. Currency, 957 F.2d at 1518-19.
163. Compare United States v. Parcels of Property, 9 F.3d 1000, 1006-07 (1st Cir. 1993)
(holding both that the government had probable cause as of the institution of forfeiture proceedings
and that the government's persistence in seeking forfeiture during the litigation was also justified, as
there was .'no intervening evidence that might have given the government pause over whether to
continue onward with the case").
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3. The "Substantial Justification" Inquiry Cannot Be Artificially
Divorced From the Basis for the Merits Decision
An application for fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act requires the court
to take a new look at the merits, by drawing a distinction between adverse rulings
grounded in unreasonable government positions and adverse rulings that simply
reflect a disagreement with the government's position. In taking this fresh look at
the merits, however, courts must be wary of artificially divorcing the "substantial
justification" inquiry from the basis for the adverse decision on the merits. By
amending the EAJA specifically to require the courts to evaluate the substantial
justification of "the action or failure to act by the agency upon which the civil
action is based,""' Congress plainly intended to preclude such an attempt to
disassociate the underlying merits of the case from the EAJA inquiry.
65
To prevent the "substantial justification" analysis from collapsing into the
merits decision and resulting in "automatic" fee-shifting, some courts have unduly
emphasized the discrete nature of the inquiries. Courts must avoid falling prey to
the fallacy that the EAJA requires a "separate" or "independent" analysis from the
determination on the merits, or that such a "separate" or "independent" inquiry may
support a fmding of substantial justification even if the court had ruled on the
merits that the government's conduct was unreasonable.'66 If the standard on the
merits is truly one of reasonableness, then how can an adverse decision to the
government not be regarded as the equivalent of a finding of want of substantial
justification under the EAJA? Is reasonableness so variable in meaning that the
government's conduct can be castigated as untenable on the merits but defended as
substantially justified when the fee request is considered? Isn't this talking out of
both sides of the mouth?
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has held that
reasonableness under the EAJA must be assessed in a disparate manner from
reasonableness on the merits, saying: "As Emerson said of nature, reasonableness
'is a mutable cloud, which is always and never the same."" 67 The court did not
explain what it meant by this allusion, nor did it explain how a court could declare
an agency's action unreasonable on the merits and then in the next breath acquit the
government of a fee-shifting obligation on the grounds that its position was
164. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(D) (1988).
165. Cf Spencer v. NLRB, 712 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (in a decision prior to 1984
amendment to the EAJA, the court recognized that defining the "position of the United States" to
include underlying government conduct would mean that the standard for review on the merits would
sometimes correspond with the substantial justification inquiry under EAJA), cert. denied, 466 U.S.
936, 104 S. Ct. 1908 (1984).
166. See Lousiana ex rel. Guste v. Lee, 853 F.2d 1219, 1222 (5th Cir. 1988) (stating that the
EAJA determination requires a "separate analysis" from the merits); Federal Election Comm'n v.
Rose, 806 F.2d 1081, 1087 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (holding that the standard for determining whether to
award fees under the EAJA is "separate and distinct from whatever legal standards governed the
merits phase of the case," and that the EAJA inquiry requires "an independent evaluation").
167. Sierra Club v. Secretary of Army, 820 F.2d 513, 517 (1st Cir. 1987).
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reasonable. To the contrary, the standard of reasonableness is a rather constant
measure and one that was adopted in the EAJA context precisely because of its
familiarity and the considerable experience that the legal system had amassed in its
application. The Supreme Court settled upon the measure of reasonableness as the
proper interpretation of "substantial justification" under the EAJA in part because
the fixed meaning associated with this standard is a means of assuring "steady and
consistent judicial behavior."'
Absurd and arbitrary results follow from viewing reasonableness as a
"mutable cloud," because this malleability of a crucial concept allows a court to
characterize as substantially justified the very governmental conduct that earlier
was rejected as unreasonable. In Pullen v. Bowen, 69 the Fourth Circuit
considered the case of a claimant who had obtained a court-ordered award of
disability benefits under the Social Security Act.' 70 The agency had denied her
claim for benefits, stating that the claimant's panic and anxiety attacks, in
addition to her low IQ, did not impose significant work-related limitations.171
The district court reversed, finding that her anxiety attacks did amount to a
significant limitation and that the agency's denial of benefits was not supported
by substantial evidence. 72 The claimant then requested and was denied an
award of fees under the EAJA.17 3
On the claimant's appeal from the denial of attorney's fees, the Fourth
Circuit held that "fee shifting [under the EAJA] is not automatic and the reversal
of an agency for lack of substantial evidence does not raise a presumption that
the agency was not substantially justified."'74 The court then proceeded to
hold that the agency, despite having been reversed on substantial evidence
review, "could reasonably have found that [the claimant's] panic and anxiety
attacks did not impose an additional and significant work-related limitation. '75
168. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 568, 108 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (1988) (rejecting a "more
than mere reasonableness" test for the EAJA as "out of accord with prior usage" and, in contrast with
the test of reasonableness, leaving "no ledge that can hold the anchor for steady and consistent
judicial behavior"). See supra section IV.B (discussing meaning of "substantial justification" and the
decision in Pierce).
169. 820 F.2d 105 (4th Cir. 1987).
170. Id. at 106.
171. Id. at 107.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 108; see also Sotelo-Acuije v. Slattery, 62 F.3d 54, 58 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding,
without further explanation, that "there is no congruence between the 'substantial evidence' standard
and the 'substantially justified' standard'); Hadden v. Bowen, 851 F.2d 1266, 1267-69 (10th Cir.
1988) (rejecting equation of lack of substantial evidence with lack of substantial justification under
the EAJA). But see Herron v. Bowen, 788 F.2d 1127, 1132 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that since "[tIhe
crux of the substantial justification standard is reasonableness" and that substantial evidence on the
merits is such evidence that is "relevant and sufficient for a reasonable mind to accept as adequate
to support a conclusion," then the absence of evidentiary support for the agency's decision in the
record demonstrated an absence of justification for the government's position).
175. Pullen, 820 F.2d at 109.
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This holding is unavoidably in conflict with the district court's decision on the
merits. If the agency indeed "reasonably" found that the claimant suffered from
no significant work-related limitation, then the district court should not have
reversed and ordered the payment of benefits.
The scope ofjudicial review over the agency's decision on a disability claim
is controlled by the Social Security Act, which provides that the findings of the
agency "as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclu-
sive. ' 76 "Substantial evidence," as the Supreme Court has held, "means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion."' 7 It is the province of the agency to resolve any conflicts in the
evidence and to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence. 78 As Professor
Kenneth Culp Davis has explained, "[u]nder 'substantial evidence' the test is
whether a reasonable person could draw the conclusion reached, and a finding
can be clearly wrong without being unreasonable."'79  In sum, substantial
evidence is a very deferential standard which allows reversal only if no
reasonable person could have sustained the agency's conclusion.
In the Pullen case, the Fourth Circuit held that the agency's denial of
benefits was substantially justified, notwithstanding the reversal of that
administrative decision for want of substantial evidence. The court noted that the
nature of the claimant's problem "proved elusive," that the diagnoses of the
treating physicians indicated the anxiety was mild, that a reporting physician
concluded that her "complaints stemmed from her attempt to obtain medication
and disability benefits," and that the anxiety attacks were infrequent and not of
undue severity." ° The Fourth Circuit thereby provided a catalog of reasons
why the district court should have deferred to the agency's denial of benefits
under the substantial evidence standard of review.
The Fourth Circuit concluded its decision in Pullen by saying:
[The claimant's] case was not an easy one. It required government
attorneys and an administrative law judge to make difficult judgments
on the evidence. We agree with the district court that an award of
176. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1988). Under the Social Security Independence and Program Improve-
ments Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-296, § 101, 108 Stat. 1464, 1465 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 901), the Social Security disability programs are now administered by the Social Security
Administration as an independent agency in the executive branch.
177. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S. Ct. 1420, 1427 (1971); Consolidated
Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S. Ct. 206, 217 (1938).
178. Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 856, 102 S. Ct. 2182,
2189 (1982) (stating that "[d]etermining the weight and credibility of the evidence is the special
province of the trier of fact"); see also Crum v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 642, 644 (6th Cir. 1990)
(establishing that in a Social Security disability case, "[t]he Secretary, and not the court, is charged
with the duty to weigh the evidence, to resolve material conflicts in the testimony, and to determine
the case accordingly"); Wheeler v. Heckler, 784 F.2d 1073, 1074-75 (11th Cir. 1986) (same).
179. II Kenneth'C. Davis & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law § 11.2, at 174-75 (3d ed.
1994).
180. Pullen, 820 F.2d at 109.
1995]
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
benefits to [the claimant] was appropriate. We likewise agree with the
district court that its reversal on the merits did not mandate an award
of attorney's fees.18'
Logically, the court's two conclusions cannot co-exist.8 2 The court's artificial
insistence upon separating the merits and the "substantial justification" inquiries
led it to the contradictory conclusion that an agency decision set aside as
unreasonable was nonetheless substantially justified.'
The Pullen court's insistence that the standard of "substantial evidence" on
the merits be strictly separated from the standard of "substantial justification" on
the EAJA inquiry is particularly ironic. In Pierce v. Underwood,'8 4 the
Supreme Court expressly cited the example of the "substantial evidence" standard
in support of its conclusion that the term "substantial justification" may be
understood as meaning "not 'justified to a high degree,' but rather 'justified in
substance or in the main'-that is, justified to a degree that could satisfy a
reasonable person."'8 5  As "guidance" for the adoption of a reasonableness
standard for the EAJA, the Court observed that the "substantial evidence"
standard for judicial review of agency action "does not mean a large or
considerable amount of evidence, but rather 'such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."" 86  Thus,
the Supreme Court plainly understood that "reasonable" means reasonable in any
context.
181. Id. at 109-10.
182. See James R. Cromwell, A Substantial Paradox: Attorney's Fees Under the Equal Access
to Justice Act in Social Security Appeal, 7 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 355, 387 (1984) (stating that
when a court has reversed an agency determination on substantial evidence grounds and then denied
EAJA fees on the basis that there is some evidence to support the government's position, "either the
decision of the court on the merits of the appeal [from the agency] or on the denial of attorney's fees
may be questioned").
183. In Cummings v. Sullivan, 950 F.2d 492 (7th Cir. 1991), the court also insisted that
"substantial evidence" and "substantial justification" are "two different legal standards of review...
which are used at different stages and involve different tests." Id. at 498. However, the court then
proceeded to define both standards as measured by reasonableness, without explaining how one
measure differed from the other. Id. In any event, the court observed that the agency's denial of
social security benefits had not been reversed for lack of substantial evidence, but rather was
remanded solely for consideration of new evidence raised on judicial review. Id. at 498-99. In sum,
the Cummings case, in contrast with Pullen, did not involve the application of a rational basis form
of review on the merits nor a corresponding determination that the government's decision must be
set aside on the merits because it lacked a reasonable foundation.
184. 487 U.S. 552, 108 S. Ct. 2541 (1988).
185. Id. at 564-65, 108 S. Ct. at 2550.
186. Id., 108 S. Ct. at 2550 (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59
S. Ct. 206, 217 (1938)); see also Herron v. Bowen, 788 F.2d 1127, 1132 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding
that since "[t]he crux of the substantial justification standard is reasonableness" and that substantial
evidence on the merits is such evidence that is "'relevant and sufficient for a reasonable mind to
accept as adequate to support a conclusion,"' then the absence of evidentiary support in the record
for the agency's decision demonstrated an absence of justification for the government's position).
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Judge Ruggero Aldisert has explained in common-sense terms why EAJA
fees ordinarily should be forthcoming when the government fails to satisfy the
reasonableness test:
If the claimant wins because a court determines as a matter of law that
there was not substantial evidence, there can be no gradations to his or
her victory. I cannot parse this legal determination in metaphysical
terms. I do not find myself able to say, for example, that in given
cases, there was almost substantial evidence, but we cannot find it, or
that the question is close but we decide that the evidence was not there,
or that only a wee bit of the evidence existed, but not enough. The
legal profession and our judicial tradition are disserved when a court's
analysis begins with a lack of evidence determination and then proceeds
by rationalization, and not ratiocination, to try to explain when the
claimant may or may not obtain attorney's fees.'
Of course, a Social Security disability determination may be reversed for
reasons other than the court's conclusion that the denial of benefits is not
reasonably supported by the evidence. Just as the "arbitrary and capricious"
standard encompasses more than mere rationality review, the "substantial
evidence" standard also includes more than assessment of the evidence in the
light of reasonableness. The court may conclude that while substantial evidence
exists to support the denial of benefits, the agency decision inadequately reflects
that all the evidence was considered or given appropriate weight. In such
instances, the court instead of reversing will remand to the agency for further
consideration.'
For example, in Stein v. Sullivan,'"9 the Seventh Circuit held that a remand
of a disability case to the agency so that it could articulate more completely its
assessment of the evidence did not require a conclusion that the agency's
position was without "substantial justification.' '"90 Similarly, in Williams v.
Bowen,' 9' the Ninth Circuit upheld a denial of EAJA fees when a disability
case was remanded to the agency for failure to properly weigh conflicting
evidence and make credibility findings. 2 These remands were procedural
187. Washington v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 959, 969 (3d Cir. 1985) (Aldisert, C.J., concurring).
188. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1988) ("The court shall have power to enter ... a judgment
affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Secretary, with or without remanding the cause
for a rehearing."). A case may be remanded to the agency as well for the consideration of new
evidence, a determination on the merits that hardly constitutes a condemnation of the government's
original position as unsupported by substantial evidence or unreasonable in nature. Id. See, e.g.,
Cummings v. Sullivan, 950 F.2d 492 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that government's position was
substantially justified notwithstanding remand of Social Security benefits case to agency for
consideration of new evidence and ultimate award of benefits at administrative level).
189. 966 F.2d 317 (7th Cir. 1992).
190. Id. at 319-20.
191. 966 F.2d 1259 (9th Cir. 1991).
192. Id. at 1261.
1995]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
only. In Stein, the court qualified its ruling by saying it was not holding that the
agency's denial of benefits was without support in the evidence.'93 In Wil-
liams, the court observed that some evidence did support the denial of bene-
fits.1
94
At the same time, the fact of a remand without a court judgment awarding
benefits does not necessarily mean that the government's position was justi-
fied.'95 The answer to that question depends upon a searching review of the
reasons for the remand-did the agency unreasonably disregard evidence, did the
agency violate clear court precedent concerning the weight to be given to
evidence, did the agency unreasonably fail to provide a coherent rationale for its
decision, etc."'
4. The "Substantial Justification" Inquiry and the Basis for the Decision
on the Merits are Interrelated
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit properly
recognized the interdependence of the EAJA inquiry and the decision on the
merits in Federal Election Commission v. Political Contributions Data, Inc. 97
In that case, the Federal Election Commission had brought an enforcement action
to enjoin a private company from selling reports analyzing contributions to
federal election campaigns.' 98 The Commission alleged that the company's
activity violated a federal election law prohibiting the use of contributor
information for commercial purposes.'" In an earlier ruling on the merits, the
Second Circuit rejected the Commission's allegations by holding that the
1
193. Stein, 966 F.2d at 320.
194. Williams, 966 F.2d at 1261.
195. This assumes, of course, that a remand of a Social Security disability case to the agency,
without an award of benefits, is a sufficient victory to make the plaintiff a prevailing party eligible
for a fee award. The Supreme Court has so indicated. Shalala v. Schaefer, 113 S. Ct. 2625, 2631-32
(1993) (holding that a Social Security claimant who obtains a judgment reversing the denial of
benefits and remanding the case to the administration becomes a prevailing party'at the time of the
court judgment, notwithstanding that an actual award of benefits will not occur without further
administrative proceedings on remand). See supra section III.A.2b (discussing prevailing party status
in the context of government benefit programs in general and Social Security claims in particular).
196. See, e.g., Flores v. Shalala, 49 F.3d 562, 570-71 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that agency was
not substantially justified in Social Security case in defending administrative law judge's failure to
consider report documenting claimant's cognitive limitations, which the court characterized as "clear
error" under circuit precedent); Williams v. Bowen, 966 F.2d 1259 (9th Cit. 1991) (ruling by majority
upholding district court's denial of EAJA fees in Social Security disability case despite remand for
failure of agency to properly weigh conflicting evidence and make credibility findings, while dissent
would have found that government's denial of benefits was not substantially justified because the
agency selectively disregarded undisputed evidence).
197. 995 F.2d 383 (2d Cit. 1993) (Political Contributions Data I), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1064
(1994).
198. Federal Election Comm'n v. Political Contributions Data, Inc., 943 F.2d 190, 191-94 (2d
Cir. 1991) (Political Contributions Data 1).
199. Id. at 193-94; Political Contributions Data If, 995 F.2d at 384.
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commercial purpose limitation was restricted to use of contribution information
for purposes of solicitation.0 0 The court ruled that the Commission's enforce-
ment litigation was premised upon an unreasonable interpretation of the statute
and of its own corresponding regulation.2"'
When the prevailing party then applied for fees under EAJA, the Second
Circuit held that the reasoning of the court on the merits-that the Commission
had failed to provide a reasonable interpretation of the statute and regula-
tion--conclusively established that the government's position was not substantial-
ly justified.2 2 Because "the legal standards which governed the merits phase
of this litigation are precisely those to be applied to the EAJA question," the
court held "that the earlier panel's careful analysis of the government's position
allows no further consideration of this issue."2 3 The Second Circuit correctly
recognized that true rational basis review on the merits speaks directly to the
question of "substantial justification" when the EAJA issue later arises.2"'
Nevertheless, one judge dissented in the Political Contributions Data
case.20 5 Judge Jacobs acknowledged that "[t]he Commission lost its claim on
the merits-in the only way it could lose on the merits of that claim-upon a
finding that it adopted an unreasonable interpretation of' the statute and
regulation.2"o Nevertheless, he argued that the EAJA inquiry is an historical
one--"whether it was unreasonable for the Commission to litigate the reasonable-
ness of its statutory interpretation.""2 7
There are two flaws in the dissent's analysis. First, the EAJA inquiry
requires us to consider not merely whether it was reasonable to litigate a question
(the government's litigating position), but also whether the government's
underlying position on the merits was reasonable. If the government's
underlying interpretation of the statute which led to its enforcement action is
determined to be unreasonable, then substantial justification is wanting regardless
200. Political Contributions Data , 943 F.2d at 194-98.
201. Id. at 196-97.
202. Political Contributions Data I, 995 F.2d at 386-87.
203. Id. at 386. But see Sotelo-Acuije v. Slattery, 62 F.3d 54, 58 (2d Cir. 1995) (viewing
Political Contributions Data as a narrow precedent involving the "unusual" situation in which the
legal standards applying to the merits were precisely those to be applied to the EAJA inquiry, and
further declaring, without explanation, that the substantial evidence standard applied to the merits is
not the same as the substantial justification standard applied to the EAJA inquiry).
204. See also Estate of Smith v. O'Halloran, 930 F.2d 1496, 1501-02 (10th Cir. 1991) (ruling
that earlier decision on the merits that agency had "abdicated" its duty and that its failure to follow
the statute was arbitrary and capricious was then binding upon the court in the EAJA proceeding and
established that the government's position was not substantially justified); Herron v. Bowen, 788 F.2d
1127, 1132 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that since "[the crux of the substantial justification standard is
reasonableness," the conclusion that the agency's decision was not supported by substantial evidence
demonstrated the absence of justification for the government's position).
205. Political Contributions Data 11, 995 F.2d at 387-88 (Jacobs, J., dissenting) (emphasis in
original).




of whether the decision to litigate the unreasonable position is itself also
unreasonable. If the government's underlying adoption of an interpretation of the
statute and regulation was unreasonable, the government may not escape a fee
award by arguing that it was nonetheless reasonable in hoping that it could
convince a court otherwise. It appears that the dissenting judge's contrary view
on the EAJA inquiry may reflect his doubts about the validity of the earlier
unreasonableness ruling on the merits. He suggests that while the merits panel
may have determined the Commission's interpretation of the statute was
mistaken, "that result was not a foregone conclusion."2 8  But the merits
panel's holding that the Commission's interpretation of the statute was
unreasonable is simply another way of saying that the result was indeed "a
foregone conclusion." If reasonable minds could differ as to the proper
interpretation of the statute, then the court should have deferred to the Commiss-
ion's position on the merits.2 °9
208. Id. at 387-88.
209. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-45,
104 S. Ct. 2778, 2782-84 (1984) (upholding principle of deference to administrative interpretations
of a statutory scheme if the agency's determination "is based on a permissible construction of the
statute," that is, if the agency's choice "represents a reasonable accommodation of conflicting
policies"). However, with respect to the Chevron doctrine of deference to reasonable agency
statutory constructions, it must be emphasized that the reversal of an agency's interpretation of a
statute should not lead ineluctably to a finding of lack of substantial justification for purposes of an
EAJA award. Although there is a rationality review element to the Chevron doctrine, it is confined
to the second part of the inquiry directed in that decision. Chevron set forth a two-step test for
review of an administrative agency's implementation of a statutory provision and only step two
establishes a straightforward reasonableness inquiry. Id. at 842-44, 104 S. Ct. at 2781-83. If an
agency loses a case under step two after the court has found a statute was indeed "silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue," id. at 843, 104 S. Ct. at 2782, but nevertheless
concludes that the agency selected an interpretation beyond the bounds of reasonableness, then want
of "substantial justification" for EAJA purposes seems an unavoidable conclusion.
However, under the first step of the Chevron analysis, the court must ask whether the statute is
sufficiently ambiguous to leave any room for agency discretion. Id. at 842-43, 104 S. Ct. at 2781
("If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency,
must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress."). On this threshold question
of "whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue," the answer may depend
on the theory of statutory interpretation or the tools of construction adopted by the reviewing court.
Id. at 842, 104 S. Ct. at 2781. With the revival of a textualist approach to interpretation championed
by United States Supreme Court Justice Scalia, Nicholas Zeppos has colorfully described "the entire
Chevron step-one landscape [as] a major intellectual battlefield over theories of statutory
interpretation." Nicholas S. Zeppos, Judicial Review of Agency Action: The Problems of
Commitment, Non-Contractibility, and the Proper Incentives, 44 Duke L.J. 1133, 1136 (1995).
The consequence is uncertainty about the outcome of difficult statutory interpretation questions.
Textualists, who focus upon language and structure, together with the use of objective canons of
construction to fix statutory meaning, may be more likely to find "that the meaning of a statute is
apparent from its text and from its relationship with other laws," leaving no "agency-liberating
ambiguity" to trigger Chevron deference. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative
Interpretations of Law, 1989 Duke LJ. 511, 521. But see Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the
Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 Wash. U. L.Q. 351, 370 (1994) (contending the argument "that
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Second, except in cases where the law has been uncertain and its meaning
is solidifying through court decisions over time, it is not meaningful to
characterize the EAJA inquiry as an "historical" analysis. The fact that a court
naturally does not pronounce the government's position as unreasonable until it
issues its decision on the merits does not necessarily mean that the government's
position was reasonable prior to that point in time. In Pierce v. Underwood,"'
the Supreme Court held that the EAJA inquiry was an "historical" one requiring
the Court to consider "not what the law now is, but what the Government was
substantially justified in believing it to have been." '' However, the Pierce
Court was merely observing that an appellate court faced with review of an
EAJA determination after a merits appeal must evaluate the reasonableness of the
government's position in the prior context before it was contrary to the precedent
textualism constrains judicial discretion and hence reduces the number of occasions when reference
to agency views is appropriate" under Chevron remains unproven). Alternative approaches to
statutory interpretation may be more flexible, involve resort to extrinsic materials such as legislative
history, or be amenable to evolving understandings of a statutory provision, thereby enhancing the
opportunities for agency discretion. See Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform
286-87 (1985) (proposing an "imaginative reconstruction" approach to statutory interpretation
whereby the judge "put[s] himself in the shoes of the enacting legislators and figure[s] out how they
would have wanted the statute applied to the case before him"); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic
Statutory Interpretation 48 (1994) (arguing that statutory interpretation is "dynamic," which means
that it "is multifaceted and evolutive rather than single-faceted and static, involves policy choices and
discretion by the interpreter over time as she applies the statute to specific problems, and is
responsive to the current as well as the historical political culture"). But cf id. at 161-73 (questioning
whether agencies, rather than courts, should be given the primary responsibility of dynamically
interpreting statutes). Thus, during this period of jurisprudential transition, reasonable people may
certainly disagree, as reasonable Supreme Court justices have, as to whether a certain statutory text
is open to alternative interpretations or instead possesses a determinate meaning. See, e.g., Pauley
v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 111 S. Ct. 2524 (1991) (ruling by a seven-justice majority
that the statute was ambiguous and that the agency's interpretation was owed deference under step
two of the Chevron test, while Justice Scalia in dissent would have found the statute to be
unambiguous and ruled against the agency under step one of the Chevron test); INS v. Cardoza-Fons-
eca, 480 U.S. 421, 107 S. Ct. 1207 (1987) (ruling by a five-justice majority, with concurrence by
Justice Scalia, that statute was unambiguous and contrary to agency's interpretation, while a
three-justice dissent found the statute ambiguous and would have deferred to the agency view). See
also Zeppos, supra note 209, at 113940, 1140 n.27 (discussing Cardoza-Fonseca and Pauley
decisions).
Accordingly, when step two of the Chevron test is reached, a determination that an agency's
permissible discretion was exercised in an unreasonable manner should lead rather directly to an
award of EAJA fees. But an agency's loss at step one under Chevron may simply reflect an
understandable lack of omniscience and a reasonable failure to anticipate what theories or tools of
statutory construction might be applied by a court in deciding whether ambiguity does or does not
lurk in the statute. Until the smoke clears from the "intellectual battlefield" and one or another
theory of statutory interpretation emerges as the victor, an agency acting reasonably in a time of
uncertainty should not suffer the casualties of both a reversal of the agency decision and the rebuke
of an EAJA award for unjustifiable conduct.
210. 487 U.S. 552, 108 S. Ct. 2541 (1988).
211. Id. at 561, 108 S. Ct. at 2548.
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established by the merits decision.212 Thus, while it might well be unreason-
able in the future for the government to persist in its position in the face of the
contrary precedent now established by the court of appeals, it would not
necessarily have been unreasonable for the government to adopt that position
initially before any court ruling on the merits and to seek to uphold that position
in court prior to clarification of the law. Such was not the situation in the
Political Contributions Data case. When the Second Circuit decided the case on
the merits and declared that the government's interpretation of the statute was
unreasonable, the court was firmly saying it had always been unreasonable and
had been unreasonable ab initio. The Political Contribution Data case was not
one where the law had changed or had become more certain in the interim, thus
requiring the court to evaluate reasonableness in the light of preexisting and
different circumstances.
In Cooper v. United States Railroad Retirement Board,1 3 the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit also correctly appreciated
the interrelationship of review on the merits to the EAJA determination, although
not without first insisting that substantial justification is a distinct legal standard
from rationality review.214 The Railroad Retirement Board had refused to
waive the recovery of overpayments of disability annuity benefits to a retiree
who had outside earnings beyond the statutory limit. The Board concluded that
the retiree was at fault for the problem because of his mistaken belief that he had
converted the disability annuity into an age and service annuity that contained no
restrictions on outside earnings."' The Board found that the retiree, "by virtue
of his union experience and education," should have understood the statutory
scheme and known that he was prohibited from converting his disability annuity
to an age and service annuity."' On judicial review, the District of Columbia
Circuit reversed, holding that there was "[n]othing in the record" to indicate that
the individual's union experience "should have apprised him of the 'intricacies'
of a 'highly complex [statute], capable of being misunderstood even by those
considered experts in the field .. .
On its subsequent consideration of the application by the individual for
EAJA fees, the District of Columbia Circuit hastened to say that "the inquiry into
reasonableness for EAJA purposes may not be collapsed into our antecedent
evaluation of the merits, for EAJA sets forth a 'distinct legal standard."'2 18
However, despite its cautious words, the court nevertheless recognized that its
212. See id.
213. 24 F.3d 1414 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
214. Id. at 1416.
215. Id. at 1416-17.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 1417 (quoting Cooper v. Railroad Retirement Bd., 977 F.2d 647, 650 (D.C. Cir.
1992)).
218. Id. at 1416 (quoting Federal Election Comm'n v. Rose, 806 F.2d 1081, 1089 (D.C. Cir.
1986)).
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prior reversal of an unreasonable factual determination by the agency led
ineluctably to a finding of lack of "substantial justification": "[A]lthough the
court couched its holding [on the merits] in the language of the relevant legal
standard-i.e., 'no substantial evidence'-we essentially determined that the
Board wholly lacked a reasonable factual basis for its conclusion."" 9 Despite
its implicit attempt to separate the standard of review on the merits from the
concept of reasonableness, the court's "essential determin[ation]" that there was
no "reasonable factual basis" for the agency's decision is exactly what was
required to set aside an administrative factual determination under the substantial
evidence standard. In other words, "the relevant legal standard" of substantial
evidence demanded that the court inquire whether the agency had "a reasonable
basis for its conclusion," which parallels the EAJA inquiry. " °
Writing in dissent, Judge Silberman fully appreciated that the Cooper court's
analysis "equates the reasons for favoring [the individual] on the merits... with
those supporting a finding that the government's position is not substantially
justified."' But it was precisely that equation of a standard of review on the
merits with the standard of substantial justification that prompted him to dissent
from the award of fees.' However, in taking that position Judge Silberman
was forced first to deny that the decision on the merits constituted a denunciation
of the agency's action as unreasonable and then to insist that the agency's
decision in fact was reasonable.' Both positions undermine the validity of
the merits decision itself. Indeed, in addressing the question of whether the
individual was at fault for his ignorance about annuity conversion rights, Judge
Silberman opined that "a reasonable person surely could think it justifiable that
the Board expected a person whose pension benefits are his sole source of
income to keep apprised of the conditions of those benefits." '22 If the Board's
219. Id. at 1417.
220. See Krent, supra note 156, at 500 (observing that "the substantial justification standard
cannot be easily distinguished from the substantial evidence standard'); Cromwell, supra note 182,
at 356-57 (observing that the "similarity between these two standards [substantial evidence and
substantial justification] lies at the heart of the difficulty facing courts seeking to apply the Equal
Access to Justice Act to social security litigants").
221. Cooper, 24 F.3d at 1420 (Silberman, J., dissenting).
222. Judge Silberman argued that to equate the determination on the merits with the "substantial
justification" finding would "render the latter concept mere surplusage," because it would permit an
award of fees to the prevailing party without satisfaction of the additional requirement that the
position of the United States lack "substantial justification." Id. However, any correlation of the
decision on the merits with the "substantial justification" inquiry may occur only when the decision
on the merits was truly grounded in a rational review analysis. When the question on the merits of
the case is decided by a form of legal analysis that does not implicate the basic rationality of the
government action, then success on the merits should not lead directly to a conclusion that the
government's position was unreasonable for purposes of an EAJA award.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 1420-21. At two points in his dissent, Judge Silberman hints that he may be applying
the substantial justification standard as one layer of analysis further removed than a simple
reasonableness inquiry. In the statement quoted above, he says that "a reasonable person surely could
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expectation truly had been reasonable, then the court was obliged to defer to it
and erred by overturning it. Unless the District of Columbia Circuit has re-
formulated the substantial evidence standard to mean something other than "such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion," the merits court was obliged to accept the Board's determina-
tion unless it reached the conclusion that it lacked a rational foundation. Having
reached that conclusion on the merits, the court cannot avoid the consequences
the decision carries for the parallel EAJA inquiry.
In the end, Judge Silberman seems to recognize the internal inconsistency
in his argument, as he confesses: "I went along with the disposition [on the
merits] because I, like most judges, do not think it wise to dissent in every case
that I think is wrongly decided, but only where the legal and practical conse-
quences of the jurisprudential error justify comment." 6  But however much
a judge may have come to "regret [his] initial acquiescence, ' '227 the EAJA
proceeding is not the time for second-guessing the merits. When the issue on
the merits turns on application of a standard of rational review, a denial of EAJA
fees would amount to a cynical and contradictory declaration that the govern-
ment's position was unreasonable when the court decided the merits, but
suddenly became reasonable when the party asked for attorney's fees.
5. Conclusion-The EAJA Requires a Fresh, But Not Independent,
Review of the Merits
The "substantial justification" analysis requires a fresh look at the case, but
not an inquiry that is separate and divorced from the merits and the reasons for
the court's adverse decision on those merits. The court must carefully review
the determination on the merits, distinguishing between those issues upon which
the court simply found the government's position mistaken and those upon which
think it justifiable" that the Board had a certain expectation. Id. Again in the concluding line of the
dissent, he says that the Board's failure to explain its assumptions about the retiree's ability to refund
the overpayment "does not mean that a reasonable person would think that the Board's position is
not justifiable." Id. at 1421. By this unusual framing of the question, Judge Silberman seems to be
stating the test, not as whether "a reasonable person could think [the government's position is]
correct" (as the Supreme Court articulated the standard in Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 566
n.2, 108 S. Ct. 2541, 2550 n.2 (1988) (emphasis added)), but rather as whether a reasonable person
could think the government's position is reasonable. Because reasonable people may often disagree
as to what positions remain within the realm of reasonableness, a further abstraction of the test away
from the direct issue of the tenability of the government's position would seldom result in a finding
of no substantial justification. In any event, the standard is clear and the focus is directly upon the
justification of the government conduct. The reviewing judge must ask, not whether some other
reasonable person might find the government's position to be minimally rational, but whether the
reviewing judge believes that reasonable people could differ on the validity of the government's
position.
225. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S. Ct. 206, 217 (1938).
226. Cooper, 24 F.3d at 1421.
227. Id.
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the court concluded the government's position was unreasonable. The analysis
must not be mechanistic, nor should it fixate on labels (such as arbitrary and
capricious) as a substitute for an exploration of reasoning. Sometimes the
standard and reasons for the underlying judgment will correspond closely or even
precisely to the "substantial justification" inquiry. Sometimes, however, the
EAJA analysis must be more searching.
When a case on the merits involves true rational review, under which the
government action is overturned precisely because it is unreasonable, then an
award of fees under the EAJA should ineluctably follow. In other words, if the
government's action may be set aside on the merits only if it is unreasonable,
then an adverse judgment on the merits constitutes a determination of want of
reasonableness. The EAJA fee award is "automatic" only in the circular sense
that fee-shifting occurs automatically when the government acts unreasonably.
As a student commentator has written, "there is no indication that Congress
would have objected to awarding fees automatically in a limited number of cases
where the government's failure to prevail in the suit was a consequence of the
fact that the government's underlying action lacked substantial justification."
This fully comports with the plain language of the EAJA statute which directs
a mandatory award of fees unless the United States' position is found to be
substantially justified."9
When the case turns upon a factual or legal issue as to which reasonable
persons could disagree, then EAJA fees should not be awarded. Indeed, one
would expect that the government would rarely be subject to an EAJA award,
because one would also expect (and hope) that the government would rarely act
without a reasonable basis. Yet, two studies indicate that EAJA applications are
granted by district courts at a surprisingly high rate.23° When any person
makes a decision, it is easy to believe that no reasonable person could have
reached a contrary determination. Too many district judges may be falling into
the temptation of viewing their opinions on the merits as the measure of manifest
reasonableness."' "As with all mirror-gazing, there is a risk of being unduly
228. Sullivan, supra note 140, at l105 n.131.
229. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(dXl)(A) (1988) (providing that "a court shall award to a prevailing party
... fees... unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified;"
emphasis added).
230. See Krent, supra note 156, at 484 (finding, in a study of EAJA decisions reported to the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, that when an EAJA application was filed after a party
prevailed in civil litigation with the federal government, an award was made in between 70% and
85% of the cases); Susan G. Mezey & Susan M. Olson, Fee Shifting and Public Policy: The Equal
Access to Justice Act, 77 Judicature 13, 18 (1993) (finding, in a study limited to published decisions,
a high rate of successful applications in individual benefits cases, but that a majority of petitions for
fees were denied in cases concerning government regulation).
231. See Lawrence M. Grosberg, Illusion and Reality in Regulating Lawyer Performance:
Rethinking Rule 11, 32 Vill. L. Rev. 575, 635 (1987) (stating that, in deciding whether to impose
sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, "[t]here seems to be an ineluctable pressure on
judges to reinforce the propriety of their initial legal determinations by extending them a step further,
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taken with what you see."232 A declaration of want of "substantial justifica-
tion" should be reached only after careful contemplation and never be imposed
merely to emphasize the strength of the judge's conviction that he has ruled
correctly on the merits.23  The prescription for avoiding this error is due
humility among district court judges2' and vigilant appellate review.233
D. Objective Factors and Other Circumstances Supporting or Undermining
"Substantial Justification"
By its very nature, a standard of "reasonableness" (as established by the
requirement that the court evaluate the position of the government for "substan-
tial justification") 6 is one that demands application on a case-by-case ba-
sis." 7 Rather than an exercise in mechanical jurisprudence, the "substantial
justification" inquiry requires "something of that common-sense accommodation
of judgment to kaleidoscopic situations,"238 that is, to the range of factual and
legal issues that may arise in civil litigation against the federal government.
Indeed, as discussed in the next section of this Article,239 the Supreme Court
thus concluding that their legal analysis is so correct and perhaps even self-evident that anybody but
a fool, an incompetent lawyer, or one misusing the courts should have reached the same conclusion").
232. Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Young, 909 F.2d 546, 549 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(describing district court's task in assessing government's motivation in taking an action favorable
to the plaintiff and determining whether that action had been prompted by the government's
perception of a likely adverse decision by the district court, which would mean that the litigation had
served as a catalyst for the government action and thus make the plaintiff a prevailing party eligible
for a fee award).
233. See Mark S. Stein, Rule 11 in the Real World: How the Dynamics of Litigation Defeat the
Purpose of Imposing Attorney Fee Sanctions for the Assertion of Frivolous Legal Arguments, 132
F.R.D. 309, 316 (1990) (stating that, in considering whether to impose sanctions under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 11 for an allegedly frivolous legal argument, "a judge's perception of whether an
argument is so wrong as to be sanctionable may become clouded" and the judge "may be impelled
to proclaim the frivolousness of a position as a means of emphasis, just like a lawyer").
234. See Grosberg, supra note 231, at 635 (stating that, in deciding whether to impose sanctions
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, "[c]onsiderable discipline is required for a judge to resist
[the) kind of reasoning or intellectual pressure" that leads a judge to conclude that his ruling on the
merits is so correct or self-evident that only a fool could have reached a conclusion different from
that of the judge).
235. See infra section IV.E (discussing appellate review of EAJA rulings).
236. See generally supra section IV.B (discussing the meaning of "substantial justification"
under the EAJA).
237. See H.R. Rep. No. 120, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 10 (1985), reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N.
132, 138 (stating "that the determination of what is 'substantially justified' will be decided on a case-
by-case basis due to the wide variety of factual contexts and legal issues which make up government
disputes").
238. See Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 117, 57 S. Ct. 96, 100 (1936) (discussing need
for common-sense evaluation of what constitutes a "case arising under the Constitution or laws of
the United States" for purposes of federal court jurisdiction).
239. See infra section IV.E (discussing appellate standard of review of"substantial justification"
determinations under the EAJA).
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settled upon an abuse of discretion standard of appellate review for "substantial
justification" determinations precisely because this is "a multifarious and novel
question" not susceptible to narrow guidelines.2" Accordingly, courts must be
wary of adopting fixed rules or quantitative measures that purport to obviate the
need for practical wisdom and sound judgment.
Nevertheless, the standard of reasonableness is nonetheless largely an
objective one, not purely subjective. As a substantial body of case law develops,
"[t]ime and experience" may allow "the formless problem to take shape, and the
contours of a guiding principle to emerge." 24' Although the time has not yet
come, and undoubtedly never will, when a fixed rule could be adopted to strictly
govern the "substantial justification" inquiry, the patterns formed by numerous
decisions over more than a decade give some meaningful guidance, at least under
certain recurring circumstances. Certain relatively objective factors or
circumstances arising in litigation with the federal government may give rise to
a weak inference or a strong presumption that substantial justification has or has
not been established.242 Some factors, such as a showing of dishonesty or a
breach of public trust in the underlying government conduct, create a powerful
presumption against "substantial justification. 243 Other factors, such as a line
of cases in other jurisdictions adopting or rejecting the government's position,
give rise to inferences of varying strength (depending upon the number of such
decisions, the level of courts deciding the question, and the presence or absence
of division among those courts), thus preventing unthinking reliance upon such
a factor while still demanding attention by any court evaluating the reasonable-
ness of the government's position.2" Still other factors, such as the govern-
ment's willingness to settle or abandon a case, may superficially suggest the
presence or absence of substantial justification of the government's position but,
on closer examination, prove unworthy of reliance without further investigation
of the reasons underlying the development. 45
240. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 562, 108 S. Ct. 2541, 2548 (1988).
241. Id. (quoting Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed From
Above, 22 Syracuse L. Rev. 635, 662-633 (1971), for proposition that adoption of an abuse of
discretion standard for appellate review of a matter will allow the needed flexibility for the courts
through cumulative experience to develop an appropriate guiding principle). See also John C. Dods
& Timothy J. Kennedy, The Equal Access to Justice Act, 50 UMKC L. Rev. 48, 55 (1981)
(suggesting that the test of reasonableness under the EAJA will become less subjective as "a body
of case law" develops).
242. See Pierce, 487 U.S. at 568, 108 S. Ct. at 2551 (stating that while the factors present in the
particular case did not provide a conclusive answer, the Court did "not disagree that objective indicia
can be relevant" to the EAJA "substantial justification" inquiry).
243. See infra section IV.D.4 (discussing the factor of dishonesty or breach of public trust by
the government).
244. See infra section IV.D.8 (discussing the factor of judicial endorsement of government
position).




Judge Ruggero Aldisert complained ten years ago that "there is neither
predictability nor reckonability to the case law" concerning when the government
is substantially justified under the EAJA.2 6 While a standard of reasonable-
ness must always remain flexible, this section is dedicated to a distillation of the
case law over the past decade in the hopes that guidelines have emerged and that
progress has been made toward "reckonability" of the law. The discussion below
analyzes several objective factors or other circumstances arising in EAJA court
decisions to ascertain whether they provide meaningful direction to courts in
addressing the "substantial justification" inquiry. Although not all of these
factors or circumstances are worthy of reliance or are of equal weight in the
balance, hopefully some may provide a compass to chart a course and set
boundaries of analysis toward the application of sound judicial discretion.
1. Settlement or Abandonment of a Case by the Government
Although one may hope that the government would hasten to settle or
abandon a case that government litigators determine involves indefensible
government conduct, one nonetheless may not presume that the government's
willingness to settle or dismiss a case reflects a lack of substantial justification.
The expectation or hope that the unjustifiability of the underlying government
action will lead to a prompt retreat in litigation by the government does not
permit formulation of an opposite syllogism, that is, that a settlement or dismissal
must signal an unreasonable position. As the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit stated in Kuhn v. Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System," 7 "[c]hanges in agency policies or priorities, lack of
resources, or developments outside the agency's control, rather than the absence
of evidence or legal support, may cause the government to drop a proceeding it
reasonably expected to win."'"
Likewise, the Supreme Court ruled in Pierce v. Underwood 9 that the
government's willingness to settle a case on terms unfavorable to the government
may as likely be explained by "a change in substantive policy instituted by a new
administration" as by a lack of substantial justification.5 0 Therefore, as the
Court further stated, the fact of settlement or capitulation by the government in
litigation, "without inquiry into the reasons" for that action, "cannot conclusively
establish the weakness of the Government's position. To hold otherwise would
not only distort the truth but penalize and thereby discourage useful settle-
ments."' If the government settles or drops litigation because its underlying
conduct cannot be defended before the court, then "substantial justification" is
246. Washington v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 959, 968 (3d Cir. 1985) (Aldisert, C.J., concurring).
247. 930 F.2d 39 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
248. Id. at 43.
249. 487 U.S. 552, 108 S. Ct. 2541 (1988).
250. Id. at 568, 108 S. Ct. at 2552.
251. Id. at 568, 108 S. Ct. at 2552.
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obviously lacking. But the settlement or abandonment itself does not establish
that conclusion; rather, the answer depends on the reasons behind the concession
of the case." In the end, the court cannot avoid inquiry into the government's
underlying conduct and, in the absence of an admission by the government that
it surrendered because its position was utterly without merit, must conduct an
evaluation of the justifiability of that position on the merits."
From time to time, courts have suggested that even when the reason for the
government's abandonment or settlement of litigation is the indefensibility of the
government's underlying conduct, the government may nonetheless escape EAJA
fees by acting expeditiously in abandoning or settling litigation. For example,
in Ashburn v. United States,' the court held that the government was not
without substantial justification when it took five months after service of the
plaintiff's complaint before determining to concede the case, because the matter
was of sufficient complexity as to warrant that length of time to evaluate the
validity of its position. 5 However, many of these decisions, including the
236Ashburn case, were grounded upon the premise that the "position of the
United States" examined for "substantial justification" referred only to the
government's litigation position, a premise that was overturned by the 1985 re-
enactment legislation defining that position to include both the government's
252. See Hanson v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 975 F.2d 1150, 1155-56 (5th Cir. 1992)
(stating, in considering an award of fees in a tax case under 26 U.S.C. § 7430 (1988), that "the
government's concession of a case does not in itself indicate that the government's position was
unreasonable," but rather the court must consider "all of the facts in a given case").
253. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Watt, 722 F.2d 1081, 1085 (2d Cir. 1983) ("[T]he
government's ultimate acquiescence in a settlement is merely the beginning, not the termination, of
our inquiry.").
254. 740 F,2d 843 (1lth Cir. 1984).
255. Id. at 850. See also Del Mfg. Co. v. United States, 723 F.2d 980, 984-86 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(holding that the government's litigation position was "entirely reasonable" when the government's
course of conduct in the lawsuit brought the plaintiff "full relief within three days of filing suit");
Watt, 722 F.2d at 1085-86 (holding that the government's position lacked substantial justification
when it failed to abandon its opposition to a private party's suit as soon as it became apparent that
its position was without merit, but instead "consumed a full seven months" in settlement negotiations
although "the issues at stake in this case were few and discrete" and the resulting stipulation was
brief and resolved all issues against the government); Operating Eng'rs Local Union No. 3 v. Bohn,
541 F. Supp. 486, 496 (D. Utah 1982) (holding that the government's litigation position was
substantially justified because "[o]nce the action was filed, the government acted almost immediately
to concede all the substantive relief plaintiff sought"), aff'd, 737 F.2d 860 (10th Cir. 1984); Brener
Bldg. Maintenance Co. v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 277, 278 (1985) (stating that the government's
litigation position was substantially justified when it settled promptly after discovery, which revealed
the strengths and weaknesses of the case); Clark v. United States, 3 Cl. Ct. 194, 197 (1983) (ruling
the government's position in litigation was substantially justified when it did not answer the
complaint but, after ascertaining the facts and researching the law, stipulated to entry of judgment
in favor of the plaintiff).
256. Ashburn, 740 F.2d at 846-50 (explaining that the court was adopting the "litigation




litigation position and its pre-litigation position.17  Thus, while it may be
justifiable in terms of a litigation position for government litigators to be allowed
a reasonable time to review the matter before conceding the case, nothing
pertaining to the handling of the litigation can retroactively confer justifiability
upon pre-litigation conduct by the government.
2 58
If the government's underlying conduct giving rise to the litigation was
without substantial justification, the expeditious settlement or abandonment of the
matter in court by government litigators cannot prevent the mandatory imposition
of an attorney's fee award under the EAJA."9 For example, in Koss v.
Sullivan, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit com-
mended the Social Security Administration for acknowledging that the
administrative law judge had failed to follow circuit precedent in evaluating a
claim for Social Security disability benefits and for eventually agreeing to a
remand.26 Nevertheless, in light of the conceded failure to follow precedent
at the agency level, the government had essentially admitted that its pre-litigation
position (consisting of the administrative law judge's decision on behalf of the
agency) was not substantially justified.2 62 Moreover, since the government had
initially filed an answer in court denying entitlement to benefits and asking for
dismissal of the claimant's complaint for failure to state a claim, the govern-
ment's litigation position was not justified prior to asking for a remand. 3
This does not mean that the government's prompt capitulation in court is
without significance, since the quick resolution of the litigation will thereby limit
the amount of fees to which the opposing party may lay claim.2 ' But it
257. See Pub. L. No. 99-80, § 2(cX2), 99 Stat. 183, 185 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(D)
(1988)). See generally supra section IV.A. I (discussing the statutory definition of the "position of
the United States" as including the action by the agency which underlies the lawsuit).
258. Hanson v. Commissioner ofInternal Revenue, 975 F.2d 1150, 1155 (5th Cir. 1992) (stating,
in considering an award of fees in a tax case under 26 U.S.C. § 7430 (1988), that the government's
"otherwise unreasonable position" cannot be "automatically rescued" from a fee award if it
"surrenders 'promptly").
259. See First Interstate Bank v. Purewell Inv., Inc., No. C 92-2567 EFL, 1994 WL 241371, at
*3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 1994) (stating, in context of award of fees in a tax case under 26 U.S.C. §
7430 (1988), "[the government's abandonment of its position once disproved does not eliminate its
obligation for the attorney fees necessitated because of its original taking of a substantially unjustified
position").
260. 982 F.2d 1226 (8th Cir. 1993).
261. Id. at 1228-29.
262. Id. See also supra section IV.A.3 (explaining that, because Social Security claims are
processed in a non-adversarial manner, the determination of the administrative law judge is not
judicial in nature, but rather is part of the government's pre-litigation position).
263. Koss, 982 F.2d at 1228-29.
264. See Ramirez-Isalquez v. Heckler, 632 F. Supp. 100, 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (observing that
when the government answered the complaint but then conceded the case, "what little opposition
there was to the case did not result in the expenditure of significant additional time" by plaintiff's
counsel); see also Hanson, 975 F.2d at 1157 (stating, in the context of a fee award in a tax case
under 26 U.S.C. § 7430 (1988), that the government will be encouraged to quickly settle cases
because "the longer the government maintains an unreasonable position the higher its costs, and those
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cannot undo the entitlement to a fee award that became vested at the time the
party was initially forced to resort to litigation to challenge unreasonable
government conduct.265 Moreover, if a party in litigation with the federal
government protracts the litigation despite nominal or no opposition or prolongs
settlement negotiations when the government seeks to offer reasonable
concessions, this behavior provides an independent basis under the EAJA for
severely limiting the amount of any fee award. Under EAJA Subparagraph
(d)(2)(D), "fees and expenses may not be awarded to a party for any portion of
the litigation in which the party has unreasonably protracted the proceed-
ings. '' 6
Nevertheless, even post-1985, the expeditious action of government counsel
to concede a matter when the facts become known may in certain circumstances
preserve substantial justification so as to avoid a fee award. If the underlying
government conduct was justifiable based upon the facts as reasonably
understood by the government at the time, assuming due diligence in its initial
investigation,267 but additional evidence has now become available, the
government's position does not become unjustifiable if it acts promptly in
response to the new development. For example, in Miller v. Hotel & Restaurant
Employees and Bartenders Union,2" the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit considered a case in which the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) had issued a complaint and had filed a petition in district court to enjoin
it will have to pay the prevailing party" under the fee-shifting statute).
265. See Powell v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 791 F.2d 385, 391 (5th Cir. 1986)
(stating, in context of fee award in a tax case under 26 U.S.C. § 7430 (1988), that "[i]f the IRS takes
an arbitrary position and forces a taxpayer to file suit, then, after the papers have been filed, becomes
sweet reason, the taxpayer should be permitted to recover the cost of suing").
266. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(D) (1988).
267. When taking action or adopting an initial position, the government may not remain blithely
ignorant of additional factual information that would have been uncovered by due diligence. The
government should be held to a duty of reasonable inquiry akin to that objective standard of prior
investigation imposed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 upon parties presenting a pleading,
motion, or other paper to a court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b) (providing that an attorney or
unrepresented party presenting a pleading, written motion, or paper to the court certifies "that to the
best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the
circumstances" that the paper is not presented for an improper purpose, that the paper is warranted
by existing law or a nonfrivolous argument for a change in the law, that allegations have evidentiary
support, and that any denials of factual contentions are warranted); Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of
New York, 762 F.2d 243, 253-54 (2d Cir. 1985) (stating that whether an adequate investigation has
been made for purposes of Rule 11 is judged by an objective reasonableness standard). See generally
Gregory P. Joseph, Sanctions: .The Federal Law of Litigation Abuse § 7(CX), at 132-34 (2d ed.
1994) (discussing the objective standard of reasonableness for adequate inquiry under Rule 11).
Accordingly, time constraints, lack of cooperation by the private parties involved, or other
circumstances may make it necessary for the government to act before all relevant information is
acquired. Provided that the government has made a reasonable inquiry under the circumstances, the
discovery of adverse information at a later point in time does not make the government's position
unreasonable if it acts promptly and appropriately once in possession of the new information.
268. 806 F.2d 1371 (9th Cir. 1986).
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a striking union from engaging in a secondary boycott by picketing in front of
neutral businesses in the vicinity.' After a hearing, the district court denied
the injunction."' When the union sought attorney's fees under the EAJA, the
district court concluded that the NLRB had been substantially justified in filing
the petition and litigating the matter until the day upon which it received
additional evidentiary submissions from the union, but that the NLRB was not
substantially justified in pursuing the matter through the hearing held one
working day later.2 ' The Ninth Circuit reversed the award of EAJA fees,
ruling "that the government is entitled to a reasonable time to reevaluate a
position before deciding to abandon it in the face of adverse but previously
unknown evidence."272 The court found "no authority remotely suggesting that
the government, or any other party, acts unreasonably when it chooses to go
forward with a previously set hearing after receiving adverse evidence shortly
before the hearing date."2"
By contrast, if the government fails to act with due expedition when
confronted with new information that casts doubt on the validity of a previously
reasonable position, a substantially justified pre-litigation position may evolve
into an unjustified litigation position, resulting in an award of fees. For example,
in United States v. $12,248 U.S. Currency,"4 the government may have had
probable cause to seize currency found at the scene of a drug arrest, but even
after being apprised by the claimant that there was an innocent source for the
funds, the government failed to take even minimal steps to verify the explana-
tion.27s Thus, what is an initially reasonable government action may lose its
justification through the government's failure to take expeditious action and
abandon an unfounded position in the light of new information.
2. Stage of Disposition of Litigation
In the House Report accompanying the legislation enacted as the Equal
Access to Justice Act in 1980, the committee suggested:
Certain types of case dispositions may indicate that the Government
action was not substantially justified. A court should look closely at
cases, for example, where there has been a judgment on the pleadings
or where there is a directed verdict or where a prior suit on the same





274. 957 F.2d 1513 (9th Cir. 1991). See also supra section IV.C.2 (discussing $12,248 US.
Currency in the context of requirement that the court evaluate the merits of the case as part of the
substantial justification inquiry).
275. $12,248 US. Currency, 957 F.2d at 1518-19.
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claim had been dismissed. Such cases clearly raise the possibility that
the Government was unreasonable in pursuing the litigation.
76
Although the stage at which litigation is concluded may indeed shed light on the
reasonableness of the government's position, courts must be careful to appreciate
the basis of the disposition and the reason why the matter was resolved at that
particular stage. Most particularly, courts must distinguish between early
dispositions based upon resolution of legal questions and summary disposition
based upon the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, that is, the
insufficiency of factual evidence to proceed to trial.
In Pierce v. Underwood,7 the Supreme Court rejected the argument that
the weakness of the government's position on a question of statutory interpreta-
tion was established "by the objective fact that the merits were decided at the
pleadings stage. ' '27' The Court stated that "[a]t least where ... the dispute
centers upon questions of law rather than fact, summary disposition proves only
that the district judge was efficient."279 Indeed, whenever and at whatever
stage the court disposes of a lawsuit based upon a purely legal question, the only
relevant inquiry is whether the government's position on that legal question was
substantially justified. That the lawsuit is cut short and proceedings are
terminated because of court resolution of a controlling question of law, by itself,
says nothing about the strength or weakness of the government's position on that
question.
By sharp contrast, when the government is on the losing end of a summary
disposition because of inadequate evidentiary support for its position, the strict
standard for granting summary disposition strongly suggests an absence of
"substantial justification."'21°  Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56,
summary judgment shall be granted only when "there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law.""28 When summary judgment is sought based upon the absence of a
genuine issue of material fact, the evidence is considered in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences from the
evidence are drawn in favor of the non-moving party.282 The ultimate test is
276. H.R. Rep. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4984,
4989-90.
277. 487 U.S. 552, 108 S. Ct. 2541 (1988).
278. Id. at 568, 108 S. Ct. at 2551.
279. Id. at 568-69, 108 S. Ct. at 2551-52. See also Kali v. Bowen, 854 F.2d 329, 333 (9th Cir.
1988) (stating, with citation to Pierce, that the district court's entry of summary judgment on a legal
issue did not demonstrate that the government's position was not substantially justified).
280. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Clay Printing Co., 13 F.3d 813, 815 (4th Cir.
1994) ("When summary judgment rests on the government's inadequate factual showing, ... we
think that the 'stage of decision' factor assumes added prominence in the 'substantially justified'
inquiry, because the burden resting on the party resisting a summary judgment is so minimal.").
281. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
282. Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473, 82 S. Ct. 486, 491 (1962)
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whether a fair-minded jury could reasonably return a verdict for the non-moving
party based on the evidence presented."3 Because the standard for summary
judgment is one of reasonableness, and thus parallels the standard of "substantial
justification," a determination by the court that the government's evidentiary case
cannot survive summary judgment raises a strong presumption of lack of
substantial justification for the factual element of the government's position. If
no reasonable person could adopt the government's position based upon the
government's evidentiary showing,2 then surely the government's position is
unreasonable as a matter of fact.
As discussed above in the previous subsection,2 5 a government position
that was initially substantially justified, based upon the evidence and information
available to the government when the position was adopted, may lose its
plausibility as additional information or evidence comes to light during discovery.
In that event, as discussed previously,2"6 the government should be allowed a
reasonable period of time to assess new evidence or developments and re-
evaluate its factual position without being characterized as substantially
unjustified in its conduct. In United States v. Certain Real Property,' the
district court issued a warrant based upon evidence that one of the residents had
used the property in connection with the sale of controlled substances, and the
government initiated a civil forfeiture action against the real property. 28 The
claimants in the litigation asserted that they were the true and innocent owners
of the property. 289 Although the government ultimately did not oppose the
claimants' motion for summary judgment based upon this defense, a motion
which the court granted,2se the district court nevertheless held that the govern-
ment was not without substantial justification in having pursued the forfeiture
action.2 It was appropriate for the government "to look beyond the title to
investigate the possibility of a 'strawman owner' set up to conceal the illegal
activities of another," and to determine whether the illegal activities of the
("We look at the record on summary judgment in the light most favorable to ... the party opposing
the motion.'); Charles A. Wright, Law of Federal Courts § 99, at 708 (5th ed. 1994) (stating "that
the party opposing the motion is to be given the benefit of all reasonable doubts in determining
whether a genuine issue exists').
283. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2512 (1986) ('[The
judge must ask himself not whether he thinks the evidence unmistakably favors one side or the other
but whether a fair minded jury could return a verdict for the [non-moving party] on the evidence
presented. ... [T]here must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [party].").
284. See id. at 248, 106 S. Ct. 2510 ("(S]ummary judgment will not lie ... if the evidence is
such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.').
285. See supra section IV.D. I (discussing whether the government is substantially justified when
settling or abandoning litigation).
286. Id.
287. 767 F. Supp. 949 (E.D. Wis. 1991).
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property resident were conducted without the knowledge of the claimants.2 92
After such an investigation, the government apparently was satisfied that the
innocent owner defense was proper because the government chose not to oppose
the summary judgment motion.293 Additionally, there is no indication the
government unduly delayed before conceding the case. Accordingly, an award
of EAJA fees was not warranted.
The House Report accompanying the EAJA legislation enacted in 1980 also
suggested that want of substantial justification would be strongly indicated if the
government's case was lost on a directed verdict.2 4 The standard for removing
a case from the jury on a directed verdict is essentially the same as that for
summary judgment. Indeed, the directed verdict motion has been described as
"somewhat like a delayed summary judgment motion in that it determines that
there are no genuine issues of [material] fact that need to be sent to the
jury.""" However, civil cases involving the federal government are almost
invariably tried to the bench, rather than a jury.29 Accordingly, the directed
verdict device will rarely be applied to dispose of a federal government case.
Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(c) permits a party to move for
judgment as a matter of law against a party who has been fully heard on a claim
or defense during a trial without a jury,297 the standard is not quite the same
292. Id. at 950-51.
293. See id. at 950.
294. H.R. Rep. No. 1418,96th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.AN. 4984,
4989-90.
295. Friedenthal et al., supra note 121, § 12.3, at 544. Under the 1991 amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the motion for a directed verdict and the motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict have been renamed as motions for "judgment as a matter of law." Fed.
R. Civ. P. 50; Friedenthal et al., supra note 121, § 12.3, at 543 n.I. One of the reasons for this
change in terminology was that the term "judgment as a matter of law" "is an almost equally familiar
term and appears in the text of Rule 56" on summary judgment; thus, "its use in Rule 50 calls
attention to the relationship between the two rules." Advisory Committee Notes on 1991
Amendments to Fed. R. Civ. 50, 28 U.S.C. app. at 805 (Supp. V 1993).
296. Urban A. Lester & Michael F. Noone, Litigation With the Federal Government § 7.104,
at 180 (3d ed. 1994) (stating that "[s~uits against the United States are in the main tried by the court,"
and that "Djury trial is available in relatively few situations"). In Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156,
101 S. Ct. 2698 (1981), the Supreme Court held that the Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury
does not apply against the federal government because the sovereign was not subject to jury trial
under the common law at the time of the ratification of the Constitution in 1791, and held that a jury
trial against the government is barred by sovereign immunity unless the Congress by statute
unequivocally grants such a right. Id. at 160-62, 101 S. Ct. at 2701-02.
297. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(c) provides:
If during a trial without a jury a party has been fully heard on an issue and the court finds
against the party on that issue, the court may enter judgment as a matter of law against
that party with respect to a claim or defense that cannot under the controlling law be
maintained or defeated without a favorable finding on that issue, or the court may decline
to render any judgment until the close of all the evidence. Such a judgment shall be
supported by findings of fact and conclusions of law ....
Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(c).
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as that permitting withdrawal of a matter from a jury in a case with a right to
trial by jury. Under Rule 52(c), the judge as the trier of fact is not required to
consider all evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the
motion is directed,298 but may decide a contested factual matter against the
party who has been fully heard and then enter a finding of fact.2' Thus, rather
than determining that no genuine issue of material fact exists upon which a
reasonable jury could premise a verdict, a judge entering judgment on partial
findings of fact under Rule 52(c) will have heard the evidence presented by the
party against whom judgment is rendered and, as trier of fact, will have weighed
and balanced that evidence to reach the disposition.
The decision of a judge to enter adverse findings to a party under Rule
52(c), without even the need to hear the opposing party's affirmative evidence
to the contrary, need not necessarily reflect that the party's case was wholly
unfounded as a matter of fact. Thus, for example, the government may have a
reasonable and tenable position based upon the evidence it presents, but as a
matter of assessing the credibility of witnesses or on the basis of additional
evidence drawn out on cross-examination, the trial court simply has concluded
that it is not convinced. In any event, since the trial court will have heard the
evidence presented by the government, the court will be in an ideal position to
evaluate whether the government's factual position was not only mistaken but
also was without substantial justification.
3. Inconsistency in Government Position
Courts have frequently identified an inconsistency in the government's
position as establishing or evidencing lack of "substantial justification."3"
When the government acts inconsistently, these courts say, a particularly strong
showing of justification should be demanded of the government."' Although
a "flip-flop" in position during the course of a case or the singling out of a
private party for atypical treatment quite appropriately may be regarded as
indicators of unjustified conduct, courts should be careful to differentiate
298. Wright, supra note 282, § 96, at 688.
299. Advisory Committee Notes on 1991 Amendments to Fed. R. Civ. P. 52, 28 U.S.C. app. at
806 (Supp. V 1993) (stating that the amendment to Rule 52(c) "authorizes the court to enter judgment
at any time that it can appropriately make a dispositive finding of fact on the evidence," and that the
nature of the evaluation is different from that on summary judgment because "[a] judgment on partial
findings is made after the court has heard all the evidence bearing on the crucial issue of f&ct").
300. See, e.g., Ramon-Sepulveda v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 863 F.2d 1458, 1460
(9th Cir. 1988); International Woodworkers v. Donovan, 792 F.2d 762, 765 (9th Cir. 1986); Dubose
v. Pierce, 761 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1985), vacated on other grounds, 487 U.S. 1229, 108 S. Ct. 2890
(1988); Spencer v. NLRB, 712 F.2d 539, 560-61 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 936, 104
S. Ct. 1907 (1984).
301. See, e.g. , Ramon-Sepulveda, 863 F.2d at 1460; International Woodworkers, 792 F.2d at 765;
Spencer, 712 F.2d at 561.
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objectionable oscillation in position from justifiable changes in governmental
policy that do not warrant a fee award under the EAJA.
The political branches of the federal government, including the executive
agencies, are entitled to change policies, including adopting new regulations,
rules, or formal policy statements that contradict previous positions taken by
earlier administrators. In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.,3"2 the Supreme Court affirmed the authority of administrative
agencies to adopt regulations that reflect a permissible construction of the
authorizing statute, 3 even if the regulations reflect a reversal in policy
implemented by a new administration."° The Court stated:
[A]n agency to which Congress has delegated policymaking responsibil-
ities may, within the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the
incumbent administration's views of wise policy to inform its judg-
ments. While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the
Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch
of the Government to make such policy choices-resolving the
competing interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not
resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency charged with
the administration of the statute in light of everyday realities. 3
Accordingly, when the government has acted formally to change a policy
with broad application, such an action does not legitimately give rise to any
inference of unjustified conduct. The mere fact of a change in policy cannot
excuse the court from carefully deciding whether the new policy is reasonable
and therefore substantially justified. Thus, for example, the court must evaluate
the promulgation of a new regulation on its own merits, however much it may
depart from past policy.'O°
By contrast, inconsistency in government positions divorced from a
considered policy change raises strong suspicions of unjustifiable conduct. In
302. 467 U.S. 837, 104 S. Ct 2778 (1984).
303. Id. at 842-45, 104 S. Ct. at 2781-82.
304. Id. at 853-59, 104 S. Ct. at 2787-90.
305. Id. at 865, 104 S. Ct. at 2793.
306. In International Woodworkers v. Donovan, 792 F.2d 762 (9th Cir. 1986), the court ruled
that the adoption of new regulations, which reflected a change in the department's interpretation of
a statute, was such an inconsistency as to place a heavy burden on the government to demonstrate
substantial justification. Id. at 765. However, despite the court's reference to inconsistency as a
basis for an EAJA award, it appears that the salient factor in the court's decision was that the new
regulation was less favorable to the affected individuals, whereas the governing statute expressly
mandated that the department adopt the construction most favorable to those affected. Id.
Accordingly, the language in the decision suggesting that the mere fact of inconsistency between the
old and new regulations indicated lack of substantial justification may be dicta. The holding in the
case need not support the proposition that mere adoption of a new regulation contrary to a prior
construction of a statute can in itself be characterized as unjustifiable, provided that the new
regulation evaluated on the merits reflects a plausible construction of the statute.
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particular, lack of substantial justification has been found in three different
scenarios of inconsistency. First, when the government violates its own
established policy, it is in no position to claim substantial justification. 7 The
government at least must live by its own rules. However, courts must be careful
to distinguish between a patent violation by an agency of its own rules and a
"mere failure to conform" with an ambiguous regulation as ultimately construed
by the court.3 " As one court has noted, "[u]ndoubtedly, there will be instances
in which an agency might take a position about its own statute or regulation,
which, while incorrect, might appear correct to a reasonable person."'3°9 In the
end, an accusation against an agency of violating its own regulations or rules is
only the beginning of the inquiry. The follow-up question is whether there were
reasonable grounds for debate about the meaning and application of that rule or
whether instead the agency acted in direct violation of an unequivocal regulatory
or policy prescription.
Second, the government acts without substantial justification when it has
"adopt[ed] a general policy in dealing with cases of a given variety but take[s]
a different position (inexplicably or maliciously) in one or a few cases."'31 In
such an instance, the government apparently has targeted a particular party for
atypical treatment.3 ' As the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit recognized in Spencer v. National Labor Relations
Board,"2 this atypical treatment implicates one of the central purposes of the
EAJA: "One of the systemic sources of inequity advocates of the [EAJA] sought
to eliminate was the ability of the government to use its superior resources to
beat into submission the hapless victims of such deviations from customary
practices."'3 3 Accordingly, as that court stated, "a court reviewing an EAJA
307. See, e.g., Bunn v. Bowen, 637 F. Supp. 464, 468 (E.D.N.C. 1986) (finding that the
government's position was not substantially justified because, inter alia, "the government failed to
follow its own regulations"); Kennedy v. Heckler, 598 F. Supp. 124, 125 (D. Md. 1984) (awarding
attorney's fees under the EAJA because "[g]iven the Secretary's failure to apply the dictates of her
own regulations, it becomes apparent that her litigation position was legally and factually
indefensible').
308. Trahan v. Brady, 907 F.2d 1215, 1220 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (stating the distinction between
"patently unreasonable agency conduct" and "mere failure to conform to their own statutes and
regulations'). Cf Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536, 108 S. Ct. 1954, 1958 (1988)
(stating that, for the government to be precluded from asserting the discretionary function exception
as a defense to a Federal Tort Claims Act suit on the basis that a mandatory duty deprived the
government of discretion, the "federal statutb, regulation, or policy [must] specifically prescribe a
course of action for an employee to follow").
309. Id. at 1220.
310. Spencer v. NLRB, 712 F.2d 539, 560 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 936, 104 S.
Ct. 1908 (1984).
311. Essex Electro Eng'rs, Inc. v. United States, 757 F.2d 247, 254 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (identifying
as a factor relevant to the substantial justification inquiry the question "whether the government
departed from established policy in such a way as to single out a particular private party").
312. 712 F.2d at 539.
313. Id. at 560. The EAJA was originally enacted as a rider to a small business assistance bill.
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petition should demand that the government make a particularly strong showing
of justification for its position when there is evidence that the petitioner was
subjected to atypically harsh treatment."3 4
Finally, there may be times when the government just cannot seem to get its
story straight in court. Under such circumstances, the inconsistency in position
is not attributable to formal adoption of a new policy, but rather the slipshod or
uncertain handling of the matter by the agency involved or by its litigators in
court.3"' Vacillation by government litigators in the position taken before the
court would itself suggest an inability to settle upon a satisfying, that is, a
defensible position.316 Although a change of horses in midstream may not be
conclusive evidence of an indefensible position, it raises the suspicion.
4. Dishonesty or Bad Faith by the Government
In litigation, as in life, being caught in a lie or deception is usually fatal to
claims of justification. The public rightly demands accountability from its
government and an appreciation by government officials that they hold a public
trust. When an agency in its underlying conduct or a government counsel in
court presents dishonest rationales for an action, adopts a clandestine practice
adverse to citizens, or conceals vital information (for reasons other than accepted
bases for confidentiality or security), the logical conclusion is that the govern-
ment's position cannot bear open scrutiny and cannot stand on its candid merits.
Moreover, beyond merely being a signal that the government's position on the
merits is not colorable, dishonesty or bad faith independently undermines the
"substantial justification" for the government's position. Limited deception or
dishonesty infecting only minor aspects of an overall justifiable case position
may not command a conclusion of lack of substantial justification when the case
is viewed as a whole.31 However, a particularly "egregious example of
misconduct might, even if confined to a narrow but important issue, taint the
Congress was concerned that small businesses were being subjected to arbitrary regulation by federal
administrators and "that small business are the target of agency action precisely because they do not
have the resources to fully litigate the issue." H.R. Rep. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1980),
reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4984, 4988; S. Rep. No. 253, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1979). See
generally supra section I.B (discussing the background and purposes of the EAJA).
314. Spencer, 712 F.2d at 561.
315. "Inconsistency in position" should be understood as describing irreconcilable or strongly
varying positions, as contrasted with the appropriate refinement and development of additional
supporting arguments that occurs during the progression of a case from initial incident to litigation
posture.
316. See Schuenemeyer v. United States, 776 F.2d 329, 331 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (stating that the
government's concession that its earlier articulated basis for adverse personnel action was contrary
to statutes and regulations and the subsequent advancing of new defenses for its actions provided
another ground for holding that its position was not substantially justified).
317. See generally supra section IV.A.2 (discussing the "holistic" approach to substantial
justification, which requires evaluating the "position of the United States" in the case as a whole).
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government's 'position' in the entire case as unreasonable.""3 8  Deliberate
deception and breach of the public trust may well qualify as an "egregious
example of misconduct."3 9
For example, in Linn v. Chivatero,3 20 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit reversed a district court's denial of EAJA fees in substantial
part because of disturbing dishonesty by a government official in the underlying
incident that gave rise to the litigation.32 ' The Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
had issued a summons to a taxpayer requiring the production of certain corporate
records.322 The taxpayer's counsel inadvertently sent the taxpayer's personal,
as well as corporate, records to the IRS.3" The taxpayer's counsel immediate-
ly informed the IRS that only the corporate records were responsive to the
summons and that Fifth Amendment privilege was asserted as to the remaining
documents. The IRS agent agreed with the taxpayer's counsel to jointly
inventory the documents and separate the non-responsive personal records on the
following day. Instead, the IRS agent remained long after working hours,
staying until after midnight, copying as many of the documents as she could.32
When the IRS refused to return the copies made, the taxpayer and his counsel
filed an action alleging violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments and sought
a return of the documents and all copies together with an injunction against use
of any information gathered from them.3' Eventually the government capitu-
lated and agreed to entry of judgment.326
The Fifth Circuit ordered an award of attorney's fees under the EAJA,
stating that "[t]he government, by its actions, has implicitly conceded that this
action was wrongful. 327  In addition to the government's capitulation and
apparent acceptance of the complaint's characterization of the IRS's actions as
wrongful, the court specifically singled out the deceitful conduct of the IRS agent
who, after reaching an oral agreement with the taxpayer's counsel to inventory
318. Roanoke River Basin Ass'n v. Hudson, 991 F.2d 132, 139 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 182 (1993).
319. See id.
320. 790 F.2d 1270 (5th Cir. 1986).
321. Id. at 1272.
322. Id. at 1271. In 1982, Congress adopted a new and distinct fee-shifting provision for
Internal Revenue cases and also simultaneously withdrew tax cases from the scope of,the EAJA. Tax
Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 292, 96 Stat. 324, 572-74
(codified at 26 U.S.C. § 7430 (1988) and 28 U.S.C. § 2412(e) (1988)). See generally supra section
ll.D (discussing exclusion of tax cases from the EAJA). The Linn court did not address whether this
case would have come within the scope of the internal revenue fee-shifting statute or, because it
sought the return of documents and alleged violations of the Constitution, would have fallen outside
of the scope of that provision. The court apparently assumed the applicability of the EAJA without
further consideration.
323. Linn, 790 F.2d at 1271.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 1272.
327. Id.
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and segregate the documents, instead spent most of the night copying as many
documents as possible.32 When the government takes clandestine actions in
the dark of night, we may presume that its conduct cannot survive scrutiny in the
light of day.
If the government's deceptive or otherwise objectionable misconduct rises
to the level of bad faith, the government may be liable for attorney's fees not
only under EAJA Subsection (d) but also under Subsection (b). EAJA
Subsection (b) subjects the United States to liability for attorney's fees "to the
same extent that any other party would be liable under the common law or under
the terms of any statute which specifically provides for such an award."329
This provision makes the federal government liable for fees under common law
and statutory fee-shifting rules to the same extent as any other party.330
Through Subsection (b), the government has been found liable for attorney's fees
under the common law rule permitting fees when the losing party has acted "'in
bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons."'33'
The bad faith exception to the American Rule applies only in exceptional
cases.332  The court "may consider conduct both during and prior to the
litigation, although the award may not be based solely on the conduct that led to
the substantive claim." '333 Bad faith in conduct giving rise to the suit may be
a basis for a fee award when, even after a party's legal duty became manifest,
that party remained so recalcitrant that the injured party was forced to resort to
litigation to vindicate plain legal rights.334 The essence of bad faith for
purposes of this fee-shifting rule is egregious misconduct that impinges upon the
integrity of the judicial process.33 The rationale behind the bad faith rule is
328. Id. See also Hanover Potato Prods., Inc. v. Shalala, 989 F.2d 123, 126, 129-30 (3d Cir.
1993) (holding the Food and Drug Administration's promulgation of a regulation in violation of
administrative procedures was not substantially justified, focusing primarily upon the agency's filure
to place most of the administrative record on public file as required by the Administrative Procedure
Act, its subsequent disclosure only in the middle of litigation that the certified record was not the true
and complete administrative record, and the fact that regulated parties were unable to obtain the
"hidden" documents actually relied upon by the agency).
329. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(h) (1988).
330. See generally supra section I.B.2 (providing a summary of the EAJA, including Subsection
(b)); Sisk, supra note 33, at 783-88 (discussing EAJA Subsection (b)).
331. Perales v. Casillas, 950 F.2d 1066, 1071 (5th Cir. 1992) (quoting F.D. Rich Co. v. United
States ex rel. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129, 194 S. Ct. 2157, 2165 (1974)).
332. Bergman v. United States, 844 F.2d 353, 357 (6th Cir. 1988).
333. Perales, 950 F.2d at 1071; see also McLarty v. United States, 6 F.3d 545, 549 (8th Cir.
1993) (same); Sanchez v. Rowe, 870 F.2d 291, 295 (5th Cir. 1989) (same).
334. American Hosp. Ass'n v. Sullivan, 938 F.2d 216, 220 (D.C. Cir. 1991). See also Perales,
950 F.2d at 1072 (stating that the agency's disregard of regulations well over a year into litigation
might support a finding of bad faith for the award of fees under EAJA Subsection (b)).
335. See, e.g., Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Hendrix College, 53 F.3d 209, 211
(8th Cir. 1995) (affirming district court finding that initiation of lawsuit against college, immediately
after being made aware of facts showing lawsuit was baseless, constituted bad faith warranting fee
award against the government under Subsection (b)); Hyatt v. Shalala, 6 F.3d 250, 255-56 (4th Cir.
1993) (affirming district court finding that government's continued and systematic refusal to comply
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to sanction and thus deter employment of the litigation process for an improper
end.3
36
If a party is able to make a case for bad faith within the common law
doctrine for fee-shifting, Subsection (b) is a more attractive basis for a fee award
because it is not subject to the limits on party eligibility337 or the $75 per hour
cap on fee awards 33 imposed under Subsection (d). Even if misbehavior falls
short of true bad faith or is not sufficiently directed at the litigation process as
to fall under the bad faith exception to the American Rule for application of
EAJA Subsection (b), misconduct by the government that approaches the level
of bad faith would surely suggest unjustifiable conduct warranting a fee award
under EAJA Subsection (d). Although the bad faith standard applicable under
Subsection (b) "must be higher than the substantial justification standard" of
Subsection (d),339 presumably the higher standard includes the lower. Bad faith
thus would ordinarily constitute unjustified conduct under Subsection (d),
assuming the misconduct is sufficiently egregious as to taint the government's
case viewed as a whole.
5. Undue Delay by the Government
In early EAJA decisions, a few courts suggested that the government has a
higher burden to demonstrate substantial justification when the litigation was
foreseeably prolonged and complex.3" In Spencer v. National Labor Relations
Board,34' the District of Columbia Circuit opined:
The longer and more complex the course of litigation necessary to
vindicate his position, the more hesitant a private party will be to
with circuit precedent with respect to the standard of pain in social security disability cases
constituted bad faith for purposes of a fee award under EAJA Subsection (b)).
336. See generally Shimmon v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, 744 F.2d 1226 (6th Cir.
1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1215, 105 S. Ct. 1191 (1985).
337. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B) (1988). See generally supra section Ill.B (discussing the nature
of the party limitations on eligibility for a fee award under Subsection (d)).
338. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2XA) (1988). See generally infra section V (discussing measurement
of fee award under Subsection (d)). See also Hyatt, 6 F.3d at 254 (saying that the distinction
between Subsections (b) and (d) "is of considerable consequence in the calculation of the amount of
fees" because Subsection (d) imposes a $75 per hour cap while Subsection (b) permits use of the
market rate to determine hourly fees); Perales v. Casillas, 950 F.2d 1066, 1072 (5th Cir. 1992)
(stating that if a finding of bad faith is made, then the court need not address substantial justification
under Subsection (d) because the fee petitioner would receive the higher market rate under Subsection
(b)).
339. Barry v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 1324, 1334 (9th Cir. 1987).
340. See, e.g., United States v. 2,116 Boxes of Boned Beef, 726 F.2d 1481, 1486 n.lI (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 825, 105 S. Ct. 105 (1984); Foley Constr. Co. v. United States Army
Corps of Eng'rs, 716 F.2d 1202, 1204 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 936, 104 S. Ct. 1908
(1984); Spencer v. NLRB, 712 F.2d 539, 560 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 936, 104 S.
Ct. 1908 (1984).
341. 712 F.2d at 539.
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defend his interests, even if an eventual finding that the government's
position was not substantially justified would result in reimbursement
of his costs of counsel. The rational litigant will realize that, the more
protracted the proceeding, the more he stands to lose if either he does
not prevail on the merits or his petition for fees is denied, while the
money he stands to gain (or the point of principle he hopes to make)
remains constant. Sensitivity to the central objective of the
[EAJA]-reduction of the deterrents to challenges of unreasonable
government conduct-thus suggests that, in categories of cases in which
substantial investments of effort and money commonly are required to
prosecute suits to their ultimate conclusions, the government should be
obliged to make an especially strong showing that its persistence in
litigation was justified. 1 2
Legislative history provides some support for this theory. The committee
reports accompanying the original legislation stated that "where a party has had
to engage in lengthy administrative proceedings before final vindication of his
or her rights in the courts, the government should have to make a strong showing
to demonstrate that its action was reasonable." '343 One commentator has stated
that the "strong showing" requirement suggested in the legislative history for
prolonged proceedings "apparently rests on the premise that the greater the
expenditure of government funds, the greater the need to make agencies
accountable." 3"
Nevertheless, in practice, this factor has been found to add little to the
"substantial justification" analysis. For example, in Dubose v. Pierce,34 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found that while the
housing subsidy litigation at issue in that case had "certainly been long and
complex, spanning some ten years and several circuits," circumstances did not
indicate that the government's behavior had deterred aggrieved parties from filing
suit." The court further stated that "simple reliance on the length of litigation
in this case is deceptive" because the length of settlement negotiations and fee
proceedings was not foreseeable at the outset of the litigation.347 Moreover,
the court concluded, when the government's position appears to be supported by
a reasonable legal argument, "the government should not be penalized for
342. Id. at 560.
343. H.R. Rep. No. 1418,96th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4984,
4997; S. Rep. No. 253, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1979).
344. Barry S. Rutcofsky, Note, The Award ofAttorney's Fees Under the Equal Access to Justice
Act, 11 Hofstra L. Rev. 307, 323 (1982).
345. 761 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1985), vacated on other grounds, 487 U.S. 1229, 108 S. Ct. 2890
(1988).




defending a suit which becomes long, complex and eventually unsuccessful."34
Although the Dubose decision was later vacated by the Supreme Court on other
grounds,349 that court's inability to usefully apply the prolonged litigation factor
to the substantial justification inquiry remains instructive.
The length and complexity of litigation are frequently matters outside of the
control of the parties to a lawsuit. If the subject matter is complicated, the
factual issues are difficult to resolve, or the legal authorities do not compel a
simple answer, neither side can be faulted for pressing forward to a resolution
of the case. The protracted nature of a lawsuit is generally so divorced from the
reasonableness of either the underlying government conduct or its litigation
position as to shed no light on the ultimate justification of its overall position.
Moreover, if applied as a fixed standard, the "strong showing" requirement
suggested in the legislative history and those early judicial opinions is difficult
to reconcile with the Supreme Court's firm rejection in Pierce v. Underwood35
of any standard for substantial justification that adds to the basic measure of
reasonableness.35
If the prolonged length of litigation is attributable to undue delay by the
government in its prosecution or defense of litigation, such that the government
is actually at fault for the protraction, the "substantial justification" calculation
changes significantly. When the government's underlying conduct was
unreasonable, delay in the litigation process just makes a bad case worse,
although by increasing litigation costs it adds to the amount of the government's
liability in fees.352 Indeed, if the charge against the government on the merits
is inexcusable delay in taking action, further delay in handling the litigation
certainly exacerbates the situation. If the government's overall position is well
justified, however, a small measure of undue delay by itself is not likely to
warrant an EAJA award. Nevertheless, delay does tarnish the justifiability of the
government's litigation position and, if sufficiently egregious, may "taint the
348. Id.
349. In Dubose, the Second Circuit applied a de novo standard of appellate review, and reversed
the district court's finding that the government's position was not substantially justified. 761 F.2d
913, 920 (2d Cir. 1985). The Supreme Court vacated the judgment in light of Pierce v. Underwood,
487 U.S. 552, 108 S. Ct 2541 (1988), which held that the proper standard of review is abuse of
discretion. See generally infra section V.E (discussing the standard of appellate review of substantial
justification findings under the EAJA). On remand, applying that deferential standard, the Second
Circuit affirmed the district court's finding. Dubose v. Pierce, 857 F.2d 889, 892 (2d Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1007, 109 S. Ct. 1643 (1989).
350. 487 U.S. 552, 108 S. Ct. 2541 (1988).
351. Id. at 565-68, 108 S. Ct. at 2250-51. See generally supra section IV.B (discussing the
meaning of "substantial justification").
352. Moreover, excessive or bad faith delay may constitute a "special factor" justifying an
increase in the hourly rate above the $75 per hour cap. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2XA) (1988)
(establishing a limit on attorney's fees of $75 per hour "unless the court determines that... a special
factor ... justifies a higher fee'). See generally infra section V (discussing measurement of a fee
award under the EAJA).
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government's 'position' in the entire case as unreasonable. 353 Under certain
circumstances, especially in a close case, a position that was initially justified
may turn sour by reason of excessive delay.
6. Uncertainty in the Law and Novel Issues of Law
It would almost go without saying that the greater the level of uncertainty
in the law, the more room there is for reasonable, that is substantially justified,
disagreement about the state of the law. Nevertheless, courts frequently pause
to observe that the government is substantially justified when the "issue was a
close one," '354 that the government's argument was more than reasonable when
"the issue involved a matter of first impression," 355 or that the government is
not without "substantial justification" when a statutory and regulatory framework
presents "a confusing tapestry in which the meaning is not easily discerned." '356
Although these kinds of statements may be little more than conclusions
announced by the courts after determining that "substantial justification" is
present, they nonetheless confirm that the government is not liable for attorney's
fees when its legal position (assuming a justified factual position) is fairly
debatable. In other words, the government must be alerted by plain statutory or
regulatory language or by clear and controlling case precedent before its practices
can be assailed as unjustified.357
353. See Roanoke River Basin Ass'n v. Hudson, 991 F.2d 132, 139 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 114
S. Ct. 182 (1993). See generally supra section IV.D.4 (discussing impact of bad faith on substantial
justification analysis).
354. Johnson v. United States Dep't of Housing & Urban Dev., 939 F.2d 586, 590 (8th Cir.
1991).
355. Edwards v. McMahon, 834 F.2d 796, 802 (9th Cir. 1987).
356. StiUwell v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 291, 303 (1994).
357. Moreover, courts must carefully distinguish between the question of whether the
government has refused to follow a clear statutory or regulatory command, which would suggest lack
of substantial justification, and the question of whether the government, while acknowledging the
existence of the obligation, carried out its duties adequately in compliance with the statutory
direction, the substantial justification of which would depend upon the particular circumstances. For
example, in Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Marsh, 52 F.3d 1485 (9th Cir. 1995), the majority
of a panel of the Ninth Circuit found that the Army Corps of Engineers had utterly failed to discuss
the cumulative impacts of three dams upon the surrounding environment in an environmental impact
statement, and had not merely been insufficiently thorough in its analysis. Id. at 1492. Because the
Corps "completely omitted an area of analysis clearly required by the regulations implementing" the
federal environmental statute, the majority concluded that this failure to comply with a mandatory
duty foreclosed any argument that the government's position was substantially justified under the
EAJA. Id. By contrast, the dissenting judge protested that the government "has never argued that
it had no such duty; its position (with which the court disagreed on the merits] was that Corps
adequately considered the cumulative impacts in its report." Id. at 1497-98 (Rymer, J., dissenting).
Because Judge Rymer in dissent believed that "[w]hether or not the Corps' report adequately
addressed these cumulative impacts was a question on which reasonable minds could differ," she
could not say that the district court had abused its discretion in determining that the government's
position was substantially justified. Id. at 1498. In sum, the characterization of the issue-as to
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However, courts must remember that the justifiability of the government's
position is to be evaluated in terms of both its pre-litigation conduct and its
litigation posture. 3s8 Although these two positions will often parallel one
another, there may be circumstances in which there is uncertainty in the law
concerning what qualifies as reasonableness in pre-litigation conduct, thereby
justifying a litigation position taken in defense of that conduct. Nonetheless, an
ultimately adverse determination on that question constitutes a declaration that
the underlying conduct was unreasonable and therefore unjustifiable. Thus, one
might reasonably contend that underlying government conduct was reasonable
(meaning the litigation position is justifiable), but the rejection of that argument
necessarily amounts to a declaration that the underlying conduct was indeed
unreasonable (meaning the pre-litigation position is not justifiable). In other
words, if the standard of judicial review of the underlying agency conduct is
truly one of rationality, the fact that reasonable people may disagree about what
is reasonable cannot dull the sting of a resolution of that dispute against the
reasonableness of the underlying action.359
For example, in Marcus v. Shalala,3 ° the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit agreed that "uncertainty in the law arising from
conflicting authority or the novelty of the question weighs in the government's
favor when analyzing the reasonableness of the government's litigation
position. '361  Indeed, the court noted that the district court had found the
government's litigation position to be substantially justified.3' However,
because the substantial justification inquiry also required consideration of the
government's pre-litigation conduct, which the courts had declared "manifestly
contrary to the statute" and unsupported by the language of the statute, an award
under the EAJA was warranted.363
Finally, the legislative history states that the "special circumstances"
exception to fee liability in Subparagraph (d)(l)(A) 3" is designed in part as a
"safety valve" to "insure that the Government is not deterred from advancing in
whether the government wholly disregarded a mandatory statutory or regulatory duty or instead failed
to adequately carry it out-may be nearly dispositive of the question of substantial justification.
358. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(dX2)(D) (1988) (defining the "position of the United States" as meaning
"in addition to the position taken by the United States in the civil action, the action or failure to act
by the agency upon which the civil action is based"). See generally supra section IV.A. 1 (discussing
the statutory definition of "position of the United States").
359. See generally supra section IV.C.3 and 4 (discussing the interrelationship of the basis for
a merits decision and the substantial justification inquiry, especially in the context of rationality
review on the merits).
360. 17 F.3d 1033 (7th Cir. 1994).
361. Id. at 1037.
362. Id..
363. Id. at 1037-38.
364. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(IXA) (1988) (providing that attorney's fees should be awarded unless
the position of the government is sustantially justified "or special circumstances make an award
unjust").
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good faith the novel but credible extensions and interpretations of the law that
often underlie vigorous enforcement efforts."'3 65 However, it is not clear how
much this "safety valve" adds. Since the legislative history refers to the "special
circumstances" provision as applicable to "novel but credible" legal arguments,
that presumably would pass muster in any event under the basic substantial
justification standard,3" the credibility qualification seems to leave little room
for the "special circumstances" exception to operate independently.367 Al-
though the "special circumstances" language has broader application as a rule of
equity limitation on the award of fees,3" it is probably best understood in this
particular context as a statement of emphasis. It is a reminder to the courts to
hesitate before denying the government the privilege of asking for judicial
resolution of novel and credible, although ultimately non-meritorious, theories of
governmental authority and regulatory or program standards.369
7. Controlling Law
The opposite of uncertainty in the law is, of course, clarity. As the District
of Columbia Circuit observed in Spencer v. National Labor Relations Board:
370
365. H.R. Rep. No. 1418,96th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4984,
4990; S. Rep. No. 253, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1979).
366. Courts sometimes refer in passing to the "novel but credible" standard from the legislative
history while discussing substantial justification, without any suggestion of an additional "special
circumstances" stage of analysis. See, e.g., Dole v. Phoenix Roofing, Inc., 922 F.2d 1202, 1209 (5th
Cir. 1991); Foster v. Tourtellotte, 704 F.2d 1109, 1112 (9th Cir. 1983).
367. See Devine v. Sutermeister, 733 F.2d 892, 895 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (ruling that, while some
of the government's argument might be characterized as "novel," "this characterization does not
detract from the fact that its positions were simply insupportable given the great weight of statutory,
regulatory, and judicial authority to the contrary"); Securities & Exchange Comm'n v. Morelli, No.
91 Civ. 3874 (LAP), 1995 WL 9387, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 1995) (stating that, "[a]lthough it is
true that the government can carry its burden [of establishing substantial justification] by showing
that its position advanced a novel but credible extension of the law, it is important not to overlook
the word 'credible' in this formulation") (citation omitted); Traveler Trading Co. v. United States,
713 F. Supp. 409, 413 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1989) (noting that while the government argued that the
special circumstance of novel and credible legal theories precluded an EAJA award, the government
"has provided essentially the same reason for existence of special circumstances as it did in its
argument that the government was substantially justified"). But see Keasler v. United States, 585 F.
Supp. 825, 841 (E.D. Ark. 1984) (stating that the court "believes that the 'special circumstances;
exception to liability can play a critical role within the framework of the EAJA," and that "even
where a court's rejection of a novel legal argument suggests that the Government's position was not
'substantially justified' the advancement of a novel legal argument might justify invocation of the
'special circumstances' exception to fees liability"), aff'd, 766 F.2d 1277 (8th Cir. 1985).
368. See infra section IV.F (discussing the "special circumstances" exception to the award of
fees under the EAJA).
369. See Devine, 733 F.2d at 895 ("In some contexts, the novelty or importance of the issues
presented may validate, for purposes of substantial justification, an otherwise marginal [case] by the
government.').
370. 712 F.2d 539, 560 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 936, 104 S. Ct. 1908 (1984).
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[T]he more clearly established are the governing norms, and the more
clearly they dictate a result in favor of the private litigant, the less
"justified" it is for the government to pursue or persist in litigation.
The government is always free, of course, to seek modification or
repudiation of established doctrine, but individual private litigants
should not be compelled to subsidize such reevaluations of controlling
doctrine.37'
Clearly established rules of law may be found in statutory or regulatory language
that leaves no room for reasonable disagreement or in mandatory precedent in
the jurisdiction that is directly on point.
Not surprisingly, government positions taken directly in the teeth of
conflicting precedent in that circuit have not received a favorable reception.
Failure to follow circuit precedent has led invariably to a finding of no
substantial justification.372 Fortunately, such a situation rarely occurs, outside
of such controversial, but rather unique and isolated, episodes as the policy of
"nonacquiescence" adopted during the 1980's by the Social Security Administra-
tion toward court of appeals rulings on evaluation of disability claims that
conflicted with the agency's preferred interpretation of the statute.373 Obvious-
ly, deliberate adoption by an agency of a policy declining to apply the law of the
circuit was sowing the whirlwind for purposes of liability under the EAJA. 74
371. Id. at 559. See also Rogers v. Heckler, No. 83 C 5030, 1985 WL 819, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar.
19, 1985) ("The government is least justified in defending suit where the controlling law is well
settled and it dictates a result in favor of the private litigant.").
372. See Love v. Heckler, 588 F. Supp. 1346, 1348 (M.D. Ala. 1984) (stating that "it is
inconceivable that the [government's] position can be substantially justified when [it] adopts a
position which is contrary to the judicial precedent in this Circuit"). See, e.g., Koss v. Sullivan, 982
F.2d 1226, 1229 (8th Cir. 1993); Washington v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 959, 962, 968 (3d Cir. 1985).
373. Among the cases criticizing the Social Security Administration's "non-acquiescence" policy
are Hyatt v. Sullivan, 899 F.2d 329, 331-34 (4th Cir. 1989); Stieberger v. Bowen, 801 F.2d 29, 32-33
(2d Cir. 1986); Layton v. Heckler, 726 F.2d 440, 442 (8th Cir. 1984); and Lopez v. Heckler, 725
F.2d 1489, 1497, 1503 (9th Cir.), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 469 U.S. 1082, 105 S.
Ct. 583 (1984). For varying views on the Social Security Administration's "non-acquiescence"
policy, see generally Michael S. Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say
What the Law Is, 83 Geo. L.J. 217, 272-76 (1994); Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz,
Nonacqutescence by Federal Administrative Agencies, 98 Yale L.J. 679, 692-704 (1989); Carolyn A.
Kubitschek, Social Security Administration Nonacquiescence: The Need for Legislative Curbs on
Agency Discretion, 50 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 399 (1989); Angela M. Johnson, The Social Security
Administration's Policy of Nonacquiescence, 62 Ind. L.J. 1101 (1987); and Carolyn B. Kuhl, The
Social Security Administration's Nonacquiescence Policy, 1984 Det. C.L. Rev. 913.
374. See, e.g., Thompson v. Sullivan, 980 F.2d 280, 283 (4th Cir. 1992) ("A policy of 'non-
acquiescence' cannot be 'substantially justified' in law.'); Hyatt v. Heckler, 807 F.2d 376, 382 (4th
Cir. 1986) ("[T]he Secretary's policy of nonacquiescence entitle(s] the claimant to attorney's fees."),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 820, 108 S. Ct. 79 (1987). See also Mezey & Olson, supra note 230, at 18
("The practice of non-acquiescence ... became a 'red flag' to federal judges. And the disability
claimants were often the beneficiaries of judicial wrath against the Social Security Administra-
tion-by having their benefits restored and by receiving EAJA fees."). However, deliberate
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Does this mean that the government may never question existing doctrine or
ask the court to overturn an established precedent? To begin with, the
government of course is never disenfranchised from "taking a long shot" and
arguing for the reversal of unfavorable precedent. The question is whether it
must pay attorney's fees under the EAJA if it proves unsuccessful in that
venture. 3" Although at least one circuit has denied fees when the government
made what it termed "a reasonable attempt to reopen a closed question" by
asking the court of appeals to reconsider precedent,376 another circuit has
questioned the justice of "forcing the private party, who has been randomly
selected by the government to be the target of its test case, to pay the large cost
of litigating the issue if he ultimately prevails."3"' And if the issue is of
sufficient importance to motivate the federal government to take the unusual step
of challenging an established precedent, government officials contemplating such
a test case will probably not be "dissuaded by the prospect of an award of fees
to a private party's counsel."37 Indeed, if such an important issue is to receive
the attention and full exploration it deserves, "it is especially important that the
private litigant not be deterred, by the prospect of high litigation expenses, from
defending his interests" so that the matter is "subjected to vigorous adversarial
testing." '379
However, not every precedent is of equal potency and integrity. If the
government asks an appellate court to mercifully deliver the last rites to a
precedent that has long since lost vitality, accepts an implicit invitation to seek
reexamination of a precedent when judges on the court have questioned its
continued legitimacy, or explores the durability of a decision that has been
nonacquiescence by an agency in the precedent of a circuit whose law will plainly govern a case
must be distinguished from inadvertent or unavoidable nonacquiescence that occurs because uncertain
venue provisions make it impossible for some agencies to know in advance where a case will be
litigated. For example, because the venue provisions of its enabling statute provide several
alternatives for seeking judicial review of its orders, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)
"cannot predict with certainty the identity of the reviewing court." Estreicher & Revesz, supra note
373, at 764. Accordingly, the NLRB by adopting a uniform national position administratively does
not thereby necessarily intend deliberate nonacquiescence to an adverse ruling by a particular court
of appeals. See id. at 765 ("[W]here venue is uncertain, petitioners aggrieved by the agency action
will typically repair to the circuit which previously ruled against the agency, and the court will view
the agency's behavior to be quite akin to intracircuit nonacquiescence.").
375. In Spencer v. NLRB, 712 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1983) cert. denied, 466 U.S. 936, 104 S. Ct.
1908 (1984), the court stated:
[T]he importance of a legal issue may justify a decision by government counsel to "take
a long shot"-for example, to argue on appeal for the overruling of a controlling
precedent unfavorable to the United States, even though the likelihood of obtaining such
a judgment is slight. Several considerations suggest that, when the government loses such
a case, it should be obliged to reimburse the private party for his attorney's fees.
712 F.2d at 558.
376. Wyandotte Say. Bank v. NLRB, 682 F.2d 119, 120 (6th Cir. 1982).
377. Spencer, 712 F.2d at 558-59.
378. Id. at 559.
379. Id. at 558.
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subject to continued and powerful critique by other courts or by legal scholars,
the reasonableness of the government's position may be apparent, even if the
court does not choose this particular day to remove the precedent. In any event,
the government certainly is not justified in ignoring controlling precedent, failing
to recognize that a case which is truly on point governs the current situation, or
petulantly refusing to accept decisions that it dislikes.3 s" When the government
determines to request a re-examination of existing precedent, it has an obligation
to do so with integrity, forthrightly acknowledging the nature of its undertaking
and supporting its position with a thoughtful and creative analysis of the
evolution of the law that justifies a change in judicial authority.
8. Judicial Endorsement or Rejection of a Position on the Merits
One of the most significant reflectors of substantial justification for a
government position is ratification of it as correct by a judge or court, notwith-
standing that the government's position was unsuccessful before the present court
in the instant case. Similarly, but with significantly lesser evidentiary strength,
a rejection on the merits of the government's position by another judge or court
may indicate a want of substantial justification. The strength of the inference of
reasonableness (or lack thereof) provided by judicial endorsement or disapproval
varies according to whether it constitutes an isolated win (or loss) or a string of
victories (or defeats), together with the level of the tribunals disposing of the
question."' Moreover, while the views of judges and courts "are properly
considered when conducting this inquiry," "[t]he most powerful indicator of the
reasonableness of an ultimately rejected position is a decision on the merits and
the rationale which supports that decision." ' A judicial endorsement or
rejection of the government's position on the merits is worthy of weight when,
rather than merely stating a conclusion, it is articulated with an analysis that
addresses the principal authorities or legal doctrine.
In Pierce v. Underwood,3"3 the Supreme Court agreed that "objective
indicia consisting of the view expressed by other courts on the merits of the
Government's position" could be relevant, although the Court found this
"category of objective criteria" not enough to decide that particular case.3u In
Pierce, nine district courts and.two courts of appeals (every court to hear the
380. See Phillips v. Sullivan, 729 F. Supp. 1571, 1573 (W.D. Va. 1990) ("The government's
refusal to acknowledge and attempt to distinguish controlling precedent, even after the court pointed
out its applicability, indicates that its position was unreasonable."), affd as modified, 936 F.2d 176
(4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1038, 112 S. Ct. 887 (1992).
381. See Universal Restoration, Inc. v. United States, 16 Cl. Ct. 214, 218 (1989) (stating that
a high "magnitude of disagreement among jurists is powerful evidence that... the government was
advancing a position that, although ultimately unsuccessful, has at least" a reasonable basis).
382. Friends of the Boundary Waters Wilderness v. Thomas, 53 F.3d 881, 885 (8th Cir. 1995).
383. 487 U.S. 552, 108 S. Ct. 2541 (1988).
384. Id. at 569, 108 S. Ct. at 2552.
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merits) had rejected the government's position, while the government had
succeeded only in obtaining a stay from one court of appeals and the Supreme
Court and a grant of its petition for certiorari by the Court (before settlement of
the case).385 While not denying that the grants of a stay and certiorari provided
some evidence of substantial justification for the government's position, the
Court concluded that the plaintiffs' "side of the case has at least sufficient force
that [the Court] could not possibly state, on the basis of these objective
indications alone, that the District Court abused its discretion in finding no
substantial justification."3
Although the Supreme Court found the judicial line-up in Pierce v.
Underwood to be inconclusive, or at least not so compelling in direction to
overcome a contrary district court finding under a deferential standard of
review, 387 the Court stated:
Obviously, the fact that one other court agreed or disagreed with the
Government does not establish whether its position was substantially
justified. Conceivably, the Government could take a position that is not
substantially justified, yet win; even more likely, it could take a position
that is substantially justified, yet lose. Nevertheless, a string of losses
can be indicative; and even more so a string of successes.3"'
In evaluating the significance of judicial ratification or rejection of the
government's position, a court must keep in mind that the government is only
obliged to present a reasonable, not a correct, argument. Thus, the mere fact of
loss in one or more courts may indicate nothing more momentous than that the
government's position was mistaken but not necessarily unreasonable. 39  By
contrast, even a single victory, while far from conclusive, counts as a determina-
tion by one court that the government's position is more than merely reasonable
but actually correct. Still, because even members of the judiciary are hardly
infallible, an isolated court decision or judicial opinion endorsing the govern-
ment's position may be the result of a lapse in judgment and thus, by itself,
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. The Pierce Court's assessment of the objective criteria of views expressed by other courts
largely reflects the deferential standard of appellate review applied to the trial court's determination
of lack of substantial justification. See generally infra section IV.E (discussing the abuse of
discretion standard of appellate review for substantial justification determinations by trial courts).
Thus, as the tribunal with primary decisionmaking power, a district court quite properly could
conclude that, notwithstanding a string of losses on the merits, the grant of a stay and certiorari by
the Supreme Court was significant evidence that the government's argument was substantially
justified.
388. Pierce, 487 U.S. at 569, 108 S. Ct. at 2552.
389. See United States v. Paisley, 957 F.2d 1161, 1165 (4th Cir.) (rejecting suggestion that the
fact that "the legal position taken by the Government had in the end been found legally wrong by
a unanimous Supreme Court" was sufficient to conclude there was not substantial justification), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 73 (1992).
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cannot decisively establish the reasonableness, much less the merit, of the
government's position.'" ° In addition, while a single loss or small set of
failures by the government on an issue may not be indicative of unreasonable-
ness, a string of defeats, with no offsetting victories, cumulatively drains the
government's position of justification, particularly if the government's position
is adopted or adhered to after the line of cases opposing it has emerged.
In evaluating the significance and strength of judicial endorsements or
rejections of the government's position, a court should begin of course with the
history of the particular case. Again, while not conclusive, a wobbly trajectory,
with different judges hearing the same case on the merits falling into opposite
positions along the path to final disposition, raises an inference of substantial
justification.39" ' For example, in Tax Analysts v. United States Department of
Justice,392 the District of Columbia Circuit considered an application for
attorney's fees under the Freedom of Information Act,393 where "reasonable-
basis-in-law" is one of the factors in the test for entitlement to a fee award.39'
Although the court of appeals and all but one member of the Supreme Court had
rejected the government's position on the merits, the court affirmed a denial of
attorney's fees.39S While it viewed the government's position as "weak," the
District of Columbia Circuit nevertheless was unwilling to conclude that the sole
dissent in the Supreme Court and the district court decision in favor of the
government, which was reversed on the merits, had no reasonable basis in
law.396
While giving it due weight, the courts must be wary of converting a "simple
head-counting ofjudges on different sides of the merits issue" into an invariably
390. See id. at 1167 (stating that the fact that "one or more presumably reasonable Article 1II
judges" found merit in the government's position is not dispositive, because "the substantial
justification issue cannot be transferred into an up-or-down judgment on the relative reasoning powers
of Article III judges who may have disagreed on the merits of a Government litigation position").
391. See Universal Restoration, Inc. v. United States, 16 Cl. Ct. 214, 217 (1989) (stating that
"see-saw decisional sequences can be potent evidence that the government's position" could satisfy
a reasonable person).
392. 965 F.2d 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
393. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1988) (authorizing an award of attorney's fees to those who
substantially prevail in Freedom of Information Act litigation against the government). See generally
Sisk, supra note 33, at 772-75 (discussing attorney's fee awards under the Freedom of Information
Act).
394. Under the Freedom of Information Act, the factors considered by the courts in determining
entitlement to a fee award "include (1) the benefit to the public if any, derived from the case; (2) the
commercial benefit to the plaintiff; (3) the nature of the plaintiff's interest in the records sought; and
(4) whether the government's withholding of the records had a reasonable basis of law." Church of
Scientology v. Harris, 653 F.2d 584, 590 (D.C. Cir. 1981). See generally Sisk, supra note 33, at 774-
75 (discussing factors for entitlement to a fee award under the Freedom of Information Act). The
"reasonable-basis-in-law" factor has obvious parallels to the substantial justification standard for
entitlement under the EAJA.
395. Tax Analysts, 965 F.2d at 1096-97.
396. Id. at 1097.
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decisive factor.397  A court considering an EAJA petition must look to the
"cogency of the reasoning" of judges who accepted the government's position
on the merits as the case wound its way through the courts.398 Although a
court should hesitate before rejecting as unjustifiable a position that was accepted
not merely as reasonable but as correct by a fellow judge,3 a government win
in district court is not always enough by itself to prove "substantial justifica-
tion." In Pate v. United States,401 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit, considering a fee petition under the parallel internal revenue
attorney's fee provision,'  ruled that the government was not substantially
justified even though it had prevailed in the district court, when the district court
had failed to apply established law and the parties had not properly briefed the
district court on the controlling law.403 By contrast, looking to the opposite
end of the judicial hierarchy, a court would rarely be justified in finding the
government's position to be unreasonable when the subject had caused a division
on the merits among the justices of the Supreme Court.'
In between, and looking beyond the history of the particular case to rulings
by other courts on the issue, the courts of appeals have developed a strong
presumption that any division in the circuits on the merits establishes the
justifiability of the government's position for the purposes of the EAJA. As the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit stated in United States v.
Winchester Municipal Utilities,40s "[w]e are not prepared to say that a consid-
ered legal interpretation adopted by one of our sister circuits is so far beyond the
pale that it cannot even be considered 'substantially justified."'' Given that
397. United States v. Paisley, 957 F.2d 1161, 1168 n.4 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 73
(1992).
398. Id. at 1167 (disapproving of the district court's failure to accord any "weight to the cogency
of the reasoning by which two circuit judges of this court had concluded that the Government's
position was not only justified, but was legally correct").
399. See Porter v. Heckler, 780 F.2d 920, 922 (11th Cir. 1986) (stating that a "district court
victory may be evidence that the government's position was justified'); Wyandotte Say. Bank v.
NLRB, 682 F.2d 119, 120 (6th Cir. 1982) (observing, in support of its conclusion that the
government "[c]learly" had a reasonable basis for its position, that two judges of the circuit had
indicated support for the position).
400. See Sierra Club v. Secretary of Army, 820 F.2d 513, 519 (1st Cir. 1987).
401. 982 F.2d 457 (10th Cir. 1993).
402. 26 U.S.C. § 7430 (1988).
403. Pate, 982 F.2d at 459.
404. See De Allende v. Baker, 891 F.2d 7, 13 (1st Cir. 1989) (reversing the district court's
finding of no substantial justification when, in a parallel case raising the same issue, the Supreme
Court had divided evenly on the merits); League of Woman Voters v. Federal Communications
Comm'n, 798 F.2d 1255, 1260 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that the government's defense of the
constitutionality of a statute was "a question upon which reasonable minds could differ, as evidenced
by the five-four division in the Supreme Court" decision on the merits). The De Allende decision
is discussed in detail in section IV.E.3 infra as an illustration of the application of the abuse of
discretion standard of appellate review.
405. 944 F.2d 301, 306 (6th Cir. 1991).
406. Id. at 306. See also Koch v. United States, 47 F.3d 1015, 1021 (10th Cir. 1995) (stating
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a published opinion by an appellate court is the product of a considered collegial
decision after substantial briefing of an issue, courts are understandably reluctant
to find that a position endorsed on the merits by a court of appeals fails to meet
at least the measure of reasonableness.'
9. Defending the Constitutionality of a Statute
When the government is defending the constitutionality of a statute enacted
by Congress, the position of the United States should almost invariably be
deemed justifiable. Likewise, when the government acts in direct accordance
with the dictates of a statute, its underlying conduct should be found justifiable.
As the First Circuit has observed, the Executive Branch cannot "be faulted for
hewing to lines drawn in bold relief by the Legislative Branch," notwithstanding
a constitutional attack brought against that statutory authorization by a liti-
that disagreement on the circuit level indicates substantial justification); Kolman v. Shalala, 39 F.3d
173, 177 (7th Cit. 1994) (stating that the government's position "had the support... of a decision
by one of our sister circuits, which we hesitate, not merely for the sake of comity, to pronounce
irrational") (citation omitted); Cummings v. Sullivan, 950 F.2d 492, 499-500 (7th Cir. 1991) (stating
that a variance in precedent on the issue at the circuit court level supported conclusion of "substantial
justification"); Devine v. Sutermeister, 733 F.2d 892, 898 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (stating that the
government was substantially justified when the issue in litigation "was subject to conflicting judicial
pronouncements in other circuits').
407. The courts of appeals have not always been so generous toward dissenting colleagues on
the same court, ruling on more than one occasion that the presence of a dissenting judge on the
merits panel did not preclude a finding that the unsuccessful position of the government was not
substantially justified. See, e.g., Friends of the Boundary Waters Wilderness v. Thomas, 53 F.3d 881,
885 (8th Cir. 1995) (reversing a district court's denial of EAJA fees as "rel[ying] too heavily upon
its original opinion and Judge Magill's dissent from our decision reversing that opinion," and finding
that the government's position was so "plainly contrary to existing law" as to determine the outcome
against substantial justification); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Clay Printing Co., 13
F.3d 813, 816 (4th Cir. 1994) (ruling that, while the dissenting judge's views should be considered,
the factor of one dissenting opinion on whether summary judgment should have been granted did not
convince the court that the district court abused its discretion in finding no substantial justification).
See generally Todd E. Pettys, Note, Making the Government Pay: The Application of the Equal
Access to Justice Act in EEOC v. Clay Printing Company, 72 N.C. L. Rev. 1575, 1589-90 (1994)
(discussing Clay Printing). In both of these cases, however, the underlying disagreement on the
merits was about whether the government's position satisfied a standard of reasonableness, that is,
whether the government had adopted a reasonable interpretation of a statute in one case, see Friends
of the Boundary Waters Wilderness, 53 F.3d at 884, and whether the government's evidentiary case
could satisfy a reasonable person in the other, Clay Printing Co., 13 F.3d at 815-16. As discussed
earlier, see supra section IV.D.6, if the standard of judicial review of the underlying agency conduct
is essentially truly one of rationality, that reasonable people may disagree about what is reasonable
cannot dull the sting of a resolution of that dispute against the reasonableness of the underlying
action. In such circumstances, the standard of review on the merits and the standard of substantial
justification under the EAJA converge, with a resolution against the government at one stage leading
into a negative determination at the other. See generally supra section IV.C.3 and 4 (discussing the
interrelationship of the basis for a merits decision and the substantial justification inquiry, especially
in the context of rationality review on the merits).
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gant. ° Even when a court in another circuit has held the statute unconstitu-
tional, the government is not "bound to abandon the wishes of Congress" and
concede the invalidity of the challenged statute.'
Of course, the analysis would be different if the court invalidating the statute
in a prior ruling was the court of appeals for the circuit in which the present case
is now pending. In that circumstance, the "substantial justification" question
would be more complex. On one side of the balance lies the obligation of the
government to follow mandatory precedent in the jurisdiction. On the other
hand, the government may be justified in maintaining its defense of a legislative
enactment, notwithstanding an intervening adverse decision by the circuit court,
if its position reflects a decision to preserve the issue pending an active effort to
secure Supreme Court review, rather than a pattern of nonacquiescence in circuit
law.4
10
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in League of
Woman Voters v. Federal Communications Commission411 refused to adopt a
uniform rule that the federal government's "decision to defend the constitutional-
ity of a statute is reasonable regardless of whether the statute itself might
reasonably be thought to be constitutional." 412  Although the Ninth Circuit
recognized that the defense of a statute against constitutional challenge "will
usually be substantially justified," the court held that the purpose of the EAJA
would be frustrated if individuals were prevented from obtaining a fee award
when challenging a statute that was manifestly unconstitutional. 43  The court
reasoned that since the EAJA was designed "to eliminate the economic deterrent
faced by individuals who wish to vindicate their rights" and since the legislative
history indicates that the EAJA is to be available when constitutional rights are
vindicated, then the Congress must have contemplated an award of fees under the
EAJA for constitutional attacks on statutes.1 4
408. United States v. One Parcel of Real Property, 960 F.2d 200, 210 (1st Cir. 1992). See also
United States v. Certain Real Estate Property, 838 F.2d 1558, 1562 (1lth Cir. 1988) ("When the
[United States] follows the express dictates of a given statute, and there is no reason to believe that
such a course is otherwise unauthorized, its position, for purposes of the EAJA, cannot lack
substantial justification.").
409. One Parcel of Real Property, 960 F.2d at 211.
410. See generally supra section IV.D.7 (discussing substantial justification of government
position taken contrary to controlling law, including decisions finding the government to lack
substantial justification when it adopts a policy of nonacquiescence in circuit precedent).
411. 798 F.2d 1255 (9th Cir. 1986).
412. Id. at 1259. See also Bullfrog Films, Inc. v. Zwick, 959 F.2d 782, 785 (9th Ci. 1992) (in
context of request for award of EAJA fees in case involving, inter alia, constitutional challenge to
treaty, the court noted that the circuit had refused to uniformly hold that defense of constitutionality
of statute is reasonable); Grace v. Burger, 763 F.2d 457, 458 (D.C. Cir.) (stating that the court is not
"rul[ing]... that the government is forever and always 'substantially justified' in defending in court
the constitutionality of an act of Congress, whatever the statute may say, and on any ground a legal
mind can conceive'), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1026, 106 S. Ct. 583 (1985).




Contrary to the Ninth Circuit's suggestion, there should be a strong and
uniform presumption that the government acts with substantial justification when
enforcing and defending a duly-enacted federal statute against constitutional
challenge. When EAJA fees are sought after a successful constitutional challenge
to a statute, the court is called upon to evaluate the reasonableness of the "position
of the United States," which includes both the underlying conduct of Congress in
enacting and the President in enforcing the statute and the litigation position of the
Executive Branch in defending the statute in court. A judicial declaration that
Congress acted unreasonably through its powers of enactment would be unseemly.
To be sure, the nature of certain constitutional protections (such as the equal
protection principle of rational basis review applied to economic regulation)"'
may require a court to explore the reasonableness of congressional action.
Nevertheless, comity between the branches of government suggests that such an
evaluation should be avoided when not constitutionally compelled and, even when
unavoidable, not be amplified beyond the necessity of ruling upon the merits of a
constitutional challenge. Similarly, a determination that the Executive Branch
acted unreasonably in defending a statute in court would be unfair and insupport-
able in view of the historical controversy that has surrounded the unusual
departures from that course.
16
415. In the context of a suit challenging a federal statute, the Supreme Court explained that, "[i]n
areas of social and economic policy, a statutory classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines
nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld against equal protection challenge if
there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the
classification." Federal Communications Comm'n v. Beach Communications, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2096,
2101 (1993). Although the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause by its terms applies only
to the states, the Supreme Court has decreed that the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause contains
an analogous equal protection component. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500, 74 S. Ct. 693, 695
(1954).
416. On fewer than a dozen occasions in American history has the Executive Branch declined
to defend, or affirmatively challenged, in court the constitutionally of a statute. See, e.g., Morrison
v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 106 S. Ct. 3181
(1986); Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983); United
States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 66 S. Ct. 1073 (1946); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 47 S.
Ct. 21 (1926); Ameron, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 809 F.2d 979 (3d Cit. 1986),
cert. dismissed, 488 U.S. 918, 109 S. Ct. 297 (1988); Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp.,
323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938, 84 S. Ct. 793 (1964); League of Woman
Voters v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 489 F. Supp. 517 (C.D. Cal. 1980); Gavett v.
Alexander, 477 F. Supp. 1035 (D.D.C. 1979). For varying views on the authority or propriety of the
President in declining to defend the constitutionality of a statute, see generally Douglas W. Kmiec,
The Attorney General's Lawyer-Inside the Meese Justice Department 54-56 (1992); Christopher N.
May, Presidential Defiance of "Unconstitutional" Laws: Reviving the Royal Prerogative, 21
Hastings Const. L.Q. 865 (1994); Eugene Gressman, Take Care, Mr. President, 64 N.C. L. Rev. 381
(1986); Arthur S. Miller & Jeffrey H. Bowman, Presidential Attacks on the Constitutionality of
Federal Statutes: A New Separation of Powers Problem, 40 Ohio St. L.J. 51 (1979). For a
fascinating account of a landmark constitutional case (the Supreme Court's Chadha decision
invalidating the "legislative veto" by which a single house or committee of Congress could overturn
executive action without formal passage of legislation) including an inside look at the deliberations
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First, while it is the province of the Judiciary to judge, it is the province of
Congress to legislate. A decent regard for a coequal branch of government
mandates that the Judicial Branch assume that the members of the Legislative
Branch, who also take an oath to uphold the Constitution, acted with integrity in
their enactment, even when a court decides on the merits that the statute exceeded
constitutional bounds." 7 By necessity in a constitutional democracy, the courts
must consider the constitutionality of governmental conduct, including the
constitutional validity of legislative enactments, when the issue is properly raised
in a pending case.4 8 That is the justification for constitutional judicial review.
However, if the courts were to move beyond holding the statute up to the measure
of the Constitution and address the "reasonableness" of the Congress in presuming
to enact a particular statute, troubling questions about propriety and separation of
powers would emerge. Wheneverjudges are tempted to expound upon the wisdom
of legislative action, they would do well to recall Judge Learned Hand's admonition
that "the Constitution did not create a tri-cameral system, [and] a law which can get
itself enacted is almost surely to have behind it a support which is not wholly
unreasonable.""4 9 Unless the exercise of constitutional judicial review compels
it, courts should avoid commentary on the prudence or rationality of legislative
action.
Second, the President can hardly be faulted for upholding his constitutional
responsibility to "take care that the Laws be faithfully executed."42 To be sure,
the President also takes an oath to "preserve, protect and defend the Constitution
of the United States,""42 which arguably means that "enforcing an invalid law
would be contrary to a president's constitutional duty and oath."4' Nevertheless,
in the Carter and Reagan Justice Departments on whether to challenge this congressional practice in
court and the reaction of members of Congress and the courts to the Executive Branch's refusal to
defend these statutory provisions, see Barbara H. Craig, Chadha: The Story of an Epic Constitutional
Struggle (1988).
417. Moreover, in the modem era, in which the courts are accepted as having primacy in
declaring what the Constitution means, see Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Faith 44 (1988)
(referring to "the 'catholic' embrace ofjudicial supremacy"), "legislatures have grown unaccustomed
to taking constitutional responsibility for their actions." Gregory C. Sisk, Questioning Dialogue by
Judicial Decree: A Different Theory of Constitutional Review and Moral Discourse, 46 Rutgers L.
Rev. 1691, 1721 (1994). Because the courts have asserted their role as the final arbiter of
constitutional law, legislators may not be much faulted (although not praised either) for seeing their
duty as pursuing colorable legislative goals, while relying upon the courts to declare the boundaries
of permissible constitutional action. See id. at 1721-22.
418. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137 (1803) (asserting judicial power to adjudicate
the constitutionality of legislative enactments).
419. Learned Hand, Mr. Justice Holmes at Eighty-Five, quoted in Gerald Gunther, Learned
Hand: The Man and the Judge 387 (1994).
420. U.S. Cont. art. 11, § 3.
421. U.S. Cont. art. II, § 1.
422. Kniec, supra note 416, at 55. See also Paulsen, supra note 373, at 267 ('The Constitution
is paramount law; the President of necessity must interpret the law in the course of performing his
constitutional duties to 'take care' that the laws be 'faithfully executed'; therefore, where, in the
performance of his duties, the President finds a statute contrary to the Constitution as paramount law,
1995]
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
while the President may have the "prerogative to disregard unconstitutional
statutes,"" this course is a weighty undertaking that will rarely be justified and
even more rarely be executed. Surely, the President will not be held to have acted
unreasonably when he chooses not to ignore the mandate of Congress and instead
awaits a judicial declaration of invalidity before refusing to enforce a legislative
enactment. In this regard, it may be remembered that President Andrew Johnson
asserted the right to decline enforcement ofa statute restricting his power to remove
cabinet officials, which he deemed unconstitutional, and that his removal of the
Secretary of War in violation of this statute nearly resulted in his removal from
office after impeachment and a trial in the Senate.4 4 Today we may honor the
courage and principle of President Johnson in resisting an unconstitutional
legislative encroachment upon the powers of his office,4" but it is quite another
he must follow the Constitution and refuse to give effect to the statute.").
423. Memorandum to Robert J. Lipshutz, Counsel to the President, from John M. Harmon,
Assistant Attorney General (Sept. 27, 1977), quoted in Kmiec, supra note 416, at 55-56. See also
Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 905, 920 (1989-90) ("If we
accept Alexander Hamilton's justification for judicial review---that unconstitutional enactments are
simply not 'law' and do not bind anyone-then there is no distinction between judge and President
[in terms of disregarding unconstitutional statutes]."); id. at 921 (quoting James Wilson, the author
of Article III of the Constitution, as explaining during the debates on ratifiction of the Constitution
that while the Congress might pass legislation that trangresses the Constitution, the independent
Judiciary would have the "duty to pronounce it void" and "the President of the United States could
shield himself and refuse to carry into effect an act that violates the constitution"). But see Lear
Siegler, Inc. v. Lehman, 842 F.2d 1102, 1121 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding a claim by the President of
a power to disregard statutes he deems unconstitutional to be "utterly at odds with the texture and
plain language of the Constitution, and with nearly two centuries of judicial precedent'), withdrawn
on reh'g, 893 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc); Ameron, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of
Eng'rs, 787 F.2d 875, 889 (3d Cir.) ("This claim of right for the President to declare statutes
unconstitutional and to declare his refusal to execute them, as distinguished from his undisputed right
to veto, criticize, or even refuse to defend in court, statutes which he regards as unconstitutional, is
dubious at best."), modified on reh 'g, 809 F.2d 979 (3d Cir. 1986) (Ameron II), cert. dismissed, 488
U.S. 918, 109 S. Ct. 297 (1988); Gressman, supra note 416, at 382 (arguing that the "Constitution
nowhere excuses the President from fulfilling his vested obligation" to faithfully enforce the laws,
regardless of his doubts about its constitutional validity).
424. See generally William H. Rehnquist, Grand Inquests 199-248 (1992) (describing the
impeachment and trial of Andrew Johnson); Kmiec, supra note 416, at 54-55 (discussing Andrew
Johnson impeachment).
425. In his classic book, Profiles in Courage, John F. Kennedy describes the epic struggle
between the Legislative and Executive Branches that led to President Johnson's refusal to retain a
cabinet official despite objections from a radical Congress or to accept a statutory limitation on his
power to remove his officials that he believed was obviously unconstitutional. John F. Kennedy,
Profiles in Courage 126-30 (1955). Kennedy's narrative honors Senator Edmund G. Ross, who cast
the deciding vote saving Johnson from conviction in the Senate after impeachment, calling his vote
a heroic act that "may well have preserved for ourselves and posterity constitutional government in
the United States." Id. at 126. See also Rehnquist, supra note 424, at 250 ("The acquittal of Andrew
Johnson by the Senate was of course a victory for the independence of the executive branch of the
government, just as the acquittal of [Supreme Court Justice] Samuel Chase sixty-three years before
had been a victory for the independence of the judicial branch."). Startlingly, a panel of the Ninth
Circuit recently recharacterized President Andrew Johnson's impeachment and near removal from
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thing to brand as unreasonable another President's decision not to take so drastic
a step.
Third, the government's litigation position in defense of a statute against a
court challenge likewise should be regarded as reasonable per se.426 To begin
with, upholding the constitutionality of a statute in court is merely an extension
of the President's duty to enforce the laws. For the same reason that the
President may appropriately determine to enforce even constitutionally doubtful
statutes, he may also decline to surrender to an attack upon that statute in court.
The great controversies that have attended the President's occasional departures
from this approach confirm that it cannot be characterized as unreasonable to
adhere to the general principle that the Executive Branch should enforce and
defend the enactments of the Legislative Branch.
Ironically, the Ninth Circuit, the very court that has declined to hold that the
government is presumptively justified in defending the constitutionality of a
statute,4" subsequently castigated the government as having acted in bad faith
in one of the rare instances where the President did decline to enforce and defend
a statute of questionable constitutionality.42 Under the Competition in
Contracting Act of 1984,429 the filing of a protest by a disappointed bidder with
the Comptroller General effects an automatic stay of the granting and perfor-
mance of government contracts by an executive agency until the Comptroller
office as the just desserts for "lawless" Executive Branch conduct. Lear Siegler, 842 F.2d at 1122
n.14 (stating that "President Johnson's removal of the Secretary of War, flouting the Tenure of Office
Act," resulted in his impeachment, "illustrating that the executive branch violates the law at its
constitutional peril"). This court panel also included Presidents Woodrow Wilson and Franklin
Roosevelt among those "lawless" Executives. Id. They had also failed to comply with statutory
limitations upon their power to remove Executive officers, which led to important constitutional
decisions by the Supreme Court in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 47 S. Ct. 21 (1926) (holding
that statutory limitation of President's power to remove "purely executive" officers violated
constitutional separation of powers), and Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 55
S. Ct. 869 (1935) (sustaining constitutional validity of statutory limitations on presidential removal
of officers on independent agencies).
426. This assumes that the government articulates a reasonable construction of the statute and
a reasonable argument in favor of its constitutional validity. See Blitz v. Donovan, 740 F.2d 1241,
1244-47 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding government's defense of statute ultimately invalidated as
unconstitutional was substantially justified when it attempted to narrow the interpretation of the
statute to save it from constitutional attack). However, the government should uniformly be held to
have articulated a reasonable defense given the strong presumption of constitutionality that attaches
to Acts of Congress. The power "to judge the constitutionality of an Act of Congress... (is] 'the
gravest and most delicate duty that... [a court] is called upon to perform,"' Rostker v. Goldberg,
453 U.S. 57, 64, 101 S. Ct. 2646, 2651 (1981) (quoting Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148, 48
S. Ct. 105, 107 (1927) (Holmes, J.)), and thus the Executive Branch may assume that it may
justifiably rely upon the presumed validity of legislative enactments pending a contrary direction from
the courts.
427. League of Woman Voters v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 798 F.2d 1255, 1259 (9th
Cir. 1986).
428. Lear Siegler, 842 F.2d at 1102.
429. Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 1175 (codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3551-56 (1988)).
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General makes a recommendation concerning the protest.43° The Reagan
Administration objected to this provision on separation of powers grounds,
contending that the Comptroller General, a legislative official, is effectively
granted executive power because he may choose when to lift the stay of an
executive agency's award of a contract, by rejecting a frivolous protest or issuing
a decision on the bid protest.43 President Reagan directed federal agencies not
to observe the automatic stay provision of the Act.432 The Third Circuit and
then the Ninth Circuit held that the Comptroller General's powers under the Act
are a legitimate exercise of congressional powers of investigation and recommen-
dation and do not usurp the executive powers over the procurement process. 433
These two courts reached this conclusion primarily because the Comptroller
General is limited to making a recommendation on the bid protest, which
procuring agencies are not compelled to follow, 434 and because the Executive
may override the stay of a contract award for compelling reasons.43s
In the Ninth Circuit panel decision of the issue, Lear Siegler, Inc. v.
Lehman,436 the court went well beyond rejecting the government's challenge
to the constitutionality of the statute. In a scathing opinion, the court panel
characterized the Executive Branch's determination not to abide by the stay
430. 31 U.S.C. § 3553(c), (d) (1988). On the Competition in Contracting Act, see generally
Ameron, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 787 F.2d 875, 879 (3d Cir.), modified on reh 'g,
809 F.2d 979 (3d Cir. 1986) (Ameron fl), cert. dismissed, 488 U.S. 918, 109 S. Ct. 297 (1988); and
Lear Siegler, 842 F.2d at 1104-05.
431. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3553(c), 3554(a) (1988). See Ameron II, 809 F.2d at 988-89 (stating that the
government's "attack focuses entirely on the Comptroller General's authority to shorten the stay if
the protester's claim is frivolous or the investigation complete, and to lengthen the stay if more time
is necessary to complete the investigation"); Lear Siegler, 842 F.2d at 1104 (describing government's
argument as saying that the Act "allows the Comptroller General to determine the length of stays or
suspensions of government contract awards when contracts are protested," and thus gives "'executive'
powers to an officer of the legislative branch")., Subsequent to the Lear Siegler and Ameron U
decisions, Congress responded to the President's objections in part by eliminating the Comptroller
General's power to extend the stay of an award of a contract beyond 125 days by lengthening the
investigation. Pub. L. No. 100-463, § 8139, 102 Stat. 2270, 2270-47 (1988) (amending 31 U.S.C.
§ 3554(a)(1) (1988)).
432. See Ameron, 787 F.2d at 879.
433. Ameron /, 809 F.2d at 991-98; Lear Siegler, 842 F.2d at 1109-12.
434. 31 U.S.C. § 3554(e)(1) (1988); see Ameron II, 809 F.2d at 995 (stating that the Act "leaves
procuring agencies free to refuse to implement any and all of the Comptroller General's 'recommend-
ation"); Lear Siegler, 842 F.2d at 1110 ("Because the recommendations of the Comptroller General
are non-binding, the stay cannot be used to coerce the procuring agency to make a particular final
disposition. ... .').
435. 31 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2)(A), (dX2)(A) (1988). See Ameron II, 809 F.2d at 995 (stating that,
even with limitations, "the statutory ability'to override the stay provides the (government] with
significant power to assert its independence and to minimize any abuse of the Comptroller General's
limited authority to delay or expedite a procurement decision"); Lear Siegler, 842 F.2d at 1111
(stating that the procuring agency's power to override the automatic stay "lodges ultimate authority
over the timing of contracts with the executive branch").
436. 842 F.2d 1102 (9th Cir. 1988), attorney's fee decision withdrawn on reh'g, 893 F.2d 205
(9th Cit. 1989) (en banc).
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provisions pending judicial resolution as an "attempt to arrogate to itself the
power of judicial review" and thus as "a paradigmatic violation of our system of
separation of powers and checks and balances."437  Accordingly, the court
panel found the government's willful disobedience of a presumptively valid law
to constitute bad faith, justifying an award of attorney's fees under the common
law bad faith exception applicable to the federal government through Subsection
(b) of the EAJA.438
We may question the Ninth Circuit panel's apparent denial of any role for
the Executive in determining whether and how to enforce statutes of doubtful
constitutional validity,439 or at least dissent from the panel's denunciation of
such an action as bad faith given the reasonable grounds for disagreement on the
question. Indeed, the en banc Ninth Circuit backed away from this position in
its withdrawal of the panel's decision on attorney's fees (albeit on different
grounds)." Nonetheless, in light of the readiness of one panel of judges to
condemn the Executive's failure to uphold and enforce "a presumptively valid
law,"' the courts certainly cannot turn about in the future and find that the
government was not substantially justified for purposes of Subsection (d) when
it chooses not to disregard a statute and does not back away from its enforcement
notwithstanding questions of constitutional validity.
437. Id. at 1125.
438. Id. at 1117-26 (applying 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). See generally
supra section IV.D.4 (discussing factor of dishonesty or bad faith in evaluating substantial
justification of government's position); Sisk, supra note 33, at 783-88 (discussing EAJA Subsection
(b)).
439. For a critique of Lear Seigler, see Paulsen, supra note 373, at 270 ("Lear Seigler is not
only plainly wrong, but absurdly wrong. If the President does not have the authority to decline to
execute unconstitutional acts, then he must execute an ex post facto law, a bill of attainder, a new
Sedition Act (making it a crime to speak out against the government), or any other plainly
unconstitutional law."); Easterbrook, supra note 423, at 906, 914-24 (discussing Lear Siegler and
concluding that the President has the authority to set the Constitution above a statute and disregard
unconstitutional legislation). The panel's primary objection was to what it termed the "truly
unprecedented" action of the President in declining to enforce the statute pending judicial resolution
of constitutional questions. Lear Siegler, 842 F.2d at 1119. However, the court also paused to raise
doubts about the constitutional validity of the Executive's challenge to a statute in court or even
declining to defend a statute in court. In any event, since substantial justification under Subsection
(d) looks to both the government's pre-litigation conduct and litigation position, the Lear Siegler
panel's suggestion that the government may never refuse to enforce a statute would command the
conclusion that the government may never be found to lack substantial justification when it does
enforce a statute, notwithstanding a subsequently successful constitutional challenge to the statute.
440. Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Lehman, 893 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc). The en banc Ninth
Circuit vacated the award of fees and withdrew from publication that part of the court of appeals
panel decision respecting fees. Id. at 208. The en banc court found that the private party seeking
fees was not a prevailing party eligible for an award because it received no tangible benefit on its
underlying bid protest claim from the grant of summary judgment to the congressional intervenors
on the constitutional validity of the Competition in Contracting Act. Id.
441. Lear Siegler, 842 F.2d at 1121.
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The Executive Branch's manifest reasonableness in upholding a statute
against constitutional challenge or in acting pursuant to the precise mandates of'
a statute notwithstanding constitutional doubts must be distinguished from the
discretionary conduct of the government acting under a general delegation of
statutory authority." 2 When the government in its regulatory or other activity
moves beyond the safe harbor of the statute's language or when a statute does
not "specifically prescribe[] a course of action" for government officials to
follow 3 but instead leaves room for discretion by the government, the wisdom
of the government's action, including the reasonableness of its assessment of the
constitutional implications, is more appropriately subject to judicial evaluation.
In sum, comity between the branches of the federal government suggests
that, even when the Judiciary is unable to find that legislation enacted by
Congress and enforced by the President passes constitutional muster, it should
still stop short of accusing the political departments of irrationality in having
chosen a different course. Accordingly, defense of the constitutional validity of
a statute and Executive actions taken under its direction should probably never
be found to be without substantial justification-if not never, then hardly ever.
E. Appellate Review of EAJA Determinations
1. The General Standard of Review-Abuse of Discretion
Because the EAJA, like most federal statutes, does not expressly enunciate
an appellate standard of review, the lower courts initially were divided on how
much deference, if any, should be given to the trial court on rulings under the
EAJA, especially on the central determination of whether the government's
position was substantially justified. After the enactment of the EAJA, the courts
of appeals gradually spread out into opposing groups with respect to the appellate
standard of review. Several circuits adopted something approaching a three-
tiered standard of appellate review: (1) When the substantial justification inquiry
was primarily factual in nature, involving the weighing of evidence in the case
or the credibility of witnesses, the appellate court would overturn the trial court's
determination only if it was clearly erroneous." (2) When the EAJA question
442. Cf. Bullfrog Films, Inc. v. Zwick, 959 F.2d 782, 784-85 (9th Cir. 1992) (observing that part
of the agency regulation held unconstitutional did not merely repeat the language of a treaty, but
rather "represent[ed] only the (agency's] efforts to interpret the language of the treaty" and thus was
not, entitled to a high degree of deference in determining the substantial justification of the
government's underlying conduct in promulgating the regulation).
443. Cf Berkovitz v. United States, 486 US. 531,536, 108 S. Ct. 1954, 1958 (1988) (ruling that
for the government to assert the discretionary function exception as a defense to a Federal Tort
Claims Act suit, the action must have been a matter of choice for the acting employee; thus the
discretionary function exception does not apply "when a federal statute, regulation, or policy
specifically prescribes a course of action for an employee to follow").
444. E.g., Cinciarelli v. Reagan, 729 F.2d 801, 806 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (stating that when "the
issue is whether the government'sfactual argument is substantially justified, the reviewing court will
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turned on "a pure question of law," that is, whether the government's legal
argument was substantially justified, the appellate court would make a de novo
determination." 5 (3) When the issue concerned the trial court's discretionary
rulings on measurement of an attorney's fees award, the standard of appellate
review was abuse of discretion."6 By contrast, other circuits reviewed the
EAJA substantial justification determination, whether grounded on factual or
legal bases, only for an abuse of discretion."7
In Pierce v. Underwood, the leading decision on the EAJA, the Supreme
Court adopted a unitary "abuse of discretion" standard of appellate review over
trial court decisions granting or denying awards of attorney's fees under the
Equal Access to Justice Act."9 Beginning with "the language and structure of
the governing statute," the Court observed that the Act provides for an award of
fees "'unless the courtfinds that the position of the United States was substan-
tially justified.' 450 The "fact that the determination is for the district court to
make," the Court stated, "suggests some deference to the district court upon
appeal. 45' Moreover, since the question of substantial justification may "turn
upon not merely what was the law, but what was the evidence regarding the
facts," the district court is better positioned to make the determination and may
have "insights not conveyed by the record" into the circumstances surrounding
the presentation of the case.452
overturn a District Court's determination only if it is clearly erroneous"); see also United States v.
Yoffe, 775 F.2d 447, 451 (1st Cir. 1985) (applying a clearly erroneous standard of appellate review
to factual findings underlying determination of substantial justification in EAJA cases); Alger v.
United States, 741 F.2d 391, 393-94 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (same).
445. E.g., Cinciarellt, 729 F.2d at 806 (holding that the appellate court "will make a de novo
determination whether a government litigation position on a pure question of law is substantially
justified"); see also Yoffe, 775 F.2d at 451 (applying a de novo standard of appellate review to legal
issues raised in a determination of "substantial justification" in EAJA cases); Alger, 741 F.2d at 393-
94 (same).
446. E.g., Washington v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 959, 962 n.3 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that trial
court's discretionary rulings in EAJA case on measurement of the attorney's fee award, such as the
amount of a quality multiplier, are reviewable for an abuse of discretion).
447. E.g., Keasler v. United States, 766 F.2d 1227, 1231 (8th Cir. 1985) (applying an abuse of
discretion standard of appellate review to the trial court's "substantial justification" determination in
EAJA case); National Treasury Employees Union v. Internal Revenue Serv., 735 F.2d 1277, 1278
(1lth Cir. 1984) (holding that review of a district court's actions under the EAJA is on the abuse of
discretion standard).
448. 487 U.S. 552, 108 S. Ct. 2541 (1988).
449. Id. at 557-63, 108 S. Ct. at 2545-49; see also Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S.
384, 403, 110 S. Ct. 2447, 2459 (1990) (following Pierce in adopting a "unitary abuse-of-discretion
standard" of appellate review in cases involving .sanctions under analogous Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11, which also involves evaluation of whether a litigant's position is well-founded).
450. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. at 559, 108 S. Ct. at 2547 (quoting 28 U.S.C. §
2412(d)(1)(A) (1988) (emphasis added)).
451. Id.
452. Id. at 560, 108 S. Ct. at 2547.
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Even where the substantial justification question requires evaluation of a
purely legal issue governing the litigation, the Court held a deferential standard
of review is appropriate because "the investment of appellate energy will either
fail to produce the normal law-clarifying benefits that come from an appellate
decision on a question of law or else will strangely distort the appellate
process." '453 When the law of the circuit has since become clear by reason of
intervening legal decisions by the Supreme Court or the court of appeals, the
EAJA question of whether the government was substantially justified in believing
the law to have been otherwise when the litigation began is now a matter "of
entirely historical interest. '4S4 If the law of the circuit remains unsettled at the
time of the EAJA appeal, a de novo ruling by the appellate court "that the
Government was not substantially justified in believing it to be thus-and-so
would... effectively establish the circuit law in a most peculiar, secondhanded
fashion.""45 These "untoward consequences," the Court ruled, can be avoided
or reduced by adopting a deferential abuse of discretion standard of review. s6
Finally, the Court concluded that the "substantial justification" inquiry
presents "a multifarious and novel question, little susceptible, for the time being
at least, of useful generalization, and likely to profit from the experience that an
abuse-of-discretion rule will permit to develop."457 In other words, an abuse
of discretion standard of appellate review would "permit that needed flexibili-
ty'45s8 for the lower courts to apply the standard of "substantial justification"
to various different contexts with the freedom to consider the totality of the
circumstances outside of the constraints of narrow guidelines and fixed rules.4 9




457. Id. at 562, 108 S. Ct. at 2548.
458. Id. at 562, 108 S. Ct. at 2549.
459. Justice White, joined by Justice O'Connor, dissented from the majority's adoption of an
abuse of discretion standard for reviewing whether the government's legal position was substantially
justified. Id. at 583-88, 108 S. Ct. at 2559-62 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Given that neither the language nor the structure of the EAJA compels deferential review of a district
court's determination of "substantial justification," Justice White contended that Congress would
certainly have been aware of "the general rule that issues of law are reviewed de novo" and also
would have "known that whether or not a particular legal position was substantially justified is a
question of law rather than of fact." Id. at 583-84, 108 S. Ct. at 2559-60. Moreover, Justice White
argued that de novo appellate review "would also foster consistency and predictability in EAJA
litigation" so that ultimate decisions on the "substantial justification" of the government's position
on a particular legal question would not "vary from circuit to circuit or even within a particular
circuit." Id. at 585, 108 S. Ct. at 2560. See also Mary M. Schroeder, Appellate Justice Today:
Fairness or Formulas, 1994 Wis. L. Rev. 9, 20-22 (criticizing the adoption of the abuse of discretion
standard of review for EAJA cases in Pierce because it relieves appellate courts of the responsibility
to explain the basis for a decision to uphold an EAJA determination on review and thus makes the
availability of fees under the EAJA unpredictable).
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2. The Meaning of the Abuse of Discretion Standard of Review in the
Context of the EAJA
As courts and commentators have observed, the term "abuse of discretion" "is
often misunderstood and, perhaps, is an unfortunate label." Judge Henry J.
Friendly explained:
There are half a dozen different definitions of "abuse of discretion,"
ranging from ones that would require the appellate court to come close to
finding that the trial court had taken leave of its senses to others which
differ from the definition of error by only the slightest nuance, with
numerous variations between the extremes."'
Thus, "abuse of discretion" is a variable standard and "the scope of review will be
directly related to the reason why that category or type of decision is committed to
the trial court's discretion in the first place."' 2 As the authors of the leading
treatise on appellate standards of review suggest, with specific citation to the Pierce
v. Underwood decision,"3 "[t]he strength or presence of such factors-including
judicial economy, position to judge, use of evidentiary facts, and practicality of
generating a principle or rule" that led to the adoption of an abuse of discretion
standard may "also weigh heavily in a court's considered decision as to the strength
and scope of review within an abuse of discretion standard."'
In Pierce v. Underwood, the Supreme Court adopted an abuse of discretion
standard largely for reasons of sound judicial administration. First, the Court
believed that the district court was in the best position to review the totality of the
circumstances, which may involve a mix of factual and legal issues, and evaluate
the substantial justification, or lack thereof, of the government's position under
those circumstances. 5 Second, the Court feared that a de novo standard of
review would distort the appellate process by diverting the appellate courts from
their primary role of clarifying the state of the law, to instead invest substantial
energy to the task of re-assessing the reasonableness of what the government
460. Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1069,
107 S. Ct. 2462 (1987); see also Ruggero J. Aldisert, The Judicial Process 759 (1976).
461. Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 Emory L.J. 747, 763 (1982); see also
Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1088 (quoting Friendly); LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71, 74-75
(2d Cir. 1985) (quoting Friendly); Steven A. Childress, A Standard of Review Primer: Federal Civil
Appeals, 125 F.R.D. 319, 338 (1989) (stating that "there are at least weak and strong senses of
'discretion' and in reality 'abuse of discretion' may invoke a broad spectrum of review standards and
applications").
462. United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 817 (3d Cir. 1981); see also Toussaint, 801 F.2d
at 1088 (adopting Criden statement); Rosenberg, supra note 241, at 650-53 (explaining that abuse
of discretion standard has variations in gradation).
463. 487 U.S. 552, 108 S. Ct. 2541 (1988).
464. 1 Steven A. Childress & Martha S. Davis, Federal Standards of Review § 4.01, at 4-16 (2d
ed. 1992).
465. Pierce, 487 U.S. at 559-60, 108 S. Ct. at 2547.
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believed the law to have been.' Finally, the Court believed that the "multifari-
ous and novel question" of "substantial justification" was not susceptible to strict
and narrow rules and that an abuse of discretion standard would permit the district
courts the flexibility to address the different contexts in which the issue arises,
allowing guiding principles to emerge with experience." 7
Given these reasons for adoption of the standard, the district court must be
allowed "flexibility" to assess the "multifarious" facts, circumstances, and legal
arguments that make up the government's position in a case, appreciating that the
position must be evaluated as a whole."' Nevertheless, the district court is not
to be accorded nearly unreviewable discretion. While the appellate court is not free
to simply substitute its own judgment for that of the district court, neither is it to
become a rubber stamp." 9 In United States v. Taylor,47 the Supreme Court
admonished that "a decision calling for the exercise ofjudicial discretion 'hardly
means that it is unfettered by meaningful standards or shielded from thorough
appellate review.""'47' Thus, the appellate court need not find that a district court
"ha[s] taken leave of its senses"472 before it may set aside a ruling on an EAJA
application; a "meaningful error in judgment" calls for reversal under an abuse of
discretion review. The term "discretion," after all, "means a sound discre-
tion. "11
When the district court's ruling is based primarily upon facts, or factual
circumstances play a significant role in the mix, the traditional reasons for
deference to the trial court are most strongly implicated." The trial court has a
466. Id. at 560-61,108 S. Ct. at 2547-49.
467. Id. at 561-62, 108 S. Ct. at 2548-49.
468. See supra section IV.A.2 (discussing the need to evaluate the "position of the United
States" as a whole).
469. United States v. Paisley, 957 F.2d 1161, 1166 (4th Cir.) ("Pierce obviously contemplated
a degree of deference considerably short of a simple, accept-on-faith, rubber-stamping of district court
decisions on this issue."), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 73 (1992).
470. 487 U.S. 326, 108 S. Ct. 2413 (1988).
471. Id. at 336, 108 S. Ct. at 2419 (quoting Albemarle Paper v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 416, 95
S. Ct. 2362, 2371 (1975)); see also Friendly, supra note 461, at 783 (quoting Albemarle).
472. See Friendly, supra note 461, at 763.
473. Independent Oil & Chem. Workers v. Proctor & Gamble, 864 F.2d 927, 929 (1st Cir.
1988).
474. Commercial Credit Corp. v. Pepper, 187 F.2d 71, 75 (5th Cir. 1951) (emphasis added).
475. When the trial court makes factual determinations, the traditional standard of review asks
whether the findings are clearly erroneous. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) provides that
"[flindings of fact ... shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to
the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witness." Thus, an appellate court is not
to set aside findings of fact unless it has "the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed." United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364,395, 68 S. Ct. 525,542 (1948);
see also Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564,573-74, 105 S. Ct. 1504, 1511 (1985) ("If the district
court's account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety, the court of
appeals may not reverse it even though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would
have weighed the evidence differently."). On the "clearly erroneous" standard for review of trial court
factual findings, see generally I Childress & Davis, supra note 464, §§ 2.01-2.12, at 2-1 to 2-92.
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superior vantage point in evaluating the factual evidence and may have special
insight into the circumstances surrounding the development of the evidentiary
record that either the appellate court cannot acquire or can only acquire at unusual
expense and with painstaking review of the entire record.476 Similarly, when a
district court makes the primarily factual determinations or inescapably discretion-
ary judgments involved in the "anatomy of the fee award," such as the reasonable
time expended by legal counsel and the prevailing market rate for legal services,
the courts have described. the district court's discretion as "broad,"4" thus
suggesting greater deference.478
As the Supreme Court pointed out in Pierce v. Underwood, in some EAJA
cases "the attorney's fee determination will involve a judgment ultimately based
upon evaluation of the purely legal issue governing the litigation."'479 The Court
adopted a deferential standard of review as applied even to those "purely legal"
cases.480 However, as the Supreme Court clarified in United States v. Taylor,45 '
decided the same Term as Pierce v. Underwood, even under an abuse of discretion
standard, when there is "application of law to fact" (as is often true in EAJA cases),
the reviewing court is required "to undertake more substantive scrutiny."4 2 In
this situation, the reasons for deferential review go not to the competence of the
appellate tribunal, but to the wisdom of devoting excessive appellate judicial
resources to resolving a question one step removed from determining the present
state of the law. When a discretionary decision is "not dependent in the main on
particular observations of the trial court," the narrowest form of review is not
accorded and the appellate court "must consider both the relevance and weight of
the factors considered" in reviewing the exercise of discretion,43 while still
eschewing "reversal on the ground that the appellate judges might have decided
differently had they been the original decisionmakers. ' 4u
476. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 522, 560, 108 S. Ct. 2541, 2547 (1988); see also United
States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 817 (3d Cir. 1981) ("Perhaps the most common category of decisions
committed to the discretion of the trial court encompasses those situations where the decision depends
on first-hand observation or direct contact with the litigation.").
477. United States v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, 847 F.2d 12, 14-20 (1st Cir. 1988) (discussing
discretion in measurement of fee award in non-EAJA attorney's fees case).
478. See Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 901 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc) (holding in non-
EAJA case that abuse of discretion review applies to a district court's attorney's fee-setting
calculations because the district court judge "closely monitors the litigation on a day-to-day basis"
and is "intimately familiar with the barrage of pleadings, memoranda, and documents filed, and he
observed the proficiency of counsel in court").
479. Pierce, 487 U.S. at 560, 108 S. Ct. at 2547.
480. Id. at 560-63, 108 S. Ct. at 2547-49.
481. 487 U.S. 326, 108 S. Ct. 2413 (1988).
482. Id. at 337, 108 S. Ct. at 2419-20 ("A judgment that must be arrived at by considering and
applying statutory criteria... constitutes the application of law to fact and requires the reviewing
court to undertake more substantive scrutiny to ensure that the judgment is supported in terms of the
factors identified in the statute.').
483. United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 818 (3d Cir. 1981).
484. Id. at 819.
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Accordingly, while the appellate court should resist being drawn into an unduly
burdensome rehashing of complex legal arguments, its review should be appropri-
ately thorough and its assessment of the strength of legal arguments should be given
some greater weight. When the appellate court, based upon its experience and
proficiency in law-clariiying responsibility, believes that the district court has made
a serious mistake in evaluating the substantial justification of a legal position, it
should not long hesitate to set the district court's determination aside.
Perhaps the best articulation of the standard of review that should govern in the
EAJA context is that offered by Judge Calvert Magruder to describe abuse of
discretion review forty years ago:
"Abuse of discretion" is a phrase which sounds worse than it really is. All
it need mean is that, when judicial action is taken in a discretionary
manner, such action cannot be set aside by a reviewing court unless it has
a definite and firm conviction that the court below committed a clear error
ofjudgment in the conclusion it reached upon a weighing of the relevant
factors.485
3. Application of the Abuse of Discretion Standard of Review-Principles
and Illustration
Although abuse of discretion review is deferential and allows the district court
reasonable flexibility in approaching the substantial justification question in EAJA
cases, the trial court is nevertheless bound by the standards articulated in the
governing statute, by slowly emerging principles to guide the exercise of discretion,
and by the need to conduct a thorough and balanced evaluation of the circumstanc-
es.4 6 When a district court makes a ruling on an application for attorney's fees
under the EAJA, "[a]buse [of discretion] occurs when a material factor deserving
significant weight is ignored, when an improper factor is relied upon, or when all
proper and no improper factors are assessed, but the court makes a serious mistake
in weighing them."487 The district court does not have the privilege of neglecting
to consider significant factors that support or undermine the government's claim of
485. In re Josephson, 218 F.2d 174, 182 (lst Cir. 1954); see also Friendly, supra note 461, at
764 (favorably quoting Judge Magruder's articulation of the abuse of discretion standard of review);
Hanover Potato Prod., Inc. v. Shalala, 989 F.2d 123, 127 (3d Cir. 1993) (adopting, in EAJA case, the
approach to abuse of discretion as articulated by Judge Magruder (but without attribution)); De
Allende v. Baker, 891 F.2d 7, 11 (1st Cir. 1989) (adopting, in EAJA case, Judge Magruder's
approach from In re Josephson).
486. See generally supra section IV.D (discussing objective factors and other circumstances that
support or undermine the government's contention that its position was substantially justified).
487. See Independent Oil & Chem. Workers v. Proctor & Gamble, 864 F.2d 927, 929 (1st Cir.
1988) (articulating this meaning of abuse of discretion review in a non-EAJA case); see also DeWalt
v. Sullivan, 963 F.2d 27, 28 (3d Cir. 1992) (stating, in an EAJA case, that "an abuse of discretion
occurs 'when the trial court uses improper standards or procedures in determining fees, or if it does
not properly identify the criteria used for such determination").
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substantialjustification for its position or of placing weight upon factors that are not
legitimately adduced because they are either irrelevant or were not part of the
totality of the circumstances surrounding the government's adoption of a position
at the time in question. In a case of "significant complexity," this may require "a
substantial canvassing of the relevant materials" by the appellate court,48 at least
to confirm that all proper factors and no improper factors were actually considered
by the district court. This burden on the appellate courts can be relieved by
requiring the district court to articulate the bases for its conclusion and provide a
brief, but reasonably complete, outline of the factors it considered." 9
Of course, in making the "reasonableness" determination required by the
substantial justification standard, the district court must also itself reach a
reasonable conclusion in its balancing of the pertinent factors and weighing of the
circumstances."' In weighing the appropriate factors and considering the totality
of the circumstances, the district court must act in the light of the governing legal
standards. As the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit sitting en banc held, the development of a uniform legal structure to guide
district courts in the exercise of discretion is not itself a matter of discretion for the
district courts.49" ' In Pierce v. Underwood,492 the Supreme Court, while adopt-
ing the abuse of discretion standard of appellate review in EAJA cases, simulta-
neously asserted the authority to declare the meaning of the statutory standard of
488. United States v. Paisley, 957 F.2d 1161, 1166 n.3 (4th Cir.) ("In order to declare that
discretion has been abused,... a substantial canvassing of the relevant materials may be required
in any case of significant complexity."), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 73 (1992).
489. See Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 901 n.39 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc) (holding in
a non-EAJA attorney's fees case that while the appellate court applying abuse of discretion review
"defer[s] to the trial judge's familiarity with a lawsuit," the court has a duty to review the award
which cannot be accomplished unless the award "is accompanied by a statement of reasons;" thus,
"a remand may be necessary where the District Court awards a fee without adequately articulating
underlying reasons, or bases its decision on improper factors') (citations omitted).
490. See Brown v. Superior Court, 670 P.2d 725, 730 (Ariz. 1983) ("The discretion, however,
is a legal discretion. It includes the right to decide controverted factual issues, to draw inferences
where conflicting inferences are possible and to weigh competing interests. It does not include the
privilege of incorrect application of law or a decision predicated upon irrational bases."). In Coggle
v. Snow, 784 P.2d 554 (Wash. App. 1990), the Washington Court of Appeals, in discussing the abuse
of discretion standard of review, emphasized that it must not wrongly "focus[] upon the reasonable-
ness of the decision maker," rather than "examining the reasons for the decision." Id. at 559. The
court held that "[tihe proper standard is whether discretion is exercised on untenable grounds or for
untenable reasons, considering the purposes of the trial court's discretion." Id.
491. King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 776 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
3054 (1992). See also Curtis v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 97, 99 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that, while
"[d]eterminations of attorney fee awards under the EAJA are reviewed under an abuse of discretion
standard, questions of law, such as the proper interpretation of the EAJA, are reviewed de novo");
Forest Conservation Council v. Devlin, 994 F.2d 709, 711 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that court of
appeals reviews "the district court's interpretation of the EAJA de novo"); DeWalt v. Sullivan, 963
F.2d 27, 28 (3d Cir. 1992) (stating that interpretation of the EAJA statute "presents a question of law,
as to which our review is plenary").
492. 487 U.S. 552, 108 S. Ct. 2541 (1988).
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substantial justification493 and to restrict the "special factors" that may be
properly relied upon by a district court in determining to enhance the hourly rate
for attorney's fees beyond the statutory maximum.
The decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in De
Allende v. Baker 95 provides an illustration of abuse of discretion review in the
context of an EAJA determination in a complex legal setting. Although the case
on the merits raised a complicated series of legal questions requiring substantial
statutory analysis and examination of administrative law-and although the district
court held that the government's legal position was not substantiallyjustified under
the EAJA-the court of appeals found an abuse of discretion without revisiting the
merits in arduous detail or simply substituting its judgment for that of the district
court. Instead, by looking to objective indicators and examining whether the
district court had properly weighed important factors, the court was able to reach
a sound decision overturning the district court's determination.
To fully understand the nature of the case and the basis of the EAJA appellate
review, as well as to appreciate the appellate court's application of the abuse of
discretion standard under the circumstances, the background of the Allende case
must be set out at some length. The underlying lawsuit in Massachusetts federal
district court arose as a challenge to the denial by the government of a visa to Mrs.
Hortensia de Allende, the widow of the assassinated president of Chile who sought
to visit the United States in 1983 for various speaking engagements.49 The State
Department denied the visa application under the exclusionary provisions of
Section 1182(a)(27) (Subsection 27) of the Immigration and Nationality Act497
on the ground that her entry into the country would be prejudicial to the foreign
policy interests of the United States.49 Mrs. Allende was a member and the
honorary president of the World Peace Council, an organization believed by the
State Department to be a secret propaganda tool of the Soviet Union advancing
Soviet aims of unilateral disarmament by the Western alliance. 4' Because the
United States was then engaged in sensitive international negotiations related to
arms limitations and reductions, the State Department determined that allowing
"covert manipulation" of American public opinion through the entry of agents of
the Soviet-controlled World Peace Council would harm foreign policy inter-
ests.5oo
493. Id. at 563-68, 108 S. Ct. at 2549-52.
494. Id. at 571-74, 108 S. Ct. at 2553-55.
495. 891 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1989). In the interests of full disclosure, the author was counsel for
the government in this case on the EAJA issue before the court of appeals.
496. Id. at 9. The merits decision by the court of appeals, affirming the district court's ruling
overturning the denial of the visa, is reported as Allende v. Shultz, 845 F.2d 1111(1 st Cir. 1988).
497. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(27) (1988).
498. Id.
499. Allende, 845 F.2dat 1113.
500. Id. at 1115-16.
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The challenge to the visa denial raised complex questions of statutory
interpretation and administrative law. Mrs. Allende had been denied a visa under
Subsection 27, which allows exclusion of aliens who the Attorney General knows
or has reason to believe "seek to enter the United States solely, principally, or
incidentally to engage in activities which would be prejudicial to the public
interest, or endanger the welfare, safety, or security of the United States."50'
The plaintiffs contended that this provision authorizes exclusion of aliens only
where it is anticipated that they will engage in harmful activities after entry."l
The government contended that Subsection 27 permitted exclusion where an
alien's entry or presence in the country, in and of itself, was prejudicial to the
public interest.5 3
In addition, the plaintiffs argued that the government's invocation of
Subsection 27 to deny the visa was an attempt to bypass the statutory restraints
on denial of visas to communist aliens under Subsection 28"° as modified by
the McGovern Amendment. 0 5 Although Subsection 28 purports to exclude all
communist aliens from admission to the United States,5" the McGovern
Amendment provided that the exclusion should be waived unless the Secretary
of State certifies to the Congress that "the admission of such alien would be
contrary to the security interests of the United States."50 7 The plaintiffs argued
that the real reason for Mrs. Allende's exclusion was her membership in an
allegedly communist organization and thus should have been premised upon
Subsection 28. Application of the McGovern Amendment would have led to a
waiver of the exclusion and thus a granting of the visa in the absence of a
certification by the Secretary of State to the Congress which had not oc-
curred.0 8  The government responded by arguing that an alien may be
excluded under Subsection 27 for reasons of foreign policy in addition to, even
if related to, the alien's affiliation with a Subsection 28 organization."l The
resolution of these issues required consideration of the statutory language, the
structure of the Immigration and Nationality Act, the legislative history, and
501. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(27) (1988).
502. De Allende v. Baker, 891 F.2d 7, 9-10 (1st Cir. 1989).
503. Id. at 9. The classic example of harm caused by an alien's mere entry, as opposed to
improper activities after entry, rests in the events that occurred subsequent to the admission of the
deposed Shah of Iran to the United States for medical treatment in 1979. The admission of the Shah
to the United States precipitated a violent protest in Iran, leading to the forcible takeover of the
United States embassy in Teheran by Iranian radicals and the holding of American diplomats hostage
for more than a year. See Marvin Zonis, Majestic Failure: The Fall of the Shah 162-64, 320 (1991);
Shaul Bakhash, The Reign of the Ayatollahs: Iran and the Islamic Revolution 70 (1984).
504. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(28) (1988).
505. 22 U.S.C. § 2691 (repealed 1990).
506. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(28) (1988) (excluding aliens who are or have been "members of or
affiliated with ... the Communist or any other totalitarian party ... of any foreign state, (or) ...
any.., affiliate... of any such... party").
507. 22 U.S.C. § 2691(a) (repealed 1990).
508. De Allende v. Baker, 891 F.2d 7, 9-10 (1st Cir. 1989).
509. Id. at 10; Allende v. Schultz, 845 F.2d 1111, 1116 n.9 (1st Cir. 1988).
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administrative practice."' To add to the complexity of the problem, during the
pendency of the lawsuit, Congress in the interim had enacted new legisla-
tion-the Moynihan-Frank Amendment' "-which expressly prohibited
exclusions for reasons related to "associations which, if engaged in by a United
States citizen in the United States, would be protected under the Constitution of
the United States."5 2 Thus, whatever the validity of the government's denial
under Subsection 27 at the time, the new statute would preclude a denial of a
visa to Mrs. Allende for these particular reasons, thus raising the question
whether the case was moot."3
While the Allende litigation was proceeding, the identical issue was pending
before the federal courts in Washington, D.C. in the case of Abourezk v.
Reagan,"4 which also involved the denial of a visa under Subsection 27
because of foreign policy concerns related to an alien's association with the
Soviet-controlled World Peace Council."' In that case, the district court
entered summary judgment for the government." 6 A divided panel of the
District of Columbia Circuit vacated the decision. The majority held that while
the language of the statute supported the conclusion that Subsection 27 authorizes
exclusion only based on anticipated harmful activities after entry, it was not
clearly dispositive""7  The court remanded the case to the district court to
examine the administrative practice to determine whether it supported the
government's construction of the statute."' Judge Bork dissented, concluding
that Subsection 27 permits exclusion based upon the harm caused by entry and
presence as well as anticipated harmful activities after entry."9 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari, heard argument, and affirmed the court of appeals
decision on an equally divided vote without opinion. 20
In the Allende litigation, the district court on the merits ruled in favor of the
plaintiffs on summary judgment. 2' The primary basis of the district court's
510. The full flavor of the statutory and administrative issues raised can only be appreciated by
reading the merits decision in Allende v. Shultz and the majority and dissenting opinions in the related
case of Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1986), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 484
U.S. 1, 108 S. Ct. 252 (1987).
511. Pub. L. No. 100-204, § 901, 101 Stat. 1399-1400 (as extended by Pub. L. No. 100-461, §
555 (1988)).
512. Id.
513. Allende, 845 F.2d at 1121-22 (Breyer, J., concurring) (arguing that case was moot under
new legislation).
514. 592 F. Supp. 880 (D.D.C. 1984), vacated and remanded, 785 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1986),
affid by an equally divided Court, 484 U.S. 1, 108 S. Ct. 252 (1987).
515. Abourezk, 785 F.2d at 1048.
516. Abourezk, 592 F. Supp. at 880.
517. Abourezk, 785 F.2d at 1053-60.
518. Id.
519. Id. at 1064-68 (Bork, J., dissenting).
520. Reagan v. Abourezk, 484 U.S. 1, 108 S. Ct. 252 (1987).
521. The district court's decision on the merits in Allende is unreported, although the basis of
the decision is described in the court of appeals decision on the merits. See Allende v. Schultz, 845
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ruling lay in its interpretation of the effect of the McGovern Amendment. The
court ruled that the government may exclude aliens under Subsection 27 for
foreign policy reasons only if those reasons are "separate and independent of'
membership in the communist organizations covered by Subsection 28. "
Because the government had failed to establish that its reason for excluding Mrs.
Allende under Subsection 27 was "separate and independent" of her membership
in the World Peace Council, the district court ruled that Subsection 28, with the
required waiver mandated under the McGovern Amendment, governed this
case.
523
On the merits appeal, the First Circuit affirmed, but on entirely different
grounds.52 The court of appeals set aside the question decided by the district
court, of whether Subsection 27 permits exclusion of an alien for reasons not
entirely independent of membership in a Subsection 28 organization, as a
"semantic" debate it need not enter.52 The majority opinion instead held that an
alien's mere entry or presence in the country cannot be an "activity" prejudicial to
the public interest within the meaning of Subsection 27.526 In so holding, the
First Circuit noted 27 its disagreement with the District of Columbia Circuit in the
Abourezk litigation, which had found neither the statutory language nor the
legislative history dispositive and had found it necessary to remand the case for
consideration of whether there was a longstanding administrative practice
supporting the government's construction of the statute.528 Judge Breyer
concurred separately, saying that while he agreed with the majority on the merits,
he would have concluded that the enactment of the Moynihan-Frank Amendment
had mooted the case. 9
Following the First Circuit's decision on the merits, plaintiffs' counsel applied
for an award of attorney's fees under the EAJA, contending that the government's
position had not been "substantially justified." '53 The district court awarded
attorney's fees, holding that it was "evident simply from the face of the statute" that
Subsection 27 permits exclusion of aliens only where the government anticipates
prejudicial activity after entry.53" ' The court acknowledged the government's
argument that its position was supported by a district court decision, Judge Bork's
dissent, and by an equal number of Supreme Courtjustices in the parallelAbourezk
litigation, but stated that it was "not persuaded" by this "reading of the Abourezk
F.2d 1111, 1114-16 (lst Cir. 1988).
522. Id. at 1115-16 n.9 (describing and quoting from district court decision).
523. Id.
524. Allende, 845 F.2d at 1111.
525. Id. at 1120 n.17.
526. Id. at 1116-20.
527. Id. at 1119.
528. Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1053-60 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
529. Allende, 845 F.2d at 1121-22 (Breyer, J., concurring).




litigation. 532  Most significantly, the district court found the government's
position was not substantially justified because "it is clear to this Court that the
government was attempting an 'end run' around Subsection 28, and the McGovern
Act waiver," by relying upon Subsection 27 in this instance.
533
On appeal to the First Circuit from the EAJA award, the government raised
numerous arguments, many of which invited the court of appeals to re-examine the
merits of the case in significant detail, including an exploration of the structure of
the statute, as well as the legislative history and administrative practice that the
court had declined to examine when it had addressed the merits. 34 However, the
Supreme Court in Pierce v. Underwood5 35 had counseled against an undue
"investment of appellate energy" in reviewing an EAJA determination and had
adopted the deferential abuse of discretion standard of review for precisely this
reason.5 36 Although the appellate court, to avoid being a mere rubber stamp,
must necessarily achieve some familiarity with the underlying merits, it should still
resist being drawn into a burdensome revisitation of complicated factual or legal
questions on the merits. 37 Moreover, if the appellate court were to accept an
invitation to delve deeply into complicated factual or legal arguments, it might be
tempting to reach a plenary judgment and reverse on the basis of mere disagree-
ment with the trial court's determination.
The First Circuit instead properly applied a deferential abuse of discretion
standard and reversed the district court's EAJA determination without intrusive
revisitation of the merits. 3 The district court's decision here was vulnerable on
three grounds, all reflecting an abuse of discretion as that standard has been
outlined above. First, the district court relied upon an improper factor. Second, the
district court failed to give due weight to a material factor. Third, the district
532. Id. at 23.
533. Id.
534. See Brief for Appellant at 19-34, Do Allende v. Baker, 891 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1989) (No. 89-
1360); Reply Brief for Appellant at 8-16, De Allende v. Baker, 891 F.2d 7 (lstCir. 1989) (No. 89-1360).
535. 487 U.S. 552, 108 S. Ct. 2541 (1988).
536. Id. at 561, 108 S. Ct. at 2547.
537. See also Marcus v. Shalala, 17 F.3d 1033, 1038 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating that, while the
government invited the court of appeals "to ... engag[e] in (its] own comprehensive analysis of the
statutes and regulations at issue and the numerous cases" cited by the government, "[a]ccepting [that]
invitation ... would require us to engage in particularized appellate scrutiny, which is to be avoided in
reviewing a lower court's decision for abuse of discretion").
When the appellate panel reviewing the EAJA determination is the same as that which decided the
merits, a greater familiarity with the underlying issues may exist without any substantial investment of
appellate energy. Under such circumstances, the appellate court may be able to more easily appreciate
andevaluate the legitimacy ofthe trial court's determinationon substantial justification, although it must
still avoid mere substitution ofjudgment. In any event, while the First Circuit had heard both the merits
and the EAJA appeals in the Allende litigation, the appellate panels had no judges in common who
possessed continuing familiarity with the complicated issues. Compare Allende v. Schultz, 845 F.2d
111 I, 1112 (1 st Cir. 1988) (panel of Circuit Judges Bownes and Breyer, and District Judge Lagueux)
with DeAllende, 891 F.2d at 8 (panel of Circuit Judges Torruella, Selya, and Mayer).
538. DeAllende, 891 F.2d at 11-13.
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court's determination, especially in light of the material factor it neglected, fell
outside the scope of reasonableness and thus constituted serious error.
First, although the First Circuit merely alluded to this matter 39 without
expressly relying upon it in finding an abuse of discretion, the district court's
determination of want of substantial justification was primarily based upon
reasoning in its earlier ruling on the merits that had not been affirmed on the merits
appeal. Much of the district court's substantial justification holding turned on its
view that the government's use of Subsection 27 was an "end run" around the
McGovern Amendment's restriction on the use of Subsection 28 to exclude
members of communist organizations.' By referring to this application of the
statute by the government as an "end run" and further stating that this interpretation
"subverts the will of Congress,"'" the district court seemed to be suggesting
duplicitous conduct or perhaps bad faith by the government, which if true would
certainly justify EAJA fees. However, on the merits appeal, the First Circuit had
expressly declined to enter the "semantic debate" about whether Subsection 27 and
Subsection 28 were mutually exclusive5 2 and made clear that it was affirming on
the basis of different reasoning than the district court.5 43 The substantial justifica-
tion inquiry must proceed on the basis of the issues upon which the plaintiff
prevailed. The district court had erred in diverting its attention from the "en-
try/activity" interpretation of Subsection 27 that had been the basis for the
plaintiffs' success in the litigation.
Second, and what was determinative for the First Circuit in reversing, 5" the
government's position on the merits had received support, indeed endorsement,
from a substantial group of jurists in the parallel Abourezk litigation. In that
litigation, the district judge had entered summary judgment for the government on
the merits, accepting as correct the very arguments found by the Allende district
judge to be unreasonable.5 45 The District of Columbia Circuit reserved a final
decision on the issue, instead remanding for further exploration of the administra-
tive practice.5" Judge Bork stated in an exhaustive dissent from the appellate
court's decision that he would have affirmed that summoayjudgment in favor of the
government on precisely those grounds. 47 Most importantly, three Supreme
Court justices--on an equally divided Court-would have overturned the District
of Columbia Circuit's reversal and reinstated the summary judgment in favor of the
government.548
539. Id. at 11, 12.
540. De Allende v. Shultz, 709 F. Supp. 18, 23 (D. Mass. 1989).
541. Id.
542. Allende v. Schultz, 845 F.2d 1111, 1120 n.17 (1st Cir. 1988).
543. Id. at 1112.
544. Do Allende v. Baker, 891 F.2d 7, 12-13 (1st Cir. 1989).
545. Abourezk v. Reagan, 592 F. Supp. 880 (D.D.C. 1984).
546. Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1053-60 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
547. Id. at 1064-68 (Bork, J., dissenting).
548. Reagan v. Abourezk, 484 U.S. 1, 108 S. Ct. 252 (1987).
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However, the Allende district court described the events in the Abourezk
litigation as "irrelevant" and "not persuasive," '549 without further explanation.
This rejection of the views of other courts and judges as relevant to the substantial
justification inquiry was an abuse of discretion by way of ignoring a factor
deserving material weight in the analysis. The district court's statement that those
views were "irrelevant" contradicts the Supreme Court's ruling in Pierce v.
Underwood55 that "objective criteria" consisting of the views expressed by other
courts on the merits "can be relevant." '' In that particular case, the Supreme
Court found that the "objective criteria" was not conclusive, given that two courts
of appeals and nine district courts had rejected the government's position, while the
government had succeeded only in obtaining stays of those holdings and a grant of
certiorari by the Supreme Court.5 The Allende case stood in sharp contrast, as
only the First Circuit (and the district court below) had rejected the government's
position, while the District of Columbia Circuit had refrained from ruling pending
remand and the district court in that case had adopted the government's position.
Most importantly, the Supreme Court had divided equally on the merits of the
government's position, with three of the six participating Justices prepared to
uphold a summary judgment in the government's favor.
Moreover, as a measure of the reasonableness of the government's position,
the judicial pedigree of support for the government's position in the parallel
Abourezk litigation was unassailable. The district court abused its discretion in
substance, as well as procedure, by taking the view that a government position
satisfying three Supreme Court Justices was not "justified to a degree that could
satisfy a reasonable person." '553 It is a strange and insupportable view of the
"reasonable person" test that leaves three members of the Supreme Court outside
its ambit. Indeed, it is rather presumptuous for a district court to label one side of
a legal debate as "unjustified" or "unreasonable" when the Supreme Court found
the matter so intractable that it could not resolve it. While "the fact that one other
court agreed or disagreed with the Government does not establish whether its
position was substantially justified,"' 4 certainly the substantial justification
analysis veers sharply in one direction when several members of the Supreme Court
itself have weighed in on the merits of a matter. The First Circuit agreed and
reversed the district court's ruling in Allende, stating specifically that "the
government's position in litigation was never without substantialjustification, given
549. De Allende v. Shultz, 709 F. Supp. 18, 23 (D. Mass. 1989).
550. 487 U.S. 552, 108 S. Ct. 2541 (1988).
551. Id. at 568-69. See supra section IV.D.8 (discussing objective factor ofjudicial endorsement
or rejection of government's position on merits as supporting or undermining substantial justification
of the government's position).
552. Id.
553. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565, 108 S. Ct. 2541, 2550 (1988).
554. Id. at 569, 108 S. Ct. at 2552.
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decisions in parallel cases, including the support of three of the six participating
members of the Supreme Court in Abourezk." '555
4. Conclusion-The Gradual Development of Standards and the
Refinement of the Exercise of Discretion
In Pierce v. Underwood,556 the Supreme Court explained that the abuse of
discretion standard was appropriate in the EAJA context to afford courts flexibility,
believing that "'time and experience [will allow] the formless problem to take
shape, and the contours of a guiding principle to emerge."'" 7 Accordingly, the
Court anticipated and apparently encouraged the gradual development of standards
through cumulative experience, guidelines that over the course of time will
gradually narrow the "channel of discretion. 58  As discussed previously,
559
that process of cultivation is already bearing fruit, allowing for a more refined
exercise of discretion by district courts and a more finely calibrated review of that
discretion by the courts of appeals.
F. "Special Circumstances" Exception to Fee Awards
[A] court shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States
fees and other expenses... incurred by that party in any civil action...
brought by or against the United States in any court having jurisdiction of
that action, unless the court finds that the position of the United States was
substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.
(EAJA § 2412(d)(1)(A))w
1. The Meaning of "Special Circumstances"
Subparagraph 2412(d)(1)(A) provides that, even when the position of the
United States is not substantially justified, an award of attorney's fees still may be
denied if the court finds "that special circumstances make an award unjust. 56'
The committee reports accompanying the original EAJA legislation explained this
provision in this way:
555. De Allende v. Baker, 891 F.2d 7, 13 (1st Cir. 1989).
556. 487 U.S. 552, 108 S. Ct. 2541 (1988).
557. Id. at 562, 108 S. Ct. at 2548 (quoting Rosenberg, supra note 241, at 662-63).
558. Friendly, supra note 461, at 772 (stating that, as settled practice in an area develops over
time, "the channel of discretion ... narrow[s]").
559. See supra section IV.D (discussing factors and circumstances indicating or undermining
substantial justification of the government's position).




[T]he Government should not be held liable where "special circumstances
would make an award unjust." This "safety valve" helps to insure that the
Government is not deterred from advancing in good faith the novel but
credible extensions and interpretations of the law that often underlie
vigorous enforcement efforts. It also gives the court discretion to deny
awards where equitable considerations dictate an award should not be
made.5
62
A few courts have construed this legislative history as compelling a con-
strained understanding of "special circumstances," limiting it to considerations
related to the substantive issues in the case.563 Under this restrictive interpreta-
tion, the "special circumstances" provision may be invoked to deny an award only
when there is something unique about the questions raised in the merits of the
case.5" Other factors, such as the factual context of the case or the characteristics
of the parties, could not justify denial, of a fee award.5 65 For at least two reasons,
this construction of "special circumstances" is mistaken.
First, the primary point of reference in statutory interpretation must be the
actual language of the statute as enacted, looking behind the authoritative text to the
legislative history only for further clarification. There is nothing in the wording of
the EAJA suggesting any limitation on the nature of the considerations or state of
affairs that could constitute "special circumstances." Beyond the essential
requirement that the circumstances truly be "special," that is, reflecting an unusual
occurrence, the statute does not hint at any categorical restriction.
Second, not only does the legislative history not support a categorical restraint
interpretation, it affirmatively negates it. The committee reports do specifically
identify "novel but credible extensions and interpretations of the law" by the
government as one type of special circumstance that may justify denying a fee
award.15 But this legislative history does not refer to substantive legal issues as
defining the entire universe of "special circumstances." To the contrary, the
committee reports immediately proceed beyond the discussion of "special
circumstances" as a "safety valve" for novel government legal arguments, to
explain that the provision also confers upon the court "discretion to deny awards
where equitable considerations dictate an award should not be made. 567
562. H.R. Rep. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4984,
4990; S. Rep. No. 253, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1979).
563. See, e.g., National Truck Equip. Ass'n v. National Highway Safety Admin., 972 F.2d 669,
672 (6th Cir. 1992); Grason Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 951 F.2d 1100, 1103 (9th Cir. 1991).
564. National Truck Equip. Ass'n, 972 F.2d at 672; Grason Elec. Co., 951 F.2d at 1103.
565. National TruckEquip. Ass 'n, 972 F.2d at 672 (ruling that the "special circumstance" reference
applies only to "substantive issues, such as close or novel questions of law," and does not include
financial circumstances as a basis for defeating an award); Grason Elec. Co., 951 F.2d at 1103 (same).
566. H.R. Rep. No. 1418,96th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4984,
4990; S. Rep. No. 253, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1979).
567. Id. See also Doria v. Brown, No. 90-626, 1995 WL 275740, at *5 (Vet. App. May 11, 1995)
(stating that legislative history suggests "two distinct categories of special circumstances;" first,
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Moreover, when viewed against the background of attorney's fee cases
predating the EAJA and the more limited use of the "special circumstances"
exception during that earlier period, the legislative history to the EAJA confirms
an expansion in meaning. Under civil rights statutes, the concept of "special
circumstances" had been "concerned with equitable considerations relating to the
factual context of the case," while the committee reports on the EAJA confirm an
expansion of the concept to include "equitable considerations relating to the legal
position of the government."' " When it enacted the EAJA, Congress was
undoubtedly aware that "special circumstances" had been developed as an
exception to fee-shifting in civil rights cases when equitable considerations made
a fee award unjust.5 69 In civil rights cases, courts had considered or identified the
exceptional factual context of a case as a "special circumstance" warranting the
denial of a fee award, especially when the plaintiff had engaged in outrageous or
obdurate conduct prior to the litigation.570 The EAJA reports augment the rule
by suggesting that, in addition to "equitable considerations," a fee award might be
denied when the government presents a novel but credible legal argument."7 In
this way, the committee reports contemplate an amplification of the "special
circumstances" concept into a general rule of equity, although one that is to be
rarely invoked." 2
"situations where the government proffers novel but credible extensions and interpretations of the law,"
and second, situations where other equitable considerations dictate an award should not be made).
568. Office of Legal Policy, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Award of Attorney Fees and other Expenses in
Judicial Proceedings Under the Equal Access to Justice Act 54 (rev. ed. 1985) (citations omitted). See
also Hill, supra note 7, at 70 n.99 (stating that the concept of "special circumstances" in civil rights
cases had focused upon the factual context of the case, while the concept under the EAJA more broadly
includes both matters relating to the factual context of the case and the legal position of the government).
569. See Newman v. Piggie Park Enter., 390 U.S. 400, 402, 88 S. Ct. 964, 966 (1968) (per
curiam) (holding that a successful plaintiff in a civil rights case "should ordinarily recover an
attorney's fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust" (emphasis added)).
Indeed, when Congress enacted the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act in 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-559, § 213, 90 Stat. 2641 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988)), the legislative history articulated
this same standard for awarding fees, that is, that prevailing plaintiffs "should ordinarily recover an
attorney's fee unless special circumstances render such an award unjust." S. Rep. No. 1011, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5912 (quoting Newman) (emphasis
added). Since the EAJA contains parallel language, the "special circumstances" concept as developed
in civil rights attorney's fee litigation has obvious relevance to this analysis.
570. See, e.g., Zarcone v. Perry, 581 F.2d 1039, 1044 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1072, 99 S. Ct. 843 (1979); Scheriff v. Beck, 452 F. Supp. 1254, 1260 (D. Colo. 1978); Skehan v.
Board of Trustees, 436 F. Supp. 657, 667 (M.D. Pa. 1977), aft'd, 590 F.2d 470 (3d Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 832, 100 S. Ct. 61 (1979).
571. H.R. Rep. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4984,
4990; S. Rep. No. 253, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1979).
572. See Taylor v. United States, 815 F.2d 249, 252 (3d Cir. 1987) (stating that the "special
circumstances" provision allows consideration of general "equitable principles" in determining
whether a fee award is warranted); Oguachuba v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 706 F.2d 93,
98 (2d Cir. 1983) (same).
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
The "special circumstances" provision should be strictly applied only to truly
"special" considerations. The factors or affairs relied upon to deny a fee award
must be those that are unique to the case and unusual in occurrence. Moreover,
when other express provisions within the EAJA would apply, such as rules
concerning eligibility of a party for a fee award,573 the court should hesitate
before counting those factors a second time in the "special circumstances"
analysis." 4 However, while narrow in application, the "special circumstances"
provision is broad enough in scope to encompass appropriate factual, party
characteristic, and substantive issue "equitable considerations" that suggest it would
be unjust to award attorney's fees to a particular party in a particular case.
When equitable considerations are weighed, each case will be unique and turn
on its own particular facts and circumstances. " Nevertheless, certain types of
equitable considerations have been asserted with sufficient frequency in the EAJA
context to warrant discussion below. 6 However, as a general admonition to the
courts, the presumption of an award of fees to an eligible and entitled party is so
strong that a denial of fees on the basis of "special circumstances" should be
rare.
57
2. Substantive Issues as "Special Circumstances"
Although the "special circumstances" provision may not be limited to
considerations involving the substantive issues of the case, it certainly does include
them. The legislative history expressly contemplated that the presentation of
"novel but credible extensions and interpretations of the law" by the government,
as necessary to vigorous enforcement of the law,171 should be encouraged by
protecting the government from fee awards under such circumstances. This
particular application of the "special circumstances" was addressed earlier,5 79 and
that full discussion will not be repeated here.
573. See generally supra section HLI.B and C (discussing the net worth and employment size
eligibility requirements for parties and the requirement that a party have "incurred" fees to be eligible
for an award).
574. See infra section IV.F.4 (discussing whether financial circumstances of parties and presence
of both eligibile and non-eligible parties in a case may constitute "special circumstances" justifying
denial of a fee award).
575. Hill, supra note 7, at 70.
576. See also Ralph V. Seep, Annotation, What Constitutes "Special Circumstances "Precluding
Award ofAttorneys' Fees Under Equal Access to Justice Act (28 USCS § 2412(d)), 106 A.L.R. Fed.
191 (1992).
577. See 1 Mary F. Derfner & Arthur D. Wolf, Court Awarded Attorney Fees 10.02[3], at 10-
12 to 10-13 (1994) (stating that, in civil rights cases, "[t]he presumption in favor of an award of fees
to prevailing plaintiffs in private attorney general lawsuits is, in fact, so strong that a denial of fees
on the basis of 'special circumstances' is extremely rare").
578. H.R. Rep. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4984,
4990; S. Rep. No. 253, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1979).579. See supra section IV.D.6 (discussing uncertainty in the law and novel issues of law as a
factor suggesting the justification of the government's position).
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However, one additional case falling generally within this substantive issue
category is worth examination. In Cannon v. Heckler,80 a district court relied
upon the "special circumstances" provision to deny attorney's fees to a plaintiff in
a Social Security case who had secured a final judgment granting benefits.5"'
Following entry of a final non-appealable judgment on the merits in Cannon, the
government's legal position had been adopted by the Supreme Court in another
case. 2 The district court ruled:
It would be unjust to force the Secretary to pay attorney's fees when it is
clear that she would not even have to pay benefits to plaintiff under
current law. It also would be unjust to force the Secretary to pay
attorney's fees for taking a legal position that has since been vindicated by
the Supreme Court. The special circumstances of this case appear to be
the very type of circumstances Congress had in mind when it enacted this
particular prohibition against EAJA awards in 28 U.S.C. §
2412(d)(1)(A).8 3
Although the district court viewed the Supreme Court's subsequent adoption of the
government's position as a "special circumstance" dictating the denial of a fee, the
development could just as easily have been understood as conclusive evidence that
the government's position was substantially justified. The Cannon case further
illustrates that, when the substance of the government's legal position is being
examined for its credibility or reasonableness, the distinction between the
substantial justification standard and the special circumstances exception appears
elusive.584
A consideration of substantive legal issues from the position of the party
opposing the government may also be relevant in an exceptional case. At least
theoretically, a case could arise in which a private party eligible for and otherwise
entitled to an EAJA award might properly be denied such an award because that
party presented a plethora of substantive legal issues that were not meritorious and,
indeed, constituted harassment of the government and imposition of frivolous
contentions upon the court. To be sure, such a case would be as rare as a snowflake
in July because the party would not be eligible for an award unless it had prevailed
on some part of the claim and would not be entitled to an award unless the
government's position as a whole had been found to be without substantial
justification. It is difficult to conceive of a case in which the government's overall
position is so lacking in merit as to be found unreasonable, but in which the
prevailing party simultaneously is found to have presented a case in which
580. 695 F. Supp. 458 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
581. Id. at 459-60.
582. Id.
583. Id. at 460.
584. See Hill, supra note 7, at 71 ("Any attempt at drawing a definitive distinction in this matter
... is conceivably academic, for one could equate a 'reasonable' interpretation for purposes of
substantial justification with a 'credible' interpretation for purposes of special circumstances.").
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outrageous arguments substantially outweigh meritorious ones. Moreover, since
any party petitioning for fees would be denied compensation for the particular time
devoted to frivolous arguments, a mixture of groundless and meritorious positions
ordinarily could be dealt with in the routine calculation of an appropriate fee, thus
falling outside the ambit of "special circumstances." Nevertheless, at least as a
hypothetical case, "special circumstances" could counsel denial of a fee award
where the positions of both the government (by necessity in being found without
substantial justification) and the private party (by presenting a predominantly
frivolous case which contains a fragment of merit) are so lacking in credit that
neither side warrants anything but disdain from the court, leaving both to bear their
own legal expenses as just desserts.
The closest real world example to this ethereal hypothetical might be the case
of Williams v. Bowen,58 5 although strictly speaking it probably should fall under
the equitable category of factual context rather than substantive legal issues. In
Williams, the district court found that the government's defense of an administra-
tive law judge's denial of Social Security widow's benefits was not substantially
justified.58 6  In the court's view, the administrative determination that the
plaintiffs hearing impairment was not equivalent to an impairment listed in the
regulation was nonsensical. The decision of the administrative law judge,
unsupported by medical expert opinion, failed to provide any explanation of the
reasoning behind the decision." 7 Indeed, the court characterized the administra-
tive decision as an "abdication" of responsibility that came close to constituting
outright legal error justifying a reversal without any remand for additional factual
findings."' Nevertheless, the court found that plaintiff's position and actions in
litigating the case were sufficiently detrimental to efficient resolution ofthe dispute
as to bring the case under the "special circumstances" provision." 9 Early in the
litigation, the government voluntarily offered a remand of the case, which would
have permitted the plaintiff to obtain the further evaluations that she demanded.5'
The plaintiff incomprehensibly rejected the offer of remand.59" ' The district court
concluded that, "[b]y ordinary principles of legal causation, all litigation in this
court after the motion to remand was attributable to the plaintiff's position, not the
government's."592 Although arguably this state of affairs could have been
resolved at the fee measurement stage by reducing the award to account for the
plaintiff's obstructionist behavior, the result probably would have been the same-a
denial of all (or nearly all) fees-as was reached under a "special circumstances"
analysis.
585. No. 85 C 2653, 1987 WL 10559 (N.D. Ill. May 6, 1987).
586. Id. at *2-3.
587. Id.
588. Id. at *2.
589. Id. at *34.
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3. Factual Context as "Special Circumstances"
The most common "special circumstance" identified by courts to justify denial
of an EAJA award is some form of outrageous or obdurate behavior by the plaintiff
related to the factual context of the litigation. A classic example of a party
engaging in such contumacious behavior as to warrant the denial of a fee award on
equitable grounds is the Second Circuit's early EAJA decision in Oguachuba v.
Immigration & Naturalization Service." 3 In that case, Oguachuba, a Nigerian
citizen who had previously been deported after persistent efforts to evade
immigration laws, returned to the United States within days after deportation and
was immediately taken into custody by the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS).5" Despite diligent efforts by the INS, Nigerian consular officials refused
to provide travel documents permitting Oguachuba's deportation to Nigeria. 5
Oguachuba sought a writ of habeas corpus from the district court, alleging that the
INS had detained him beyond the statutory six-month limit.5" Although the INS
contended that the recalcitrance of Nigerian consular officials amounted to an
obstruction tolling the statute, the district court held that the six-month limitation
was absolute. 597 However, the district court denied an award of attorney's fees
under the EAJA on "special circumstances" grounds, stating that while the INS
may have violated the literal requirements of the six-month statute, it would be "a
travesty ofjustice" to award fees in view of Oguachuba's "flagrant violation" of his
duty to depart and his use of "various devices" to avoid carrying out his agreement
to voluntarily leave the country. 9"
The tale of Oguachuba and his obstinate resistance to immigration laws and
pertinacious efforts to evade immigration authorities is truly remarkable. After
being twice dismissed as a student from American universities, Oguachuba
overstayed his student visa.'9 He repeatedly violated agreements with the INS
to voluntarily depart, claimed on some occasions to be married to an American
citizen while on other occasions described himself as unmarried, escaped from INS
custody, and traveled from coast to coast while under an order of deportation, all
the while running into other trouble with the law (repeatedly being arrested on
criminal and traffic charges). 6m Even after being escorted onto a flight out of the
country, Oguachuba reappeared at the same airport only three days later, falsely
claiming that he was an American citizen, at which point he was taken into
custody."' Even after the events in question, and his second deportation,
593. 706 F.2d 93 (2d Cir. 1983).
594. Id. at 95-96.
595. Id. at 96.
596. Id.
597. Id.
598. Id. at 96-97.
599. Id. at 94.
600. Id. at 95 & n.2.
601. Id. at 95-96.
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Oguachuba returned yet again to the United States after only four months, once
again claiming to be an American citizen and once again being taken into
custody.6 2 In sum, this was a compelling case for application of the "special
circumstances" exception, a scenario hopefully seldom replicated.
The Second Circuit affirmed the denial of EAJA fees, finding that "in classic
equity terms," Oguachuba did not come to the court with "clean hands": 3
Oguachuba's extraordinary persistence in evading the lawful efforts
of the INS to deport him to Nigeria, his flagrant contempt for United
States law and the fact that his own decision not to acquiesce in deporta-
tion caused his incarceration constitute the "special circumstances" that
make it inequitable to award him attorneys' fees under the EAJA.'
A similar case of improper motives and taking unfair advantage, but which also
stands as a warning that the "special circumstances" rule is narrow in application,
is the Third Circuit's decision in Taylor v. United States.605 Taylor, a former
serviceman, obtained a court order restraining the government from surrendering
him to Spanish authorities to serve a criminal sentence, when the military had
involuntarily extended his enlistment in order to hold him in military custody.'
Although the courts ruled that the government was without authority to extend his
enlistment, the district court found, and the Third Circuit affirmed, that an EAJA
award would be inequitable because Taylor's conduct was designed to avoid
serving his validly imposed sentence for criminal manslaughter committed while
he was stationed in Spain.'
Judge Becker concurred in Taylor to "emphasize the narrowness of the
principle" informing the "special circumstances" exception to fee liability.' 8
He explained that the analysis is not so simplistic as to justify denial of EAJA
fees "any time a 'bad guy' litigant has defeated the government in a law-
suit."'  Indeed, the government is frequently sued for misconduct or over-
reaching in cases involving plaintiffs with other than stainless reputations. Nor
is the government's "good faith" a basis for denial of a fee award because the
consideration of the government's conduct is already subsumed within the
substantial justification analysis.6t0 Rather, what Judge Becker argued motivat-
602. Id. at 97.
603. Id. at 99. See also Bar Bea Truck Leasing Co. v. United States, 4 Ct. Int'l Trade 137, 138
(1982) (finding that plaintiff's "hands are very far from clean," thus warranting a denial of EAJA fees
on special circumstances grounds, when plaintiff had acquiesced for over five years in unauthorized
use of its customhouse cartage license by another related entity, which had precipitated the
government's attempt to nullify the license).
604. Oguachuba, 706 F.2d at 94.
605. 815 F.2d 249 (3d Cir. 1987).
606. Id. at 251.
607. Id. at 254.
608. Id. (Becker, J., concurring).
609. Id.
610. Id. at 254 & n.l.
[Vol. 56
EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT
ed the denial of fees was Taylor's "affirmative activity that took advantage of the
very government misconduct that he later challenged in court. '611 Taylor had
avoided being turned over to Spanish authorities precisely because of his
continued enlistment in the military during his period in Spain and then had
turned around and challenged the validity of that continued enlistment when it
led to his being placed in military custody for the purpose of being transferred
to Spain to serve his prison sentence. 62  As in the case of Oguachuba, the
Taylor case is exceptional because the party had deliberately manipulated the
law, seeking to avoid deserved treatment by reliance on legal technicalities, and
had taken affirmative advantage of the government's diligent, but nevertheless
mistaken, efforts to uphold its responsibilities.
A final case falling in this category of factual context is more questionable
in analysis, if nevertheless appropriate in final result. In Dubose v. Pierce,1 3
a district court invoked the "special circumstances" language of Subparagraph
(d)(1)(A) to deny fees claimed by an individual attorney who had been "less than
forthright" in explaining to legal services organizations with whom he had been
previously affiliated that he intended to take the case with him and handle it in
his private capacity. 64 The attorney had served as lead counsel in the class
action suit against the federal government, beginning while he was employed by
one legal services organization and continuing while employed by another, but
with periods of self-employment between and after his legal services organization
employment." 5 Although neither legal services organization opposed this
attorney's request for an award of fees based upon his work during these two
time periods, he had not been candid with either the court or those organizations
in revealing that he considered himself to be representing the class action
plaintiffs in his private capacity during these periods.616 For this reason, the
district court cited the "special circumstances" provision and determined that the
attorney's misconduct called for the denial of his individual fee request.6"7
In relying upon the "special circumstances" provision to deny a fee award
to an individual attorney because of apparently dishonest conduct by that attorney
toward his own law firm or client, the Dubose court misunderstood the nature of
statutory fee-shifting. Under the EAJA, as under other statutory fee-shifting
provisions, the fee award is made to the party-not to the attorney.1 ' At issue
611. Id.
612. Id. at 253-54.
613. 579 F. Supp. 937 (D. Conn. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 761 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1985),
vacated on other grounds, 487 U.S. 1229, 108 S. Ct. 2890 (1988).
614. Id. at 964-66.
615. Id. at 964-65.
616. Id. at 965-66.
617. Id. at 964-66.
618. See Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 730-32, 106 S. Ct. 1531, 1538-40 (1986) (ruling that
a fee-shifting statute bestows eligibility for fee awards on the party, not on the attorney, and the party
may waive eligibility for fees as part of a settlement of the case, notwithstanding the objections of
the attorney); Phillips v. General Services Admin., 924 F.2d 1577, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (stating that,
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is the party's eligibility for and entitlement to a fee award, not the attorney's.
Although a party properly may be denied a fee award because of misconduct
committed by the attorney (as the client's agent) toward the court or the
opposing party, a party should not be deprived of a fee award because of the
attorney's violation of duties of candor toward his own client. If a party has
truly incurred legal expenses that are reasonable in amount, it would be oddly
punitive to deny that party reimbursement because that party had been the victim
of deception by his own attorney. The Dubose court erred both in treating the
individual attorney as having any standing to request a fee award and in denying
a fee award based upon the attorney's misconduct relating to his own law firm
and thus indirectly to his own clients.
However, the result may nevertheless be defended on other grounds.
Although a court should not deny a fee award to a party for reasonable legal
expenses actually incurred, the court does have the power to investigate the
arrangement between the attorney and client and to excuse the client from being
held to any inequitable obligation. While the questions of an award under a
statutory fee-shifting provision and the propriety of the private contractual
relationship between attorney and client may be analytically separate, they
become related in the fee-shifting context. These two subjects converge when
an attorney, who has breached a duty of candor or other fiduciary responsibility
to a client, then seeks an award of fees on behalf of that client against another
party. The determination of what charges were properly imposed by the attorney
and therefore legitimately incurred by the client is a necessary first step in the
analysis. The second and analytically separate step is to determine whether the
fee obligation may be transferred to the opposing party. In other words, when
a court protects the client from being charged an improper fee, the client has not
incurred a fee to be passed along to the opposing party through a fee-shifting
award.
The court has an inherent supervisory power to protect a client from
improper assessment of fees by attorneys. 9 Because the attorney in Dubose
covertly appropriated a case from one legal services organization for handling in
his private capacity, and continued to devote time to this purportedly private
activity while employed by another legal services organization, the Dubose court
quite properly reprimanded the attorney for his lack of candor and prohibited him
from profiting by this behavior. Since the legal services organizations did not
under the EAJA, "any fee award is made to the 'prevailing party,"' and thus an attorney who
arranged for payment contingent on availability of a fee award "could not directly claim or be entitled
to the award"; the award "had to be requested on behalf of the party"); Oguachuba v. Immigration
& Naturalization Serv., 706 F.2d 93, 97 (2d Cir. 1983) (stating that the EAJA allows a fee to the
"prevailing party," not the attorney, and thus it is the party's entitlement to the fees, not the
attorney's, that is at issue).
619. Charles W. wolfram, Modem Legal Ethics § 9.1, at 496 (1986) ("The basic contractual
relationship between the client and lawyer is itself subject to an overriding power in courts to affect
the terms of the relationship between client and lawyer in ways favorable to the client.!).
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seek fees for this particular period of time, ° this segment of legal work would
not have been properly chargeable to a client by any legal representative
(whether the client was paying a fee for service or, as here, benefiting from pro
bono services). Even if this had been a case involving a paying client, the court
properly could have determined to excuse the client from paying fees for the
particular hours worked by the attorney with a dishonest motivation. Passing
from stage one (judicial supervision of attorney-client relationship) to stage two
(fee-shifting) of the analysis, legal expenses which are not properly attributable
to the client do not constitute fees "incurred by that party," a prerequisite to
obtaining a fee award under the EAJA.62 Thus, rather than falling under the
"special circumstances" category of party misconduct as an exception to fee-
shifting, Dubose is more amenably analyzed as a case where the particular fees
at issue were not properly chargeable to the client in the first instance and thus
were not actually incurred for purposes of making an EAJA claim.
4. Party Characteristics as "Special Circumstances"
On a couple of occasions, courts have invoked the "special circumstances"provision of the EAJA to deny fee awards when the court believed that the joint
participation of both eligible and ineligible parties 622 created the specter of one
party "free riding" through the case on the back of another.623 In Lousiana ex
rel. Guste v. Lee,624 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
declared that "[i]f the party ineligible for fees is fully willing and able to
prosecute the action against the United States, the parties eligible for EAJA fees
should not be able to take a free ride through the judicial process at the
government's expense."625 For that reason, the Fifth Circuit suggested that "in
special circumstances the participation of a party ineligible for EAJA fees may
make a fee award for other eligible parties unjust."626
In a previous section of this article, it was suggested that the "free rider"
concern is "largely overstated," whether viewed as a fear that attorneys for
eligible parties will engage in work duplicative of that of ineligible parties
because of the prospects of a fee award or that ineligible parties will ride to
620. Dubose, 579 F. Supp. at 964.
621. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1XA) (1988) (providing that an award may be made under the
EAJA for "fees ... incurred by that party"). See generally supra section ILI.C (discussing
requirement that a party have "incurred" fees to be eligible for an EAJA award).
622. Under the EAJA, eligibility of parties is defined in terms of net wortfi and employment size.
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B) (1988). See generally supra section III.B (discussing party eligibility
limitations based upon net worth and employment size).
623. See, e.g., United States v. 27.09 Acres of Land, 43 F.3d 769, 775 (2d Cir. 1994); Louisiana
ex rel. Guste v. Lee, 853 F.2d 1219, 1223-25 (5th Cir. 1988).
624. 853 F.2d 1219 (5th Cir. 1988).
625. Id. at 1225. See also 27.09 Acres of Land, 43 F.3d at 775 (stating that the "EAJA should
be administered in ways that deter free riding by unnecessary parties').
626. Louisiana ex rel. Guste, 853 F.2d at 1225.
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success in the litigation on the efforts and expenses of the eligible party.627 An
eligible party may only recover fees that it has actually incurred. Additionally,
there is generally no incentive for an eligible party to duplicate legal work
performed on behalf of ineligible parties or to accept a disproportionate share of
the legal expenses necessary to prosecute or defend a case. as Moreover, given
the general unpredictability of an EAJA award, the previous discussion in this
article concluded that "the litigation choices made by various counsel are likely
to be driven by more immediate economic and practical considerations such as
the respective resources of the parties and ability of their counsel and by
determination of the best strategy to achieve success on the merits." 69 Eligible
and ineligible parties are unlikely to join a lawsuit or expend significant
resources upon it unless they have concluded that their active participation is
either necessary to the successful outcome or that other parties are not adequately
or competently presenting a claim or defense against the federal government. 3"
In addition, because the EAJA expressly sets out the standards for eligibility of
parties,63' it would not ordinarily be appropriate to supplement the statutory
eligibility rules and further restrict eligibility under the guise of "special
circumstances" analysis.
To say that the concern expressed in a handful of court decisions about the
prospect of abuse of the eligibility limitations through "free riding" may be
largely overstated, however, is not to say that the concern is nonexistent. As
stated earlier, it may be appropriate to deny or reduce a fee award "when eligible
parties or their attorneys have abused the situation, such as by needlessly joining
an action brought by an ineligible party that is destined for inevitable victory or
by incurring excessive or duplicative legal expenses when counsel for an
ineligible party is fully and ably prosecuting the matter. ' 63 2 Even under those
circumstances, the problem ordinarily can be addressed in the measurement of
a fee award and thus would not constitute "special circumstances" implicating
this exceptional statutory limitation.
627. See supra section UL.B.5 (discussing fee awards in cases with participation by both eligible
and ineligible parties).
628. Id.
629. See supra text accompanying note 763 in section III.B.5.
630. See supra notes 769-70 and accompanying text in section III.B.5.
631. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B) (1988) (defining "party" under the EAJA by category, net worth,
and employment size). See generally supra section ILI.B (discussing party eligibility under the
EAJA).
632. See supra text accompanying note 772 in section III.B.5. In addition, this Article
previously suggested that, in an unusual case, a trade association might be denied fees under the
"special circumstances" provision if the trade association's position in litigation conforms to an
agenda set by a dominating industry member that itself would be ineligible by reason of net worth
or employment size for a fee award. See supra note 674 in section III.B.3.b.ii (discussing eligibility
of trade associations for EAJA fees).
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For example, in United States v. 27.09 Acres of Land,633 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that special circumstances made a
fee award unjust "where all of the fees [of a particular eligible party] were
expended on discrete efforts that achieved no appreciable advantage and where
the claim of the prevailing parties rests largely on a result to which the claimant
made no contribution. 634 The sole eligible party merely joined in submissions
of the other ineligible parties, and the eligible party's separate efforts "were
marginal, duplicative and unnecessary because of the laboring oar" taken by the
other parties. 5 The court's determination to deny fees was quite appropriate,
although its reliance on the "special circumstances" provision is questionable.
When any party seeking attorney's fees, under the EAJA or another fee-shifting
provision, has engaged in wasteful behavior through duplicative or unnecessary
submissions, the denial or reduction of fees is justified as a basic principle of
calculation of a reasonable fee award.63 In other words, this case does not
present a "special" circumstance, but rather a garden-variety issue of proper
measurement of a reasonable fee award. The court's analysis of this issue as a
"special circumstance" consideration suggests that eligible parties will be
penalized simply because ineligible parties independently joined litigation, which
is impossible to square with the statutory provision declaring the standards for
party eligibility.
V. MEASUREMENT OF THE FEE AWARD
"[F]ees and other expenses" includes the reasonable expenses of
expert witnesses, the reasonable cost of any study, analysis, engineering
report, test, or project which is found by the court to be necessary for
the preparation of the party's case, and reasonable attorney fees. (The
amount of fees awarded under this subsection shall be based upon
prevailing market rates for the kind and quality of the services
furnished, except that (i) no expert witness shall be compensated at a
rate in excess of the highest rate of compensation for expert witnesses
paid by the United States; and (ii) attorney fees shall not be awarded
in excess of $75 per hour unless the court determines that an increase
in the cost of living or a special factor, such as the limited availability
of qualified attorneys for the proceedings involved, justifies a higher
fee.) (EAJA § 2412(d)(1)(A))637
633. 43 F.3d 769 (2d Cir. 1994).
634. Id. at 773.
635. Id. at 771, 774-75.
636. See infra section V.A (discussing measurement of a fee award).
637. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A) (1988).
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A. General Principles for Fee Award Calculation Under EAJA Subsection (d)
1. The $75 Per Hour Rate Ceiling
One of the distinctive features of EAJA Subsection (d) is the explicit ceiling
on the amount of attorney's fees that may be awarded to a private party from
federal government funds. Measurement of an attorney's fee award under
Subsection (d) begins in the ordinary way, with the calculation of the "lodestar."
The lodestar is a reasonable fee based upon the product of hours reasonably
expended by the attorney on legal services multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate
for the attorney.63 However, in contrast with most other statutes authorizing
an award of attorney's fees from an opposing party,639 Subparagraph (d)(2)(A)
places a specific limitation on permissible fee awards, directing that fees "shall
not be awarded in excess of $75 per hour unless the court determines that an
increase in the cost of living or a special factor, such as the limited availability
of qualified attorneys for the proceedings involved, justifies a higher fee."'
The $75 per hour rate cap "is of considerable consequence in the calculation
of the amount of fees.""' As the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit explained in Hyatt v. Shalala,"2 a party who is able to obtain
a fee award under an alternative fee-shifting provision can obtain fees that
"greatly exceed the cap placed on a § 2412(d) award."'643  The sharp contrast
in approach is illustrated by different provisions of the EAJA. Under Subsection
(b) of the EAJA, which subjects the United States to liability for attorney's fees
"to the same extent that any other party would be liable under the common law
or under the terms of any statute which specifically provides for such an
award,"6' an award would be made at full market rates adjusted by discretion-
638. See infra section V.A.2 (discussing the lodestar measurement of attorney's fee awards).
639. Other than the EAJA, there are two other significant statutory fee-shifting provisions, both
applicable only to the federal government, that place a cap on the hourly rate of attorneys. As
discussed previously, see supra section II.D, the EAJA was amended in 1982 to withdraw federal tax
cases from its scope. Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 292(c), 96 Stat. 324, 574 (1982) (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2412(e) (1988)). A separate fee-shifting provision was created under the Internal Revenue Code.
Id. § 292(a), 96 Stat. at 572 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 7430 (1988)). Section 7430, as applied in the
tax determination or collection context. is virtually identical to EAJA Subsection (d), in that it
imposes a similar "substantial justification" standard for entitlement to a fee award and the $75 per
hour cap on fees. 26 U.S.C. § 7430(c)(1)(B)(iii), (c)(4)(A)(i) (1988). In addition, the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (1994) (codified in scattered sections of
11 and 28 U.S.C.), includes a waiver of sovereign immunity of the federal government and states,
including provision for award of attorney's fees, in bankruptcy proceedings. Id. § 113, 108 Stat. at
4117 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 106(a)(3) (1994)). This bankruptcy proceeding attorney's fee provision
incorporates the $75 per hour rate cap from EAJA Subparagraph (d)(2)(A). Id.
640. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A) (1988).
641. Hyatt v. Shalala, 6 F.3d 250, 254 (4th Cir. 1993).
642. Id.
643. Id. at 254.
644. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (1988). See generally supra section I.B.2 (providing a summary of the
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ary factors." 5 Thus, if a party can demonstrate that the fee should be awarded
under Subsection (b), such as by showing that the government engaged in
misconduct within the meaning of the common law bad faith rule for awarding
attorney's fees, 6 the party would escape the $75 per hour cap applicable to
awards under the Subsection (d) "substantial justification" provision.
The rate cap provision, at least in part, may reflect anti-lawyer sentiment in
Congress. 7 Indeed, one leading sponsor of the EAJA insisted that his
"philosophy" was "not to assist the lawyers of this country, and it wasn't to pay
attorney's fees for lawyers."" In Pierce v. Underwood,"9 the Supreme
Court explained the limitation as confirming that "Congress thought that $75 an
hour was generally quite enough public reimbursement for lawyers' fees,
whatever the local or national market might be."65  Nevertheless, because
restricting compensation to lawyers ultimately restricts availability of legal
services, Congress sought to strike some balance by setting the $75 figure and
including a safety valve for enhancement by cost of living increases and special
factors.65' In this manner, Congress attempted "to provide full market compen-
sation for successful litigants while, at the same time, limiting costs."652
Although the statutory rate ceiling and especially its exceptions play the
leading role in any examination of the amount of fees awarded under the EAJA,
the discussion must begin with a review of fundamental principles for calculation
of attorney's fees awards under the EAJA or any other fee-shifting statute.
2. The "Lodestar" Approach
a. The "Lodestar" and the EAJA
With the advent of the age of attorney's fees shifting in the 1970's, courts
struggled to devise a rational and practical method for calculating a reasonable
EAJA, including Subsection (b)); Sisk, supra note 33, at 783-88 (discussing EAJA Subsection (b)).
645, Hyatt, 6 F.3d at 254.
646. See supra section IV.D.4 (discussing government dishonesty or bad faith, including
application of Subsection (b) to cases falling under the common law bad faith exception to the
American Rule on fee awards).
647. In addition, despite the necessary arbitrariness of any fixed limit, the cap on the fee rate
may have the salutary effect of streamlining litigation over fees and facilitating settlement of fee
disputes, at least when the dispute concerns the amount of an award. Moreover, the ceiling obviously
has a fiscal effect, placing an upper limit on the amount of public funds that may be devoted to the
purposes underlying the EAJA. See supra section I.B.3 (discussing the purposes of the EAJA).
648. Award ofAttorneys'Fees Against the Federal Government: Hearings on S. 265 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1980) (testimony of Senator Domenici).
649. 487 U.S. 552, 108 S. Ct. 2541 (1988).
650. Id. at 572, 108 S. Ct. at 2554.
651. See infra sections V.B (discussing cost of living increase) and V.C (discussing special
factors permitting enhancement of the hourly rate).
652. Action on Smoking & Health v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 724 F.2d 211, 217 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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fee and accounting for appropriate elements in measurement of an attorney's fee
award.65 3  Two approaches, derived from cases in two different circuits,
evolved and competed for allegiance among the courts.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit articulated a test for
calculation of fees under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act in Johnson v. Georgia
Highway Express, Inc.'" In Johnson, the court directed district courts to base
fee awards on twelve factors, including the time and labor required, the novelty
and difficulty of questions, the skills needed, the customary fee in the communi-
ty, the results obtained, and several other criteria."' However, as the Supreme
Court later observed, the Johnson factors provided "very little actual guidance"
to the district courts on the concrete calculation of a fee award in a particular
factual setting.6"6 One critic of the Johnson factors explained that "the
fundamental problem with an approach that does no more than assure that the
lower courts will consider a plethora of conflicting and at least partially
redundant factors is that it provides no analytical framework for their applica-
tion. '65 7 As the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit commented, a formula is necessary "to translate the relevant factors into
terms of dollars and cents."6 8
Accordingly, the courts gravitated toward the more practical "lodestar" fee
approach, which was first articulated by the Third Circuit in Lindy Bros.
Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp. (Lindy I)659 and
its successor en banc decision, Lindy II." o Under the Lindy rule, the heart of
the analysis is the "lodestar" fee, established by multiplying a reasonable hourly
rate by the number of hours reasonably expended on the lawsuit."' In several
subsequent decisions, the Supreme Court has adopted the lodestar as the
touchstone of a reasonable fee. 2
653. See generally Sisk, supra note 33, at 745-48 (describing the evolution of the rules for
measurement of attorney's fee awards).
654. 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974).
655. Id. at 717-19.
656. Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 563, 106
S. Ct. 3088, 3097 (1986).
657. Samuel K. Berger, Court Awarded Attorneys' Fees: What is "Reasonable, " 126 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 281, 286-87 (1977).
658. Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 890 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc).
659. 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973) (Lindy 1).
660. 540 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1976) (en banc) (Lindy I1).
661. Lindy I, 487 F.2d at 167.
662. Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 94, 109 S. Ct. 939, 945 (1989) (stating that the Court
has "adopted the lodestar approach as the centerpiece of attorney's fee awards"); Pennsylvania v.
Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 565-66, 106 S. Ct. 3088, 3098
(1986) (stating that "the lodestar figure includes most of the relevant factors constituting a
'reasonable' attorney's fee'). Although the Johnson factors test has never been declared officially
dead, it has appeared in recent cases only as a ghost of its former self. Even the Fifth Circuit which
authored the test has recognized that most, if not all, of the Johnson factors are "presumably fully
reflected in the lodestar amount." Shipes v. Trinity Ind., 987 F.2d 311, 320 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
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EAJA Subsection (d) plainly contemplates application of the lodestar rule for
measurement of attorney's fees, stating that "[t]he amount of fees awarded under
this subsection shall be based upon prevailing market rates for the kind and
quality of the services furnished." 3 Of course, the lodestar approach is
limited in the EAJA context by the statute's declaration of $75 per hour as the
ceiling upon the hourly rate side of the lodestar calculation, absent cost of living
increases or a special factor.'
The lodestar approach, subject to the $75 rate cap, will be applied in the vast
majority of EAJA Subsection (d) cases. However, in a few cases, an alternative
measurement may be appropriate, if it does not exceed the lodestar amount, when
it reflects the actual amount of fees incurred by the private party. In TGS
International, Inc. v. United States,"5 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit held that the EAJA fee award in that case should not be
based upon time expended, but rather upon the nature of the fee arrangement
between the attorney and client.' In that case, the party had agreed to pay
a contingent fee based upon actual recovery." 7 Because the statute restricts
reimbursement to the amount of fees actually "incurred" by the party,' the
Federal Circuit held that the award under Subsection (d) must be measured by
the attorney's fee contract which sets out the actual obligation of the client to
pay fees to the attorney.669 In this manner, the statutory reference to "fee
incurred" serves, not only as a prerequisite for eligibility, but also as a limitation
upon the quantum of fees that may be claimed.
In this respect, the EAJA stands in contrast to other attorney's fee-shifting
provisions. In the context of a civil rights fee-shifting statute, the Supreme Court
in Blanchard v. Bergeron670 stated that a private fee arrangement does not
impose "an automatic ceiling" on the attorney's fee award.6 ' In Blanchard,
114 S. Ct. 548 (1993). Other circuits that persist in citing the Johnson factors do so merely as a way
of describing the elements to "be considered in determining the reasonable rate and reasonable hours,
which are multiplied to determine the lodestar figure which will normally reflect a reasonable fee."
Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Service News Co., 898 F.2d 958, 965 (4th Cir. 1990).
See also Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1212 (9th Cir. 1987), as amended, 808
F.2d 1373 (9th Cir. 1987) (explaining that the Johnson factors "are largely subsumed within the
initial calculation of reasonable hours expended at a reasonable hourly rate').
663. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A) (1988).
664. Id.
665. 983 F.2d 229 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
666. Id. at 230.
667. Id.
668. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(dXl)(A) (1988). See generally supra section III.C (discussing
requirement that a party have "incurred" fees to be eligible for an EAJA award).
669. TGS Int'l, 983 F.2d at 230. See also Marrt v. United States, 38 F.3d 823, 828-29 (5th Cir.
1994) (holding, under parallel tax fee-shifting statute, 26 U.S.C. § 7430 (1988), that attorney's fees
could not be awarded in amount greater than those required under a contingency fee agreement,
because the statute limits recovery to those fees actually incurred).
670. 489 U.S. 87, 109 S. Ct. 939 (1989).
671. Id. at 93, 109 S. Ct. at 944.
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the Court held that the fee award should be measured by the lodestar and not be
limited to a percentage of the damage recovered in the lawsuit, notwithstanding
the existence of a contingent-fee contract between the attorney and the
plaintiff.' The Court deemed percentage of damages an inappropriate
measure for a fee-shifting award in a civil rights case because Congress intended
to "encourage successful civil rights litigation, not to create a special incentive
to prove damages and shortchange efforts to seek effective injunctive or
declaratory relief."673  However, as the Federal Circuit recognized in TGS
International,674 the EAJA statute differs significantly in this respect from the
civil rights statute analyzed in Blanchard. Whereas most fee-shifting statutes
generally authorize the award of a "reasonable fee," 675 EAJA Subsection (d)
expressly restricts its authorization to an award for fees that have actually been
"incurred" by the party.6 76 To give full effect to the statutory language, a fee
award under Subsection (d) must correspond to that amount for which the party
is actually obliged to pay the attorney under the legal services retainer
agreement.
677
Under no circumstances, however, may the fee award exceed that which
would result from the lodestar calculation subject to a $75 per hour rate
limitation (as adjusted for inflation and in the absence of a special factor).67
672. Id. at 91-96, 109 S. Ct. at 942-46.
673. Id. at 95, 109 S. Ct. at 945.
674. TGS Int'l, Inc. v. United States, 983 F.2d 229, 230 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
675, Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 562, 106
S. Ct. 3088, 3096 (1986).
676. TGS Intl, 983 F.2d at 230. See also Marr6 v. United States, 38 F.3d 823, 828-29 (5th Cir.
1994) (stating same analysis for parallel tax fee-shifting statute).
677. See generally section IILC (discussing the requirement that a party have "incurred" fees to
be eligible for an EAJA award). A clever attorney may attempt to contract around this problem by
drafting a retainer agreement under which the client agrees to fees that are the larger of a percentage
of any damages recovered or any EAJA fees obtained as measured by the lodestar approach. This
author's tentative reaction is that such a scheme should not be permitted, because the client/party is
only obligated to pay the percentage of recovery, which thus sets the ceiling on the fee actually
incurred. Although a contract to create a nonrecourse debt payable only by a fee award is an
appropriate fee mechanism in the context of pro bono legal services and litigation insurance, this
arrangement does not appear to qualify. See supra section IIl.C.3. Instead of establishing a
legitimate pro bono legal services contract providing for recovery of fees only if awarded by a court,
the attorney here would be seeking to ensure payment directly from the client whether or not a fee-
shifting award is recovered. In sum, the attorney would not be "loaning" his or her services, and
anticipating payment only in the event of fee-shifting, but rather has adopted a typical contingency
fee structure (presumably determined according to the competitive market for legal services).
Perhaps, in a rare case, the attorney could overcome the presumption that the amount actually
incurred by the client is limited to the out-of-pocket charge by demonstrating that the contingency
fee aspect of the agreement reflected a deliberate reduction of the attorney's ordinary charges for
legal services for public-spirited reasons. Cf Covington v. District of Columbia, 57 F.3d 1101, 1103
(D.C. Cir. 1995) (allowing fee award at prevailing market rate, and above the attorney's billing rate,
for "attorneys who customarily charge reduced fees reflecting non-economic, public spirited goals,"
such as reducing rates for poor clients).
678. See infra sections V.B (discussing cost of living increase) and V.C (discussing special
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If the rate ceiling is to be faithfully honored, no fee award may be made,
however calculated, that provides greater compensation than the capped lodestar
approach would permit. In other words, a party seeking an award under EAJA
Subsection (d) may never claim more fees than he actually incurred, but may
receive less than was actually incurred if the attorney charges a fee that totals
more than would be reached by application of a $75 per hour rate ceiling.
b. Lodestar-Hours Reasonably Expended
The basic concept of the lodestar is simple: the value of an attorney's work
on a case is measured by (1) the number of hours reasonably expended on the
litigation, multiplied by (2) a reasonable hourly rate. However, defining and
applying each of these elements is more difficult.
i. Documentation of Hours
An attorney seeking a fee must document the hours for which compensation
is sought. The EAJA expressly requires a party seeking an award of fees to
submit an application that includes "an itemized statement from any attorney...
representing ... the party stating the actual time expended."' 79 With respect
to fee applications in general, the Supreme Court has declared a strong
preference for contemporaneously recorded time records."O A growing number
of circuits have announced that contemporaneous time records are a prerequisite
to any application for attorney's fees."' A dwindling number of courts will
permit an attorney to reconstruct time records after the fact, if proven to be accu-
rate. 82 Under the rule that waivers of sovereign immunity must be construed
strictly in favor of the government, the District of Columbia Circuit has opined
that a demand for contemporaneous time records "is particularly apt when the fee
requirements will be satisfied from the United States Treasury."683
factors permitting enhancement of the hourly rate).
679. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B) (1988) provides, in pertinent part:
A party seeking an award of fees ... shall, within thirty days of final judgment in the
action, submit to the court an application for fees ... which shows . .. the amount
sought, including an itemized statement from any attorney... representing... the party
stating the actual time expended and the rate at which fees.., were computed.
680. Webb v. Board of Educ., 471 U.S. 234, 238 n.6, 105 S. Ct. 1923, 1926 n.6 (1985). See
also Sierra Club v. Mullen, 619 F. Supp. 1244, 1251 (D.D.C. 1985) (criticizing in an EAJA case the
provision of "after-the-fact estimates" of attorney's time records).
681. Sheets v. Salt Lake City, 45 F.3d 1383, 1391 (10th Cir. 1995); Community Heating &
Plumbing, Inc. v. Garrett, 2 F.3d 1143, 1145 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (EAJA case); Grendel's Den, Inc. v.
Larkin, 749 F.2d 945,952 (lst Cir. 1984); New York Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 711 F.2d
1136 (2d Cir. 1983).
682. MacDissi v. Vaimont Ind., 856 F.2d 1054, 1061 (8th Cir. 1988); Jean v. Nelson, 863 F.2d
759, 772 (11th Cir. 1988) (EAJA case), affd on other grounds, 496 U.S. 154, 110 S. Ct. 2316
(1990).
683. In re Donovan, 877 F.2d 982, 994 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
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The time records submitted by the petitioning attorney must provide
information about the activities on which those hours were expended. In
devising the lodestar method, the Third Circuit in the Lindy case did not envision
the documentation process as burdensome:
It is not necessary to know the exact number of minutes spent nor the
precise activity to which each hour was devoted nor the specific attain-
ments of each attorney. But without some fairly definite information as
to the hours devoted to various general activities, e. g., pretrial
discovery, settlement negotiations, and the hours spent by various
classes of attorneys, e. g., senior partners, junior partners, associates, the
court cannot know the nature of the services for which compensation is
sought.6 "
However, just as private clients are increasingly demanding that attorneys
specifically account for the time devoted to legal representation, courts likely
will, and should, expect greater specificity in time records submitted to support
a fee petition. 85  With the advent of the personal computer, detailed time
records by individual attorneys are more easily maintained and thus will come
to be the required standard. Inadequate documentation of hours worked and
failure to designate the nature of work performed is a common basis for
reduction of a fee award.e6 In EAJA cases, district courts have reduced the
fee awards by as much as 60% to 80% because of inadequate documentation of
hours and nature of work.
687
684. Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161,
167 (3d Cir. 1973) (Lindy 1).
685. See, e.g., H.J. Inc. v. Flygt Corp., 925 F.2d 257, 260 (8th Cir. 1991) (criticizing as
inadequate documentation such vague time entries as "legal research," or "trial prep," or "met w/
client"); In re Meese, 907 F.2d 1192, 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (time records are inadequate "where no
mention is made of the subject matter of a meeting, telephone conference or the work performed
during hours billed"); Cheng v. McCredit, No. 94 C 7520, 1995 WL 430953, at *4 (N.D. Ill. July
11, 1995) (in EAJA case, reducing number of hours for compensation for insufficient documentation
where counsel listed most hours simply as "research issues and draft" or "research and draft issues');
Cabrera v. Fischler, 814 F. Supp. 269, 289-90 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (characterizing as "vague and cryptic
designations" such entries as "staff meeting," "talk w/," and "processed documents'), afd in part,
retnanded in part on other grounds, 24 F.3d 372 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 205 (1994);
Weinberger v. Great Northern Nekoosa Corp., 801 F. Supp. 804, 829 (D. Me. 1992) (rejecting as
inadequate such time entries as "research," "attention to matter," "draft letter," and "strategize'),
aft'd, 47 F.3d 463 (lst Cir. 1995); Soler v. G & U, Inc., 658 F. Supp. 1093, 1099 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)
(finding insufficient such entries as "Outline," "Research," and "Travel").
686. See, e.g., H.J. Inc., 925 F.2d at 260; DeGidio v. Pung, 920 F.2d 525, 533 (8th Cir. 1990);
Meese, 907 F.2d at 1203-04; Kennecott Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 804 F.2d 763,
766-67 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
687. Terrell v. Shalala, No. 93 C 5059, 1995 WL 307157, at * 4 (N.D. Il. May 15, 1995)
(reducing award by 60% because of inadequate documentation of hours worked); Sierra Club v.
Mullen, 619 F. Supp. 1244, 1252 (D.D.C. 1985) (reducing number of hours claimed by 800 because
of duplication of efforts and insufficient documentation of time expended).
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ii. Justifiability of Time Expended
Documenting the hours spent is only the first step. As the District of
Columbia Circuit has explained:
Compiling raw totals of hours spent, however, does not complete
the inquiry. It does not follow that the amount of time actually
expended is the amount of time reasonably expended. In the private
sector, "billing judgment" is an important component in fee setting. It
is no less important here. Hours that are not properly billed to one's
client also are not properly billed to one's adversary pursuant to
statutory authority." 8
A district court may disallow compensation for certain hours for a variety
of reasons, such as a finding that hours devoted were excessive for the particular
task or proceeding involved;689 that time spent was excessive because an
attorney lacked expertise in an area and devoted too much time developing
familiarity with the topic;' 9° that hours spent were excessive because a partner
performed tasks that could more appropriately have been delegated to an
associate;69 that time was nonproductive, for example, because associates
received insufficient direction by partners;692 or that hours expended were
688. Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 891 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc). See also Hensley v.
Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 1940 (1983) ("Counsel for the prevailing party should
make a good-faith effort to exclude from a fee request hours that are excessive, redundant, or
otherwise unnecessary, just as a lawyer in private practice ethically is obligated to exclude such hours
from his fee submission."),
689. Cooper v. United States R.R. Retirement Bd., 24 F.3d 1414, 1417-18 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(ruling, in an EAJA case, that claimed attorney hours of 399.8 hours for legal research and writing
briefs and for oral argument preparation was excessive, where the issues involved in the particular
case were not difficult, briefs were not well organized, and briefs devoted considerable space to
arguments extraneous to the main issues, and thus fees would be awarded for only half the time
claimed); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Reilly, 1 F.3d 1254, 1258-60 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
(denying entirety of fees requested for work of one attorney for submitting "outrageously excessive
time entries," including billing 3.5 hours for preparing a routine notice of appearance and 73.45 hours
for preparing two short letters to the government agency about the request for fees); Oklahoma
Aerotronics, Inc. v. United States, 943 F.2d 1344, 1347 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (stating, in an EAJA case,
that "there is a point at which thorough and diligent litigation efforts become overkill," and ruling
that 266 hours of attorney time and 74 hours of paralegal time for a memorandum updating points
and authorities was excessive, that arguments could have been effectively presented with fewer than
169 pages of memoranda, and that chargeable hours were appropriately reduced by 40%).
690. Action on Smoking and Health v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 724 F.2d 211, 223 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (EAJA case); see also Golden Gate Audubon Soc'y v. Army Corps of Engineers, 732 F. Supp.
1014, 1018 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (court "would not expect defendants to finance basic background
lessons for plaintiffs' lawyers in whole area of law with which they are unfamiliar") (EAJA case).
691. Kronfeld v. Transworld Airlines, Inc., 129 F.R.D. 598, 602-03 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
692. Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 902-03 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc).
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duplicative, for example, where attorneys representing the same party engaged
in parallel efforts yielding a single legal document.
693
The determination of hours reasonably expanded requires a case-by-case
evaluation. The hours reasonably required to handle a matter will vary according
to the novelty of the legal theories, the difficulty of the legal and factual issues,
the complexity of the case, and the nature of the opposition. For example, it
may be appropriate to staff a complex case with more than one attorney,
6%
while a simple case may not justify employing the services of more than one
attorney.6 95
In the routine case, the district court should examine the time records
submitted in support of the fee application and determine whether any hours
should be disallowed for compensation as unjustified.6' However, in a
voluminous fee dispute, the district court may properly account for this "billing
judgment" component of the lodestar figure by reducing the claimed hours by a
fixed percentage.697 Moreover, the trial judge is an expert on this matter and
properly may "'draw[] on his own experience and wisdom [in] deciding whether
the time spent on each phase was in excess of a reasonable amount."'6 98
iii. Hours Spent on Unsuccessful or Substantially Justified
Claims or Issues
In an EAJA Subsection (d) case, the court should award fees for all time
reasonably expended on the successful litigation as a whole, not just the time
spent contesting the particular aspect of the government's case that was found
to be without substantial justification.6" There is no support in either the
693. Action on Smoking and Health, 724 F.2d at 222 (reducing, in an EAJA case, the lodestar
where attorneys engaged in two parallel, full-time work efforts that yielded a single brief and resulted
in one attorney's draft brief being largely discarded).
694. New York Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 711 F.2d 1136, 1146 (2d Cir. 1983);
Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 655 F.2d 848, 872 (8th Cir. 1981), affd in part, rev'd in part
on other grounds, 462 U.S. 476, 103 S. Ct. 2516 (1983).
695. Jardien v. Winston Network, Inc., 888 F.2d 1151, 1160 (7th Cir. 1989). See also Childress
v. Sullivan, 738 F. Supp. 1348, 1350 (D. Colo. 1990) (finding, in an EAJA case, that attendance of
more than one plaintiffs' attorney at depositions and oral arguments was duplicative and therefore
unreasonable).
696. See, e.g., Bowman v. Secretary of H.H.S., 744 F. Supp. 898, 899-901 (E.D. Ark. 1989)
(reviewing, in an EAJA case, the time charges and outlining each charge which the court found was
not wholly justified).
697. New York Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 711 F.2d 1136, 1146 (2d Cir. 1983)
(percentage reduction in hours is appropriate in a voluminous case because "it is unrealistic to expect
a trial judge to evaluate and rule on every entry in an application"). See also Oklahoma Aerotronics,
Inc. v. United States, 943 F.2d 1344, 1347 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (approving reduction of chargeable hours
by 40% because of excessive billing).
. 698. United States v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, 847 F.2d 12, 18 (1st Cir. 1988) (quoting
Gabriele v. Southworth, 712 F.2d 1505, 1507 (1st Cir. 1983)).
699. Russell v. National Mediation Bd., 775 F.2d 1284, 1291-92 (5th Cir. 1985).
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statutory language or the legislative history for apportioning attorney time
between hours spent challenging the government's substantially unjustified
arguments or averments and those spent opposing other arguments or averments
found to have substantial justification, even if ultimately mistaken.7' Since the
government's position as a whole is evaluated for substantial justification,"
further parsing of the segments of a single claim for justified and unjustified
elements is contrary to this unitary concept of a claim against the government.
Once the threshold entitlement question of substantial justification has been
answered in the negative as to the government, liability for an attorney's fee
award is established in whole. As the Supreme Court ruled in Commissioner v.
Jean,"02 in approving an award for fees litigation under the EAJA without a
separate finding of substantial justification,' 3 "[w]hile the parties' postures on
individual matters may be more or less justified, the EAJA-like other fee-
shifting statutes-favors treating a case as an inclusive whole, rather than as
atomized line-items." 704
However, when a case involves multiple claims-as opposed to mere
multiple issues-the court must consider whether compensation should be
granted for time spent litigating claims upon which the party seeking the fee
either did not ultimately prevail or, in an EAJA context, upon which the
government's position was substantially justified and thus, if litigated separately,
would not have resulted in a fee award.' ° Indeed, when truly separate claims
are joined together in a single lawsuit, such that the lawsuit involves different
"cases or controversies" in a constitutional sense,7 °6 the "position of the United
States" should be evaluated in the context of each separable claim joined in the
single complaint. 7 When fee liability is separately determined on a claim-by-
claim basis, the fee amount should be separately measured as well.
700. Id. at 1291.
701. See supra section IV.A.2 (discussing need to evaluate single "position of the United States"
based upon the case as a whole).
702. 496 U.S. 154, 110 S. Ct. 2316 (1990).
703. See generally section V.A.4 (discussing "fees for fees" under the EAJA).
704. Jean, 496 U.S. at 161-62, 110 S. Ct. at 2320.
705. The contemporaneous time records submitted by a -fee petitioner in a multiple claim case
should distinguish between time spent on the various claims. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424,
437, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 1941 (1983). See also Fair Housing Council of Greater Washington v.
Landow, 999 F.2d 92, 97-98 (4th Cir. 1993) (stating that "the applicant must make every effort to
submit time records which specifically allocate the time spent on each claim" and "which describe
work" allocated to separate unsuccessful claims, and further stating that if the applicant instead
"requests one lump sum so outrageously excessive," the district court should exercise its discretion
to deny the fee request in its entirety).
706. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725, 86 S. Ct. 1130, 1138 (1966)
(defining a single constitutional case or controversy within the meaning of U.S. Const. art Ill, § 2,
as litigation arising from "a common nucleus of operative fact").
707. See supra section IV.A.2 (discussing evaluation of the substantial justification of the
government's position in multiple-claim cases).
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However, the courts generally have been reluctant to segregate causes of
action in determining an appropriate fee unless there is a clear line of demarca-
tion between parts of a single case. In Hensley v. Eckerhart,°s the Supreme
Court stated:
Where the plaintiff has failed to prevail on a claim that is distinct in all
respects from his successful claims, the hours spent on the unsuccessful
claim should be excluded in considering the amount of a reasonable fee.
Where a lawsuit consists of related claims, a plaintiff who has won
substantial relief should not have his attorney's fee reduced simply
because the district court did not adopt each contention raised.7°
The same analysis applies when a lawsuit consists of related causes of action,
some of which arise under statutes authorizing a shifting of attorney's fees and
some of which do not. 70 The same line of analysis would apply if multiple
counts are brought against the federal government, some of which involve
unjustifiable government conduct resulting in a fee award under EAJA
Subsection (d) and some of which involve reasonable government positions
would which preclude a Subsection (d) award.
Accordingly, if there is significant overlap or relationship between successful
and unsuccessful causes of action, or between fee and non-fee claims, a plaintiff
may properly recover for time spent on those related claims when substantial relief
was obtained. The court will eliminate hours devoted to unsuccessful components
of a case only if there are "distinctly different claims for relief that are based on
different facts and legal theories." '' If the case involves what is essentially a
single claim arising from a common core of facts, and the plaintiff advances
separate legal theories that "are but different statutory avenues to the same goal,"
then all of the time should be compensable.12 By contrast, as the District of
Columbia Circuit held in Martin v. Lauer,713 when the "claims overwhelmingly
involved distinct legal and factual issues," with only the largely inevitable presence
of "some overlap in the requisite factual and legal analysis," "the purposes of the
EAJA would not be well served by awarding ... attorneys' fees for time spent on
the unsuccessful pursuit" of the separate claim. 4
708. 461 U.S. 424, 103 S. Ct. 1933 (1983).
709. Id. at 440.
710. Seaway Drive-In, Inc. v. Township of Clay, 791 F.2d 447, 455 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 884, 107 S. Ct. 274 (1986).
711. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434, 103 S. Ct. at 1940.
712. See Paris v. United States Dept. of Hous. & Urban Dev., 988 F.2d 236, 239-40 (1st Cir.
1993) (discussing prevailing party status). See also Wedra v. Thomas, 623 F. Supp. 272, 277
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (ruling, in an EAJA case, that both successful and unsuccessful claims in challenge
to correctional centers legal and social visitation policies "involve a common core of facts" and thus
hours would not be apportioned among claims).
713. 740 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
714. Id. at 47.
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At least one court has suggested that the analysis must be different when a
fee award is sought against the federal government, because of the special
considerations of sovereign immunity." 5  In Slugocki v. United States,7 16 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that segregation was
required between work performed on claims covered by a fee-shifting statute and
work performed on related claims which were not covered by the statute.717
Although acknowledging the Supreme Court's contrary intimations in Hensley,
the court nevertheless held that the strictures of sovereign immunity demanded
a different result when a fee was claimed against the United States.78 For the
federal government to be charged with attorney's fees, Congress must have
expressly waived the government's sovereign immunity. 9 Moreover, the
courts must strictly observe any limitations or conditions placed upon the
government's consent to be sued.720 Accordingly, the Federal Circuit held that
allowing compensation for attorney hours worked on claims falling outside of the
statutory waiver---even though related to the fee claim-would "not represent
strict observance on the Government's waiver of sovereign immunity." 2 '
Extrapolating this holding to the EAJA context, compensation also would not be
permitted for attorney hours worked on claims for which the federal government
offered a substantially justified position, notwithstanding the presence of other
claims, however closely related, upon which the government took an unreason-
able position.
The better argument may be made for applying the Hensley approach, even
in the context of federal government fee-shifting statutes like the EAJA.7 "
Contrary to the Federal Circuit's analysis in Slugocki, the refusal to artificially
715. At least one other circuit court has acknowledged the issue, but did not address the question
of whether the jurisprudence on "mixed bags of claims-some successful, some not" applies to fee
petitions against the federal government under the EAJA. Sierra Club v. Secretary of the Army, 820
F.2d 513, 520 n.6 (1st Cir. 1987).
716. 816 F.2d 1572 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 976, 108 S. Ct. 486 (1987).
717. Id. at 1579.
718. Id.
719. Id. (citing Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 95 S. Ct. 1612 (1975)).
720. Slugocki, 816 F.2d at 1579 (citing Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S. 270, 276, 77 S. Ct.
269, 273 (1957)).
721. Slugocki, 816 F.2d at 1579.
722. Although not addressing the particular question of multiple claims or causes of action, the
Supreme Court in the EAJA case of Commissioner v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 110 S. Ct. 2316 (1990), stated
that "once a private litigant has met the multiple conditions for eligibility for EAJA fees, the district
court's task of determining what fee is reasonable is essentially the same as that described in Hensley."
Id. at 161, 110 S. Ct. at 2320. The Court in Jean was faced with the somewhat different question of
whether a fee award for additional legal services in litigation regarding the fee application may be
granted without a separate finding that the government's position on the fee phase of the litigation
lacked substantial justification. Id. at 157, 110 S. Ct. at 2318. Nevertheless, the Court's approval of the
unitary concept of the litigation, that is, "treating a case as an inclusive whole, rather than as atomized
line items," strongly supports application of the Hensley approach to a case involving multiple related
causes of action arising out of a common core of facts. See id. at 162, 110 S. Ct. at 2320.
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segregate hours worked among related causes of action ordinarily does not result
in compensation for prosecution of unsuccessful or non-fee claims. Rather,
courts allow full compensation for work performed on a case as a unitary whole,
recognizing that an action arising out of a common core of facts is best
conceived as a single claim supported by more than one theory of recovery.'
By virtue of the "interrelatedness" ''2 of several causes of action premised upon
a single set of facts, pursuit of each theory, even if unsuccessful or based on a
statute without a fee-shifting provision, serves to promote the entire claim and
likely strengthens those other theories for relief that do prove successful or that
do authorize award of fees.7' Thus, allowing full compensation for all hours
expended upon the unitary claim promotes the purposes of the fee-shifting statute
and does not run afoul of sovereign immunity by awarding compensation for
separate claims.
It may be best to devise and use terminology precisely in this context,
defining a "claim" as encompassing all "causes of action" arising from a
"common nucleus of operative fact. '726  Rather than speaking of related
"claims," for which full compensation is appropriate, we should refer to related
"causes of action" within the scope of a single "claim." When the causes of
action joined in a lawsuit are truly unrelated, that is, "based on different facts
and legal theories, 727 then they are better described as separate "claims,"
which justifies segregated evaluation for purposes both of determining liability
for and measurement of an attorney's fee.
The refusal to strictly apportion hours between successful and unsuccessful
causes of action, or fee and non-fee counts, in a single claim case does not mean
that the degree of success is irrelevant. The actual results obtained in the case
remains a critical factor in arriving at a reasonable fee.728 However, the extent
of success depends upon the "results obtained, 7 29 not the legal theories or
factual contentions accepted. Thus, multiple causes of action may all be directed
toward achieving the same relief, which if obtained constitutes perfect success,
723. Dan B. Dobbs, Reducing Attorneys' Feesfor Partial Success: A Comment on Hensley and
Blum, 1986 Wis. L. Rev. 835, 839 (stating that under the related claim rule of Hensley, "the case
should be considered as a single unit, rather than as a series of discrete claims joined together'). See
also Goos v. National Ass'n of Realtors, 997 F.2d 1565, 1569 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (stating that claims
are related for purposes of awarding attorney's fees when they "constitute[] different legal attacks on
the same factual premise').
724. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 453-54, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 1950 (1983).
725. Moreover, in any lawsuit, even those involving truly separate claims, "[m]uch ofcounsel's
time will be devoted generally to the litigation as a whole, making it difficult to divide the hours
expended on a claim-by-claim basis." Id. at 435, 103 S. Ct. at 1940.
726. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725, 86 S. Ct. 1130, 1138 (1966)
(defining what a single constitutional case or controversy within the meaning of U.S. Const. art. III,
§ 2, as litigation arising from "a common nucleus of operative fact").
727. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434, 103 S. Ct. at 1939-40.
728. Id. at 440, 103 S. Ct. at 1943.
729. Id. at 440, 103 S. Ct. at 1943.
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notwithstanding the rise or fall of particular counts of the complaint on the way
to ultimate victory. For these reasons, the degree of success in terms of relief
granted ordinarily must be measured independently of hours devoted by the
attorney to a particular cause of action or phase of the litigation. Thus, limited
success as to the relief obtained on the merits of the case is generally evaluated
at a separate stage of the analysis from the determination of hours reasonably
expended on legal work." '
To be sure, denial of a particular form or aspect of relief occasionally may
be attributable to a discrete motion or proceeding, thus allowing the limited
success factor to be measured by hours devoted to that effort. When "a party
has obtained no favorable results in a particular aspect of litigation, that party
may receive no fee for work on that part of the case."73' However, the degree
of success element can be applied at the lodestar stage only when hours
expended upon a particular task can be directly correlated to an adverse ruling
on relief,32 which then permits the court to account for the party's limited
success on results by denying compensation for those particular hours. Because
ordinarily it is difficult to precisely link a certain segment of legal services to the
denial of particular relief, the limited success factor typically is addressed at a
separate stage through a percentage downward adjustment of the lodestar.733
c. Lodestar-A Reasonable Hourly Rate
The reasonable hourly rate 3 ' is the charge for legal services that prevails
in the market for the relevant community."' Thus, the reasonable hourly rate
730. See infra section V.A.3 (discussing downward adjustment of lodestar to account for limited
success).
731. Anthony v. Sullivan, 982 F.2d 586, 589 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (EAJA case).
732. See id. at 589-90 (denying compensation for hours expended by plaintiff on an unsuccessful
appeal limited to a request for higher level of attorney's fees based on alternative fee-shifting statute
to EAJA).
733. See infra section V.A.3 (discussing downward adjustment of lodestar to account for limited
success).
734. Under fee-shifting statutes applied to private parties, the hourly rate maybe established on the
basis of current rates (rates prevailing in the market at the time of the fee application) or historic rates
(rates prevailing in the market at the time the attorney performed the legal services). Current rates may
be used if the work was performed close in time to the fee application or to provide a form of
compensation, equivalent to interest, for the delay between the date on which legal services were
performed and the date of the fee award. See generally Sisk, supra note 33, at 763-64 (discussing
compensation for delay in receipt of attorney's fee award). Because the government generally is not
amenable to an award of interest, Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310,322-23, 106 S. Ct 2957,
2965-66 (1986), the reasonable hourly rate in federal government cases must ordinarily be determined
on the basis of historic rates. See infra sections V.B.4 (discussing cost of living adjustment of $75 per
hour rate cap, as limited to date of performance of work, because of prohibition on award of interest)
and V.C.3 (discussing excessive delay as a special factor permitting enhancement).
735. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895, 104 S. Ct. 1541, 1547 (1984).
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for an individual attorney will depend on a multiplicity of factors, including the
attorney's level of skill, reputation in the community, experience in practice, and
expertise in the subject matter, as well as the undesirability of the case. In sum,
the court must attempt to determine what the market for legal services in that
community would bear for that attorney's work performed on an hourly basis.
However, with adjustments for increases in the cost of living and an exception
for special factors, the maximum statutory hourly rate under EAJA Subsection
(d) is fixed at $75 per hour. 36
The petitioning attorney's billing rate charged to paying clients, if he has
one, is "important substantiating evidence of the prevailing community rate. 737
Indeed, a few circuits have held that an attorney's actual billing rate is the
presumptively appropriate figure, irrespective of whether the prevailing market
average would lead to a higher or lower rate. 38 Other circuits have refused
to regard billing rates as controlling, concluding that the measure of a reasonable
fee is the prevailing market rate in the community and that the ordinary billing
rate serves only as a relevant factor in establishing the market figure.7 39 The
ultimate resolution of this matter will have to await Supreme Court review.' 4
Of course, when a private attorney has an actual billing rate, that rate presumably
is the product of market forces and thus would fall within the range of
competitive rates charged by other attorneys of similar ability and experience
doing similar work.74'
In the absence of an actual billing rate, as with attorneys in non-profit public
interest organizations, or as further evidence of prevailing market rates, the
petitioning party should submit affidavits from other attorneys not affiliated with
the case. The affidavit may state the rate that the outside attorney, with
comparable experience and expertise, customarily charges for handling similar
matters or may offer an expert opinion based on personal knowledge of the rates
charged by other lawyers with similar ability in the community for similar
736. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A) (1988).
737. National Ass'n of Concerned Veterans v. Secretary of Defense, 675 F.2d 1319, 1326 (D.C.
Cir. 1982).
738. Gusman v. Unisys Corp., 986 F.2d 1146, 1149-51 (7th Cir. 1993). See also Scales v. J.C.
Bradford & Co., 925 F.2d 901, 909-10 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that district court did not have to
determine prevailing rate in the community when court had been given actual billing rates of
plaintiff's attorneys); Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux Community v. City of Prior Lake, 771 F.2d
1153, 1160 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1011, 106 S. Ct. 1185 (1986).
739. Starrett v. Wadley, 876 F.2d 808, 825 (10th Cir. 1989); Save Our Cumberland Mountains,
Inc. v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1516, 1518-24 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (en banc).
740. See Webb v. Maldonado, 484 U.S. 990, 108 S. Ct. 480 (1987) (White, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari) (arguing that Supreme Court should resolve division among the circuits on
whether attorneys with an established billing rate should be compensated under fee-shifting statutes
at market rates or at ordinary billing rates).
741. But see Covington v. District of Columbia, 57 F.3d 1101, 1103 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (allowing
fee award at prevailing market rate, and above the attorney's billing rate, for "attorneys who
customarily charge reduced fees reflecting non-economic, public spirited goals," such as reducing
rates for poor clients).
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litigation.742 In addition, the court may consider the amounts awarded by other
courts to counsel with similar experience in other similar cases,743 the hourly
rate charged by defense counsel,7 " or surveys of lawyers about billing rates
charged in the community.745 In the final analysis, the court itself is an expert
on the question and may consider its own knowledge and experience in
determining the appropriate hourly rate.7"
It might be thought that the question of the prevailing market rate for an
attorney is of diminished importance under EAJA Subsection (d), in view of the
$75 per hour rate ceiling. However, the $75 per hour figure in the statute is a
ceiling, not a substitute for the prevailing rate. If the prevailing rate is actually
lower than $75 per hour (an unlikely prospect given the increase in the cost of
living since the original enactment of the EAJA in 1980), then the prevailing rate
will determine the figure to be applied in the lodestar calculation. In addition,
even when the $75 figure is adjusted for cost of living increases,, the adjustment
is to the statutory ceiling, not the prevailing rate in a particular community. 7
If prevailing market rates for legal services in a particular community have risen
more slowly than the overall increase in the general cost of living,7" the
current prevailing rate for an attorney (even though higher than $75 per hour)
may remain lower than the adjusted statutory ceiling. In any event, the court
certainly may not simply assume that every attorney appearing before it charges
rates that meet or exceed the statutory rate cap, as adjusted for increases in cost
of living. The attorney remains obligated to establish, with appropriate evidence,
his reasonable hourly rate. Finally, before any party may assert that a "special
742. National Ass'n of Concerned Veterans v. Secretary of Defense, 675 F.2d 1319, 1325-26
(D.C. Cir. 1982); Davis v. City & County of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536, 1547 (9th Cir. 1992),
vacated in part on other grounds, 984 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1993).
743. Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1214 (9th Cit. 1986), as amended, 808
F.2d 1373 (9th Cir. 1987); National Ass'n of Concerned Veterans, 675 F.2d at 1325 n.7.
744. Arriola v. Harville, 781 F.2d 506, 512 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 820, 107 S. Ct. 84
(1986); Gomez v. Gates, 804 F. Supp. 69, 77 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (stating that "[a]s to all fee-shifting
cases ..., this court believes that a reasonable hourly rate should be determined by looking to the
rate normally charged by lawyers of comparable skill and experience who routinely defend similar
cases").
745. Grendel's Den, Inc. v. Larkin, 749 F.2d 945, 956, 958-(1st Ci. 1984). Under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 54(d)(2XD), the district court may by local rule establish a schedule of customary
fee rates in the community. However, "[t]he parties, of course, should be permitted to show that in
the circumstances of the case such a schedule should not be applied or that different hourly rates
would be appropriate." Advisory Committee Notes on 1993 Amendments to Fed. Rule Civ. Proc.
54(d)(2), 28 U.S.C. app. at 808 (Supp. V 1993).
746. Norman v. Housing Auth. of City of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1303 (11th Cir. 1988).
747. Levernier Constr., Inc. v. United States, 947 F.2d 497, 504 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ('The COLA
which the EAJA authorizes is an increase to the maximum rate allowed under the statute, not to the
attorneys' prevailing market rate."). See also Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 571 (1988)
(referring to "the $75 cap (adjusted for inflation)" and "$75 per hour (adjusted for inflation)").
748. See infra section V.B.2 (discussing measurement of cost of living increases by general
Consumer Price Index, rather than by increases in the category of legal services).
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factor" justifies enhancement of fee above the statutory ceiling,749 the party's
attorney must explain his hourly rate as an essential, but not necessarily
sufficient, prerequisite to a claim that compensation at that higher rate is
necessary and justified. 50
3. Upward and Downward Adjustments to the Lodestar
As originally conceived, the lodestar approach comprehended that certain
adjustments to the lodestar figure would be applied to account for additional
factors beyond the time expended and the hourly rate. As articulated by the
Third Circuit in Lindy Brothers Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp.,"1 the lodestar rule was a two-step process. First, the court
calculated the lodestar, by determining the hours reasonably spent and multiply-
ing that figure by a reasonable hourly rate.' Second, the court determined
whether to adjust the lodestar upward, for factors such as the contingency risk
that the case might be lost, and upward or downward based upon the quality of
the work done on the case." 3
a. Upward Adjustments (Multipliers)
Although the lodestar concept that originated in the Lindy line of cases has
taken firm hold in fee-shifting jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has largely
rejected the additional element of an upward adjustment or multiplier. In every
case brought before it, the Court has adhered to the lodestar figure as the
touchstone of a reasonable fee, ruling that other factors were either subsumed
within the lodestar calculation or were not a legitimate basis for enhancing a fee
award.
5 4
Thus, the Supreme Court has ruled that the novelty and complexity of the
issues presented in a lawsuit cannot justify an upward quality adjustment,' s
that the quality of representation provided by an attorney cannot justify a
departure from the lodestar figure, 6 that the results obtained in the litigation
749. See infra section V.C (discussing "special factors" allowing enhancement of the statutory
rate cap).
750. See Meyer v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 1029, 1033-34 (11 th Cir. 1992) (stating that a court needs
to determine whether to "adjust the hourly fee upward from $75 to take into account an increase in
the cost of living, or a special factor" only "if the market rate is greater than $75 per hour").
751. 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973) (Lindy 1), on rh'g, 540 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1976) (Lindy fl).
752. Lindy I, 487 F.2d at 167.
753. Id. at 168-69; Lindy I, 540 F.2d at 112-18.
754. See generally Sisk, supra note 33, at 756-59 (discussing upward adjustments to the
lodestar).
755. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 898, 104 S. Ct. 1541, 1548-49 (1984).
756. Id. at 899-900, 104 S. Ct. at 1549; Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for
Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 565, 106 S. Ct. 3088, 3098 (1986).
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do not provide an independent basis for increasing the fee award,7s7 and that
the lodestar may never be raised to compensate for the contingent risk of
loss.75 8 Although the Court has not foreclosed the possibility of a justifiable
upward enhancement in a "rare" or "exceptional" case, it has emphasized that the
lodestar is "more than a mere 'rough guess' or initial approximation of the final
award to [be] made"-it is presumptively the reasonable fee. 719
The question of upward adjustments or multipliers to the lodestar figure is
of only passing interest in the EAJA Subsection (d) context. The express
language of the statute doubly confirms that upward adjustments are not available
here, even in the rare or exceptional case. First, because a claim for an EAJA
fee award is limited to obligations actually "incurred" by the party,7 ° the court
may not alter the lodestar (except to bring it down under the statutory rate cap)
to the extent that figure reflects the true obligation for fees contracted by the
party. Second, in defining "fees and other expenses," the statute specifically
directs that "[t]he amount of fees awarded under this subsection shall be based
upon prevailing market rates for the kind and quality of the services furnished,"
subject to a rate of $75 per hour as adjusted by increases in the cost of living or
special factors." Thus, the text focuses precisely upon the lodestar element
of a prevailing rate and does not admit to any enhancement of the lodestar
product for quality, superior result, or contingent risk.762
b. 'Downward Adjustments Based Upon Degree of Success
Although the Supreme Court apparently has closed the door on upward
adjustments of the lodestar, and such adjustments are in any event clearly
unavailable under EAJA Subsection (d), the Court emphatically has retained the
option of adjusting the fee downward to reflect a plaintiffs limited success.
Indeed, the Court has said that the degree of success obtained is "the most
critical factor" in determining the reasonableness of a fee award.763 Unfortu-
nately, the Court has provided little guidance on when less than perfect success
757. Blum, 465 U.S. at 900, 104 S. Ct. at 1549.
758. City of Burlington v. Dague, 112 S. Ct. 2638, 2643-44 (1992).
759. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council, 478 U.S. at 564-65, 106 S. Ct. at 3098.
760. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1988) (providing that the court may award "fees... incurred
by that party"). See generally supra section III.C (discussing the requirement that a party have
actually "incurred" a fee obligation to be eligible for an award under the EAJA).
761. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A) (1988).
762. See Martin Geer & Paul Reingold, Making Uncle Sam Pay: A Review of Equal Access to
Justice Act Cases in the Sixth Circuit, 1983-87, 19 U. Tol. L. Rev. 301, 318 (1988) (stating that,
under the EAJA, "only the more general" prevailing market rate factor is relevant, to the exclusion
of such other factors as special expertise, contingency, superb results, etc.).
763. Farrar v. Hobby, 113 S. Ct. 566, 574 (1992); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424,436, 103
S. Ct. 1933, 1941 (1983).
1995)
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
will trigger an adjustment or on how partial success should affect the lodestar
figure.
76
In Hensley v. Eckerhart,765 the Supreme Court ruled that "[w]here a
plaintiff has obtained excellent results, his attorney should recover a fully
compensatory fee," and further stated that "the fee award should not be reduced
simply because the plaintiff failed to prevail on every contention raised in the
lawsuit."7 " Moreover, the Court firmly resisted reduction of the lodestar
according to a mathematical ratio that compares the number of issues upon which
the plaintiff actually prevailed with the total number of issues in the case.767
Success in a case is a qualitative, rather than a mathematical question, requiring
an evaluation of not only the number of claims or issues but also the nature and
significance of the relief.
Similarly, in Naekel v. Department of Transportation,'" an EAJA case, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit rejected the government's
suggestion that the lodestar should be reduced by a fraction corresponding to the
number of briefing pages devoted to successful versus unsuccessful issues.769
The number of pages of argument does not necessarily indicate the significance
of an issue, as opposed to the degree of dispute between the parties on a matter.
Moreover, as the Federal Circuit noted, apportioning fees based upon length of
argument would have the perverse effect of providing "disproportionately low
recompense" for those points on which the party's arguments were strongest and
the government's weakest, because presumably fewer pages of argument were
occupied with such relatively undisputed points. Because the government failed
to articulate any "fair basis or justification for allocation," the court declined to
divide the attorney fee award.770
In City of Riverside v. Rivera,"' the Supreme Court also rejected the
theory that the amount of attorney's fees awarded must be directly proportionate
to the amount of monetary damages obtained on the merits. 2 The plaintiffs,
who prevailed in a civil rights action against the city and police officers for using
excessive force in making arrests, were awarded $33,350 in compensatory and
punitive damages.77' The plaintiffs sought and were awarded $245,456.25 in
764. See generally Dobbs, supra note 723, at 844-62, 869-71 (describing various and distinct
standards that could be applied to judge degree of success, discussing difficulty in finding a standard
for reducing fee awards for partial success, and concluding that the Supreme Court's success test is
"almost unfathomable").
765. 461 U.S. 424, 103 S. Ct. 1933 (1983).
766. Id. at 435, 103 S. Ct. at 1940.
767. Id. at 435 n.ll, 103 S. Ct. at 1940-41 n.ll.
768. 884 F.2d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
769. Id. at 1379-80.
770. Id. at 1380.
771. 477 U.S. 561, 106 S. Ct. 2686 (1986).
772. Id. at 574, 106 S. Ct. at 2694.
773. Id. at 564-65, 106 S. Ct. at 2689.
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attorney's fees-some seven times the amount of damages awarded." 4 The
Supreme Court affirmed the fee award.7S The plurality opinion recognized
that money damages cannot be the only measure of success in litigation,
especially in civil rights cases, because "a civil rights plaintiff seeks to vindicate
important civil and constitutional rights that cannot be valued solely in monetary
terms. 776  Justice Powell concurred in the judgment, concluding that the
reasonableness of the fee was supported by the district court's "explicit finding"
that the "public interest" had been served by the jury verdict establishing that the
police conduct had been lawless and unconstitutional.7 Moreover, as the
plurality opinion pointed out, Congress intended fees to be available when the
rights involved are non-pecuniary in nature, such as when a plaintiff seeks and
obtains only non-monetary equitable or declaratory relief."' This ruling has
particular application to EAJA cases, as many arise in the context where the
relief sought is equitable, rather than monetary, in nature.
However, when the sole purpose of a lawsuit is indeed to obtain damages,
the Supreme Court has directed some comparison between the amount of
damages awarded and the amount of attorney's fees sought.77 9 In Farrar v.
Hobby,"' the plaintiff sought $17 million in compensatory damages against
Texas public officials for allegedly illegal actions in closing a private school
operated by plaintiff and his son.78 ' The jury concluded that one state official
had deprived plaintiff of a civil right, apparently by urging an investigation of
the school in a press release, participating in an inspection of the school, and
attending a hearing that led to a temporary injunction against the school, but that
this conduct did not proximately cause any damages suffered by plaintiff. 52
Ultimately, the district court awarded nominal damages of one dollar.7"
Under those circumstances, where the sole relief sought was damages and
the recovery was purely nominal, the Supreme Court ruled that "the only
774. Id. at 565-66, 106 S. Ct. at 2689.
775. Id. at 564-81, 106 S. Ct. at 2686-97 (plurality opinion); id. at 581-86, 106 S. Ct. at 2697-
2700 (Powell, J., concurring).
776. Id. at 574, 106 S. Ct. at 2694 (plurality opinion).
777. Id. at 585-86, 106 S. Ct. at 2700 (Powell, J., concurring) ("In some civil rights cases ...
the court may consider the vindication of constitutional rights in addition to the amount of damages
recovered. In this case, for example, the District Court made an explicit finding that the 'public
interest' had been served by the jury's verdict that the warrantless entry was lawless and
unconstitutional.").
778. Id. at 575-76, 106 S. Ct. at 2694-95 (plurality opinion).
779. Farrar v. Hobby, 113 S. Ct. 566, 575 (1992); City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561,
585, 106 S. Ct. 2686, 2700 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring) ("Where recovery of private damages is
the purpose of a civil rights litigation, a district court, in fixing fees, is obligated to give primary
consideration to the amount of damages awarded as compared to the amount sought.').
780. 113 S. Ct. 566 (1992).
781. Id. at 570. The plaintiff dropped his claim for injunctive relief, limiting the complaint
solely to damages. Id.
782. Id.
783. Id. at 571.
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reasonable fee is ... no fee at all."'' The Farrar ruling may be limited,
however, to cases in which money is the only aim and thus the only possible
measure of success. Justice O'Connor, whose vote was necessary to form a
Court majority, stated in a concurrence that the relevant indicia of success
involves not only the extent of relief, but also "the significance of the legal issue
on which the plaintiff prevailed, and the public purpose served."785 However,
Justice O'Connor found no public purpose served by the litigation in this
particular case.7
In sum, when a party, although prevailing on some part of the litigation, has
achieved mere "partial or limited success," the Supreme Court has directed that
the fee award must be reduced accordingly.'87 As the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled in Perales v. Casillas,'8 when remanding
an EAJA fee dispute to the district court, a court must "consider the relationship
between the extent of [the party's] ultimate success and the amount of the fee
award."'89 It may not be a mathematical ratio based upon number of issues
presented, number of pages of argument devoted to an issue, or the amount of
money recovered, but the court must make some equitable adjustment of the
lodestar when a party has fallen meaningfully below full success in the relief
granted.
Thus, while the lodestar is the presumptive measure of the reasonable fee,
at some unspecified breaking point a plaintiff's success may fall to a level where
a reduction of the overall fee is appropriate. Plainly, a plaintiff need not aspire
to perfection to avoid a reduction-an "excellent result" is sufficient to assure
a full fee recovery.' On the other end of the spectrum, when the plaintiff has
attained a mere technical victory without corresponding public benefit, the fee
applicant may expect a significant reduction or total disallowance of the fee."9
784. Id. at 575.
785. Id. at 579 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See also Cabrera v. Jakabovitz, 24 F.3d 372, 393
(2d Cir.) (citing Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Farrar and upholding attorney's fee award where
"the plaintiffs prevailed on a significant legal issue-namely, that landlords can be held liable for
employing real estate brokers who are engaged in racial steering," notwithstanding award of only
nominal damages), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 205 (1994); Willis v. City of Chicago, 999 F.2d 284, 290
(7th Cir. 1993) (holding with citation to Farrar that in determining whether an award of fees should
be denied because of limited success when a plaintiff is awarded nominal damages, "courts must
certainly also take into consideration other factors, including the significance of the holding to other
litigants and to the growth of the law," although the court found that no such other factors were
present in that case).
786. Farrar, 113 S. Ct. at 578.
787. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 436, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 1941 (1983).
788. 950 F.2d 1066 (5th Cir. 1992).
789. Id. at 1074.
790. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435, 103 S. Ct. at 1940.
791. See Farrar v. Hobby, 113 S. Ct. 566, 575 (1992) (ruling that when the sole purpose of a
lawsuit is to obtain damages, without any request for equitable relief, and the party obtains merely
nominal damages, with no public purpose served by the litigation, "the only reasonable fee is... no
fee at all'); Johnson v. Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist., 949 F.2d 1000, 1003 (8th Cir. 1991) (ruling that
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In between, however, there would seem to be a wide range of possible outcomes,
ranging from cases of rather substantial success on most claims or issues to cases
of distinctly "partial or limited success."'792 Unless and until the Supreme
Court provides further guidance on this issue, it appears that the determination
of the point at which full compensation ceases to be reasonable when mixed
results are achieved in a case and what reduction should be assessed against the
lodestar has been left to the largely unfettered discretion of the district court.793
4. Fees for Fees
Just as fees are available for work performed in bringing the case on the
merits to a successful conclusion, compensation also is available for legal fees
incurred in applying for and securing an award of fees-what is sometimes
called "fees for fees."794  In Commissioner v. Jean,795 the Supreme Court
held that fee-shifting statutes "favor[] treating a case as an inclusive whole,
rather than as atomized line items."' 7' Thus, the Court held that an award of
fees for legal services in the fee litigation does not require a second finding that
the government's position in the fee litigation itself was not substantially
justified.797 The "single finding" that the government's position on the merits
of the case lacks substantial justification "operates as a one-time threshold for fee
eligibility. '798 The Court recognized that requiring a prevailing party to bear
the cost of fee litigation could effectively dissipate the value of any fee award
on the merits, thereby resurrecting the same financial disincentive to pursuing a
judicial remedy that the fee-shifting statute was intended to eliminate.79
when all that was gained by the litigation was the defendant's promise to take action that it had not
previously refused to take, the consent agreement reflected such "limited success" that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in denying a fee award).
792. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436, 103 S. Ct. at 1941.
793. Grant v. Martinez, 973 F.2d 96, 101 (2d Cir. 1992) (determining that whether an adjustment
for limited success is warranted "lies largely within the discretion of the district court"), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 978 (1993); Moore v. City of Des Moines, 766 F.2d 343, 345-46 (8th Cir. 1985)
(exercising court's "supervisory powers" to state that appeals of attorney's fee awards are rarely
appropriate when parties contend that a district court has abused its discretion in determining the
amount of the award including, inter alia, the downward adjustment for level of success, and warning
that sanctions may be imposed for frivolous appeals of fee awards), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1060, 106
S. Ct. 805 (1986). See Dobbs, supra note 723, at 862 (stating that, without clearer standards, fee
reduction for limited success may "be applied inconsistently and on an ad hoc basis").
794. American Fed. of Gov't Employees v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 994 F.2d 20 (D.C.
Cir. 1993).
795. 496 U.S. 154, 110 S. Ct. 2316 (1990).
796. Id. at 161-62, 110 S. Ct. at 2320.
797. Id. at 158-62, 110 S. Ct. at 2318-21.
798. Id. at 160, 110 S. Ct. at 2320. See also supra section IV.A.2 (discussing Jean's ruling that
the "position of the United States" is singular and is evaluated once for substantial justification based
upon the case as a whole).
799. Jean, 496 U.S. at 163-64, 110 S. Ct. at 2321-22.
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Accordingly, the Court held that fees may be awarded for the attorney's time in
preparing and litigating a fee application.mo
However, as with a fee application for work performed on any other aspect
of the case,"l the reasonableness of the fee award sought with respect to the
fee application must reflect the results obtaineds82 Thus, if a party achieves
only limited success in obtaining relief in the fee phase of the litigation, the court
may reduce the fee award for those legal services. 3 For example, as the Jean
Court noted in dicta, if the defendant's "challenge to a requested rate for
paralegal time resulted in the court's recalculating and reducing the award for
paralegal time from the requested amount, then the applicant should not receive
fees for the time spent defending the higher rate.""
B. Adjustment of the Statutory Rate Ceiling for Increases in Cost of Living
1. Adjustment of the $75 Per Hour Rate Cap for Cost-of-Living
Increases Should Be Routinely Granted
EAJA Subsection (d) establishes a $75 ceiling on the hourly rate charged by
the attorney for legal services, "unless the court determines that an increase in
the cost of living or a special factor ... justifies a higher fee."' s Although
"special factor" enhancements are rarely granted,"° courts routinely approve
c6st-of-living adjustmentsY°7 Accordingly, the $75 per hour statutory rate has
been adjusted upward by courts to the point where most EAJA fees in the recent
past have been set in the $105 to $120 range.808
800. Id. at 161-62, 110 S. Ct. at 2320-21.
801. See supra section V.A.3.b (discussing downward adjustments of the lodestar based upon
degree of success).
802. Jean, 496 U.S. at 163 n.10, 110 S. Ct. at 2321 n.10 (dicta).
803. Anthony v. Sullivan, 982 F.2d 586, 589-90 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (EAJA case); Nanetti v.
University of Ill., 944 F.2d 1416, 1420-21 (7th Cir. 1991).
804. Jean, 496 U.S. at 163 n.10, 110 S. Ct. at 2321 n.10.
805. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A) (1988).
806. See infra section V.C (discussing "special factor" enhancements to $75 per hour statutory
rate).
807. See Meyer v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 1029, 1031 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding that the district court
"must consider cost-of-living increases when awarding fees under EAJA"); Johnson v. Sullivan, 919
F.2d 503, 504-05 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that when a party presents proper proof of cost-of-living
increase, the court ordinarily must grant the enhancement).
808. Harold J. Krent, Explaining One-Way Fee Shifting, 79 Va. L. Rev. 2039, 2087 n.164
(1993). If, as is discussed below, infra section V.C.2 and 3, the $75 per hour statutory rate is
adjusted by a uniform national Consumer Protection Index for all items (CPI-U) from a base period
of October, 1981, when the EAJA went into effect, the adjusted rate ceiling as of March, 1995 is
$121.57. (The formula requires dividing the current (March, 1995) CPI-U index figure of 151.4 by
the CPI-U for October, 1981, which is 93.4, and then multiplying that result by $75.) The CPI-U
historical index is set out in Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, CPI Detailed Report:
Data for March 1995 at 73 (1995) (hereinafter CPI Report for March 1995].
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Nevertheless, a few courts of appeals have affirmed district court refusals to
grant cost-of-living adjustments, even when presented with proper evidence of
changes in the cost of living. For example, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit in May v. Sullivan,' held that a cost-of-living adjust-
ment under the EAJA is within the sound discretion of the trial court and is not
mandato ry.5 The court ruled that a party seeking an adjustment must do
more than merely present evidence of an increase in the cost of living between
the enactment of the EAJA and the date of the award,"' although the court
failed to suggest what other evidence is necessary. Other courts of appeals have
also ruled that a cost-of-living adjustment is not mandatory and that a district
court does not abuse its discretion by declining to award an adjustment, even
though the cost of living indisputably has risen."'
To the extent that the Fourth Circuit meant merely to emphasize that the
cost-of-living increase results in an adjustment only to the statutory ceiling, and
not to the prevailing rate,"' the decision is appropriate. If the current prevail-
ing rate in a community remains below the statutory rate cap as adjusted upward
by cost-of-living increases, the lower prevailing rate remains the maximum
amount that can be awarded.81 4 However, to the extent that the Fourth Circuit
809. 936 F.2d 176 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1038, 112 S. Ct. 887 (1992).
810. Id. at 177-78.
811. Id. at 177.
812. See, e.g., Begley v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 966 F.2d 196, 199 (6th Cir. 1992)
("The refusal of a district court to award cost of living adjustments will not normally amount to an
abuse of discretion, even though the cost of living has risen since the enactment of the EAJA.');
Headlee v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 548, 552 (10th Cir.) (holding that a cost-of-living adjustment is not
mandated "in each instance in total disregard of the discretion afforded the district court in setting
EAJA attorney fees"), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 979, 110 S. Ct. 507 (1989). Unfortunately, district
courts have relied upon these appellate court decisions as justifying or even mandating the routine
denial of cost-of-living adjustments because a party has presented only evidence of an increase in
the cost of living, without the ephemeral supplemental evidence that these courts have demanded
without adequate explanation. See, e.g., Brown v. Shalala, No. 93-4265-RDR, 1995 WL 462212, at
*5 (D. Kan. July 26, 1995) (ruling, with citation to Headlee, that the statutory rate is "appropriate"
and a cost-of-living adjustment is not "necessary" without explanation); Burgess v. Sullivan, 771 F.
Supp. 1161, 1163 (E.D. Okla. 1991) (relying upon Headlee to deny adjustment to statutory maximum
rate because the plaintiff introduced only evidence of an increase in the cost of living, without
explaining what more would be required to justify the adjustment).
813. Levemier Constr., Inc. v. United States, 947 F.2d 497, 504 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("The COLA
which the EAJA authorizes is an increase to the maximum rate allowed under the statute, not to the
attorneys' prevailing market rate.'); Thompson v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 790 F. Supp.
753, 756 (S.D. Ohio 1991) (ruling that the court must, first, determine the prevailing market rate for
legal services and then, second, "determine that an increase in the cost of living justifies raising the
statutory ceiling on hourly rates").
814. At least a couple of the appellate decisions approving denial of cost-of-living adjustments
may simply reflect the possibility that the prevailing rate had fallen below the adjusted statutory
ceiling, although these decisions are frustratingly vague in explaining how and why a denial of a
cost-of-living adjustment can be a sound exercise of discretion. See Hall v. Shalala, 50 F.3d 367,
369 (5th Cir. 1995) (observing that the district court recognized that "the statutory cap, adjusted for
inflation, was approximately $1 11 at the time of the award," but that "a $75 per hour award, well
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approved a denial of a cost-of-living adjustment when both proof of inflationary
changes was indisputable and the current prevailing rate met or exceeded the
adjusted statutory ceiling, the court's reasoning is difficult to follow. Indeed,
beyond stating that a mere increase in cost of living is not enough, the court
failed to elucidate any circumstances that would justify a grant of a cost-of-living
adjustment."' 5
Although the Fourth Circuit in May did not describe the additional evidence
that it apparently expected for a party to secure a cost-of-living adjustment, the
court approvingly cited&1 6 the Fifth Circuit's decision in Baker v. Bowen."1 7
In Baker, the Fifth Circuit suggested an analysis of increases in the cost of living
that appears to implicate both general cost-of-living increases for a geographical
area and specific market trends in attorney's fees rates.1 8 On the one hand,
the court stated that, through the cost-of-living allowance in the statute,
"Congress intended to provide attorneys at most with an hourly rate in present-
day dollars commensurate with seventy-five dollars in 1981, but no more."
81 9
This reference can only be to a general cost of living index, which measures the
below the $111 ceiling, satisfied the purposes of the EAJA"); Begley, 966 F.2d at 199 (stating that
a district court may normally decline to award a cost-of-living adjustment, in a case where the district
court had found a prevailing market rate below $75 per hour, although the court of appeals reversed
and remanded the case on the ground that the prevailing rate finding was not grounded in the
evidence and the cost-of-living factor had not been properly considered).
815. The Fourth Circuit may have slightly mitigated the harm caused by its ambiguous decision
in May through its subsequent opinion in Payne v. Sullivan, 977 F.2d 900 (4th Cir. 1992). In Payne,
the majority held that a request for an inflationary adjustment must be given "careful consideration"
by the district court, id. at 902, and that the disposition of any request for such an increase "should
be accompanied by sufficient explanation to enable us to review whether it was properly considered."
Id. at 903. However, the Payne court felt obliged to honor the May precedent by reiterating that a
district court may deny an adjustment '"when presented with nothing except an increase in the
Consumer Price Index."' Id. at 903 n.l (quoting May, 936 F.2d at 178). The court again failed to
explain what additional evidence beyond proof of an increase in the cost of living would satisfy the
court or what explanation by a district court could justify the denial of the adjustment. Moreover,
the dissenting judge opposed even the modest requirement that a district court be obliged to articulate
the reasons for its exercise of discretion. Id. at 904-05 (Widener, J., dissenting). He described the
requirement as a "hollow formalit[y]" that a district court could discharge by merely stating it had
chosen not to exercise its discretion to grant a cost-of-living adjustment, with no further explanation.
Id. at 904. The dissenting judge further "caution[ed] against any suggestion that the majority's
decision today in any way compels district courts presumptively to award cost-of-living increases to
a fee award at the statutory maximum rate of $75 per hour." Id. Again, neither the majority nor the
dissent in Payne explained on what basis, other than as an arbitrary exercise of judicial power, a
court could refuse to acknowledge uncontested evidence of increase in the cost of living. Given that
the statute expressly authorizes an adjustment in the rate ceiling precisely for reasons of "an increase
in the cost of living," 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A) (1988), it is difficult to conceive of a basis for the
sound exercise of judicial discretion in denying an adjustment when the evidence indisputably
demonstrates an "increase in the cost of living."
816. May, 936 F.2d at 178.
817. 839 F.2d 1075 (5th Cir. 1988).
818. Id. at 1084.
819. Id.
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purchasing powver of the dollar at different points in time. But on the other hand,
the coxirt stated that the hourly rate "should never exceed the percentage by
which the market rate attorneys' fees have increased since the statute was
enacted in 1981."' 20 That reference indicates that a court should track the
increases in the costs of legal services in particular and calculate adjustments to
the EAJA rate cap by market trends in this specific type of service. Unfortunate-
ly, the court's opinion thereby identifies two distinct measures of increases in the
cost of living under the EAJA, without clearly explaining which should govern,
other than perhaps to hint that the adjustment to the $75 per hour rate cap should
be the lower of these two indices."'
The use of the Consumer Price Index which measures general changes in
prices of consumer items, as opposed to a subcategory index for personal or legal
services, in computing the cost-of-living adjustment to the statutory rate cap is
discussed below. The courts of appeals that have addressed the issue more
explicitly than the Fifth Circuit in Baker have uniformly concluded that the
former rather than the latter measure should be applied." In any event, the
Baker decision does not ultimately support the proposition that a cost-of-living
adjustment may be denied when uncontested evidence of an increase in the cost
of living is presented; rather, it appears to touch lightly upon the different
question of what constitutes proper evidence of that increase.
Other courts of appeals have ruled that undisputed proof of an increase in
the cost of living does indeed mandate an adjustment to the statutory rate,
assuming of course that the attorney's prevailing rate exceeds the unadjusted rate
ceiling of $75 per hour. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit, in Johnson v. Sullivan,' held that where "an EAJA petitioner presents
uncontested proof of an increase in the cost of living sufficient to justify hourly
attorney's fees of more than $75 per hour, enhanced fees should be award-
ed."824  The court acknowledged that the district court should also consider
"any circumstances that would render a' cost-of-living increase unjust or
improper," but provided only the example of an attorney who ordinarily charges
a fee of $75 per hour or less, which would then make it unnecessary to adjust
the rate ceiling."u
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, in Meyer v.
Sullivan,"" was even more emphatic in directing that a district court "must
820. Id.
821. As discussed below, see infra section V.B.2, because the general cost of living as measured
by the Consumer Price Index has increased more slowly than the cost of personal services, including
legal services, the general cost of living would always govern under this understanding of the Baker
decision.
822. See infra section V.B.2 (discussing Consumer Price Index as measure of cost-of-living
adjustment to EAJA statutory rate cap).
823. 919 F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1990).
824. Id. at 505.
825. Id.
826. 958 F.2d 1029 (1lth Cir. 1992).
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consider cost-of-living increases when awarding fees under EAJA."'27  By
including the allowance in the statute, "Congress undoubtedly expected that the
courts would use the cost-of-living escalator to insulate EAJA fee awards from
inflation."8'2 As the court stated, because Congress intended through the EAJA
to ensure adequate legal representation to parties challenging unreasonable
government conduct, "it seems difficult to envision a situation in which the
district court would not adjust the cap upward for inflation."829  The only
situation that the Eleventh Circuit imagined as justifying denial of an adjustment
was if "the rate of inflation were to fall to such an insignificant level that the
district court in its discretion decides that further litigation over whether to adjust
the rate cap for inflation is simply unworthy of the court's, and litigants',
time." 30 This scenario has not yet presented itself in the real world. Unless
and until this happy scenario does arise, courts should routinely adjust the
statutory $75 per hour rate ceiling to account for increases in cost of living,
absent exceptional circumstances adequately explained in the court order.8"3
2. The Consumer Price Index as the Measure of Increases in Cost of
Living
Courts regularly accept the Consumer Price Index (CPI) as "proper proof'
of changes in the cost of living.832 The CPI, as calculated by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics at the United States Department of Labor, is "a measure of the
average change over time in the prices paid by urban consumers for a fixed
market basket of consumer goods and services." '3  The Bureau of Labor
Statistics selects a large sample of goods and services used by average
827. Id. at 1031.
828. Id. at 1034.
829. Id.
830. Id. at 1035.
831. As the Eleventh Circuit mentioned in a footnote in Meyer, although declining to incorporate
this observation into its holding, the Supreme Court's decision in Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552,
108 S. Ct. 2541 (1988), implies that "a cost of living adjustment under the EAJA is next to
automatic." Meyer, 958 F.2d at 1035 n.9. In the Pierce opinion, the Court referred to "the $75 cap
(adjusted for inflation)" and "$75 per hour (adjusted for inflation)." Pierce, 487 U.S. at 571, 108 S.
Ct. at 2553. The Meyer court viewed these references as hinting "that the proper cap on hourly fees
under the statute is an inflation-adjusted figure rather than a static rate of $75 per hour." Meyer, 958
F.2d at 1035 n.9. See also Marcus v. Shalala, 17 F.3d 1033, 1039 (7th Cir. 1994) (describing the
cost-of-living increase allowance "as the statute's built-in mechanism for automatically updating
itself, ensuring that the $75 per hour cap will not be eroded by inflation").
832. Johnson v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 503, 504 (8th Cir. 1990). See also Harris v. Sullivan, 968
F.2d 263, 265 (2d Cir. 1992) (ruling that cost of living "is properly measured by the Consumer Price
Index"); Allen v. Bowen, 821 F.2d 963, 967 (3d Cir. 1987) ("This court has expressly approved the
use of the Consumer Price Index in determining cost of living adjustment under the Equal Access
to Justice Act .... !).
833. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, BLS Handbook of Methods 176 (Sept.
1992) [hereinafter BLS Handbook].
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Americans, determines the change in prices of each item, and then, by a
weighted average of price indices for the individual items, determines an overall
change in consumer prices.n The CPI is used as "a general indicator of
inflation.""' Beginning in 1988, the numeric base for changes in the cost of
living was established as 1982-84.36 Accordingly, with 1982-84 having a
numeric base reference as 100,837 a CPI index of 151.4 for March, 199538
indicates an inflationary increase of 51.4% between the two periods of time.
Because the CPI is a weighted average of price changes in many goods and
services, some have suggested that the change in "cost of living" for purposes
of the EAJA should be more specifically pegged to the particular building block
of the CPI that corresponds to the cost of legal services.839 The broadest, most
comprehensive measure of price changes is the "Consumer Price Index for All
Urban Consumers (CPI-U)."' However, a price index is also published of a
subcategory of the CPI for personal expenses, including legal service fees."'
834. Ralph Turvey et al., Consumer Price Indices 29 (1989); John M. Berry, Where Do You
Draw the Bottom Line?: Figuring the Consumer Price Index is the Raging Debate Among
Economists and Politicians, Wash. Post Nat'l Weekly Ed., Feb. 20-26, 1995, at 21. The methods
used by the Bureau of Labor Statistics to calculate the CPI have become the subject of heated
political debate, as congressional leaders and the chairman of the Federal Reserve Board charge that
the CPI as presently measured overstates inflation by as much as 0.5 to 1.5 percentage points, thereby
excessively increasing adjustments to Social Security benefits and tax exemptions and brackets,
yielding a higher federal budget deficit. Id. at 21. The controversy focuses upon the Bureau's use
of a "fixed-market basket approach," which includes the same mix of items notwithstanding alteration
in consumer buying patterns as prices change, as opposed to a changing basket approach that would
reflect substitution of old items for new ones by consumers in response to changes in market prices.
Id. at 21-22. See also BLS Handbook, supra note 833, at 178 ("In a fixed-weight index such as the
CPI, the implicit quantity of any item used in calculating the index remains the same from month to
month."); Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Understanding the Consumer Price Index:
Answers to Some Questions, at Question 3 (April 1993) [hereinafter Understanding the Consumer
Price Index] (explaining that the CPI is not technically a "cost-of-living index" because "[i]t does not
reflect the changes in buying or consumption patterns that consumers probably would make to adjust
to relative price changes").
835. Turvey et al., supra note 834, at 21.
836. BLS Handbook, supra note 833, at 180. The Bureau of Labor Statistics is currently
engaged in a periodic revision of the CPI, which will take effect in 1998 and will result in a new
numeric base for cost of living changes of 1993-95. CPI Report for March 1995, supra note 808,
at 4.
837. CPI Report for March 1995, supra note 808, at 4.
838. Id. at 1.
839. The CPI is "a weighted average of price indices for all the elementary aggregates," that is,
the samples of goods and services chosen to represent average consumer purchases. Turvey et al.,
supra note 834, at 29. The "elementary aggregate," which is the sum of purchases of a defined set
of items from a defined region or outlet type, is "the basic building block of the consumer price
index." Id.
840. Understanding the Consumer Price Index, supra note 834, at Question 12.
841. The "legal service fees" component has a weight of 0.457 out of a total of 100 in
calculating the CPI. BLS Handbook. supra note 833, at 210, 215. The Bureau of Labor Statistics
is currently engaged in a periodic revision of the CPI, which will result in updated expenditure
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Since the personal expenses component yields a significantly higher inflationary
figure, many attorneys not surprisingly have asked to be compensated under that
measure.8
4 2
The argument that courts should look to the personal or legal services
category of the CPI for purposes of fee awards under the EAJA has its judicial
defenders" 3 and is not wholly implausible. Since the subject is the allowable
rate in compensation for legal services, there is a certain logic to the proposition
that the cost-of-living increase permitted under the statute should be measured
by the increase in the market cost of legal services. As one district court
remarked, "[b]eans, corn, and hamburger may have appreciated less than an hour
of lawyer's time, but plaintiffs must shop in the legal market, not the supermar-
ket." If the cost of legal services increases at a faster pace than the general
cost of living, but the statutory cap is fixed to the lower gauge, then the gulf
between full compensation for legal expenses and the fee award permissible
under the EAJA will continually grow. This persistent erosion in fee compensa-
tion afforded under the EAJA (as compared to the actual expense of legal
services incurred by litigants) will incrementally diminish the level of reimburse-
ment to parties who must engage attorneys at full market rates to challenge
unreasonable government conduct.
However, the courts of appeals that have directly addressed this question
have uniformly rebuffed the request for higher compensation under the personal
services component, ruling that "cost of living" under the EAJA should be
understood in its common and general sense and, thus, should be measured by
the composite Consumer Price Index.S On balance, the argument for a
composite measure of the general Consumer Price Index is considerably stronger.
First, the unadorned language of the statute refers to "an increase in the cost of
living,"' leading more directly to the conclusion that Congress intended courts
to look to general price increases rather than focus upon particular goods or
services."' The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held in
weights. CPI Report for March 1995, supra note 808, at 4.
842. E.g., Sullivan v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 574, 575 n.3 (4th Cir. 1992) (observing that the general
Consumer Price Index increased 47.1% from October, 1981 through October, 1991, while the
personal expenses subcategory increased 107.7%).
843. See, e.g., Dewalt v. Sullivan, 963 F.2d 27, 30-33 (3d Cir. 1992) (Becker, J., dissenting);
United States v. A Leasehold Interest in Property, 789 F. Supp. 1385, 1394 (E.D. Mich. 1992); Harris
v. Sullivan, 773 F. Supp. 612, 614-16 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), rev'd, 968 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1992); Dewalt
v. Sullivan, 756 F. Supp. 195, 198-201 (D.N.J. 1991), rev'd, 963 F.2d 27, 30-33 (3d Cir. 1992).
844. Dewalt, 756 F. Supp. at 201.
845. Jones v. Espy, 10 F.3d 690, 692-93 (9th Cir. 1993); Harris, 968 F.2d at 264-66; Dewalt,
963 F.2d at 28-30; Sullivan v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 574, 575-78 (4th Cir. 1992); Elcyzyn v. Brown,
7 Vet. App. 170, 179-81 (1994). But ef Baker v. Bowen, 839 F.2d 1075, 1084 (5th Cir. 1988)
(vaguely suggesting that a cost-of-living adjustment "should never exceed the percentage by which
the market rate attorneys' fees have increased since the statute was enacted in 1981"). On the Baker
decision, and its meaning, see also supra section V.B.1.
846. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A) (1988).
847.- Harris, 968 F.2d at 265 (ruling that the "ordinary meaning ascribed to the phrase 'cost of
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Jones v. Espy' that "[b]y using the generalized phrase 'cost of living,'
Congress meant to permit upward adjustments based on the overall purchasing
power of money and not on the ability of money to buy legal services."'" 9
Indeed, Congress obviously could not have contemplated a specific indexing of
the statutory rate cap to market trends in legal services because the "legal service
fees" component has been separately indexed only since December, 1986,50
unless we assume that the broader personal expenses subcategory index roughly
approximated increases in the cost of legal services occurring prior to 1986. 8s"
Second, given the intent of Congress through the statutory rate cap to limit
the amount of public reimbursement available for lawyer's fees, it would be
incongruous to apply a measure that accommodates a more dramatic increase in
legal fees than in the general cost of living.85 It is more likely that Congress
would have expected legal professionals to hold the costs of their services to the
same level as the general changes in consumer cost of living. 53  At the very
least, fixing the adjustment of the statutory rate cap to the general increase in the
cost of living ensures that awards in EAJA cases do not contribute to the
escalation of legal fees and might encourage attorneys to maintain a more stable
fee for their services.54
living"' is the general cost of purchasing goods and services as measured by the CPI); Sullivan, 958
F.2d at 576-77 (stating that "cost of living" is "a term with a commonly understood meaning," that
is, "the costs of food, shelter, clothing, and other basic goods and services needed in everyday life,"
as reflected in the CPI).
848. 10 F.3d 690 (9th Cir. 1993).
849. Id. at 692.
850. See CPI Report for March 1995, supra note 808, at 21 (listing "legal service fees"
component with a numeric base of December 1986); Dewalt, 963 F.2d at 28 & n.1; Sullivan, 958
F.2d at 575 n.2. Moreover, if inflationary adjustments to the EAJA rate cap are to be calculated on
a local or regional basis, see infra section V.B.3 (discussing whether the cost-of-living adjustment
should be calculated on a local or national basis, and concluding that a national measure is more
appropriate), recourse to the legal services component would be precluded because it is calculated
only on a national basis. Dewalt, 963 F.2d at 28. See CP1 Report for March 1995, supra note 808,
at 44 (reflecting that while composite of "personal and educational expenses" is calculated on a
regional basis, the item of "legal service fees" is not separately indexed).
851. Sullivan, 958 F.2d at 575 n.2 (assuming, "for purposes of this opinion," that "the broader
'personal expenses' subeategory provides a roughly accurate measure of increases in the cost of legal
services," although ultimately rejecting use of this measure over the general CPI-U).
852. See Dewalt, 963 F.2d at 30 ("Congress has decreed that the public fisc shall be vulnerable
only to the extent of $75 per hour plus 'cost of living' increases since 1981, and we cannot sanction
fee awrds in excess of that limitation .... ').
853. See Uskokovic v. Sullivan, 772 F. Supp. 387, 393 (N.D. I1. 1991) (adopting general CPI
as measure of increases in the cost of living, saying "[lit is highly unlikely that Congress intended
the statutory ceiling to be determined by the fee demands of attorneys"). Moreover, an escalator tied
to the general increase in the CPI does not leave lawyers at a significant disadvantage. Assuming
that the money received by the attorney in fee payment will be used to purchase the types of goods
and services used by most urban consumers, a fee rate ceiling pegged to the overall change in
consumer prices will maintain the purchasing power of the recipient attorney in the consumer market.
854. One court of appeals has also suggested that the interpretive canon requiring strict
construction of waivers of sovereign immunity supports selection of the general CPI index as more
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The courts of appeals are in general agreement that the increases in the cost
of living for purposes of the EAJA should be keyed to a base year of 1981.55
Congress originally enacted the EAJA in 1980, with an effective date of October,
1981,856 but with a sunset provision providing for the Act's expiration in
1984.57 In 1985, Congress re-enacted the EAJA and removed the sunset
provision, but left the $75 per hour statutory maximum unchanged."' 8 Despite
the expiration of the original Act, courts have recognized that the intended effect
favorable to the government and more protective of the public treasury. See Dewalt, 963 F.2d at 29-
30 (stating that, because Congress intended to protect the public fisc by establishing the $75 per hour
cap, and "waivers of sovereign immunity are to be strictly construed," the increase in the cost of
living should be measured by the general CPI-U rather than the personal services component).
However, the doctrine of sovereign immunity and the canon of strict construction do not contribute
to a resolution of this particular problem. Strict construction of a statute is relevant when the
question is how broadly to construe statutory language or which alternative interpretation should
prevail if one is more favorable to the government in a general sense. These interpretive tools are
not relevant, however, when raised in a singular context to argue for a result more favorable to the
government in a specific case, notwithstanding that the opposite result might be more favorable to
the government in a future case. Although relying upon the general CPI index may reduce
government expenditures in the current economic context, this may not be true in the future if the
price index for legal services were to decrease or rise at a rate lower than overall consumer prices.
Accordingly, the statutory interpretation question cannot be decided by whether the government
benefits in the case of the moment, but rather must be resolved by an analysis of more general
application.
855. See, e.g., Harris v. Railroad Retirement Bd., 990 F.2d 519, 521 (10th Cir. 1993); Chiu v.
United States, 948 F.2d 711,718-19 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Ramon-Sepulveda v. United States Immigration
& Naturalization Serv., 863 F.2d 1458, 1464 (9th Cir. 1988); Jean v. Nelson, 863 F.2d 759, 773-74
(1lth Cir. 1988), aftd, 496 U.S. 154, 110 S. Ct. 134 (1990); Kelly v. Bowen, 862 F.2d 1333, 1336
(8th Cir. 1988); Baker v. Bowen, 839 F.2d 1075, 1084 (5th Cir. 1988); Trichilo v. Secretary of
Health & Human Servs., 823 F.2d 702, 705-07 (2d Cir. 1987); Allen v. Bowen, 821 F.2d 963, 967
(3d Cir. 1987); Sierra Club v. Secretary of the Army, 820 F.2d 513, 521-23 (1st Cir. 1987); Action
on Smoking & Health v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 724 F.2d 211, 218 (D.C. Cir. 1984). See also
Marcus v. Shalala, 17 F.3d 1033, 1038 (7th Cir. 1994) (approving use of 1981 as base year for
calculating cost-of-living adjustment to EAJA statutory rate); Payne v. Sullivan, 977 F.2d 900, 903
(4th Cir. 1992) (quoting with approval from decisions using 1981 as base year for calculating cost-of-
living adjustment to EAJA statutory rate). The Sixth Circuit stands alone among the courts of
appeals in suggesting that, since Congress did not raise the $75 figure when it re-enacted the EAJA,
increases in the cost of living between 1981 and 1985 need not be reflected in an adjustment to the
statutory rate cap. Chipman v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 781 F.2d 545, 547 (6th Cir.
1986). However, some district courts within the Sixth Circuit have concluded that the statement in
Chipman was either incorrect dicta, see, e.g., United States v. A Leasehold Interest in Property, 789
F. Supp. 1385, 1394 (E.D. Mich. 1992); Holden v. Bowen, 668 F. Supp. 1042, 1047 (N.D. Ohio
1986), or did not strictly direct district courts to adopt 1985 rather than 1981 as the base year for
cost-of-living adjustments, see, e.g., Thompson v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 790 F. Supp.
753, 756-57 (S.D. Ohio 1991).
856. Pub. L. No. 96-481, Title II, § 208, 94 Stat. 2325, 2330 (1980) (providing for an effective
date of October 1, 1981).
857. Id. § 204(c), 94 Stat. at 2329 (1980) (providing that EAJA Subsection (d) would expire on
October 1, 1984).
858. Pub. L. No. 99-80, § 6(a), 99 Stat. 183, 186 (1985).
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of the re-enactment was to treat the EAJA as if it had never expired.859 If
Congress had desired to alter the prior understanding that the increase in the cost
of living would be calculated from 1981, it would not have merely re-enacted the
same language, but would have offered some definite indication of a changed
intent.u6
Accordingly, the cost-of-living adjustment to the rate cap is measured from
the original effective date of the EAJA in October, 1981, not from the date of
the re-enactment in 1985. The formula for adjusting the EAJA statutory rate
ceiling for inflationary changes is to divide the current CPI-U by the October,
1981 CPI-U, thereby determining the change in the cost of living, and then
multiplying that figure by $75 (the unadjusted statutory rate ceiling).s'
3. Measuring Increases in the Cost of Living on a National or Local
Scale
Any price index or other measure of cost of living changes must be linked
to a particular geographical or demographic category within which purchasing
behavior and changes in item prices are measured. The Bureau of Labor
Statistics publishes indices for the United States as a whole, four regions
(Northeast, North Central, South, and West), and the five largest metropolitan
areas (Chicago, Los Angeles, New York, Philadelphia, and San Francisco) on a
monthly basis, indices for the next ten largest metropolitan areas on a bimonthly
basis, and indices for certain smaller areas only as semi-annual and annual
averages. 62 A court considering whether to grant a cost-of-living adjustment
to the Subsection (d) statutory rate cap must determine whether to apply the
national Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U), which is
representative of the buying habits of about 80% of the population of the United
States,s 3 or one of the regional or local area indices.
859. Baker, 839 F.2d at 1084; Trichilo, 823 F.2d at 705. See also Pub. L. 99-80, §6(a), 99 Stat.
183, 186 (1985) (providing that Subsection (d) (and the administrative EAJA, 5 U.S.C. § 504) "shall
be effective on or after the date of the enactment of this Act as if they had not been repealed").
860. Sierra Club, 820 F.2d at 522.
861. In Animal Lovers Volunteer Ass'n v. Carlucci, 867 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir. 1989), the Ninth
Circuit in a footnote provided an illustration of the proper formula for adjusting the $75 statutory rate
cap. First, the present CPI-U (which in that case was for December 1988) was found (which in that
case was 120.5). Second, the CPI-U for October 1981 (the original effective date of the EAJA) was
referenced, which is 93.4. Third, the present CPI-U (120.5) was divided by the October 1981 CPI-U
(93.4), which here resulted in a figure of 1.2901498. Multiplying that figure by the statutory $75 per
hour rate produced an adjusted ceiling of $96.76. The formula is thus: $96.76 = $75 x (120.5/93.4).
Id. at 1227 n.2.
862. Understanding the Consumer Price Index, supra note 834, at Question 15; BLS Handbook,
supra note 833, at 184. Beginning in 1998, the Bureau of Labor Statistics plans to update its sample
of urban areas, which will result in publication of monthly indices for only three metropolitan areas
(New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles), bimonthly indices for another 11 areas, and semi-annual
indices for 12 smaller areas. CPI Report for March 1995, supra note 808, at 4.
863. BLS Handbook, supra note 833, at 176.
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Most courts have passed rather lightly over this issue, with many simply
assuming that the cost-of-living adjustment to the statutory rate should be
determined by price changes in the local area, apparently because the prevailing
market rate for legal services is calculated by reference to the locality 8"
Because the prevailing market rate is indeed calculated "in the relevant
community," ' which ordinarily is the community in which the court forum
is situated,' there is a superficial appeal to pegging the cost-of-living adjust-
ment to the community in which the prevailing market rate is found.
However, the question of the proper adjustment to the statutory rate cap and
the issue of the prevailing market rate for an attorney in the community are
distinctly separate stages of the fee measurement analysis. The prevailing hourly
rate is the measure of what an individual attorney could reasonably charge in the
open market for the legal services provided in the case at issue. The statutory
864. See, e.g., Jones v. Lujan, 887 F.2d 1096, 1101 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (applying cost-of-living
increase in the Washington, D.C. area); Wilkett v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 844 F.2d 867, 875
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (applying CPI for Washington, D.C.-Maryland-Virginia urban area); United States
v. A Leasehold Interest in Property, 789 F. Supp. 1385, 1394 (E.D. Mich. 1992) (applying cost-of-
living increase for the Detriot-Ann Arbor area); Butts v. Bowen, 775 F. Supp. 1167, 1173 (N.D. Ill.
1991) (ruling that "it is appropriate to use the index for Chicago instead of the index for all Urban
Consumers in the country"); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Addison Airport, 733 F. Supp. 1121, 1126
(N.D. Tex. 1990) (stating that, while "[t]he award need not necessarily track the cost-of-living index
for a particular geographical area, that index is a significant indicator," and then applying cost-of-
living increase in the Dallas-Fort Worth area); Harkins v. Sullivan, No. 85-151 1-C, 1990 WL 193778,
at *2 (D. Kan. Nov. 6, 1990) (ruling that "[lit is appropriate to calculate the cost of living increase
based upon the rise in the consumer price index for the Kansas City area"); Kidd v. Sullivan, No.
87 C 8532, 1990 WL 103569, at *2 (N.D. I1. July 5, 1990) (applying the "Consumer Price Index
for the North Central Region of the United States'). See generally Gary Knapp, Annotation, Award
of Attorneys' Fees in Excess of S75 Per Hour Under Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) Provision
(28 USCS § 2412(d)(2)(A)(ii)) Authorizing Higher Awards-Cases Involving Law Other Than Social
Security Law, 119 A.L.R. Fed. 1, 37-38 (1994) (collecting cases in which the cost-of-living
adjustment under the EAJA was calculated based upon the CPI in the particular metropolitan area
in which the attorney services were performed).
A few other courts have just as casially (if more appropriately) assumed that the appropriate
measure of the increase in the cost of living under the EAJA is the national standard of the CPI-U.
See, e.g., Russell v. Sullivan, 930 F.2d 1443, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (applying "the most recent
consumer price index for urban consumers"); Ramon-Sepulveda v. Immigration & Naturalization
Servs., 863 F.2d 1458, 1463 (9th Cir. 1988) (applying "the consumer price index (figure for all urban
consumers, all items...) (hereafter CPI-U)'). See generally Knapp, supra note 864, at 36-37
(collecting cases in which courts applied the CPI-U to measure the cost-of-living adjustment under
the EAJA). See also Johnson v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 503, 505 (8th Cir. 1990) (ruling that "an increase
in... cost of living should result in consistent hourly fee awards in each case, rather than producing
disparate fee awards from each court within the district or from different districts within this circuit").
865. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895, 104 S. Ct. 1541, 1547 (1984) (stating that a
"reasonable" fee is to be "calculated according to the prevailing market rate in the relevant
community').
866. Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.3d 1439, 1449 (9th Cir. 1994); Rum Creek Coal Sales, Inc. v.
Caperton, 31 F.3d 169, 175 (4th Cir. 1994); Cullens v. Georgia Dep't of Transp., 29 F.3d 1489, 1494
(I Ith Cir. 1994).
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rate cap of $75 per hour (as adjusted for inflation) is a fixed ceiling upon the
expense that Congress was willing to impose upon the taxpayer, regardless of
what fee that attorney might be able to demand in the marketplace." 7
A national standard should govern the cost-of-living adjustment under the
EAJA, both to vindicate the fiscal purpose behind the statutory rate cap and for
practical reasons in application of the available measuring devices.
As enacted, Congress established a uniform ceiling of $75 per hour for
attorney's fees under EAJA Subsection (d),' with no variation by region or
locality, although prevailing rates for attorney's fees obviously differed greatly
from one part of the nation to another when the statute was enacted. As the
district court in Wedra v. Thomass 9 said, "[s]urely Congress was aware in
enacting the attorneys' fees provisions of the wide disparity in fee rates between
urban and rural areas; between the Northeast and the Midwest, etc.; yet Congress
chose to set one uniform rate to be applied nationwide. 870 Nothing in the text
of the EAJA would lead one to believe that Congress contemplated that what
began as a uniform national standard would gradually over time disintegrate into
a hodge-podge of disparate rate caps, variously devised in isolation by every
federal district court district. It would be a strange interpretation of a federal
statute with nationwide application to assume that a uniform standard expressly
set out in the text would devolve thereafter into a local standard, varying from
place to place according to regional economic trends.87'
The purpose of the statutory rate cap is plainly one of protection of the
public fisc. 872  As the Supreme Court observed in Pierce v. Underwood,"
"Congress thought that $75 an hour was generally quite enough public
reimbursement for lawyers' fees, whatever the local or national market might
be."8 4 Although the cost of living may vary from region to region or city to
city, the impact upon the federal treasury of an increase in allowable fee awards
against the federal government is the same, whether the federal dollar is paid out
to an attorney in New York or in Kansas City. The statutory rate cap is best
867. See Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 572, 108 S. Ct. 2541, 2553-54 (1988) ("We do
not think Congress meant that if the rates for all lawyers in the relevant city-or even in the entire
country-come to exceed $75 per hour (adjusted for inflation), then that market-minimum rate will
govern instead of the statutory cap.").
868. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A) (1988) ("[A]ttorney fees shall not be awarded in excess of $75
per hour unless the court determines that an increase in the cost of living... justifies a higher fee.).
869. 623 F. Supp. 272 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
870. Id. at 278.
871. See Stewart v. Sullivan, 810 F. Supp. 1102, 1107 (D. Haw. 1993) (ruling that national,
rather than Honolulu, change in cost of living should be applied to adjust EAJA rate cap because "if
Congress had wanted to allow for cost of living adjustments in a particular region or city, it could
have done so in the statute').
872. Dewalt v. Sullivan, 963 F.2d 27, 29 (3d Cir. 1992) (stating that, "in providing the $75 per-
hour cap, Congress intended to protect, to some extent, the public fisc").
873. 487 U.S. 552, 108 S. Ct. 2541 (1988).
874. Id. at 572, 108 S. Ct. at 2554 (discussing special factor enhancement to statutory rate cap).
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conceived of as a uniform ceiling upon fee award outlays, so that the impact
upon the public fisc remains the same from year to year in constant dollars.
Indeed, other federal statutes with fiscal effect measure changes in the cost
of living by the unitary national standard of the CPI-U. Statutes authorizing pay
out of the public treasury, such as Social Security benefits.. and civil service
retirement pay,"' incorporate cost of living increases. Similarly, the Internal
Revenue Code, which governs payments into the public treasury, indexes income
tax rate brackets to the rise in inflation.8"
This approach is also more consistent with the majority rule, discussed
above, 78 that the cost-of-living adjustment should be calculated by reference
to the general CPI-U for all items rather than the particular index for a
subcategory of legal services. Both the rule requiring that increases in the cost
of living be measured by general movements in consumer prices (not by changes
in the cost of legal services) and the adoption of a uniform national index (rather
than a local index) reflect an understanding that the statutory rate cap was not
designed to rise apace with increases in the market rates charged by attorneys.
The statutory rate cap is intended to stand separately as a ceiling on public
expenditures, tracking national changes in the general cost of living.
Moreover, for reasons of practicality, the national CPI-U standard is
preferable to regional or metropolitan indices. The Bureau of Labor Statistics
"strongly urges users to consider adopting the national average (or regional)
CPI's for use in ... escalator clauses.8 79 The volatility of local indices,8 '
reflecting the smaller sample size which makes them subject to more sampling
and other measurement error,88' make use of the local measure unwise and
inaccurate.8 Once we have passed beyond the locality, within which the
875. 42 U.S.C. § 415(i)(D) (1988) (for purposes of cost of living increases in benefits, defining
"CPI increase percentage" as including a reference to "the Consumer Price Index... (as prepared
by the Department of Labor)").
876. 5 U.S.C. § 8331(15) (1994) (for purposeg of cost of living increases, defining "price index"
as meaning "the Consumer Price Index (all items-United States city average) published monthly by
the Bureau of Labor Statistics").
877. 26 U.S.C. § l(f)(5) (1988) (for purposes of adjustment of tax tables so that inflation will
not result in tax increases, defining "Consumer Price Index" as "the last Consumer Price Index for
all-urban consumers published by the Department of Labor").
878. See supra section V.B.2.
879. Understanding the Consumer Price Index, supra note 834, at Question 15. An "escalator
clause" is a provision in a contract providing for an increase in future periods according to a fixed
standard, such as an employment agreement providing for an increase in wages by the cost of living
or a lease providing for an increase in rent according to the rise in inflation. Black's Law Dictionary
544 (6th ed. 1990).
,880. Understanding the Consumer Price Index, supra note 834, at Question 13.
881. CPI Report for March 1995, supra note 808, at 57.
882. See Eames v. Shalala, No. 81-CV-0483E, 1994 WL 520972, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 22,
1994) (applying national CPI "because there is insufficient difference between the local and the
national indices to necessitate a local calculation and because testimony has been offered to the effect
that the national index is less likely to contain error"). See also National Law Ctr. v. United States
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prevailing market rate is established, there is no particular reason to come to rest
at the regional level rather than moving to the national index.
In addition, the use of local or even regional indices adds to the burden of
a court in applying a cost-of-living adjustment, because the court must solicit and
evaluate evidence about the local or regional index and calculate an adjustment
for the rate cap disparate from that used by courts in other districts or circuits.
Moreover, because price indices for some localities are not published,"8 3 the
court must consider whether to substitute the use of a regional index as a rough
analogy. The Supreme Court has counseled that a request for attorney's fees
"should not result in a second major litigation."' ' The adoption of a uniform
standard, adjusting the $75 per hour rate cap by changes in the national CPI-U,
would permit announcement of the adjusted ceiling on a monthly and annual
basis, perhaps in a publication by the Department of Justice or Administrative
Office of the United States Courts, which would be readily accessible to each
judge without the necessity of separate consideration and calculation.
4. The Cost-of-Living Adjustment May Not Be Used as a Substitute for
Interest to Compensate for Delay in Receipt of Fees
Even in routine litigation, there may be a significant delay between the date
on which legal services are performed and the date on which a fee is awarded.
For parties other than the federal- government, the Supreme Court has held that
"an appropriate adjustment for delay in payment-whether by the application of
current rather than historic hourly rates or otherwise-is within the contemplation
of' fee-shifting statutes.S' But when the federal government is the defendant,
compensation for delay in receipt of payment-by using current rates, by
adjustment of the lodestar, or by direct award of pre-judgment interest-is
generally unavailable.
In Library of Congress v. Shaw,"' the Supreme Court rejected an enhance-
ment of the lodestar in a Title VII fee-shifting case against the federal govem-
ment to compensate for delay in receipt of the award. The Court held that such
an enhancement amounted to an award of pre-judgment interest, from which the
federal government traditionally has been held immune. 87  Although the
government had expressly waived its sovereign immunity for an award of
Dept. of Veterans Affairs, 799 F. Supp. 148, 157 n.10 (D.D.C. 1992) (ruling that the CPI-U should
be used, "not the CPI for the Washington D.C. area which is only published every other month, and
less often in most other American cities with a population of 200,000 or more").
883. For example, even after the 1998 periodic revision of the CPI, no index will be published
for localities in Iowa; indeed, price data will not even be collected from Iowa for compiling national
and regional indices. See CPI Report for March 1995, supra note 808, at 4-5.
884. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 1941 (1983).
885. Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 284, 109 S. Ct. 2463, 2469 (1989) (authorizing
compensation for delay in receipt of fee award from state government).
886. 478 U.S. 310, 106 S. Ct. 2957 (1986).
887. Id. at 314, 106 S. Ct. at 2961.
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attorney's fees under Title VII, the Court read that statutory waiver narrowly to
preserve the government's special immunity from interest.88 In the Civil
Rights Act of 1991,89 Congress expressly waived the sovereign immunity of
the federal government against awards of pre-judgment interest in Title VII
cases, thereby overruling Library of Congress v. Shaw in the limited context of
that statutory cause of action. 9 However, the "no-interest" rule continues to
preclude an award of interest or other compensation for delay under other
statutes that permit awards of attorney's fees against the government.89 '
Indeed, with certain statutory exceptions, 92 the federal government is not
subject even to awards of post-judgment interest on district court civil judg-
ments.
893
Accordingly, in setting a cost-of-living adjustment under EAJA Subsection
(d), the court may only consider inflation that occurred prior to the date upon
which the attorney performed the work, and may not consider increases that
occurred subsequent to the work performed."' A few courts have allowed
888. Id. at 319-20, 106 S. Ct. at 2963-65.
889. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 114, 105 Stat. 1071, 1079 (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (Supp. III 1991)).
890. See generally Estate of Reynolds v. Martin, 985 F.2d 470, 475 n.2 (9th Cir. 1993)
(outlining amendments to Title VII in Civil Rights Act of 1991, including Section 114, which
authorizes awards of interest against the United States).
891. See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Hanson, 859 F.2d 313, 318 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding that no-
interest rule applied to fee award against federal government under Clean Water Act).
892. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1961(c)(2) (1988) (authorizing award of interest on judgments of
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit); 28 U.S.C. § 1961(c)(3) (1988) (authorizing
award of interest on judgments in Court of Federal Claims in internal revenue cases).
893. See Thompson v. Kennickell, 797 F.2d 1015, 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (concluding, in
exhaustive analysis, that 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a), which generally authorizes awards of post-judgment
interest on district court civil judgments, is not a sufficiently unambiguous waiver of sovereign
immunity to permit recovery of judgment interest against the United States), cert. denied, 480 U.S.
905, 107 S. Ct. 1347 (1987); A.L.T. Corp. v. Small Business Admin., 823 F.2d 126, 128-29 (5th Cir.
1987) (same); International Woodworkers v. Donovan, 792 F.2d 762, 766-67 (9th Cir. 1986) (same).
894. One law review article argues that the provision for a cost-of-living adjustment under EAJA
Subsection (d) constitutes a sufficiently express waiver of sovereign immunity to permit enhancement
of an EAJA award to compensate for delay in receipt of fees. Geer & Reingold, supra note 762, at
320-21. See also Hong-Yee Chiu v. United States, 18 Cl.' Ct. 567, 572 n.2 (1989) (finding statutory
allowance for cost-of-living adjustment to $75 rate sufficient to justify adjustment as of date of
award, rather than as of date services were rendered), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Chiu v.
United States, 948 F.2d 711 (Fed. Cir. 1991). The article mixes together distinctly different concepts,
by concluding that an enhancement is appropriate, "whether one calls the add-on a delay adjustment,
a cost of living increase, or interest." Geer & Reingold, supra note 762, at 321. The allowance
under Subparagraph (dX2)(A) for a cost-of-living adjustment serves the discrete purpose of adjusting
the statutory $75 per hour rate ceiling that is imposed upon the market rate for legal services
prevailing at a particular point in time. The provision does not speak to the different question of
whether an hourly rate should be enhanced beyond the market rate that prevailed at the time legal
services were performed, so as to provide a measure of compensation for the delay in payment. The
statute is silent on pre-judgment interest, thereby precluding the implication that such is available
under the strict construction rule of Shaw. Moreover, the EAJA does address the precise question
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cost-of-living adjustments based upon the current CPI index, although without
considering whether an award so calculated amounted to the prohibited charge
of interest against the United States. 95 More recently, several courts have held
that using current, rather than historic, CPI indices, is tantamount to an award of
pre-judgment interest," in violation of the no-interest rule of Library of
Congress v. Shaw. 97 Moreover, the EAJA authorizes a party to make a claim
for "fees ... incurred by that party," '898 which suggests a focus upon the point
in time at which the obligation for payment of fees arose (presumably when the
services were performed) as opposed to a later date when a fee award is made.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Perales v.
Casillas,89 illustrated the problem:
If an attorney provides services in 1991 and is compensated in that
same year, adjusting the $75 statutory rate based on increases in the
cost of living between 1981 and 1991 provides no concerns of
prohibited interest. The adjustment operates simply to update the
EAJA's statutory rate; delay is not a consideration. Suppose instead the
attorney provides services in 1988 and the appropriate adjusted rate is
then $100 per hour; however, because of the delays normally attendant
on litigation, the fee award is not made until 1991. An award of $100
per hour for those services is expressly permitted under the EAJA. If
the court goes further and awards the attorney $110 per hour to
compensate for inflation not only between 1981 and 1988, but also
between 1988 and 1991, then the court has in effect awarded interest for
the three-year delay in payment. We do not find that the EAJA
expressly countenances such a result. Accordingly, following the
teachings of Shaw, we conclude that cost-of-living compensation of
attorneys under the EAJA merely for the delay in payment is a
prohibited award of interest against the United States.w°
Several courts of appeals have left open the possibility that prolonged delay
in payment might constitute a "special factor" allowing enhancement of an EAJA
of interest, providing that the government is liable for post-judgment interest when the government
unsuccessfully appeals an award of costs or attorney's fees. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(f) (1988). Under this
provision, interest on a district court judgment for attorney's fees runs from the date of the award
through the day before the date of the appellate court's issuance of the mandate affirming the award.
Id. Especially given the express provision for post-judgment interest, the silence of the statute on
pre-judgment interest gives ample answer to the suggestion that an EAJA award may be enhanced
to compensate for routine delay in receipt of payment of fees.
895. See Garcia v. Schweiker, 829 F.2d 396. 402 (3d Cir. 1987).
896. See, e.g., Marcus v. Shalala, 17 F.3d 1033, 1038-39 (7th Cir. 1994); Perales v. Casillas, 950
F.2d 1066, 1074-77 (5th Cir. 1992); Chiu, 948 F.2d at 719-22.
897. 478 U.S. 310, 106 S. Ct. 2957 (1986).
898. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1988).
899. 950 F.2d 1066 (5th Cir. 1992).
900. Id. at 1076-77.
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fee award,"' although the Seventh Circuit has recently characterized any
enhancement for delay as an impermissible "end run" around the no-interest rule
of Library of Congress v. Shaw.'°2 Even those courts willing to contemplate
this possibility have restricted it to exceptional cases of unusual and prolonged
delay. 903 The normal delay attendant on litigation cannot qualify as a special
factor allowing upward adjustment of an EAJA fee.' Exceptional delay as
a potential "special factor" is discussed further in a later subsection of this
article. 5
For purposes of the case of ordinary delay, at least, the district court opinion
in Burr v. Bowen,W provides an illustration of how to apply the cost-of-living
adjustment in a manner that adjusts the statutory rate cap for inflation but does
not introduce an illicit interest component. For each year in which legal services
were performed, 1987 to 1991 in that case, the court calculated the increase in
the cost of living by applying the CPI-U annual average for that year against the
CPI-U for October, 1981, when the EAJA went into effect.' ° In this manner,
the court determined the appropriate adjustment to the $75 per hour rate cap,
ranging from $91.21 for 1987 to $108.18 for 199 1.s For one attorney, whose
prevailing rate exceeded the adjusted statutory cap,' the court multiplied the
numbers of hours approved as reasonable1 ° for each individual year against the
statutory rate cap as adjusted for that year.9 ' For the other attorney, whose
prevailing rate for the one year in which she performed legal services fell below
901. See, e.g., Perales v. Casillas, 950 F.2d 1066, 1077 (5th Cir. 1992) (rejecting delay in
payment as special factor under circumstances of that case); Oklahoma Aerotronics, Inc. v. United
States, 943 F.2d 1344, 1349-50 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (afirming delay of payment enhancement as special
factor); Jean v. Nelson, 863 F.2d 759, 776 & n.13 (l1th Cir. 1986) (remanding EAJA dispute to
district court to consider, inter alia, whether a special factor enhancement was appropriate because
of the government's unusually litigious position causing delay), arfd sub nom. Immigration &
Naturalization Serv. v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 110 S. Ct. 2316 (1990).
902. Marcus v. Shalala, 17 F.3d 1033, 1039 (7th Cir. 1994).
903. Perales, 950 F.2d at 1077; Oklahoma Aerotronics, 943 F.2d at 1349.
904. Wilkett v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 844 F.2d 867, 876 (D.C. Cit. 1988).
905. See infra section V.C.3 (discussing exceptional delay as "special factor" allowing
enhancement of a fee beyond the statutory rate cap).
906. 782 F. Supp. 1285 (N.D. Ill. 1992).
907. Id. at 1290-91.
908. Id.
909. Id. at 1290. Although the district court found that this attorney had a prevailing rate of
$109, the court did not expressly set out the attorney's prevailing rate for each of the years in
question, that is, her "historic" rate. Such findings are necessary to give full force to the statutory
rate cap and prevent enhancement of the fee award in a manner equivalent to the award of interest
If an attorney had a prevailing rate for one of the years in question which fell below the statutory rate
cap as adjusted for that particular year, the lower prevailing rate for that year would constitute the
maximum rate at which an EAJA award could be made. For present purposes, it is assumed that this
attorney's historic prevailing rates exceeded the adjusted statutory cap for each of the years in
question.
910. Id. at 1290.
911. Id. at 1291.
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the statutory rate as adjusted for inflation, the court properly based the award
upon the lower prevailing rate.9"
The EAJA does authorize an award of post-judgment, as opposed to pre-
judgment, interest when the government unsuccessfully appeals an award of costs
or attorney's fees.9 3 Under EAJA Subsection (f), interest on a district court
judgment for attorney's fees or costs runs from the date of the award through the
day before the date of the appellate court's issuance of the mandate affirming the
award.
914
C. Enhancement of the EAJA Fee Award for "Special Factors"
1. The "Special Factor" Exception is Strictly Construed to Preserve the
Integrity of the $75 Per Hour Rate Cap
In addition to the cost-of-living adjustment to the statutory rate of $75 per
hour, EAJA Subparagraph (d)(2)(A) permits enhancement of the fee award for
a "special factor, such as the limited availability of qualified attorneys for the
proceedings involved." 95 While a cost-of-living escalation may properly be
regarded as routine,9 6 the "special factor" allowance must be strictly construed
to preserve the integrity of the statutory rate and to prevent its disintegration
through perfunctory enhancements that largely restore the award to the prevailing
rate level.
In Pierce v. Underwood,"7 the Supreme Court ruled that the "special
factor" provision must be narrowly interpreted to "preserve the intended
912. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has suggested in a footnote
in one decision that a simpler method of calculation would be for a court to adopt "a single mid-point
inflation adjustment factor 'applicable to services performed before and after that mid-point," while
excluding inflation occuring after all services were performed. Chiu v. United States, 948 F.2d 711,
722 n.10 (Fed. Cir. 1991). However, the court cautioned that the court must then "reasonably weigh
the quantum of hours and inflation factors which are otherwise applicable." Id. Because a court still
must examine the number of hours worked in each year, as well as the extent of inflationary
fluctuations in the various years in which legal services were peformed, to ensure that any selected
mid-point does not overstate the increase in the cost of living as applied to the bulk of the hours
worked (as well as establishing the historic prevailing rates for the attorney), the purported simplicity
of this alternative approach is likely to be lost in actual practice. Moreover, since application of an
annual average CPI index (as opposed to applying a month-by-month inflationary adjustment) greatly
minimizes the number-crunching necessary, a year-by-year determination should not be overly
burdensome. Whenever the legal services involved extend over more than one or two years, an
annual average, as opposed to a monthly CPI index, may be appropriate.
913. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(f) (1988).
914. Id.
915. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A) (1988).
916. See supra section V.B.1 (discussing routine award of cost-of-living adjustments to the
statutory cap).
917. 487 U.S. 552, 108 S. Ct. 2541 (1988).
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effectiveness of the $75 cap." 918 The Court stated that "Congress thought that
$75 an hour was generally quite enough public reimbursement for lawyers' fees,
whatever the local or national market might be." '919 For that reason, the Court
held that the "'special factors' envisioned by the exception must be such as are
not of broad and general application." Considerations that are "applicable
to a broad spectrum of litigation" or that are "little more than routine reasons




2. Limited Availability of Qualified Attorneys as a "Special Factor"
a. Introduction
The single example of a "special factor" set out in the statute is the "limited
availability of qualified attorneys for the proceedings involved. ' 922 Consistent
with its warning that the integrity of the $75 per hour rate ceiling must be
defended, the Supreme Court in Pierce v. Underwood interpreted this special
factor narrowly.92 The Court stated that if this special factor allowance
"meant merely that lawyers skilled and experienced enough to try the case are
in short supply, it would effectively eliminate the $75 cap-since the 'prevailing
market rates for the kind and quality of the services furnished' are obviously
determined by the relative supply of that kind and quality of services." 24
Accordingly, the Court held that an enhancement of the hourly rate might
be justified under the "limited availability of qualified attorneys" special factor
only if three requirements were met.9' First, the attorney must have "some
distinctive knowledge or specialized skill," an example of which "would be an
identifiable practice specialty such as patent law, or knowledge of foreign law
or language."92 6  Second, this special qualification must be "needful for the
litigation in question. '92 7 Third, the party must establish that attorneys with
such qualifications "can be obtained only at rates in excess of the $75 cap." '28
The courts of appeals are divided on what circumstances indicate "limited
availability of qualified attorneys for the proceedings involved,9 29 and, in
particular, whether and when an attorney's specialization in an area of law may
918. Id. at 573, 108 S. Ct. at 2554.
919. Id. at 572, 108 S. Ct. at 2554.
920. Id. at 573, 108 S. Ct. at 2554.
921. Id. at 573, 108 S. Ct. at 2554.
922. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A) (1988).
923. Pierce, 487 U.S. at 571-72, 108 S. Ct. at 2553-54.
924. Id. at 571, 108 S. Ct. at 2553.
925. Id. at 572, 108 S. Ct. at 2554.
926. Id. at 572, 108 S. Ct. at 2554.
927. Id. at 572, 108 S. Ct. at 2554.
928. Id. at 572, 108 S. Ct. at 2554.
929. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A) (1988).
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justify an enhancement of the hourly rate in an EAJA fee award.93° After
surveying and commenting upon the opposing approaches proposed by the courts




b. A Liberal Approach
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has taken a leading
position in applying a fairly liberal interpretation of the "limited availability of
qualified attorneys." In Pirus v. Bowen,932 the Ninth Circuit affirmed an
enhancement of an EAJA Subsection (d) award based upon "a practice specialty
in social security law. 933 The court defined the practice specialty element of
the "limited availability of qualified attorneys" factor as being satisfied when the
attorney performing the legal services has developed "expertise with a complex
statutory scheme; familiarity and credibility with a particular agency; and
understanding of the needs of a particular class of clients.., and of how these
needs could best be met under the existing statute and regulations.9 3 4  In the
subsequent case of National Wildlife Federation v. Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission,935 the Ninth Circuit found an attorney's expertise in environmen-
tal law to warrant an enhancement and further elucidated the special factor
analysis. 936  The court explained that the key criterion for a special factor
enhancement was the attorney's "mastery of a technical subject matter gained by
the investment of time and energy.
' 937
930. See infra section V.C.2.b & c (discussing opposing positions of the courts of appeals on
whether a substantive practice specialty may justify an enhancement of an EAJA fee award).
931. See infra section V.C.2.d.
932. 869 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1989).
933. Id. at 541.
934. Id. The court spoke at length about the attorneys' "practice specialty in social security law"
and their "extensive knowledge of the Act, its legislative history, and the development of the Social
Security Administration's regulations" as demonstrating distinctive knowledge. Id. However, the
court also noted the district court's finding that this "class action was no routine disability case,"
which could be viewed as limiting the precedential reach of the decision. See id. at 542. See Raines
v. Shalala, 44 F.3d 1355, 1361 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that Pirus may be read as holding social
security law to be a specialty only in the context of a class action, but expressing "respectful
disagreement" with Pirus if "read as holding that social security cases are always a matter of
specialization for purposes of the EAJA").
935. 870 F.2d 542, 547 (9th Cir. 1989).
936. Id. at 547.
937. Id. In light of this focus on "mastery of a technical subject matter," it seems ironic that
the Ninth Circuit has declined to find that an attorney's specialization in federal tax, which is
universally recognized as an intricate code, constitutes a "special factor" for purposes of the parallel
fee-shifting statute for internal revenue cases. In Huffinan v. Commissioner, 978 F.2d 1139, 1149-50
(9th Cir. 1992), the court held that generalized tax expertise did not justify a fee enhancement beyond
the $75 per hour statutory rate under the identical "limited availability of qualified attorneys"
language of 26 U.S.C. § 7430(c)(1)(B)(iii) (1988). See also Cassuto v. Commissioner, 936 F.2d 736,
743 (2d Cir. 1991) (same). Of course, the Huffinan case may be distinguished on the ground that,
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In Love v. Reilly,938 an action against the Environmental Protection Agency
to enjoin an order banning the use of a pesticide, the Ninth Circuit again held
that "[e]nvironmental litigation is an identifiable practice specialty that requires
distinctive knowledge.9 39 The court ruled that a remand was necessary,
however, because the trial court had made no specific finding that other attorneys
with environmental expertise were not available at the statutory rate.' On this
occasion, there was a dissenting voice. Judge Wallace argued that "such a broad
legal field [as environmental law] cannot qualify as a specialized practice area
warranting payment in excess of $75 per hour."'
Experience has proven Judge Wallace correct in his fear that the Ninth
Circuit was "stray[ing] too far from the limiting constraints" placed by the
Supreme Court on the special factor provision to preserve the integrity of the
statutory rate ceiling. 2 That circuit's identification of expertise in a complex
statutory and regulatory regime with the "special factor" enhancement has not
proven to be a meaningful limitation. The Ninth Circuit itself has approved
enhancements for specialization in environmental law9 3 and social security
law,9 " and suggested in dicta that immigration law might be recognized as a
since Section 7430 applies only to tax cases, treating tax expertise as a special factor "would allow
this 'special factor' to swallow the $75 an hour rule." Cassuto, 936 F.2d at 743. See also In re
Abernathy, 158 B.R. 749, 754 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1993) ("If tax law were considered a specialty
permitting a market rate in excess of the $75 statutory rate to apply, fees in excess of the statutory
rate could be recovered in virtually all cases in which § 7430 applies."). Still, in the EAJA context,
it appears that the Ninth Circuit's liberal standard of expertise in an intricate statutory framework for
fee enhancement may achieve a similarly nugatory effect with respect to the EAJA rate cap. In any
event, the fact that Congress evidently did not see specialization in tax law, a quintessential field of
distinctive legal knowledge, as warranting a premium rate casts substantial doubt upon the Ninth
Circuit's adoption of a standard of expertise in a statutory framework in the parallel EAJA context.
938. 924 F.2d 1492 (9th Cir. 1991).
939. Id. at 1496. The court affirmed the district court's finding that the attorney's "prior
insecticide litigation experience, coupled with his experience in obtaining federal preliminary
injunctions, amounted to 'distinctive knowledge,"' justifying a fee enhancement. Id.
940. Id.
941. Id. at 1498 (Wallace, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
942. Id. at 1499 (Wallace, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("In broadly stating that
'environmental litigation' qualifies as such a practice specialty, the majority strays too far from the
limiting constraints placed on the [EAJA] by the Court in Pierce.").
943. Love, 924 F.2d at 1496; National Wildlife Federation v. Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, 870 F.2d 542, 547 (9th Cir. 1989). Contra Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. Lee, 853 F.2d
1219, 1226 (5th Cir. 1988) (reversing award of enhanced EAJA fees to attorney in environmental
case based on exceptional qualifications and remanding matter to district court for reconsideration,
holding that there was insufficient evidence that qualified counsel had refused to undertake
representation because of fee limitations).
944. Pirus v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 536, 540-42 (9th Cir. 1989). Contra Raines v. Shalala, 44 F.3d
1355, 1361 (7th Cir. 1995) (ruling that "the area of social security law cannot in itself be considered
such a specialized area of law practice as to warrant, as a general rule, payment in excess of the
$75.00 rate"); Stockton v. Shalala, 36 F.3d 49, 50 (8th Cir. 1994) (ruling that the fact that an
"attorney is experienced in social security cases does not in itself warrant a fee in excess of the
statutory rate'); Chynoweth v. Sullivan, 920 F.2d 648, 650 (10th Cir. 1990) (rejecting social security
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suitable practice specialty in an appropriate case. 5 Subsequent to the limiting
interpretation of the EAJA in Pierce v. Underwood, no other court of appeals has
joined the Ninth Circuit in expressly holding that a practice specialty in a
particular area of law constitutes a "special factor" within the meaning of the
EAJA.' Although some of these Ninth Circuit decisions could be understood
to make a more modest statement, 7 trial courts within the circuit have relied
benefits law as a specialized practice area warranting payment in excess of the statutory rate); Baker
v. Bowen, 839 F.2d 1075, 1084-85 (5th Cir. 1988) (remanding case to district court with instruction
that "the special expertise of certain attorneys or the mere unattractiveness of the field" of social
security law does not warrant departure from statutory ceiling, and that enhancement is justified only
if social security claimants would actually be denied access to court because of lack of available
representation).
945. Ramon-Sepulveda v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 863 F.2d 1458, 1462-63 (9th
Cir. 1988) (assuming, without deciding, that immigration law qualified as a practice speciality for
enhancing EAJA award due to the complexity of the immigration laws, but ruling that the case did
not raise immigration law issues nor was there a shortage of qualified immigration lawyers in the
area). See also Nadler v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 737 F. Supp. 658, 662 (D.D.C. 1989)
(finding immigration law to fall within practice specialty for purposes of "special factor"
enhancement); Lyden v. Howerton, 731 F. Supp. 1545, 1556 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (finding immigration
law to be a specialty and that there was a shortage of qualified immigration lawyers justifying a rate
enhancement). Contra Perales v. Casillas, 950 F.2d 1066, 1078 (5th Cir. 1992) (rejecting
specialization in immigration law as a basis for a "special factor" enhancement of an EAJA award);
Chen v. Slattery, No. 94 CIV. 2585 (DAB), 1995 WL 498766, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 1995)
("[Ajbsent an extreme shortage of attorneys in New York for immigration cases or the need for
specialized knowledge to properly litigate this case, Plantiff is not entitled to recover increased
attorney fees based on the immigration expertise of his counsel."); Masonry Masters, Inc. v. Barr,
Civ. A. No. 86-201 (CRR), 1992 WL 13208, at *3 (D.D.C. Jan. 9, 1992) (holding in EAJA case that
"[i]mmigration law is not a discrete specialty for which higher fees are justified, nor have Plaintiffs
shown that there is a limited availability of immigration lawyers in the Washington metropolitan
area").
946. Two other circuits have approached, but stopped short of declaring an area of substantive
federal law to be a practice specialty warranting an EAJA "special factor" enhancement. The
Eleventh Circuit, in Jean v. Nelson, 863 F.2d 759 (1 1th Cir. 1988), aff'd on other grounds, 496 U.S.
154, 110 S. Ct. 2316 (1990), remanded an EAJA case to the district court to consider whether
expertise in immigration law can be a special factor, but without actually deciding the issue. Id. at
774. Judge Kravitch dissented from that remand ruling, warning that "[t]he depths of fourth-
amendment law or first-amendment law, for example, are no less murky than the recesses of
immigration law. [If a lawyer specializing in immigration law is entitled to an enhancement], district
courts will find it difficult to identify a legal specialty that does not justify an increase." Id. at 781
(Kravitch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In a pre-Pierce case, the Sixth Circuit ruled
that social security law did not qualify as a specialty notwithstanding arguments that it required a
great deal of study. Chipman v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 781 F.2d 545, 547 (6th Cir.
1986). More recently, however, the Sixth Circuit remanded a case to the district court to consider
whether "Social Security class actions, as opposed to individual representations, require a specialized
knowledge and expertise," sufficient to justify enhancement. Begley v. Secretary of Health & Human
Servs., 966 F.2d 196, 200 (6th Cir. 1992). However, the court also acknowledged the government's
contention that the "special factor" did not "include the type of 'general lawyerly skills' professed
to have been necessary to successfully prosecute plaintiffs' class action suit," thus indicating the
government's opposing argument remained open as well for consideration on remand. Id.
947. See infra section V.C.2.d (discussing moderate approach to "limited availability of qualified
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upon the broader statements in these decisions to regularly award enhancements
for a wide variety of practice specialties. In addition to routinely approving rate
increases for the environmental law"4 and social security law949 specialties
identified by the Ninth Circuit, courts in this jurisdiction have also awarded
EAJA fees in excess of the statutory rate for specialization in Medicaid law,9' 0
bankruptcy practice,95' and even attorney's fee litigation.952 In sum, within
the Ninth Circuit, enhancements above the EAJA statutory limit are springing up
all over, like dandelions in spring.
Each of these areas of law undoubtedly present complex issues that may best
be handled by lawyers who specialize in the subject and who bring their
substantive expertise to bear on the questions presented by a given case arising
in that field. This, however, "is true for virtually any area of law, particularly
those involving the intricate federal statutory schemes that typically give rise to
awards under the EAJA."953 If such expertise or practice limitation is routinely
recognized as a "special factor," then the fee award that is actually subject to the
statutory cap imposed by Congress will be rare indeed.
95 4
The Supreme Court's emphasis that "special factors" "must be such as are
not of broad and general application'" s5 makes plain that the focus cannot be
upon whether an attorney practices or specializes in a general area of substantive
law, even if the specialty is defined by reference to federal statutory regimes.
In the modem legal profession, specialization is common-place. Twenty years
attorneys" factor, with discussion of alternative interpretation of Ninth Circuit decisions).
948. See, e.g., Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Lujan, 865 F. Supp. 1464, 1476 (D. Or. 1994);
Washington Dept. of Wildlife v. Stubblefield, 739 F. Supp. 1428, 1433 (W.D. Wash. 1989); Golden
Gate Audubon Soc'y v. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 738 F. Supp. 339, 344 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
949. See, e.g., Volkers v. Sullivan, 785 F. Supp. 871, 873 (D. Mont. 1991); Bondy v. Sullivan,
No. C 90-0223 TEH, 1991 WL 193535, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 8, 1991); Cervantez v. Sullivan, 739
F. Supp. 517, 524-25 (E.D. Cal. 1990). Contra Stewart v. Sullivan, 810 F. Supp. 1102, 1108 (D.
Haw. 1993) (rejecting enhancement of an EAJA fee to an attorney with experience in social security
law in a "relatively straightfoward, albeit procedurally complex, disability matter").
950. Sneede v. Coye, 856 F. Supp. 526, 535-36 (N.D. Cal. 1994); Edwards v. Griepentrog, 783
F. Supp. 522, 530 (D. Nev. 1991). See also David v. Sullivan, 777 F. Supp. 212, 220-21 (E.D.N.Y.
1991) (finding expertise in Medicare law to be a specialty warranting enhancement of EAJA award).
951. In re Tom Carter Enter., 159 B.R. 557, 562 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1993) (awarding EAJA fees
at a rate of $130 an hour because "counsel had specialized knowledge in the area of bankruptcy
jurisdiction," as demonstrated by the fact he "had lectured extensively in the area").
952. Phayboun v. Sullivan, Civ. No. S-90-225 EJG/PAN, 1992 WL 247012, at *19 (E.D. Cal.
Sept. 4, 1992) (awarding EAJA fees at a rate of$ 160 per hour for attorney's work on the fee petition
because "the fee litigation raised extremely complex legal issues, and [the attorney's] experience,
reputation and ability in this area cannot seriously be disputed").
953. Perales v. Casillas, 950 F.2d 1066, 1078 (5th Cir. 1992) (rejecting specialization in
immigration law as a basis for a "special factor" enhancement of an EAJA award).
954. See Esprit Corp. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 491, 494 (1988) (stating that specialization in
an area like federal procurement law does warrant an enhancement, and that a contray ruling would
only "serve to emasculate the effectiveness of the $75 cap as each practice group could argue that
it possesses a 'specialized skill").
955. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 573, 108 S. Ct. 2541, 2554 (1988).
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ago, the Supreme Court observed that "[w]ith the increasing complexity of legal
practice, perhaps the strongest trend in the profession today is toward specializa-
tion."9"6 Ten years ago, one commentary reported:
[A] poll of Wisconsin lawyers revealed that 55 percent of the respon-
dents spent more than half of their professional time in one field of law.
In California, a 1969 survey showed that two-thirds of the state's
lawyers considered themselves specialists; in fact, when only firms of
10 or more lawyers were considered, the proportion rose to four out of
five. And an Illinois survey conducted in 1975 found 48 percent of the
state's attorneys saying they engaged in a specialized practice, "while
15 percent called themselves general practitioners who also had one or
more specialties.""9 7
Today, it is clear that "the majority of lawyers are de facto specialists and so
regard themselves. 9 8
By elevating a practitioner's specialization in a general substantive area of
the law or expertise in a federal statutory scheme to the level of a "special
factor," the Ninth Circuit established an approach that admits of few principled
limitations and that is virtually incapable of distinguishing one lawyer from
another. Substantive specialization, including limitation of practice to a field
defined by a federal statutory and regulatory framework, is ubiquitous.959 Each
area of specialization may well demand considerable skill in working within a
complex subject matter, but nearly every lawyer today can lay claim to expertise
of that nature in some area of the law.' Specialization just is not "special"
956. Bates v. Arizona State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 403 n.13, 97 S. Ct. 2691, 2697 n.13 (1977).
957. Clarence E. Hagglund & Robert Birnbaum, Legal Specialization: The Need for Uniformity,
67 Judicature 437, 437 (1984) (quoting Alvin Esau, Specialization in the Legal Profession, 9
Manitoba L.J. 255, 260-61 (1979)).
958. Wolfram, supra note 619, at 203. See generally Michael Ariens, Know the Law: A History
of Legal Specialization, 45 S.C. L. Rev. 1003 (1994).
959. In the author's home state of Iowa, for example, lawyers who meet certain eligibility
requirements may describe their practice as limited to up to three of 33 designated areas, including
many that involve the kinds of federal statutory regimes that typically give rise to litigation against
the federal government covered by the EAJA, such as Administrative Law, Banking, Debt and
Bankruptcy Law, Environmental Law, Immigration Law, Labor Law, Military Law, and Social
Security Disability. Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility DR 2-105(aX2) (West 1995). Nor is
this phenomenon limited to one state. The American Bar Association's Standing Committee on
Specialization has developed model standards for certifying lawyers as specialists in 23 different areas
of law, including such standard subjects of federal government litigation as Bankruptcy Law,
Government Contracts and Claims, Immigration Law, Labor and Employment Law, and Military
Administrative Law. American Bar Association Standing Committee on Specialization, Model
Standards for Specialty Areas (1985).
960. Ariens, supra note 958, at 1060 (stating that today "assertions of specialization and
concentration are expected of lawyers").
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any more. The "special factor" of "limited availability of qualified attorneys"
must be more closely defined.s'
c. A Narrow Approach
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has adopted the
most rigorous standard for specialty enhancements under EAJA Subsection (d),
and one that excludes legal expertise altogether as a potential "special fac-
tor." 2  In Perales v. Casillas,9 3 the Fifth Circuit specifically rejected spe-
cialization in immigration law as a "special factor" under the EAJA.9  The
court observed that the Supreme Court in Pierce v. Underwood provided
examples of specialization in patent law and knowledge of foreign law or
language."'s From this, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that "the Supreme Court in
Underwood intended to distinguish nonlegal or technical abilities possessed by,
for example, patent lawyers and experts in foreign law, from other types of
substantive specializations currently proliferating within the profession" as
potentially warranting a fee above the statutory rate.' In sum, the Fifth
Circuit has attempted to navigate a very narrow course, not only avoiding general
legal specializations in general, but steering away from any legal knowledge or
skill in defining the "special factor" concept. In so doing, however, the court
boxes the statutory compass. 97
The adoption of this most narrow rule depends upon a close reading and
strict construction of the Supreme Court's decision in Pierce v. Underwood.'
In that opinion, the Court stated that the "limited availability of qualified factors"
provision 969 must refer to "attorneys having some distinctive knowledge or
specialized skill needful for the litigation in question," and provided, as
examples, "an identifiable practice specialty such as patent law, or knowledge of
foreign law or language." 0 It is certainly true that the particular examples
given by the Court do implicate skills or expertise beyond knowledge of
961. See infra section V.C.2.d (suggesting an alternative approach to "limited availability of
qualified attorneys" as a "special factor").,
962. See Perales v. Casillas, 950 F.2d 1066, 1078-79 (5th Cir. 1992).
963. Id.
964. Id. at 1078-79.
965. Id. at 1078 (citing Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 572, 108 S. Ct. 2541, 2554 (1988)).
966. Perales, 950 F.2d at 1078. See also Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Maritime Subsidy Bd., 901
F.2d 1119, 1124 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (after stating that it would be "premature" to decide the issue in
light of a remand, the court in dictum characterized the examples of a "special factor" in Pierce as
requiring "technical or other education outside the field of American law').
967. See Raines v. Shalala, 44 F.3d 1355, 1361 (7th Cir. 1995) (saying the government's
argument that the "special factor" applies only to nonlegal technical skills "invites us to adopt too
narrow, at least too rigid, a definition').
968. Pierce, 487 U.S. at 552, 108 S. Ct. at 2541.
969. 28 U.S.C. 2412(dX2)(A) (1988).
970. Pierce, 487 U.S. at 572, 108 S. Ct. at 2554.
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American law. A patent lawyer typically must have training in a scientific or
technical area.97' Experts in foreign law or foreign language bring to their
practice additional knowledge and skills that are different in kind from expertise
in a substantive area of domestic law. If we read the Pierce v. Underwood
decision in the manner of a statutory text, complete with codified examples, it
might be appropriate to apply the doctrine of ejusdem generis, the canon of
statutory construction which holds that a general reference in a statute should be
interpreted in light of the nature of related specific examples in the statute.'
In this way, one might construe the general term, "limited availability of
qualified attorneys," in light of the specific examples of patent law, foreign law,
or a foreign language skill, and, because those specific examples share the
element of nonlegal or technical knowledge, confine the general term to that
narrow category of attributes.
But the opinion in Pierce v. Underwood is not a statutory code and should
not be read as such. The language of judges is not the same as the language of
legislators." 3 Every word, every sentence in an Act of Congress is law, while
a judicial opinion interpreting a statute contains much that is analysis and
justification, authoritative to be sure, but not to be meticulously studied as a
statutory text. A court opinion is not subject to the parsing of verbiage and
careful line-by-line analysis of text in the same manner as a statute. A textualist
or canonical construction is woefully out of place in the reading of judicial
opinions. Thus, primary recourse must be made back to the text of the EAJA,
which provides for an enhancement of a fee award for a "special factor, such as
the limited availability of qualified attorneys for the proceedings involved."974
These words, while plainly dictating a narrow application (through the use of the
word "special"), do not suggest that only nonlegal or technical skills are
included. Indeed, if Congress had intended to limit the term "special factor" to
nonlegal or technical skills, the reference to "qualified attorneys" would be an
odd way to express that purpose, since the qualifications of an attorney are
ordinarily measured in terms of professional ability and legal knowledge.
The Pierce v. Underwood decision must be appreciated as a judicial exegesis
upon the statutory text. The examples provided in the opinion must be
understood in this context, not as imposing a categorical restriction upon the
meaning of the statute, but rather as further elaboration. The salient point of the
971. Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379, 384, 83 S. Ct. 1322, 1325 (1963) (stating that practice
before the Patent and Trademark Office is limited to persons with the scientific and technical
qualifications necessary to render patent applicants a valuable service).
972. Where "specific words follow[] general ones" in a statute, the doctrine of ejusdem generis
applies to "restrict[] application of the general term to things that are similar to those enumerated."
2A Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 47.17, at 188 (5th ed. 1992).
973. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Legislation Scholarship and Pedagogy
in the Post-Legal Process Era, 48 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 691, 692 (1987) ("Reasoning from a statute is not
the same as reasoning from a judicial opinion. A court spells out a principled basis for its decision
while legislatures often just offer imperative language and little explanation.").
974. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A) (1988).
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pertinent part of this opinion is that the "special factor" concept must be
narrowly applied, not that it must be understood as strictly distinguishing
between legal and nonlegal attributes. Thus, it is the exceptional nature of the
examples, not their nonlegal characteristics, that is crucial to a proper understand-
ing of the decision. Confinement of the factor of "limited availability of
qualified attorneys" to nonlegal skills may be a permissible, but certainly is not
a necessary, derivation from Pierce v. Underwood. And it is not a permissible
interpretation of the statute itself. To impose a categorical, rather than
qualitative, restriction upon the "special factor" provision, through the misguided
medium of textual analysis of a judicial opinion, would be a mistake both in
interpretation of the statute and in reading the Court decision.
d. A Middle Approach, Moderate in Theory, Strict in Application
i. A Fee Enhancement May Be Available When the Attorney
Possesses Distinctive Knowledge or Skill, Legal or Nonlegal,
Not Reasonably Accessible to a Competent Lawyer Acting
With Diligence
In Raines v. Shalala,9" the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit reversed an enhancement of an EAJA attorney's fee award by a district
court which had found social security benefits law to constitute a specialized
practice.976 The Seventh Circuit took a moderate approach toward the issue,
rejecting a liberal standard that would have permitted routine enhancement
whenever an attorney claims a practice specialty, but also resisting the narrow
view that only nonlegal attributes may qualify as a "special factor." 977 The
court adhered to the Supreme Court's admonition in Pierce v. Underwood978
that enhancements based upon the limited availability of qualified counsel must
be confined to cases where the attorney possesses "'some distinctive knowledge
or specialized skill needful for the litigation in question"' and where "'such
qualifications ... can be obtained only at rates in excess of the $75 cap."' 979
The Seventh Circuit agreed that "the area of social security law cannot in itself
be considered such a specialized area of law practice as to warrant, as a general
rule, payment in excess of the $75.00 rate."'80 The Raines court narrowly (and
generously) interpreted the Ninth Circuit's ruling in Pirus v. Bowen98' as
approving an enhancement for a social security specialization only in the narrow
975. 44 F.3d 1355 (7th Cir. 1995).
976. Id. at 1359-62.
977. Id.
978. 487 U.S. 552, 108 S. Ct. 2541 (1988).
979. Raines, 44 F.3d at 1360-61 (quoting Pierce, 487 U.S. at 572, 108 S. Ct. at 2554).
980. Raines, 44 F.3d at 1361.
981. 869 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1989).
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context of a class action.982 However, "to the extent that Pirus may be read
as holding that social security cases are always a matter of specialization for
purposes of the EAJA," the Seventh Circuit expressed its "respectful disagree-
ment."9 s3 Nevertheless, the court also rebuffed the government's argument that
only technical, nonlegal skills qualify for "special factor" treatment, saying this
is "too narrow, or at least too rigid, a definition.""
Instead, the Seventh Circuit defined the "special factor" concept in terms of
practice specialties that "require more advanced and specialized legal skills than
those possessed or easily acquired by most members of the bar." ' The test
is whether the distinctive legal knowledge or other specialized skill required for
the litigation surpasses that which could "be easily acquired by a reasonably
competent attorney."'6 Because the fundamentals of social security law are
"not beyond the ability of the diligent practitioner," the district court abused its
discretion in awarding an enhancement in a typical disability case involving the
kinds of issues that not infrequently arise in such litigation. 7
In sum, between the liberal practice-specialty-as-special-factor rule and the
narrow nonlegal-technical-knowledge-only approach lies the middle way of the
competent and experienced attorney standard. While distinctive legal knowl-
edge-as well as nonlegal technical education or skills-may be considered, a
"special factor" enhancement will be warranted only in an unusual case that
requires "specialized training and expertise unattainable by a competent attorney
through a diligent study of the governing legal principles.""88 The measuring
rod is that of the reasonably able and effective attorney, with professional
experience, who diligently devotes him or herself to scholarly study of the
governing legal principles. When such a lawyer would be unable to achieve a
basic level of proficiency sufficient to handle the case, an award in excess of the
EAJA ceiling would be justified, assuming as well that attorneys with the
specialized ability are in painfully short supply and unavailable at the statutory
rate.
ii. Specialization in a Federal Statutory Regime, By Itself, Does
.Not Qualify
Mastery by an attorney of an intricate federal statutory framework does not
by itself suffice for purposes of an EAJA enhancement based on the "limited
982. Raines, 44 F.3d at 1361. See also infra section V.C.2.d.iv (discussing Pirus as a case
involving multiple legal complexities, in terms of an intricate substantive statutory regime and a
complex class action procedural format).




987. Id. at 1362.
988. Chynoweth v. Sullivan, 920 F.2d 648, 650 (10th Cir. 1990).
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availability of qualified attorneys.!"9  The dense forest of federal statutes and
regulations is the natural habitat of the EAJA fee petition. As discussed
above,' identification of the "special factor" concept with practice specialties
in a general area of law, even if defined by a federal and regulatory regime,
places no meaningful limitation upon the occasion for enhancements and would
nullify the statutory rate ceiling.
Any attorney with moderate experience in the interpretation or litigation of
federal statutes and regulations can, with reasonable diligence, attain a general
level of competence with respect to another chapter of the United States
Code.99' Upon entering into the realm of a new statutory or regulatory
scheme, the attorney will find him or herself in familiar surroundings. The
attorney will observe the similar structure of a code and the parallel relationship
of statute to regulation, as well as the continued relevance of canons and theories
of construction, hierarchy of authorities, and sources of reference. The
differences at the level of detail will be all the more manageable because of the
correspondence at the level of generality.
To be sure, the attorney who is a neophyte to a particular set of federal
statutes and regulations cannot aspire to mastery of the new field during the
pendency of a single case. The standard is not one of expertise, but rather of
qualification.992 Although a party may prefer representation by the specialist
who charges a premium for his or her expert services, the EAJA affords
compensation only at the level of general competence. 93 If an effective and
989. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A) (1988).
990. See supra section V.C.2.b (discussing the liberal approach of basing the "special factor"
standard upon specialization in statutory regimes as failing to establish a meaningful limitation upon
enhancements).
991. See Chynoweth, 920 F.2d at 650 ("Although Social Security benefits law involves a
complex statutory and regulatory framework, the field is not beyond the grasp of a competent
practicing attorney with access to a law library and the other accoutrements of modern legal
practice."); Jean v. Nelson, 863 F.2d 759, 781 (11 th Cir. 1988) (Kravitch, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("[C]ompetence in immigration law requires no peculiar base of knowledge; an
attorney with a reasonable amount of 'general lawyerly knowledge and ability' can learn immigration
law."), aff'don other grounds, 496 U.S. 154, 110 S. Ct. 2316 (1990); Elcyzyn v. Brown, 7 Vet. App.
170, 182 (1994) (stating that the court does not believe that "the practice of veteran's law is a
specialty which requires 'distinctive knowledge or specialized skill needful for the litigation in
question,"' reasoning that the practice of veteran's law "is analogous to the practice of administrative
law before any federal appellate court" and therefore requires only general lawyerly knowledge and
ability).
992. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(dX2)(A) (1988) (allowing enhancement beyond the statutory fee rate
for a "special factor, such as the limited availability of qualified attorneys for the proceedings
involved") (emphasis added).
993. See Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Morelli, No. 91 Civ. 3874 (LAP), 1995 WL 9387, at
* 11 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 1995) (stating that the fact that the party's attorneys "specialize in securities
law and have considerable experience in such practice no doubt was beneficial to their client," but
did not justify an increase above the statutory cap because the representation "did not require special
skills that a normally competent attorney does not possess"); Award of Attorneys' Fees Against the
Federal Government: Hearings on S. 265 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the
[Vol. 56
EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT
experienced attorney, willing to devote diligent attention to scholarly study, is
able to attain basic proficiency in the matter, a "special factor" is not present and
the statutory rate controls.
iii. Distinctive Nonlegal Technical Skills May Qualify
Although nonlegal technical attributes may not be the exclusive category of
distinctive knowledge or specialized skills that may qualify for an EAJA
enhancement, they certainly are included. In Pierce v. Underwood,' the
Supreme Court identified "knowledge of foreign ... language" as an exam-
ple."' Obviously no attorney, however exceptional his or her general legal
talents, could be expected to develop proficiency in a foreign tongue for the
purposes of handling a single case. When truly needful for competent
representation,' s an attorney's fluency in a foreign language may justify a fee
above the statutory rate.
Similarly, advanced education in scientific or other technical knowledge,
comparable to that grounding in science required for admission to the patent
bar,"7 might be sufficiently distinctive to warrant an enhancement. The
measure, again, would be whether an attorney of reasonable intelligence, but
lacking formal scientific education or its equivalent, would be able to understand
and competently apply that technical knowledge in the case at hand. When
knowledge of technical matters beyond the ken of an ordinary well-educated
professional is truly needful,"' a fee above the statutory rate may be justified.
One of the Ninth Circuit's EAJA enhancement decisions, although more
readily understood to identify the "special factor" concept with general practice
specialization, might have involved scientific knowledge which would qualify
under this more stringent standard. In Love v. Reilly,' the Ninth Circuit
began with the sweeping declaration that "[e]nvironmental litigation is an
identifiable practice specialty that requires distinctive knowledge."'000 Judge
Wallace dissented from this general labeling of environmental law as a practice
Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1980)
(statement of Rep. Kastenmeier) (stating that the $75 per hour statutory rate ceiling "would prevent
a party from engaging... an expensive law firm and being able entirely to cover all the expenses
that might be charged").
994. 487 U.S. 552, 108 S. Ct. 2541 (1988).
995. Id. at 572, 108 S. Ct. at 2554.
996. See infra section V.C.2.d.vii (discussing the requirement that distinctive knowledge or
specialized skill, including foreign language skill, be truly necessary for the litigation).
997. See Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379, 384, 83 S. Ct. 1322, 1325 (1963) (stating that practice
before the Patent and Trademark Office is limited to persons with the scientific and technical
qualifications necessary to render patent applicants a valuable service).
998. See infra section V.C.2.d.vii (discussing the requirement that distinctive knowledge or
specialized skill, including scientific or technical knowledge, be truly necessary for the litigation).
999. 924 F.2d 1492 (9th Cir. 1991).
1000. Id. at 1496.
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specialty warranting an enhancement.' °°' The majority further described the
attorney's expertise as "familiar[ity] with the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and
Rodenticide Act and the areas of expert witness testimony necessary to assemble
a complicated insecticide case in the short period dictated by the need for a
preliminary injunction."' ' 2  In the context of the opinion, this additional
recitation of experience and qualifications appears to be merely further evidence
that the attorney is an expert in environmental law, not a ruling that additional
distinctive scientific knowledge beyond a practice specialty was necessary to the
enhancement result. Moreover, the court fails to develop the point so as to
indicate that the attorney possessed, not merely exceptional proficiency and
knowledge about the legal presentation of an insecticide case, but truly distinctive
scientific knowledge beyond the appreciation of a reasonably intelligent person.
The court's reference to the attorney's familiarity with "the areas of expert
witness testimony '  likely meant nothing more than the general lawyerly
ability to digest, index, and marshal crucial items of evidence. However, to the
extent that the attorney's familiarity with expert testimony reflected advanced
scientific knowledge, the case might be squeezed inside the tight standards for
a "special factor" enhancement.
iv. Multiple Legal Specialties in Distinct Complex Subjects May
Qualify
It may properly be expected of a competent attorney that he or she develop
a basic facility with one or more related areas of law in order to litigate a matter.
It cannot generally be expected that an attorney achieve even minimal proficien-
cy in several distinct complex legal fields during the pendency of one case. In
any lawsuit, an attorney may need to explore more than one related regulatory
framework. It is a qualitatively different matter, however, when the attorney is
confronted by two or more distinctly different areas of legal complexity, drawn
together only by the peculiar circumstances of the particular case. When an
attorney demonstrates expertise in a combination of difficult legal subjects, thus
raising the level of necessary qualification above what an individual generalist
lawyer could expect to achieve in the preparation of a single case, the argument
for an enhancement above the statutory rate is stronger.
One of the Ninth Circuit's leading decisions in this area may be subject to
a narrow reading in accord with this understanding. In Pirus v. Bowen,'" the
Ninth Circuit affirmed a "special factor" enhancement for attorneys described by
the court as having "developed a practice specialty in social security law."'005
In that portion of the opinion devoted to the question of what qualifies as a
1001. Id. at 1497-1500 (Wallace, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
1002. Id. at 1496.
1003. Id.
1004. 869 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1989).
1005. Id. at 541.
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practice specialty involving distinctive knowledge, the court focused upon
extensive familiarity of the attorneys with the Social Security Act, its legislative
history, and the regulations." Moreover, the court defined the "special
factor" concept in terms of "expertise with a complex statutory scheme;
familiarity and credibility with a particular agency; and understanding of the
needs of a particular class of clients.., and of how those needs could best be
met under the existing statute and regulations." l"7 The court further explained
that this expertise in social security law was needful because the litigation
involved a highly complex area of the statute."' ° Accordingly, the Pirus
decision, together with other decisions in that circuit, is probably best recognized
as establishing a liberal standard for enhancements in the context of specializa-
tion in an intricate statutory regime.'00
However, the Pirus court also cited the district court's statement "that Pirus'
class action was no routine disability case," although the court proceeded to
indicate that the exceptional nature of the case lay in the need for "substantial
knowledge of the legislative history" of a particular aspect of the statute.' 10
The undeveloped reference to the "class action" format of the case appears to be
a casual observation and not a true limitation on the application of the decision
as precedent. However, with some effort, it is possible to construe Pins as
supporting an EAJA enhancement only in a case involving, not merely the
substantive intricacies of social security law, but also the procedural complexities
of class action litigation.0"
If Pirus is restricted to the particular context of class actions involving
complex statutory and regulatory frameworks, the result may be well grounded.
We may expect an attorney with general legal knowledge to achieve basic
proficiency in an area of federal statutory and regulatory law such as social
security disability benefits law. But it is asking too much to expect that same
attorney, while diligently engaged in the study of a statutory regime with which
he or she is not accustomed, to simultaneously learn new procedures that change
the very ground rules for litigation of the subject. Expecting the former is
legitimate; demanding the latter sets the attorney up for failure.
1006. Id.
1007. Id.
1008. Id. at 542.
1009. See supra section V.C.2.b (discussing the liberal approach to "special factor" enhancements
for limited availability of qualified attorneys).
1010. Pirus, 869 F.2d at 542.
1011. See Raines v. Shalala, 44 F.3d 1355 (7th Cir. 1995):
Although Pirus does acknowledge that social security cases can be a specialized area, it
does so in the context of a class action and therefore may be based on the need for special
expertise. However, to the extent that Pirus may be read as holding that social security





Class action litigation is notoriously complicated; 12 its complexity and
controversy has caused it to be denominated by some as the "Frankenstein
monster" of civil procedure.' 3 The class action procedure "permits a lawsuit
to be brought by or against large numbers of individuals or organizations whose
interests are sufficiently related so that it is more efficient to adjudicate their
rights or liabilities in a single action than in a series of individual proceed-
ings." '04 Because of the need to protect the interests of absent parties and
resolve in a single proceeding the rights and obligations of a multitude of
individuals or entities, procedural complexities and special procedures abound
within this format.' 1
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23,'016 a number of procedural
prerequisites must be satisfied before the matter may proceed as a class action,
including whether there is an identifiable class, whether the representatives are
members of the class, whether the class is so large that joinder is impracticable,
whether there are questions of law or fact common to all members of the class,
whether the claims or defenses of the representatives of the class are typical of
other class members, and whether the representatives of the class will adequately
represent the interests of absent class members.' 7 In addition, "[b]ecause
class actions embrace the rights of so many persons, and often present highly
complex issues to resolve, the courts must use special procedures to manage or
control the litigation in a way to assure fair representation of all the interests
involved.""" Adequate notice must be provided to absent class members of
the pendency of the action, in a manner reasonably calculated to reach them, to
allow them to appear or opt-out of the litigation.' 9 The court may also need
to communicate with class members at other times to inform them of develop-
ments or for other reasons.'0 20 The court may issue special orders to deter-
mine the course of proceedings and direct the manner in which evidence or
arguments are presented.'0 2' Finally, to protect the interests of the absent class
members, any dismissal or settlement of the case must be submitted to and
1012. Charles Alan Wright, perhaps the leading scholar on federal court practice, has
characterized the rules on class actions as "extremely complicated." Wright, supra note 282, § 72,
at 508 n.9.
1013. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 572 (2d Cit. 1968) (Lumbard, C.J.,
dissenting) (characterizing litigation, because of its complexity and length, as a "Frankenstein monster
posing as a class action").
1014. Friedenthal et al., supra note 121, § 16.1, at 721-22.
1015. Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the
"Class Action Problem," 92 Hare. L. Rev. 664, 677 (1979) ("The procedural complexities that can
emerge under rule 23 are extraordinarily variegated in character."). On class action procedures, see
generally Herbert B. Newberg & Alba Conte, Newberg on Class Actions, vols. 1-6 (3d ed. 1992).
1016. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.
1017. Friedenthal et al., supra note 121, § 16.2, at 726.
1018. Id. § 16.5, at 743-44.
1019. Id. § 16.6, at 749-54.
1020. Id. § 16.5, at 746.
1021. Id.
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approved by the court.' 22 In sum, litigation of a class action is not the place
for the disorganized, the faint-hearted, or the novice.
When the class action format of a case raises complex procedural issues of
its own, the assistance of an attorney already possessing expertise in the multiple
areas of the underlying substantive law and the procedural framework may be
required. Indeed, courts frequently consider the class counsel's experience with
and expertise in the field of law or in class action litigation when determining
whether the representation is sufficiently adequate to justify certification of the
case as a class action.' 23 Affording a premium rate when necessary to attract
class action expertise, together with mastery of the substantive law, may be
warranted in these unusual circumstances. This does not mean that every class
action automatically qualifies for rates above the statutory figure. If the class
action aspect is relatively straightforward, such as where the government does
not resist certification or the number of class members is manageable, then the
matter may remain within the facility of an attorney of ordinary lawyerly
knowledge and skill. As always, the standard is whether the subject matter, even
when combined with other legal complexities in the case, remains accessible to
the attorney of reasonable ability and professional experience devoting diligent
effort to the matter.
v. Certain Unique Legal Specialties Beyond the Facility of a
Reasonably Competent Generalist Lawyer May Qualify
Although practice specialties grounded in the type of federal statutory and
regulatory areas in which EAJA petitions typically arise cannot qualify as a
"special factor," certain law-defined specialties may justify a higher fee if they
are sufficiently unique and complex as to be well beyond the facility of a
reasonably competent and experienced generalist lawyer. The pertinent example
given by the Supreme Court in Pierce v. Underwood"24 is "knowledge of
foreign law."'0 2" It goes without saying that no lawyer schooled and experi-
enced solely in American law would be expected to attain facility in a short
period with the legal foundation of another nation. Not only might he or she
encounter the obstacle of attempting to decipher texts written in another
language, but the legal concepts themselves may not be correctly translated by
one disciplined to American patterns of legal thinking.' 26 When the law of
1022. Id. § 16.7, at 754-56.
1023. Id. § 16.2, at 730; Carl A. Aron et al., Class Actions: Law and Practice § 9.03, at 9-3 to
9-4 (1987).
1024. 487 U.S. 552, 108 S. Ct. 2541 (1988).
1025. Id. at 572, 108 S. Ct. at 2554.
1026. As an example of the error into which American courts are prone to fall when dealing with
foreign or international law concepts, consider a situation which this author addressed in an earlier
publication on a distinctly different topic. The Warsaw Convention, a multilateral treaty governing
international carriage by air, was drafted in French. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules
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a foreign state is implicated, the very premises of legal understanding may differ
and thus would justify recourse to an expert in that other nation's law. Although
the Supreme Court mentioned knowledge of foreign law as an example, it did
not explain under what circumstances this expertise would be relevant to a case
in which an EAJA petition could arise. Situations in which the United States
could be held to have waived its sovereign immunity, so as to be held subject to
legal responsibilities defined in terms of the laws of a foreign nation, do not
readily come to mind.' 27 Thus, an occasion for this "special factor" is not
likely to arise.
By contrast, the United States may have obligations to act in conformity
with international law, making proficiency in the "law of nations" necessary with
respect to a civil case involving the federal government. Although international
law apparently is not binding of its own external force against the United States
when contrary to domestic constitutional 28 or statutory law,' 29 internation-
Relating to International Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876, L.N.T.S.
11 (1936). A French phrase, llsion corporelle, appears in article 17 of the Convention, the article
that establishes a cause of action for injured air travelers. See generally Gregory C. Sisk, Recovery
for Emotional Distress Under the Warsaw Convention: The Elusive Search for the French Legal
Meaning of Lesion Corporelle, 25 Tex. Int'l L.J. 127 (1990). In considering whether an action for
emotional distress, as opposed to physical injury, could be maintained under the Convention, a
number of American courts misguidedly attempted to interpret this phrase by searching for a precise
French legal meaning, rather than accepting its ordinary linguistic meaning as "bodily injury." Id.
at 135-38. In so doing, these courts confused and misapplied the distinct French legal concepts of
dommage corporel (a loose term for both pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages relating to physical
pain and mutilation) and lMsion (a concept in contract law allowing rescission of a contract based
upon an unjust price). Id. In sum, the phrase is not a French term of art at all, but rather "a
combination of two French words selected by the Convention's drafters to convey a particular
linguistic meaning, one that is accurately rendered in English as 'bodily injury."' Id. at 129. See
also Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 111 S. Ct. 1489 (1991) (holding that article 17
of the Warsaw Convention does not allow recovery for mental or psychic injuries unaccompanied
by physical injury or physical manifestation of injury).
1027. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (1988) (providing that the United States is not subject to liability
under the Federal Tort Claims Act for "[a]ny claim arising in a foreign country").
1028. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16-17, 77 S. Ct. 1222, 1230-31 (1957) (plurality opinion)
(holding that the international law principles or treaties cannot supersede constitutional limitations
upon government respecting individual rights); Martin v. Warden, 993 F.2d 824, 829 (11 th Cir. 1993)
("The constitutional rights of individuals, including the right to due process, are superior to the
government's treaty obligations.").
1029. See Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929,935-42 (D.C.
Cir. 1988) (holding that domestic courts have no authority to remedy violations of international law,
whether a treaty or a rule of customary international law, when inconsistent with a statute, although
the domestic legal consequences of a violation of peremptory norms (j'us cogens) of international law
are unclear but will rarely arise because few norms meet the stringent criteria of jus cogens).
However, it is a "maxim of statutory construction" that "'an act of Congress ought never to be
construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains."' Weinberger v.
Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32, 102 S. Ct. 1510, 1516 (1982) (quoting Murry v. The Schooner Charming
Betsy, 6 U.S. [2 Cranch] 64, 118 (1804)).
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al law may be incorporated into domestic law by statute'0 30 or treaty or
accord"0 3' or may provide a persuasive example in understanding American
legal principles. 3 2  Because international law differs so markedly from
American domestic law, and is "a dauntingly complex and variegated sub-
ject,"0 33 the need for an expert in the subject is more pronounced than with
respect to most other areas of law likely to arise in federal litigation. The
discipline of international law differs in identification of legal rules, legal
process, and sources of authority,' 34 and there is even disagreement about
whether the standards of behavior among nations are properly called "law" in the
absence of a sovereign to enforce it.0 35 When international law issues are
tangential to a case, or the issue is a relatively straightforward one, such as
application of a simple treaty provision, an enhancement of an EAJA fee cannot
be justified. But when the gravamen of a case implicates complex concepts of
international law, the payment of premium fees if necessary to attract qualified
international law counsel may be warranted.
Similarly, the field of international trade law practiced by attorneys
specialized in customs law may qualify for "special factor" treatment because of
the "limited availability of qualified attorneys.'0 36  In Nakamura v.
Heinrich,0 37 the United States Court of International Trade awarded attorney's
1030. See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,436-41, 107 S.
Ct. 1207, 1215-18 (1987) (observing that the Refugee Act should be construed in light of
international understanding of the United National Protocol on Refugees).
1031. See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2549, 2562-67 (1993) (considering whether
a presidential order directing the Coast Guard to intercept vessels transporting passengers from Haiti to
the United States and return them to Haiti violated, inter alia, the United Nations Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees as a treaty obligation of the United States, but holding that the pertinent article
of the Convention did not apply extraterritorially to interdiction on the high seas).
1032. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 623, 103
S. Ct. 2591, 2598 (1983) (explaining that federal common law may be informed by reference to
international law principles); Maria Frankowska, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
Before United States Courts, 28 Va. J. Int'l L. 281 (1988) (discussing the frequent invocation by
United States courts of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties as a codification of customary
international law rules governing the interpretation of treaties, notwithstanding the fact that the United
States has not ratified the Convention). See also David Weissbrodt, Globalization of Constitutional
Law and Civil Rights, 43 J. Legal Educ. 261 (1993) (arguing that foreign law and international law
sources should be considered as useful guidance in the interpretation of constitutional principles).
1033. Mark W. Janis, An Introduction to International Law xv (2d ed. 1993).
1034. On rules of international law, sources ofthat law, and international legal process, see generally
id. chs. 1-5; Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law chs. I, XXXI (2d ed. 1973).
1035. Janis, supra note 1033, at 2-4 (discussing historical scholarly debate about whether
international law is properly termed as "law"); Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave: Law and
Foreign Policy 3-4 (2d ed. 1979) (stating that those who conduct foreign policy "do not appear to
consider international law important" and that "[e]ven friends of international order whisper that there
really is not international law," but arguing that "international law does far better than its reputation"
and that "law is a major force in international affairs").
1036. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2XA) (1988).
1037. No. 91-08-00547, 1993 WL 45900 (Ct. Int'l Trade Feb. 17, 1993).
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fees under the EAJA at the rate of $185 per hour to an attorney specializing in
customs trade law.' °3 The court declared that "Customs law is a specialized
practice area, circumscribed and distinct from general and administrative law, as
manifest by the existence of this Court of limited subject matter jurisdic-
tion." 39  The court further took "judicial notice" of the small number of
attorneys practicing before the court, most of whom are based in New York, as
establishing that there is limited availability of customs lawyers.'m
Practice of international trade law requires familiarity with customs and trade
statutes, bilateral treaties between the United States and other nations, and the
United States' participation in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT)."'" To competently represent a client in a customs dispute with the
government, an attorney must be prepared to address such matters as the
classification of goods and the place of origin for tariff purposes; 4 2 non-tariff
barriers, such as contraband rules, quotas, anti-dumping laws, and unfair trade
practices;' 4s trademark law as applied to imported merchandise;'" and the
impact of international agreements"' such as the United States-Canada Free-
Trade Agreement 10 6 and the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA).'0'7 Given the high level of detailed specialization involved in this
area of law, together with the need to be in command of multiple complex areas
of substantive law (including international law and intellectual property law),
customs and international trade law appears to qualify under even a stringent
standard for a "special factor" enhancement under the EAJA.
vi. Other Exceptional Circumstances May Limit the Availability
of Qualified Attorneys and Thus Justify an Enhancement
In addition to advanced knowledge or specialized skills, there may be other
exceptional circumstances that limit or suppress the availability of qualified
1038. Id. at *3.
1039. Id.
1040. Id.
1041. David Serko, Import Practice: Customs and International Trade Law 5-6 (2d ed. 1991).
1042. Serko, supra note 1041, at ch. 3; Ralph H. Folsom & Michael W. Gordon, International
Business Transactions §§ 3.1, 3.4, 3.6-3.7, at 57, 60-63, ch.5 (1995).
1043. Serko, supra note 1041, at 20, 24, chs. 20-21; Folsom & Gordon, supra note 1042, §§ 6.5
to 6.25, at 130-56, § 8.1, at 191-92.
1044. Serko, supra note 1041, at 20, 541-48; Folsom & Gordon, supra note 1042, §§ 16.2, 16.4,
at 426-29.
1045. Folsom & Gordon, supra note 1042, § 3.6, at 62.
1046. United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement, Pub. L. No. 100-449, 102 Stat. 1851 (1988),
reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 281 (entered into force, Jan. 1, 1989). See generally Serko, supra note 1041,
ch. 14; Folsom & Gordon, supra note 1042, §§ 15.5 to 15.9, at 400-07.
1047. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Canada-Mexico, reprinted in
32 I.L.M. 289,: 605 (1993) (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994) (implemented in United States by North
American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993)).
See generally Folsom & Gordon, supra note 1042, §§ 15.11 to 15.16, at 409-23.
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attorneys and therefore warrant consideration of an enhancement beyond the
statutory rate ceiling. For example, in very limited circumstances, an attorney's
prior and intimate familiarity with the particular client and his legal problems
may justify compensation at a higher rate sufficient to attract that attorney to
undertake new legal services on that client's behalf. In United States v.
Knote,"'° a district court awarded enhanced EAJA fees in the context of a
proceeding to enforce a consent decree against the government with respect to
the clean-up of a toxic site."° 9 In addition to the attorney's "specialized
environmental litigation skills," the court found that the attorney's familiarity
with the defendants' toxic site and with the consent decree for the past seven
years was vital to effective representation of the defendants in their effort to
enforce the provisions of the consent decree. s The court believed that it
was "instrumental to the case that counsel who had negotiated the subject
consent decree from its beginnings protect the rights that the defendants had
obtained in the negotiations.' 0 5 ' Thus, the court determined that retention of
the same counsel for this renewed litigation against the government was
necessary to provide the party with fully qualified counsel, as well as saving time
and expense because of the attorney's intimate familiarity with the litigation and
the parties. 52
Although the special circumstances of the Knote case appear to justify an
enhancement, a request for premium rates by an attorney to agree to represent
a party in a new round of litigation is sown with ethical land-mines. According-
ly, application of this precedent should be narrowly confined to cases involving
retention of an attorney by a past client for a new, although related, matter.
Because an attorney has a fiduciary responsibility to a present client, courts have
properly treated with suspicion "demands for altered compensation made by
lawyers at a critical juncture of the representation at which the client's bargaining
power is seriously or entirely destroyed because of the lack of time or where-
withal to change lawyers.""'53 Similarly, courts should reject any suggestion
that an attorney who has obtained intimate familiarity with the subject underlying
continuing litigation is entitled to enhanced EAJA fees because he otherwise
might have withheld services and refused to see the matter through to its
conclusion.
Accordingly, an attorney should be allowed to claim that his or her prior
intimate engagement with a client or subject matter constitutes a "special factor"
only when there has been a clean break between the former and present
representation. There must be a respectable distance between the past litigation,
which gave rise to the attorney's unique familiarity with the client and subject
1048. 879 F. Supp. 89 (E.D. Mo. 1995).




1053. Wolfram, supra note 619, § 9.2.1, at 503-04.
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matter, and the present proceeding, thereby making it ethically permissible for
the attorney to accept or decline retention and to make new fee arrangements.
By contrast, an attorney's willingness to continue to provide effective representa-
tion to a present client in the next phase of an ongoing proceeding is neither
remarkable nor worthy of higher fees. In Knote, the necessary break in time and
separate character of the representation matters apparently existed. The consent
decree in the original litigation was approved and entered by the district court on
September 24, 1991; a new dispute arose more than a year later when the
government proposed new clean-up measures inconsistent with the consent
decree on October 21, 1992; and the proceeding to enforce the consent decree
was not initiated until February 26, 1993.054
The case of United States v. 2323 Charms Road'0 55 raises a particularly
unusual and interestilig scenario implicating the EAJA allowance for "limited
availability of qualified attorneys." 15 6 In that case, the successful claimant in
a civil forfeiture proceeding moved for an award of attorney's fees under the
EAJA and sought an upward departure from the statutory $75 per hour
rate.' °1 7 The district court ruled that, in light of the Supreme Court's decision
in Caplin & Drysdale v. United States,' a "special factor" existed warranting
a higher hourly fee.' 59 In Caplin & Drysdale, the Supreme Court held that
the government could obtain a restraining order preventing transfer of potentially
forfeitable property under the federal drug forfeiture statute, even if the person
subject to the restraint were then left without assets to retain legal counsel."
Moreover, the Supreme Court recognized the government's authority to recover
forfeitable funds paid by that person to legal counsel.' 6' The district court
in 2323 Charms Road found that, as a result of the Supreme Court's decision,
"attorneys representing civil forfeiture claimants are now far less certain of
receiving full payment or of being able to retain fees if it is later determined that
the money paid constitutes proceeds from drug trafficking."' 2
The government's power to seize property, approved by the Supreme Court
in Caplin & Drysdale, creates "substantial disincentives ... that discourage
attorneys skilled in criminal law from taking on clients in both civil and criminal
forfeiture cases, particularly those involving drug trafficking allegations."' 63
1054. See United States v. Knote, 818 F. Supp. 1280, 1281-82 (E.D. Mo. 1993), a ffd, 29 F.3d
1297 (8th Cit. 1994).
1055. 728 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D. Mich. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 946 F.2d 437 (6th Cir.
1991).
1056. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2XA) (1988).
1057. 2323 Charns Road, 728 F. Supp. at 1329-30.
1058. 491 U.S. 617, 109 S. Ct. 2646 (1989).
1059. 2323 Charms Road, 728 F. Supp. at 1330.
1060. Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 622-35, 109 S. Ct. at 2650-57.
1061. Id. at 625, 109 S. Ct. at 2652.
1062. 2323 Charms Road, 728 F. Supp. at 1330.
1063. Id. See also Morgan Cloud, Forfeiting Defense Attorneys' Fees: Applying an Institutional
Role Theory to Define Individual Constitutional Rights, 1987 Wis. L. Rev. 1, 33-57 (discussing how
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Given that the government's exercise of its broad forfeiture powers has
suppressed the availability of counsel under these unique circumstances, it seems
especially equitable that an enhancement be approved in such cases in order to
counterbalance with higher compensation the disincentives that the government
through its prosecutorial discretion has chosen to create. It is not merely that
this area of law, like some others involving litigation against the federal
government, is unattractive to attorneys (although demonstrable limited
availability of attorneys is an essential element). More importantly, the
government itself has affirmatively created substantial obstacles to legal
representation to serve other societal goals through the sanction of forfeiture.
Significantly, the government's lawyers have the power to choose in each case
whether to exercise this power, notwithstanding the effects on availability of
legal counsel if a person's primary assets are confiscated. Under such
circumstances, it seems just that the government take the bitter with the sweet
and accept the obligation to pay higher fees if necessary to attract qualified
counsel who successfully defend the targets of civil forfeiture.
vii. Any Distinctive Knowledge or Specialized Skills Must Be
Truly Necessary for the Litigation
The presence of special qualifications of particular counsel, however defined,
does not automatically entitle the party to an enhancement. Even if a particular
specialty would qualify for an enhancement, the party must also show that the
specialty was actually "needful for the litigation in question."'" Because the
EAJA contemplates compensation only at the level of general qualification (in
the absence of a "special factor"), it is not enough that an attorney's expertise
proves helpful or that the attorney's experience allows him or her to prepare the
litigation more efficiently than an ordinary attorney. O" The standard is one
of necessity, not mere usefulness or helpfulness.'"
If the lawsuit involved a nm-of-the-mill matter, or if the issues implicating
an attorney's specialty were distinctly secondary in the case, the court may
conclude that the expertise simply was not necessary to the successful conclusion
of the case. For example, if a legal specialization or technical knowledge beyond
the facility of an ordinary attorney did not prove central to the basis upon which
the case was resolved, then the burden of proving necessity will not be met. An
government's power to forfeit assets, including recovery of funds paid to counsel, drives attorneys
from the market for legal services in this area and weakens the collective strength of the defense bar).
1064. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 572, 108 S. Ct. 2541, 2554 (1988).
1065. Love v. Reilly, 924 F.2d 1492, 1500 (9th Cir. 1991) (Wallace, J., dissenting) (arguing that
it was not sufficient for purposes of an EAJA enhancement that the district court found that the
attorney's prior experience in the subject matter was .'helpful,' and that he was able to prepare more
efficiently than a less experienced attorney").
1066. Id. (arguing that a finding that the attorney's skills were "'helpful' does not qualify as a
finding that these skills were 'necessary"' so as to justify a fee above the EAJA statutory rate).
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attorney's expertise in class action litigation will have proved unnecessary if the
class is not certified. A lawyer's familiarity with international law cannot be
regarded as essential if international law plays a subsidiary role in the litigation,
such as where international legal principles are adduced as a supplemental
argument for reaching a result also justified on domestic legal grounds.
Moreover, when there are reasonable alternatives to retention of a higher-
priced lawyer with distinctive knowledge or skills, the claim that the attribute is
necessary for legal counsel fades away. Thus, for example, lawyers without
advanced scientific or technical training frequently litigate cases involving
complex questions of science, medicine, and technology, by relying upon experts
both to educate them and to testify as expert witnesses."°67 The EAJA
expressly allows for this development, defining an award of "fees and other
expenses" to include "the reasonable expenses of expert witnesses," limited in
amount to "the highest rate of compensation for expert witnesses paid by the
United States." '' ts Because expert assistance is routinely and effectively used
in complex cases, the case in which retention of an attorney with the same
advanced scientific knowledge is not only useful, but actually necessary, will be
unusual. Far from being a specialized or distinctive characteristic, "being able
to prepare and effectively present experts at trial is an essential skill every trial
lawyer should have."""°6
Similarly, fluency in another language by an attorney is seldom truly
necessary to litigation of a case, even if some of the individuals involved speak
a foreign tongue. The ready availability of translators, especially for the more
common foreign languages encountered in the United States, would ordinarily
suffice to maintain communication and prepare the party's case or the witness's
testimony. 10 Moreover, some courts have approved compensation for
translation expenses as part of EAJA awards. 7 However, under exceptional
1067. See McCormick on Evidence § 2, at 3 (John W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992) (stating that "it
is increasingly necessary to arrange for the employment of technical experts, such as physicians in
personal injury cases, chemists and physicists in patent litigation, engineers and architects in
controversies over construction contracts, psychiatrists in criminal cases, and handwriting experts in
disputes over the genuineness of documents"); Thomas A. Mauet, Fundamentals of Trial Techniques
§ 4.8, at 117 (3d ed. 1992) ("Modem litigation is using experts with unparalleled frequency.').
1068. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A) (1988).
1069. Mauet, supra note 1067, § 4.8, at 118.
1070. If the foreign language spoken by the client or witness is rare, and translators are not
available, an attorney's facility with the language may truly be needful to the litigation and justify
a higher fee. In Cheng v. McCredit, No. 94 C 7520, 1995 WL 430953 (N.D. Ill. July 11, 1995), the
court approved a special factor enhancement when the party "spoke a very rare Chinese dialect" and
was only able to communicate with counsel because the attorney's wife spoke that dialect. Id. at *5.
However, while the circumstance of a rare language dialect in Cheng might have constituted a special
factor, an increase in the fee rate for the attorney was improper when it was not the attorney who
possessed the special skill. It would have been more appropriate for the court to award compensation
to the attorney's wife for her translation services.
1071. Securities & Exchange Comm'n v. Kaufman, 835 F. Supp. 157, 159-60 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)
(awarding, as "expenses" under the EAJA, reimbursement for translation); Viktoria-Schaefer Int'l
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circumstances, the need to be able readily to communicate directly with clients
who do not speak English, to maintain communication with large numbers of
foreign language clients, or to be familiar with potential testimony by large
numbers of witnesses without English language skills, may support a finding that
the distinctive skill of foreign language proficiency by the attorney him or herself
is sufficiently necessary to the proceedings to warrant an EAJA enhance-
ment.10
72
viii. Distinctive Knowledge or Specialized Skills Qualify for
Enhanced Fees Only If Qualified Lawyers are Unavailable
Distinctive qualifications alone, even if truly needful for the litigation, are
insufficient without a showing that "the number of competent lawyers who will
handle [such] cases is so limited that individuals who have possibly valid claims
are unable reasonably to secure representation.' 73 The court must make
specific findings 74 that the party could have obtained qualified counsel "only
at rates in excess of the $75 cap." '  To be sure, this is an awkward and
somewhat artificial inquiry, given that any party standing before the court and
asking for a fee award plainly did obtain counsel, with no assurances that any
EAJA fee award would be obtained, much less at a premium rate.0 76 Never-
theless, the statute demands an inquiry into the "limited availability of qualified
attorneys."'077 Some exploration into the supply and demand of legal services
of a distinctive nature therefore must proceed. At least in the case of the party
who has actually paid fees for services at a premium rate, as opposed to being
represented on a pro bono basis, the enhancement inquiry determines whether the
party may properly receive a greater measure of compensation for his out-of-
Speditionsgesellschaft, mbH & Co v. United States Dep't of Army, 659 F. Supp. 85, 89 (D.D.C.
1987) (same).
1072. See Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v. Smith, 644 F. Supp. 382, 390 (S.D. Fla. 1984)
(referring to difficulties in the case that would discourage a lawyer from accepting it, including "the
translation problems in dealing with thousands of clients and witnesses from another culture who
were not accustomed to trusting the rule of law"), aff'd, 791 F.2d 1489 (11 th Cir.), as amended, 804
F.2d 1573 (1lth Cir. 1986).
1073. Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. Lee, 853 F.2d 1219, 1226 (5th Cir. 1988).
1074. See Vibra-Tech Eng'rs, Inc. v. United States, 787 F.2d 1416, 1420 (10th Cir. 1986)
(specific findings are necessary before the rate may be enhanced); Aston v. Secretary of Health and
Human Servs., 808 F.2d 9, 11 (2d Cir. 1986) (same).
1075. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 572, 108 S. Ct. 2541, 2554 (1988).
1076. Cf King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (en bane) (rejecting risk of loss or
contingency enhancement of a lodestar fee award under a non-EAJA fee-shifting statute, saying that
whether a given plaintiff would have had substantial difficulties in obtaining representation without
a contingency enhancement is an "artificial" inquiry "because, by definition, the plaintiff stands
before the court with counsel," and that "counsel could not possibly know whether a risk
enhancement was in the offing until a court decides the question years later"), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 3054 (1992).
1077. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A) (1988).
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pocket legal expenses than that afforded by the statutory rate. From that
perspective of the paying client shopping for legal representation, the size of the
fee necessary to attract counsel is hardly an academic question.
In Baker v. Bowen,' the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit cautioned that "the mere unattractiveness of the field," that "only a few
attorneys in the area handle" such cases, or "the fact that many firms do not
handle" that type of cases, do not, by themselves, provide "conclusive evidence
that there is a lack of available attorneys within the meaning of the stat-
ute." 79 If there is only a "small source of supply," but that source of counsel
meets the demand for legal services of that nature, then excess fees may not be
awarded. 080 Instead, the Fifth Circuit held, there must be a showing that
parties "with colorable claims will actually be disadvantaged by denial of access
to the courts because of the lack of available representation." 0 8' And,
moreover, there must be some reason to believe that an increased rate "will
actually cause more attorneys to enter the field," that is, that the enhancement
will serve the purpose of attracting qualified attorneys to handle the type of
litigation at issue.' °
ix. Measurement of an Enhanced Fee Award
Finally, even when a fee above the statutory ceiling is warranted because of
the presence of a "special factor," the amount of the enhancement must
correspond to what the court, in its informed exercise of discretion, believes is
necessary to attract qualified counsel to handle the type of case before the court.
That figure may, of course, never exceed the prevailing market rate for an
attorney with that distinctive knowledge or skill. But the enhancement need not
match the prevailing rate. The conclusion that a fee in excess of the adjusted
statutory rate is necessary does not automatically translate into a fee at the higher
end of the prevailing rate; something in between would ordinarily suffice to serve
the statutory purpose of alleviating the "limited availability of qualified attorneys
for the proceedings involved."' 8 3 In determining the appropriate figure, the
court might evaluate the distance between supply and demand for the type of
legal services at issue, varying the amount of enhancement to correspond to the
size of the gulf. The court might seek evidence of the range of rates charged by
attorneys specializing in that field or with that skill, appreciating that the lower
1078. 839 F.2d 1075 (5th Cir. 1988).
1079. Id. at 1084-85.
1080. Id. at 1085.
1081. Id.
1082. Id.
1083. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(dX2)(A) (1988) (authorizing an enhancement above the statutory rate
ceiling if "a special factor, such as the limited availability of qualified attorneys for the proceedings
involved, justifies a higher fee").
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end of the range reflects the fee adequate to obtain at least some counsel with
that specialization in the open market.
The Department of Justice has thoughtfully proposed a "special factor"
measurement that appropriately seeks to preserve some of the effect of the
statutory ceiling, even while allowing a degree of enhancement in amount to
account for the limited availability of qualified attorneys."~ Under this
approach, the court determines the extent to which the prevailing rate for the
specialist exceeds the prevailing rate for other attorneys in the community and
then allows an enhancement above the statutory rate (adjusted for inflation) only
to the extent of this difference. Thus, the statutory rate is recognized as
Congress's estimate of the appropriate general rate for legal services, and the
enhancement must take that rate as the starting point. In a Supreme Court brief,
the Department of Justice illustrated this method and explained its rationale:
For example, suppose the cost of living has increased by 15 per
cent, the market rate for legal services in the community has increased
to $100, and the market rate for patent attorneys in the community is
$120. In a patent case, EAJA would permit the $75 cap to be increased
to $82.50 to reflect the higher cost of living, and would permit a further
increase to $102.50 to reflect the premium necessary to attract patent
attorneys. But EAJA would not permit an increase to $120. Such an
increase would nullify the congressional judgment to impose a uniform
$75 cap on attorneys' fees, and to make adjustments in that rate based
on changes in the cost of living, rather than increases in the general
market rate for attorneys' services from one community to the
next.08
5
3. Exceptional Delay as a "Special Factor"
There is a consensus among the courts of appeals that an award for
attorney's fees under the EAJA may not include compensation for the ordinary
delay between the attorney's performance of legal services and the receipt of the
fee award, which would be in the nature of pre-judgment interest."°a Never-
theless, several courts of appeals have ruled that exceptional delay may constitute
a "special factor" justifying a higher fee award. 08 However, one court of
1084. See Reply Brief for the Petitioner, at 16 n. 11, Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 522, 108 S.
Ct. 2541 (1988) (No. 86-1512).
1085. Id.
1086. See supra V.B.4 (discussing the prohibition on pre-judgment interest and the rule against
using the cost-of-living adjustment to the EAJA statutory rate ceiling as a basis for awarding
compensation for delay).
1087. See, e.g., Perales v. Casillas, 950 F.2d 1066, 1077 (5th Cir. 1992) (rejecting delay in
payment enhancement as a special factor under circumstances of that case); Oklahoma Aerotronics,
Inc. v. United States, 943 F.2d 1344, 1349-50 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (affurming delay of payment
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appeals recently rejected an increase in the award even for egregious delay as an
impermissible "end run" around the rule prohibiting pre-judgment interest against
the federal government in the absence of an express statutory waiver.
10 88
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has
adopted the broadest understanding of the circumstances that may qualify as a
"special factor," by awarding fees above the statutory level "[w]here the delay
is exceptional and not attributable to negligence or improper conduct by the
prevailing party."'18 9  In at least two cases, Wilkett v. Interstate Commerce
Commission 1090 and Oklahoma Aerotronics, Inc. v. United States, 191 this
court of appeals has authorized an upward departure from the statutory ceiling
when an unusual lapse of time between a request for fees and the award was
caused by the mishandling of a fee application by the courts.1° 2 Unless a
court is willing to subsidize this enhancement by contributing the necessary
additional amount from its own budget (for which there would be no statutory
authority), it is impossible to justify imposing a higher award payable from an
Executive Branch agency's funds for exceptional delay attributable to the
negligence of the Judiciary.""9 When "the blame for [the] delay lies with the
court, not the parties,"'" the fee petitioner has a legitimate complaint about
the judicial process.' 09 But the government should not have to bear the
enhancement as a special factor); Jean v. Nelson, 863 F.2d 759, 776 & n.13 (1lth Cir. 1988)
(remanding an EAJA dispute to district court to consider, inter alia, whether a special factor
enhancement was appropriate because of the government's unusually litigious position causing delay),
aff'd on other grounds, 496 U.S. 154, 110 S. Ct. 2316 (1990).
1088. Marcus v. Shalala, 17 F.3d 1033, 1039 (7th Cir. 1994).
1089. Wilkett v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 844 F.2d 867, 876 (D.C. Ci. 1988).
1090. Id.
1091. 943 F.2d 1344 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
1092. Oklahoma Aerotronics, 943 F.2d at 1350 (approving enhancement of an EAJA fee because
of district court's eight.year delay in ruling upon an application for fees); Wilkett, 844 F.2d at 869,
876-77 (approving a "small increase" above the statutory ceiling because the party's EAJA fee
application "languished unnoticed in the Clerk's Office for almost four years").
1093. The EAJA makes fee awards under Subsection (d) payable from agency funds as part of
the statute's purpose in deterring unreasonable government conduct. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(dX4)
(1988) ("Fees and other expenses awarded under this subsection to a party shall be paid by any
agency over which the party prevails from any funds made available to the agency by appropriation
or otherwise.'). See also Krent, supra note 808, at 2066:
(I]f fee awards come out of the implementing agency's budget, as they largely do under
the EAJA, then the possibility of deterrence increases. Agency officials, like managers
in private firms, are then forced to internalize the costs of their actions more fully, for
they recognize that adverse fee awards may prevent them from pursuing other policy
objectives.
1094. See Wilkett, 844 F.2d at 874 (acknowledging that the blame for the long delay in action
upon the EAJA fee application lay with the court, not with the parties, but still granting an
enhancement of the fee based upon exceptional delay).
1095. However, in Wilkett, the fee petitioner had failed even to inquire about the status of the fee
petition for four years, which makes his situation considerably less sympathetic. See Wilkett, 844
F.2d at 874. Surprisingly, however, the court did not view this inattention by the fee petitioner as
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deterrent burden of an enhanced fee when it is innocent of responsibility for the
delay.
By contrast, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has
focused upon egregious conduct by the government that prolongs the proceedings
as the basis for an award of enhanced fees for exceptional delay. In Jean v.
Nelson," the court of appeals, in remanding an EAJA fee dispute, paused to
confmn that the district court could again approach the question of whether "the
government's unusually litigious position in this case might constitute a special
factor."' 7  The Eleventh Circuit said it "had no quarrel" with the district
court's finding the government had taken "'an unusually wavering and litigious
position throughout the litigation,"' through unwarranted opposition to every
contention, repeated motions for stays, and requiring unnecessary briefing on all
pleaded issues and motions."'" The court ruled that "[i]f the government...
advanced litigation for any improper purpose such as harassment, unnecessary
delay or increase in the plaintiffs' expense, then ... its action warrants the
imposition of a special factor."'" In its later decision in Poligreen v. Mor-
ris,"' ° the Eleventh Circuit again remanded an EAJA case for the district
court to clarify its basis for exceeding the statutory rate ceiling, saying that "[t]he
government's delay in litigating a case is a permissible special factor only when
the motivation for the delay was improper or the length of the delay itself was
inappropriate.''.
On the question of the length of the delay that qualifies for special treatment,
those courts that allow for the possibility of an exceptional delay enhancement are
in firm agreement that the delay must be unusual and prolonged." 2 The normal
delay attendant upon litigation, especially a case involving complex issues, cannot
qualify as a "special factor" justifying an upward enhancement of the EAJA
fee."
03
However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has
recently rejected delay as ever justifying a higher EAJA fee award, whether
formulated as pre-judgment interest or a special factor enhancement. In Marcus v.
detracting from his claim for an exceptional delay enhancement. See id. at 874-76.
1096. 863 F.2d 759 (1 lth Cir. 1988), affd on other grounds, 496 U.S. 154, 110 S. Ct. 2316 (1990).
1097. Id. at 776.
1098. Id. at 776 (quoting district court decision).
1099. Id. at 776 n.13.
1100. 911 F.2d 527 (11th Cir. 1990).
1101. Id. at 537. See also Marcus v. Shalala, 17 F.3d 1033, 1039-40 (7th Cir. 1994) (ruling that,
while delay may never qualify as a "special factor" justifying an enhanced EAJA award, exceptional
delay in any event would require a finding that the government engaged in "obstructive litigation
tactics or otherwise protracted the proceedings").
1102. Perales v. Casillas, 950 F.2d 1066, 1077 (5th Cir. 1992); Oklahoma Aerotronics, Inc. v.
United States, 943 F.2d 1344, 1349 (D.C. Cir. 1991).




Shalala,"° the court acknowledged "the logical appeal" of cases approving
exceptional delay as a "special factor," but ruled that these "holdings amount to an
end run around the no-interest rule in Shaw because the statutory provision
allowing for a higher fee where there is a special factor is not the kind of express,
unambiguous statutory language sufficient to waive sovereign immunity.' 5
Moreover, the Seventh Circuit worried that delay is such a common phenomenon
as to "run afoul[] of Underwood, in which the [Supreme] Court held that special
factors cannot be of 'broad and general application..'16
The Seventh Circuit's cautious position and'hesitance to take any action that
appears to contravene the no-interest rule is commendable. But its ruling takes too
narrow a view of the "special factor" allowance and is too quick to identify an
exceptional delay enhancement with routine pre-judgment interest. Although an
enhancement for exceptional delay may not be wholly divorced from the concept
of ordinary interest for delay in receipt of fee payments, this is an instance when the
difference in degree is so pronounced as to virtually constitute a difference in kind.
The occasions for application of an exceptional delay "special factor" should be
sufficiently rare and the requirements for its invocation so stringent as to place this
enhancement on an entirely different footing than ordinary pre-judgment interest.
By reserving enhancement for truly anomalous cases of deliberate or egregiously
negligent obstruction of efficient disposition by the government, exceptional delay
qualifies as a truly "special factor" and does not amount to a mere "end run" around
the no-interest rule.
The final question is the proper measure of an exceptional delay enhancement
if and when permitted. Judge Stephen F. Williams of the District of Columbia
Circuit, in a separate opinion in Oklahoma Aerotronics,"°7 persuasively argues
that full compensation for delay in payment should account for both "the erosion
of the value of the currency through inflation" and the lost opportunity to earn
"income accruing from the use of the funds, which [is lost] regardless of infla-
1104. 17 F.3d 1033 (7th Cir. 1994).
1105. Id. at 1039 (citing Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 106 S. Ct. 2957 (1986),
which established the general presumption against the award of pre-judgment interest against the
federal government).
1106. Id. at 1039 (quoting Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 573, 108 S. Ct. 2541, 2554
(1988)). In Chiu v. United States, 948 F.2d 711 (Fed. Cir. 1991), the Federal Circuit stated that "[i]t
is not urged here that the delay between the time that the debt for legal services is incurred and the
time an award under the EAJA is obtained may be deemed a 'special factor,' and we believe, in any
event, it would suffer from the ... no-interest defect." Id. at 721. The court further characterized
the District of Columbia Circuit's position in Wilkett as having been "discredited" by the Supreme
Court's limitation of "special factors" to those that are not of "broad and general application." Id.
(quoting Pierce, 487 U.S. at 573, 108 S. Ct. at 2554). However, the Federal Circuit failed to
recognize that Wilkett permitted an adjustment to the fee rate for delay only in exceptional cases and
therefore did not directly address whether exceptional delay would call for different treatment.
1107. Oklahoma Aerotronics, Inc. v. United States, 943 F.2d 1344, 1352-54 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(Williams, J., concurring and dissenting). But see id. at 1347-50 (majority approving fee
enhancement for exceptional delay by use of current statutory rate adjusted only for inflation).
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tion."" °8  Accordingly, he concludes that an award of the EAJA fee at the
current statutory rate, while adjusting for inflation, would be inadequate because
it would not include the lost income opportunity." Judge Williams further
states that "the court must be careful to allow compensation only for the egregious
portion of the delay," meaning "there should be no compensation for an initial
period of unspecial delay, running from incurrence of the fee to the date when delay
became unreasonable."'' .0 By ensuring a tight fit between the amount of the
enhancement and the inexcusable aspect of the delay, and therefore discounting for
the typical lapse of time that normally would be expected in adjudicating the
matter, the divergence of the exceptional delay "special factor" from ordinary pre-
judgment interest (which is prohibited) is further highlighted.
4. Miscellaneous "Special Factors"
The EAJA does not list all of the circumstances that may qualify as a "special
factor" warranting a fee award in excess of the statutory rate, leaving to the court
"discretion to consider other, unenumerated special factors.""" However, aside
from numerous decisions addressing the express statutory provision for an
enhancement of an EAJA award because of the "limited availability of qualified
attorneys for the proceedings involved,""'" case law sheds more light on what
does not constitute a "special factor" than on what does. Beyond the possibility of
an enhancement for exceptional delay," 3 it is nearly impossible to find another
example of a "special factor" in court decisions.
In Pierce v. Underwood,"'4 the Supreme Court swept away most suggested
applications of the "special factor" exception, recognizing that a liberal interpreta-
tion would read the general $75 per hour rate ceiling out of the statute:
[T]he... "special factors" envisioned by the exception must be such as
are not of broad and general application. We need not specify what they
might be, but they include nothing relied upon by the District Court in this
case. The "novelty and difficulty of issues," "the undesirability of the
case," the "work and ability of counsel," and "the results obtained," are
factors applicable to a broad spectrum of litigation; they are little more
than routine reasons why market rates are what they are. The factor of
"customary fees and awards in other cases," is even worse; it is not even
1108. Id. at 1353.
1109. Id. at 1352-53.
1110. Id. at 1353-54.
1111. Action on Smoking & Health v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 724 F.2d 211,218 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
1112. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A) (1988). See supra section V.C.2 (discussing limited availability
of qualified attorneys as a special factor).
1113. See supra section V.C.3 (discussing exceptional delay as a special factor).
1114. 487 U.S. 552, 108 S. CL 2541 (1988).
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a routine reason for market rates, but rather a description of market
rates.""
In addition, the Court rejected "the contingent nature of the fee," that is, the risk
that the party took at the outset of the litigation that it might not succeed in
obtaining a fee award, as "too generally applicable" to warrant exceeding the
statutory rate cap." 6
Other courts have also rejected special factor enhancements based on the pro
bono motivations of counsel," 7 the purported vindication of public rights by the
lawsuit, I"' the alleged benefit of the litigation to a broad class of people,"' 9
the claim that the suit monopolized the attention of the attorney,"2" or the
emotional hardship to parties or counsel during the pendency of the litigation." 2'
It is probably unwise to engage in abstract speculation about other
possibilities, instead leaving the door open to unanticipated and unusual situations
that may arise in the context of a concrete case or controversy. In any event, a
circumstance may qualify as a "special factor" only if it does not admit of
general application, thereby preserving the integrity of the statutory rate, and
does not correspond to factors already subsumed within the determination of the
prevailing market rate for legal services, for which the EAJA substitutes a rate
ceiling.
VI. TIMING AND PROCEDURE FOR EAJA FEE APPLICATIONS
A party seeking an award of fees... shall, within thirty days of
final judgment in the action, submit to the court an application for fees
1115. Id. at 573, 108 S. Ct. at 2554 (citations omitted).
1116. Id. at 573, 108 S. Ct. at 2554. Subsequently, the Supreme Court rejected the contingency
risk of loss as an appropriate consideration in measuring any fee award, even under other fee-shifting
statutes without a statutory rate cap. In City of Burlington v. Dague, 112 S. Ct. 2638 (1992), the
Court ruled that the lodestar may never be adjusted upward to compensate for the contingent risk of
loss. The Court reasoned that an enhancement for contingency "would likely duplicate in substantial
part factors already subsumed in the lodestar," id. at 2641. might provide an incentive to attorneys
to bring meritless claims, id. at 2642, would allow attorneys to pool the risks of loss presented by
various cases and thereby effectively obtain compensation for lost lawsuits, id. at 2643, and "would
make the setting of fees more complex and arbitrary, hence more unpredictable, and hence more
litigable." Id. On contingency enhancements, see generally Sisk, supra note 33, at 758-59; Charles
Silver, Incoherence and Irrationality in the Law of Attorneys' Fees, 12 Rev. Litig. 301, 313-33
(1993).
1117. Jean v. Nelson, 863 F.2d 759, 775 (1 th Cir. 1988), afld on other grounds, 496 U.S. 154,
110 S. Ct. 2316 (1990).
1118. Jean, 863 F.2d at 775.
1119. Pollgreen v. Morris, 911 F.2d 527, 537 (11th Cir. 1990).
1120. Johnson v. Meese, 654 F. Supp. 270, 273 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (suggesting, however, that
preclusion of employment could be a special factor if large scale litigation causes hardship to an
attorney's practice or firm).
1121. Jean, 863 F.2d at 775-76.
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... which shows that the party is a prevailing party and is eligible to
receive an award under this subsection, and the amount sought,
including an itemized statement from any attorney... representing...
the party stating the actual time expended and the rate at which fees...
are computed. The party shall also allege that the position of the
United States was not substantially justified. Whether or not the
position of the United States was substantially justified shall be
determined on the basis of the record (including the record with respect
to the action or failure to act by the agency upon which the civil action
is based) which is made in the civil action for which fees ... are
sought. (EAJA § 2412(d)(1)(B))"2
A. Timing of Application for EAJA Fee
1. The Time Limit of 30 Days After Final Judgment to File Application
Under Subparagraph (d)(1)(B), the EAJA requires that a fee claimant file an
application for fees "within thirty days of final judgment in the action."'1 23
A "final judgment" means "a judgment by a court that terminates the civil action
for which EAJA fees may be received.""2 The time for filing an EAJA
application, however, does not begin immediately upon entry of the judgment by
the court. For purposes of the EAJA, Congress in Subparagraph (d)(2)(G) has
further defined "final judgment" to mean a court judgment that is "final and not
appealable."' 2  Accordingly, EAJA's 30-day clock does not begin to run until
after the time to appeal the judgment has expired for all parties, at which point
the judgment has ceased to be appealable." 2 6  Moreover, if an appeal does
ensue, the 30-day statute of limitations does not begin to rim until the appellate
proceedings are concluded or, when the appeal ends with a remand for further
action by the district court, a final disposition of the merits occurs and no further
review of the decision is available."1
27
1122. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(l)(B) (1988).
1123. Id. The deadline for filing an application for fees under most fee-shifting statutes is set by
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d). Rule 54(d)(2)(B) provides that a motion for attorney's fees
must be filed within 14 days after the judgment on the merits, unless a statute provides for a different
period or the court by order specifies another time. The EAJA specifically sets its own statute of
limitations for filing a fee petition.
1124. Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89, 96, 111 S. Ct. 2157, 2162 (1991). See also Karen N.
Moore, The Supreme Court's Role in Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 44 Hasting
L.J. 1039, 1088-89 (1993) (discussing the Melkonyan Court's interpretation of "final judgment" in
the EAJA to mean the judgment of a court of law, and not encompassing an administrative decision
after remand from a district court).
1125. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(G) (1988).
1126. Melkonyan, 501 U.S. at 95-96, 111 S. Ct. at 2161-62.
1127. See Utu Utu Gwaitu Paiute Tribe v. Department of Interior, 773 F. Supp. 1383, 1384 (E.D.
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For certainty's sake, Subparagraph (d)(2)(G) should be applied literally, such
that the clock starts ticking only when the time to appeal has legally expired,
notwithstanding extrinsic indications that the judgment is practically final because
no further review is contemplated by the litigants. In Federal Election
Commission v. Political Contributions Data, Inc.," 2 s the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected the argument that the court of appeals'
judgment had become final when the Federal Election Commission by letter
dated October 30, 1991, notified opposing counsel that it did not intend to seek
Supreme Court review and that the EAJA fee application filed on December 19
was therefore untimely." 9 Ultimately the Commission conceded, notwith-
standing its letter, that it "had retained the absolute right to change its mind and
apply for certiorari at any time up until the deadline for such an application,
namely November 19, just thirty days before the petition for fees was
filed."' 130
In cases involving review of Social Security benefits determinations, the
district courts under certain narrow circumstances have statutory authority to
remand a case to the agency while retaining jurisdiction over the matter; under
most circumstances, however, the district courts are required to enter judgment
when ordering a remand." 3' If a district court enters judgment upon remand
of the matter to the agency, the 30-day clock for filing an application for EAJA
fees begins to run after the period for appeal of the remand judgment has
expired."3" On the other hand, if a district court properly retains jurisdiction
of a civil action while ordering a remand to the administrative agency, a final
judgment will not be entered until the completion of the administrative
Cal. 1991) (ruling that a "final judgment" is one that is no longer contestable through the appellate
process).
1128. 995 F.2d 383 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1064 (1994).
1129. Id. at 385-86.
1130. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, by local circuit rule, provides
that an application for EAJA fees must be filed within 30 days after a judgment has become final,
which is defined in the rule as when "the time for filing an appeal or a petition for a writ of certiorari
has expired, or the government has given written notice to the parties and to the court of appeals
that it will not seek further review, or judgment is entered by the court of last resort." 1st Cir. R.
39.1(a) (Dec. 1, 1994) (emphasis added). But a court may not by rule reduce, modify, or extend the
limitations period set by the statute. Although it is arguable that the government would lose the
discretion to change its mind by filing a written notice with the court of appeals that it will not seek
further review, thus making the judgment final in a practical sense, statutory limitations periods
should be measured by a permanent and certain point of reference. Because the time period for
seeking a writ of certiorari is set by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2101(c) (1988), the finality of a
judgment--and thus the setting of the EAJA clock-should be uniformly fixed to this statutory
standard and not be subject to variance by agreements of counsel or local court rules.
1131. See generally Shalala v. Schaefer, 113 S. Ct. 2625, 2629 & nn.l-2 (1993) (discussing Social
Security Act provisions which direct entry of judgment upon remand to agency under most
circumstances and which allow retention of jurisdiction after remand under certain other
circumstances). See also supra section III.A.2.b (discussing entry of judgment and remands under
Social Security Act).
1132. Shalala, 113 S. Ct. at 2628-31.
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proceedings and the return of the matter to the court for final adjudication." 33
Thus, an EAJA application would not be required until the appeal period had
elapsed after the post-remand judgment." 4
When Congress clarified the term "final judgment" in 1985 to mean "final
and not appealable," it further specified in the statute that a final judgment
"includes an order of settlement.""" The House committee report accompa-
nying the 1985 re-enactment legislation explained that "[i]f a settlement is
reached and the fee award is not part of the settlement, then the thirty-day period
would commence on the date when the proceeding is dismissed pursuant to the
settlement or when the adjudicative officer approves the settlement."" 3 6 The
report further observes that some settlements are not finalized by court order but
instead result in dismissal with consent of the parties.'"' The report suggested
that the courts should accommodate this practice and "avoid an overly technical
construction" of the "final judgment" definition."38 Because the statutory
term is "final judgment,"" '39 which connotes judicial action, the better course
would be for settling parties to request a court order recording the settlement or
granting dismissal. Such an order would then fix the point at which the EAJA
clock begins without need for flexible construction of statutory terms. Still, even
without an order, some starting point must be selected and the date of dismissal
would be the natural choice.
In Barry v. Bowen,"40 the United States Court of Appeals eased the 30-
day deadline under the "unique circumstances doctrine" where the fee petitioner
had reasonably relied upon the district court's entry of an amended judgment,
although the court actually lacked authority to amend the judgment at that late
date." 4 ' In that case, the government had filed a post-judgment motion for
clarification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), which ordinarily would
have tolled the time period for filing a notice of appeal and thereby would also
have extended the period for filing an EAJA petition." 42 Unfortunately, the
government's'Rule 59(e) motion was filed one day late, meaning that the time
for an appeal was not affected and the district court should not have considered
1133. Id. at 2629-31; Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89, 96-97, 111 S. Ct. 2157, 2162-63
(1991).
1134. Id. at 2629-31; Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89, 96-97, 111 S. Ct. 2157, 2162-63
(1991).
1135. Pub. L. No. 99-80, § 2(c)(2), 99 Stat. 183, 185 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2412(dX2)(G)
(1988)).




1139. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B), (d)(2)(G) (1988).
1140. 825 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1987).
1141. Id. at 1329.
1142. Id. at 1328 (explaining that a timely motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) tolls the time for
appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)).
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the motion or amended the judgment.""' Nevertheless, because the district
court had entered an amended judgment, the Ninth Circuit found that the private
party "quite reasonably viewed that judgment as the one from which the appeal
time should run.""" Moreover, when this amended judgment was entered,
the time for filing an EAJA petition had not yet run, meaning the party could
have filed a timely petition but for his reliance on the district court's error."
45
Accordingly, the court of appeals applied "a narrow exception to the ordinarily
rigid jurisdictional requirements for appeals" and treated the amended judgment
as the effective "final judgment" for purposes of the EAJA. Consequently, the
court held the petition for EAJA fees was timely." 4" The Barry decision,
however, depends upon the "unique circumstances" described there,"" and
will provide no solace to the party failing to file an EAJA petition within 30
days of a final judgment in the ordinary case.
Although an EAJA fee application would be untimely if filed more than 30
days after entry of final judgment, some courts have held that a party is not
obliged to wait until the time for further review has expired before seeking an
award."4  For example, in Koch v. Department of Interior,149 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that it had jurisdiction to grant
an EAJA fee application, even though either party could still appeal its judgment
by applying for certiorari from the Supreme Court."5' The House committee
report accompanying the 1985 re-enactment legislation also states that a fee
petition may be filed before a final judgment and that such a petition "should be




However, other courts have ruled that an application for EAJA fees is
premature if filed before the entry of a "final judgment," thereby depriving the
court of jurisdiction to address it."" For example, in United States v. 27.09
1143. See Barry, 825 F.2d at 1328-29.




1148. See, e.g., Koch v. Department of Interior, 47 F.3d 1015, 1021 (10th Cir. 1995); James v.
United States Dept. of Housing & Urban Dev., 783 F.2d 997, 999 (1 1th Cir. 1986); March v. Brown,
7 Vet. App. 163, 166 (1994); Utu Utu Gwaitu Paiute Tribe v. Department of Interior, 773 F. Supp.
1383, 1385 (E.D. Cal. 1991).
1149. 47 F.3d 1015 (10th Cir. 1995).
1150. Id. at 1021. But see Goatcher v. Chater, 57 F.3d 980, 981-82 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that
a petition for EAJA fees filed before entry of final judgment by the district court upon remand was
premature and would be denied without prejudice to re-filing).
1151. H.R. Rep. No. 120, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 n.26 (1985), reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N.
132, 146 n.26.
1152. See, e.g., United States v. 27.09 Acres of Land, 1 F.3d 107, 111 (2d Cir. 1993); Sohappy
v. Hodel, 911 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1990); Skip Kirchdorfer, Inc. v. United States, 803 F.2d 711, 712
(Fed. Cir. 1986).
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Acres of Land,"53 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
held that an EAJA application was not justiciable when filed prior to entry of a
formal judgment terminating the action on the merits in the district court."54
Until there was a "formal closure of legal proceedings," the court ruled, the
district court was without subject matter jurisdiction to hear the claim for
attorney's fees.""
Unfortunately, the statutory text does not unambiguously answer the
question. Subparagraph (d)(1)(B) directs that a party seeking an award shall file
the application "within thirty days of final judgment in the action.""'56 The
"within thirty days" language could be read either to simply create a statute of
limitations setting an outer time limit; or instead to define a precise window for
a proper filing, beginning with a final judgment that is not subject to further
appeal and ending thirty days later.
However, the Supreme Court's rulings pertinent to this issue support the
Tenth Circuit's view in Koch. The Second Circuit in 27.09 Acres of Land cited
the Supreme Court's decision in Melkonyan v. Sullivan"57 for the proposition
that an EAJA application filed prior to entry of a "final judgment" is premature
and falls outside of the court's subject matter jurisdiction."58 But the Su-
preme Court in Melkonyan addressed a different question: whether an EAJA
petition was untimely because it was filed more than 30 days after an administra-
tive agency had reached a final decision on remand.". The Court held that
the crucial event is a "final judgment" entered by a court of law, not a decision
by an administrative agency. "' The fee petitioner in Melkonyan did further
argue that the EAJA permits a party to "apply for fees at any time up to 30 days
after entry of judgment, and even before judgment is entered, as long as he has
achieved prevailing party status.""'.. However, because it was not clear that
the party had even prevailed so as to be eligible for fees, the Court stated that
"[t]his case is not an appropriate vehicle for resolving the issue."".62 Notwith-
standing its reluctance to decide the issue, the Court volunteered that upon entry
of a final judgment, the district court could determine to accept the application
already filed as sufficient (assuming the fee petitioner would otherwise be
entitled to fees)." 63
1153. 27.09 Acres of Land, 1 F.3d at 107.
1154. Id. at 111.
1155. Id.
1156. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B) (1988).
1157. 501 U.S. 89, 111 S. Ct. 2157 (1991).
1158. 27.09 Acres of Land, I F.3d at 111.
1159. Melkonyan, 501 U.S. at 91-97, 111 S. Ct. at 2159-63.
1160. Id. at 91-97, 111 S. Ct. at 2159-63.
1161. Id. at 103, 111 S. Ct. at 2166.
1162. Id. at 103, 111 S. Ct. at 2166.
1163. Id. at 103, 111 S. Ct. at 2166.
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Two years later, in Shalala v. Schaefer,"" the Supreme Court more
directly indicated that an application filed in advance of the entry of a final
judgment is not without consequence. In that case, a party filed an application
for EAJA fees more than a year after the district court had rendered a final
decision, prompting the government to argue that the petition was untimely."6
However, although the Court agreed that the district court should have entered
a final judgment on its order, the fact remained that the district court had failed
to formally enter judgment on a separate document as required by Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 58.""6 Because the failure to formally enter final judgment
meant that the time for an appeal had not actually elapsed, the Court found that
the EAJA application was timely and affirmed the grant of an EAJA
award."67 The Court did not suggest that the application was premature or
that the lower courts had been without power to grant it, notwithstanding the
absence of a true "final judgment." In sum, while the Supreme Court's rulings
are not as explicit on this issue as might be desired, they certainly suggest that
an application filed before the appeal period has expired, and even one filed
before formal entry of a court judgment, satisfies the timeliness requirements of
the EAJA and confers jurisdiction on the courts to consider the request." 68
In the end, a measure of common sense points the way. In Melkonyan, the
Court indicated that even if an early application is regarded as premature, the
district court upon entry of a final judgment either could determine that the
petition already filed is sufficient or allow the petitioner to reapply, emphasizing
thereby that the petitioner "will not be prejudiced by having filed premature-
ly."" 69  Even those courts that read the statute as barring the exercise of
jurisdiction over a fee petition filed prematurely are willing to accept the lodging
of the early petition as adequate to protect the petitioner's rights as of the time
a final judgment is later entered." 70
Accordingly, when a petition is filed after a court enters a judgment, but
before the time to appeal has lapsed, the court should accept the application but
generally should withhold action for the short period necessary to determine
whether litigation proceedings have truly ended.17' However, when a petition
1164. 113 S. Ct. 2625 (1993).
1165. Id. at 2627-28.
1166. Id. at 2632.
1167. Id. See also infra section VI.A.2 (discussing the effect upon the EAJA time limit of a delay
in the entry of formal judgment under Rule 58).
1168. See Koch v. Department of Interior, 47 F.3d 1015, 1021 (10th Cir. 1995) ("Schaefer...
makes clear that a plaintiff may ask for attorney's fees even when the time for appeal has not
elapsed.").
1169. Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89, 103, 111 S. Ct. 2157, 2166 (1991).
1170. See United States v. 27.09 Acres of Land, I F.3d 107, 111-12 (2d Cir. 1993) (quoting
Melkonyan and directing that any future appeal on the EAJA issue be decided on the existing filings).
1171. See March v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 163, 166 (1994) (explaining court procedure whereby "an
EAJA application received after the underlying decision is issued and before ... the appeal period
has run will be marked by the Clerk of Court as 'received' by the Court on the date it is received,
[Vol. 56
EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT
for fees is filed before entry of any court judgment, or if further review is
actually sought after a lower court judgment, it means litigation will remain
ongoing. Under those circumstances, any ruling on the petition (absent a basis
for the award of interim fees)"72 would be premature in a practical sense,
even if not in a jurisdictional sense. Because there is the possibility of a reversal
in outcome as the case proceeds, the court may waste precious judicial resources
by making a preliminary ruling on a fee petition. Moreover, because the
substantial justification of the government's position should be determined on the
case as a whole," 73 subsequent developments in the litigation may be directly
relevant to that inquiry. Finally, since a party may be entitled to fees for
succeeding stages of litigation as well, an early petition might prove incomplete,
leading to piecemeal submission of a series of fee petitions. In conclusion, while
a premature petition ought to be treated as preserving the party's right to seek
fees for legal expenses incurred to that date, a court would ordinarily be well
advised to hold any application for EAJA fees in abeyance until the finality of
the litigation is certain.
2. The Effect of Delay in Entry of Formal Judgment
In the context of a claim for EAJA fees in district court, the Supreme Court
in Shalala v. Schaefer174 ruled that the period for filing an appeal to the court
of appeals does not begin until the district court has followed the formalities for
entry of judgment on a separate document as required by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 58. 17  Rule 58 provides that "[e]very judgment shall be set forth
on a separate document," and that a judgment "is effective only when so set
forth" and entered on the civil docket pursuant to Rule 79(a). 1176  As a
consequence, if a district court-even after rendering a final decision concluding
its disposition of the merits-fails to enter a formal Rule 58 judgment on a
separate document, the EAJA clock never begins to run."177
and will be so docketed; then, on the first day of the 30-day EAJA-application period, the Clerk will
stamp the application filed as of that date and will so docket it").
1172. See supra section III.A.4 (discussing interim attorney's fee award under the EAJA).
1173. See supra section IV.A.2 (discussing the need to evaluate single "position of the United
States" based upon the case as a whole).
1174. 113 S. Ct. 2625 (1993).
1175. Id. at 2632 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 58). A formal Rule 58 judgment is not necessary for an
appeal to be taken. That is, the absence of a judgment on a separate document does not prevent an
appeal, provided the court has announced a final decision. 113 S. Ct. at 2632. However, the time
clock for taking an appeal does not actually begin to run until the formal entry of judgment, so that
a party may choose to wait until after the entry of a Rule 58 judgment before seeking appellate
review. Id. In sum, until the entry of a Rule 58 judgment, the appeal period remains perpetually
open, and the EAJA application period remains open with it.
1176. Fed. R. Civ. P. 58, 79(a).
1177. Schaefer, 113 S. Ct. at 2632.
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In the aftermath of the Schaefer decision, the courts of appeals have issued
a stream of decisions holding that applications for EAJA fees filed well after a
final district court decision were nevertheless timely because of the absence of
a separate Rule 58 judgment.""8 Fortunately, this is likely to be a short-term
and aberrational development, reflecting the uncertainty that previously prevailed
about whether a final judgment should be entered by a district court in Social
Security benefits cases ending with a remand to the agency or whether the court
instead could withhold judgment and maintain continuing jurisdiction over the
matter pending resolution of the administrative proceedings.""9
In Shalala v. Schaefer, the Supreme Court clarified that the Social Security
Act permits retention of continuing court jurisdiction over a remanded case only
in narrow circumstances.""0 Under the Social Security Act, a district court
may remand a Social Security benefits case to the agency under either sentence
four or sentence six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).""' Sentence six, which allows a
1178. See, e.g., Kolman v. Shalala, 39 F.3d 173, 176-77 (7th Cir. 1994); Kadelski v. Sullivan, 30
F.3d 399, 402-03 (3d Cir. 1994); O'Connor v. Shalala, 23 F.3d 1232, 1234-35 (7th Cir. 1994); Yang
v. Shalala, 22 F.3d 213, 216-17 (9th Cir. 1994); Newsome v. Shalala, 8 F.3d 775, 776, 780 (1 lth Cir.
1993); Gray v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 3 F.3d 1584, 1584 (9th Cir. 1993); Freeman v.
Shalala, 2 F.3d 552, 553-54 (5th Cir. 1993). There has also been some disagreement among the
courts of appeals as to what qualifies as a separate document for Rule 58 purposes. Some courts
hold that a district court order with a terse adoption of a magistrate judge's recommendation to
remand the matter to an agency is a separate judgment under Rule 58. See, e.g., Mason v. Groose,
942 F.2d 515, 516 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1039, 112 S. Ct. 891 (1992); Laidley v.
McClain, 914 F.2d 1386, 1390 (10th Cir. 1990). Other courts apply Rule 58 strictly to hold that a
remand order adopting a magistrate judge's recommendation is not a separate judgment document.
See, e.g., Yang, 22 F.3d at 216-17; Newsome, 8 F.3d at 776. In the interests of certainty as to when
the appeal period starts, it is best to strictly require issuance of the judgment on a self-contained
document, separate from any statement of reasons, preferably reciting that it is the judgment pursuant
to Rule 58.
1179. Moreover, during this same period leading up to the Schaefer decision, the general
understanding in the lower courts was that a Social Security claimant did not prevail, and thus was
not eligible for a fee award, until he had actually obtained an award of benefits either by the court
or by the administrative agency after remand. See, e.g., Bertrand v. Sullivan, 976 F.2d 977, 979 (5th
Cir. 1992); Singleton v. Bowen, 841 F.2d 710, 711-12 (7th Cir. 1988); McGill v. Secretary of Health
& Human Servs., 712 F.2d 28, 32 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1068, 104 S. Ct. 1420
(1984).
1180. Schaefer, 113 S. Ct. at 2628-31. Thus, it was settled law that a procedural victory in an
individual benefits case, followed by a remand to the agency, was insufficient to qualify the litigant
as a prevailing party. Id. For that reason, not only did district courts fail to enter formal judgments,
thereby starting the EAJA time clock, but the parties did not file applications for EAJA fees that
would have been premature under the law as it then existed. In Schaefer, the Supreme Court changed
course on this matter as well, announcing that a Social Security claimant who obtains a judgment
remanding a case to the administration becomes a prevailing party at the time of the court judgment,
notwithstanding that an actual award of benefits will not occur without further administrative
proceedings on remand. Id. at 2631-32. On prevailing party status in the peculiar context of Social
Security claims, see generally supra section III.A.2.b.
1181. Schaefer, 113 S. Ct. at 2629 (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1988)). See generally supra
section III.A.2.b (discussing prevailing party status in the context of government benefits programs
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remand only if the agency requests it before answering the complaint or where
new evidence is properly adduced, authorizes the district court to retain
jurisdiction and thereby delay entry of judgment until after the new agency
decision is filed with the court after the remand." 2  However, the vast
majority of Social Security case remands fall under sentence four of Section
405(g), which generally authorizes the reviewing court to affirm, modify, or
reverse a benefits determination, with or without a remand." 3 By the plain
language of sentence four, the court is directed to enter a judgment at the time
of any remand." 8 Thus, a sentence-four remand should be accompanied by
a final judgment which begins the EAJA time clock."8 Although a number
of district courts had mistakenly thought they could maintain continuing
jurisdiction over sentence-four remands and thus had failed to enter a Rule 58
judgment, the Schaefer decision has cleared the air and should henceforth ensure
that prompt final judgments are entered in these as well as in other cases."8 6
In the event that a district court in the future, in a Social Security or other
case, refuses to enter a formal Rule 58 judgment when the final disposition of
the matter is plain, the government would be entitled to a writ of mandamus
from the court of appeals directing the entry of a Rule 58 judgment so as to fix
the time-line for an EAJA fee application." 7 The extraordinary mandamus
power is sparingly exercised, and the writ may issue "only to enforce a clear
legal duty.""88 When the finality of a district court's decision on the merits
is undisputed, Rule 58 does indeed establish a mandatory and ministerial duty on
the part of the district court. Charles Alan Wright observes that "the require-
ments that the clerk act 'forthwith,' where the clerk has power to act, and that
the court act 'promptly,' where it must approve the form of judgment, indicate
that the process is not to be a dilatory one.""8 9 A district court that refuses
to observe this requirement, and thereby improperly holds open the time for
filing an EAJA petition, would be subject to mandamus either as abdicating a
judicial function"" or pursuant to "supervisory control of the District Courts
in general and the Social Security Act in particular).
1182. Schaefer, 113 S. Ct. at 2629 & nn.1-2 (discussing sentence six of Section 405(g)).
1183. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1988).
1184. Schaefer, 113 S. Ct. at 2629 (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1988), which provides in
sentence four that the court "shall have power to enter ... a judgment" with or without a remand).
1185. Schaefer, 113 S. Ct. at 2628-31.
1186. But see Otis v. City of Chicago, 29 F.3d 1159, 1163-64 (7th Cir. 1994) (observing that one
district court "has been less than punctilious in observing" the requirements of Rule 58, entering only
minute orders on the record, but failing to provide the clarity that a Rule 58 judgment produces, and
expressing the hope that the judges and staff of that district court "will take steps to ensure
compliance with Rule 58").
1187. See id. at 1166 (suggesting that a party entitled to entry of final judgment could "seek a
writ of mandamus if the judge does not supply the necessary document").
1188. Friedenthal et al., supra note 121, § 13.3, at 598.
1189. Wright, supra note 282, § 98, at 701-02 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 58).
1190. Friedenthal et al., supra note 121, § 13.3, at 599.
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by the Courts of Appeals [to ensure] proper judicial administration in the federal
system.""i .. Hopefully, the circumstances that would give rise to a proper
writ of mandamus will rarely come to pass.
3. Supplementation of the Application
Under EAJA Subsection (d)(1)(B), the fee petitioner is required, "within
thirty days of final judgment in the action," to submit an application for fees
which (1) shows that the party is the prevailing party, (2) demonstrates that the
party is eligible for an EAJA award, (3) alleges that the position of the United
States was not substantially justified, and (4) states the amount sought, including
an itemized statement from the attorney as to the actual time expended and the
rate at which fees are computed. 192  Accordingly, a proper application must
not only be filed within the 30-day statute of limitations but must also comply
with the statutory content requirements. Courts have regularly characterized the
timely filing of a proper EAJA fee application as a jurisdictional requirement,
reasoning that time limitations on relief against the sovereign must be strictly
construed and that the statute's use of the word "shall" compels a mandatory
reading of the requirement.1
9 3
In Dunn v. United States, 9 4 however, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit ruled that, while the time bar with respect to filing should
be strictly complied with, "deficiencies in the contents of the claim may be
corrected if the government cannot show any prejudice arising from the later
correction of those deficiencies.""s In that case, the fee petitioner filed a
claim within the 30-day period after final judgment, but the claim included
neither a specific amount of fees requested nor an itemized statement of the time
spent and the rate at which fees were computed." 96 Subsequently, but after
the 30-day period had elapsed, the petitioner filed an attorney's affidavit detailing
time records, asking for compensation at the statutory rate, and specifying a total
1191. La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 259-60, 77 S. Ct. 309, 315 (1957). See also
Wright, supra note 282, § 102, at 754 (discussing La Buy decision).
1192. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B) (1988).
1193. See, e.g., Newsome v. Shalala, 8 F.3d 775, 777 (11th Cir. 1993); Hafner v. Sullivan, 972
F.2d 249, 250 n.I (8th Cir. 1992); Peters v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 934 F.2d 693, 694
(6th Cir. 1991); Melkonyan v. Heckler, 895 F.2d 556, 557 (9th Cir. 1990), vacated on other grounds,
501 U.S. 89, 111 S. Ct. 2157 (1991); Action on Smoking & Health v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 724
F.2d 211, 225 (D.C. Cir. 1984). See also S. Rep. No. 586, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1984) (stating
that the issue of when a "judgment" is deemed "final" under the EAJA "is important since the thirty-
day deadline for filing the fee application is jurisdictional and cannot be waived.'). But see Luna
v. United States Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 948 F.2d 169, 173 (5th Cir. 1991) (ruling that
equitable tolling applies to statute of limitations for filing EAJA claims); Bacon v. Secretary of
Health & Human Servs., 786 F. Supp. 434, 438 (D.N.J. 1992) (ruling that the EAJA 30-day time
period is subject to equitable tolling principles).
1194. 775 F.2d 99 (3d Cir. 1985).
1195. Id. at 103.
1196. Id. at 101.
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amount." 97 The court of appeals characterized EAJA Subparagraph (d)(1)(B)
as establishing "two requirements: a time for filing, and a standard for plead-
ing." 98 The court concluded that strict compliance with the time requirement
is mandated for filing, but not for meeting the pleading standard.""
The Third Circuit reasoned that requiring timely filing serves the limited
purpose of establishing "a means certain for proving compliance with [the] time
bar. '"'2° However, the court stated:
[O]nce the claim is filed, whether or not it is as complete as it should
be, the interests of proof of timeliness and of finality and reliance have
been satisfied. What remains is the fleshing out of the details, and the
government has pointed out no governmental interest which is in any
way affected by the fact that the details of the fee claim came shortly
after the claim was filed. 120 1
The court believed that some degree of flexibility in meeting the pleading
requirements should be allowed, since "fee petitions must be prepared with great
care because they are often hotly contested."' 20 2 Accordingly, the court ruled
that as long as a fee petition is filed within the 30-day period, the court may
permit supplementation of its contents afterward.
Judge Adams dissented, concluding that the statute must be strictly applied
and that the court was therefore without jurisdiction to consider a defective fee
application. 2 3 He argued that the EAJA as a waiver of sovereign immunity
must be strictly construed and that the statute plainly states that a party "shall"
submit an application which "shows ... the amount sought, including an
itemized statement" of the actual time expended and rate at which fees are
computed. 2° Moreover, Judge Adams observed that the statute cannot
properly be read to differentiate between a jurisdictional filing requirement and
a non-jurisdictional content description:
In stating what is required of a petitioner, the statute uses mandato-
ry language. The requirement that an itemized statement be filed is
contained in the same sentence as the requirement that a claim be filed
within 30 days. Nothing in the wording or structure of the sentence
suggests that certain elements necessary to meet the statute's jurisdic-
tional prerequisites are more or less important than others, or that some
are to be interpreted more or less strictly than others.1
20 5
1197. Id. at 102.
1198. Id. at 103.
1199. Id.
1200. Id. at 103-04.
1201. Id. at 104.
1202. Id.
1203. Id. at 105-06 (Adams, J., dissenting).
1204. Id. at 105 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2412(dXl)(B) (1982)).
1205. Dunn, 775 F.2d at 105. See also United States v. Hopkins Dodge Sales, Inc., 707 F. Supp.
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Judge Adams' approach tracks the plain language of the statute. As he
recognizes, Subparagraph (d)(1)(B) expressly describes the application, which
must be filed within 30 days of final judgment, as a submission that includes
showings of prevailing party status, eligibility, and the fee amount sought as
proven by an itemized statement of time spent and an hourly rate, as well as an
allegation that the position of the United States was not substantially justi-
fied. 2  The application and its required contents are set forth together in the
text, and there is no basis for the Third Circuit's suggestion that the single
description may be divided into a mandatory filing requirement and a flexible
pleading standard.
Moreover, the Dunn majority's flexible approach effectively encourages
EAJA fee petitioners to file pro forma and superficial claims within the statute
of limitations period, safe in the knowledge that they may later supplement the
application with necessary details. If the application is not complete on the due
date, the necessary result is delay as both the court and the government wait for
the necessary supplementation before being able to take action upon or respond
to the EAJA fee request.20 7 The Third Circuit's approach also generates
confusion about what form of document, short of a complete submission
containing the elements outlined by the statute, might still qualify as a filing
sufficient to toll the 30-day period. In other words, how minimal or unfinished
may the paper be and still be regarded as an effective EAJA application?
Given the unambiguous direction of the statute as to what constitutes a
proper application to be submitted within 30 days of the final judgment, and the
interests of the judicial system in prompt disposition of claims, there is no excuse
for an EAJA application that is plainly deficient, as was the application in Dunn
which omitted the amount requested and the itemized statement in support of that
amount. When a fee petitioner has made a reasonable effort to file a complete
petition, one that materially complies with the content requirements, it should be
regarded as meeting the jurisdictional standard. Once the issue is fully joined,
with submission of an opposition by the government, a fee applicant may
properly submit additional information to bolster and further document a request.
Provided that the initial application makes a prima facie showing of prevailment,
eligibility, entitlement, and amount sought, including an itemized statement, the
need for additional evidence to respond to a challenge should not deprive the
court of jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter. But if an initial application is
plainly defective, and the content requirements of the statute are not materially
1078, 1080 (D. Minn. 1989) (stating that the requirement of showing eligible status "is contained in
the same sentence as the 30-day filing requirement," and therefore "a defective application which is
not completed until after the 30-day limit has run" is as fatal to the court's jurisdiction as a late filed
application).
1206. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B) (1988).
1207. See Hopkins Dodge Sales, 707 F. Supp. at 1081-82 ("Unless the government knows what
amount of fees are being sought and on what basis, it cannot know whether it is worthwhile to
contest the petition.").
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satisfied within the 30-day period, the application should be dismissed as
untimely and inadequate. 20 8
B. Procedure for Fee Applications
The courts have cautioned that "contests over fees should not be permitted
to evolve into exhaustive trial-type proceedings."' 2°9 Of course, as guaranteed
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(2)(C), "an opportunity for adversary
submissions" must be afforded by the district court with respect to the fee
motion.' 210  The court considering a fee petition should permit reasonable and
focused discovery into the basis for the hourly rate and into the legal services
performed.'' When the facts are disputed, the district court has discretion
to hold an evidentiary hearing, although frequently the documentation submitted
by each side will be sufficient for the court to resolve the matter.
2 1 2
Under Rule 54(d)(2)(C), the district court must support the fee award with
findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the award must be entered on a
separate judgment document. 2 " Although not required to provide detailed
findings, the district court must provide a "clear explanation" for the exercise of
discretion in making a fee award. 214  In the EAJA context in particular,
meaningful appellate review is possible only if the district court explains the
basis for its conclusion that the party is eligible for a fee award and that the
government's position is or is not substantially justified, including the factors that
it considered.' 215  Moreover, before extraordinary relief may be granted, such
1208. See id. at 1080-82 (rejecting Dunn and holding that an incomplete application for EAJA
fees that did not show eligibility for an award was inadequate and untimely).
1209. National Ass'n of Concerned Veterans v. Secretary of Defense, 675 F.2d 1319, 1324 (D.C.
Cir. 1982); see also Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 1941 (1983) ("[a]
request for attorney's fees should not result in a second major litigation").
1210. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(C).
1211. National Ass 'n of Concerned Veterans, 675 F.2d at 1329.
1212. Id. at 1330; see also Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 892 n.5, 104 S. Ct. 1541, 1545 n.5
(1984) (recognizing that an evidentiary hearing may be needed if facts are disputed). The Advisory
Committee Notes to amended Rule 54(d) state that while an evidentiary hearing may be necessary
in a particular case, it is not required in every case. Advisory Committee Notes on 1993
Amendments to Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 54(d)(2), 28 U.S.C. app. at 807 (Supp. V 1993). In addition, Rule
54(d)(2)(D) authorizes the district court to refer "issues relating to the value of services" to a special
master and the application for a fee award to a magistrate judge. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(D).
However, a magistrate judge does not have the power to make an independent and final decision on
an application for EAJA fees without de novo review by the district court. Rajaratnam v. Moyer,
47 F.3d 922, 923-25 (7th Cir. 1995).
1213. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(C).
1214. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 1941 (1983).
1215. See supra note 489 and accompanying text (arguing that a district court "must articulate
the bases for its [substantial justification] conclusion and provide a brief, but reasonably complete,
outline of the factors it considered"). See also Dunn v. United States, 842 F.2d 1420, 1432-35 (3d
Cir. 1988) (remanding an EAJA petition because the district court did not make adequate findings
on the question of whether the party had prevailed).
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as an enhancement of a fee above the EAJA statutory rate because of a "special
factor,"'2 6 specific findings are necessary.1
217
VII. CONCLUSION
A. The Past and Present of the EAJA
1. The Interpretation of the EAJA in the Courts
As this two-part article has amply demonstrated, the Equal Access to Justice
Act remains a constant focus of judicial attention fifteen years after its original
enactment. In virtually every volume of the Federal Reporter and Federal
Supplement, new decisions appear interpreting its provisions and applying its
standards. As always, when the law is implemented and refined through the
episodic venue of court cases, the body of jurisprudence grows in an irregular
manner and may lack systematic development. On several occasions, the
Supreme Court has intervened in disputes among the lower courts about the
EAJA to establish national uniformity, if not complete clarity, on such subjects
as the meaning of "substantial justification,"'" 8 the standard of appellate
review of EAJA determinations, 2"9 entitlement to compensation under EAJA
for legal expenses incurred in filing and litigating the fee application,1 0 and
the timing for filing an EAJA application. 22' On other issues, ranging from
the type of court with jurisdiction to award EAJA fees 22 2 to the nature of the
"special factors" that may justify an enhancement of an EAJA award above the
statutory rate ceiling,12 3 the courts remain divided and the struggle over
interpretation of this statute continues.
This author hopes the foregoing two-part article will contribute to the orderly
and informed resolution of these controversies. Within this comprehensive study,
every significant operative provision of the statute has been identified and
explored. This article has provided a critique and synthesis of the burgeoning
1216. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2XA) (1988) (establishing a ceiling of $75 per hour for fees in the
absence of a "special factor"). See generally supra section V.C (discussing enhancement of EAJA
fee on the basis of "special factors').
1217. See Vibra-Tech Eng'rs, Inc. v. United States, 787 F.2d 1416, 1420 (10th Cir. 1986)
(specific findings are necessary before EAJA rate may be enhanced); Aston v. Secretary of Health
and Human Servs., 808 F.2d 9, 11 (2d Cir. 1986) (same).
1218. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 563-68, 108 S. Ct. 2541, 2549-52 (1988). See
generally supra section IV.B.
1219. Pierce, 487 U.S. at 557-63, 108 S. Ct. at 2546-49. See generally supra section M.E.
1220. Commissioner v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 158-62, 110 S. Ct. 2316, 2319-21 (1990). See supra
section V.A.4.
1221. Shalala v. Schaefer, 113 S. Ct. 2625, 2628-32 (1993); Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89,
96, 111 S. Ct. 2157, 2162 (1991). See generally section VI.A.
1222. See generally supra section ll.B.
1223. See generally supra section V.C.
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body of caselaw that has grown up around the statute. In the tradition of the
scholarly treatise, this article was designed as both a reference work on an
important statute and a prescription for resolution of interpretive questions in a
manner that comports with the purpose and language of the Act. The article has
lingered on points of theoretical complexity or litigative intensity and given
special attention to unsettled areas of dispute or those in which a structured
analysis has not yet emerged from the court decisions. With primary recourse
to the language of the statute, and drawing upon the experience of the courts in
interpreting and applying the EAJA, the author has attempted to bring meaningful
order to this broad subject.
2. Achievement of the Purposes of the EAJA
In addition to the interpretive issues that have arisen in the courts, which
have been the focus of this article, a crucial question is whether the EAJA has
fulfilled its intended purposes, as revealed by the experiences of the past fifteen
years.2 4 Two important studies recently have concluded that the statute has
achieved mixed results and also had unanticipated effects."' s Through an
empirical study of court rulings on EAJA applications, Professors Susan Gluck
Mezey and Susan M. Olson found that, contrary to the desire of congressional
sponsors to encourage small business owners to challenge governmental
regulation,'2 6 small businesses have not used the statute in large numbers and
there is no evidence that the EAJA has contributed much to reducing government
regulation. 2 2 7 Instead, as these scholars discovered, "an unanticipated group
of beneficiaries-Social Security disability plaintiffs-flooded the federal courts
with EAJA petitions."' '5 Indeed, claimants for entitlements, including Social
Security disability benefits claimants, are by far the largest category of EAJA
petitioners, while businesses, small or large, represent only about 11%."'9
And, far from promoting deregulation, the EAJA has invited almost as many
petitioners in cases affirmatively requesting regulatory enforcement as those
challenging government regulation. 2 10  Moreover, when turning from the
1224. See generally section I.B.3 (explaining the purposes behind the EAJA as providing an
incentive for parties to contest government misconduct, deterring government wrongdoing, and
compensating citizens injured by unjustified government action).
1225. Mezey & Olson, supra note 230; Krent, supra note 156.
1226. See H.R. Rep. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4984, 4988 (explaining that the EAJA was being enacted as a rider to a small business assistance bill
to reflect the concern of Congress that small businesses were being subjected to arbitrary regulation
by federal administrators and "that small businesses are the target of agency action precisely because
they do not have the resources to fully litigate the issue"); S. Rep. No. 253, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 5
(1979) (same).
1227. Mezey & Olson, supra note 230, at 13, 17.
1228. Id. at 13.
1229. Id. at 17.
1230. Id. at 17.
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question of who brought claims for fees to who prevailed upon them, Professors
Mezey and Olson found that EAJA petitions by Social Security claimants were
successful up to 70% of the time, while business fee petitions were granted only
in 28% of those cases.' In sum, they perceive the statute as being used in
a quite different manner than was envisioned at the time of enactment. 2
Professor Harold J. Krent, in a study conducted under the auspices of the
Administrative Conference of the United States, concluded that the EAJA has
"yielded only limited benefits."'23 3 He found that the EAJA generally does
not encourage even small entities or impecunious individuals to challenge
unreasonable government conduct.'23 For most private parties, sufficient
incentives to contest government action in court already exist, either because of
the monetary stakes or the importance of the principle involved. 123S Moreover,
given that an EAJA award is available only when the government's position is
found to be without substantial justification, the prospect of which can seldom
be predicted in advance, the EAJA provides only a weak incentive to initiate a
lawsuit. 2
3
Professor Krent suggests that the potential for deterrence of governmental
misconduct under the EAJA is similarly limited, but not entirely absent." 7
When the government adopts a general policy or promulgates a regulation, these
decisions are generally influenced by broad political forces and follow a lengthy
internal deliberate process." 8 Accordingly, the possibility of an award of
EAJA attorney's fees in a subsequent challenge to the policy or regulation is
unlikely to be a significant factor in policy-making decisions. 239 By contrast,
however, the prospect of an award of attorney's fees may motivate an individual
federal official implementing a policy in a fact-specific case. 2 ' Professor
Krent found that "[m]ost successful EAJA applications stem from what may be
characterized as challenges to government implementation decisions."' 24
In the end, Professor Krent seems right to pronounce the EAJA as a
"qualified success.'1 242  As a mechanism for general refinement and reform
of regulatory administration, which was one of the motivations of the original
sponsors, 24 3 the statute has been a disappointment. The lesson to be drawn
1231. Id. at 18.
1232. Id. at 13.
1233. Krent, supra note 156, at 507.
1234. Id. at 463-67.
1235. Id. at 464.
1236. Id. at 466.
1237. Id. at 467-76.
1238. Id. at 468-69.
1239. Id. at 471-72.
1240. Id. at 469-70, 472-73.
1241. Id. at 470.
1242. Id. at 458 (title of article).
1243. H.R Rep. No. 1418,96th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4984,
4991; see also Commissioner v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 165 n.14, 110 S. Ct. 2316, 2322 n.14 (1990)
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here, as Professors Mezey and Olson put it, is "that fee-shifting statutes are a
problematic method of achieving substantive legislative policy goals."'
2
"
However, as a modest means for controlling governmental misconduct directed
against particular citizens, Professor Krent states that "one cannot totally discount
the potential for deterrence."' 2 5 Indeed, it is precisely in such a fact-specific
context, where administrators are not formulating general policy and thus may
be acting without substantial political checks or public attention,'"" that the
need for a "watch dog" device is greatest. Professors Mezey and Olson found
that EAJA petitions in cases by individuals challenging government operations
were relatively few in number and successful only a little more than half of the
time. 2 7 But even those few successful claims should cause the administrators
or offices involved and other administrators familiar with the matter to
second-guess their exercise of enforcement discretion or operational authority in
future instances."' The deterrent effect of an EAJA rebuke may be marginal
when viewed from a government-wide perspective, yet be concrete and
meaningful in certain discrete circumstances or sectors of government activity.
Under at least some circumstances and some of the time, the EAJA undoubtedly
causes administrators in an agency office whose actions led to a fee award to
re-evaluate the bases for bringing a particular enforcement or other action against
certain categories of citizens or to reconsider the manner in which a program is
implemented.
In any event, the EAJA cannot help but be successful in compensating
citizens 'for expenses incurred in successfully challenging unreasonable
government conduct. Whatever may be the effect of an EAJA award upon
general governmental policy or future circumstances, it plainly does directly
benefit the individual or entity who prevails against unjustifiable government
behavior in that particular case. As Professor Krent writes, "[tihere is
undeniably normative appeal in providing that those injured by the government
receive complete compensation for their injuries."'249 As a matter of correc-
tive justice, it is just and equitable that a citizen forced into litigation because the
(quoting favorably from the committee report accompanying the 1980 EAJA legislation and stating
that these reports "reflect the dual concerns of access for individuals and improvement of Government
policies").
1244. Mezey & Olson, supra note 230, at 20.
1245. Krent, supra note 156, at 474.
1246. Id. at 474-75.
1247. Mezey & Olson, supra note 230, at 18.
1248. Compare Mezey & Olson, supra note 230, at 19 ("The governmental actors involved in the
original 'unjustified' action are likely to be different from and possibly unknown to those involved
in an award of fees years later. The chances are small that one event would be able to deter another,
remote one.") with Kxent, supra note 156, at 473 n.59 (arguing that the deterrent effect of an EAJA
award is stronger in the particular operation context than in the context of formulation of general
policy because "there is likely less of a time gap between the case-specific implementation of policy
and the judicial resolution of any subsequent challenge').
1249. Krent, supra note 156, at 477.
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government acted in an inexcusable manner be made whole, including compensa-
tion for legal expenses. 25 Although the EAJA may not be a perfect compen-
sation mechanism even for this limited purpose, 25' it is certainly a step in the
right direction of recognizing the government's responsibility toward citizens that
it has wronged. At a minimum, then, the EAJA serves "a salutary function in
creating the appearance of fairness" by providing more complete compensation
to those who have suffered a breach of the public trust through the arbitrary and
unreasonable use of government power. "
In sum, despite its flaws, and the compromises and limitations contained
within its provisions, the EAJA is worthy of preservation. However, the
experience of the EAJA in the courts, viewed both in terms of interpretive
caselaw and legal theory, as in this article, and in terms of empirical observa-
tions, as in the two studies discussed above, indicates that it is time for a
periodic review and revision of the statute by Congress.
B. The Future of the EAJA
1. Periodic Revision of Statutes by Congress
As time passes and experience with a statute develops, unanticipated issues,
unexpected consequences, and latent ambiguities may arise. Although the courts
necessarily must attempt to construe a statute to resolve ambiguities and to apply
it to new circumstances, it is healthy for Congress to revisit an enactment from
time to time and clarify or modify a provision in the light of experience. The
fabric of statutory law is strengthened when an act is again stretched upon the
legislative loom, upon which it was originally woven, for democratic patching
of holes and mending of tears, to re-stitch areas that have become frayed, and to
re-tailor the garment to fit the current fashion.
Based upon his study, Professor Krent 2 53 and the Administrative Confer-
ence which sponsored his study,254 have suggested several potential revisions
1250. See 131 Cong. Rec. S9,998 (daily ed. July 24, 1985) (remarks of Sen. Bumpers):
And there is not a Member of this body who has not found on his or her doorstep citizens
who have been wronged by their own Government. At worst, a career or a life may be
ruined; at best, the individual has been wrongly accused and has had to incur great
expense to clear his name .... Equal access to justice made the promise of justice to
these people who had gone to great expense to challenge agency wrong, or who had
successfully defended themselves against wrongful agency action.
1251. See Krent, supra note 156, at 477-78 (arguing that "the EAJA as a whole cannot easily be
rationalized as a compensation mechanism" because it is available only to parties in cases where the
government has waived sovereign immunity as to the underlying claim, excludes many disputes from
its coverage, limits the eligibility of parties, and allows compensation only when the government has
been shown to be without substantial justification).
1252. See id. at 478.
1253. Id. at 494-506.
1254. Recommendations of the Administrative Conference Regarding Administrative Practice and
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to the EAJA. Recently, Senator Russell Feingold has introduced a bill in
Congress proposing substantial changes in the statute. 12 5  In addition, the
foregoing two-part article, through the study of court decisions and critical
analysis of interpretive disputes, confirms the propriety of certain proposed
clarifications and modifications to the EAJA, although this author believes at
least one of the proposed changes would be unwise and would amount to a
radical and mistaken shift in policy by creating an excessive incentive to resort
to litigation to resolve political disputes and policy disagreements.
2. Revision of the "Substantial Justification" Standard
a. The Effects and Costs of the "Substantial Justification" Standard
The heart of the EAJA-and the focus of most of the litigation concerning
the statute-is the provision for a mandatory award of attorney's fees unless the
"position of the United States was substantially justified."'' 25 6 The "substantial
justification" standard was deliberately chosen by Congress, rather than an
automatic award of fees to prevailing parties, in order to prevent a "chilling
effect on reasonable Government enforcement efforts, ' 1 257 and because of the
potentially large cost to the government that would be generated by a mandatory
fee-shifting provision.2 8  Moreover, the "substantial justification" standard
Procedure, 57 Fed. Reg. 30,101, 30,108 (1992).
1255. S. 554, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995), reprinted in 141 Cong. Rec. S3,897 (daily ed. March
14, 1995). Senator Feingold's proposal was offered on the Senate floor as an amendment to
comprehensive regulatory reform legislation. 141 Cong. Rec. S9,891-93 (daily ed. July 13, 1995)
(text of Amendment 1536 and remarks of Sen. Feingold). The amendment was adopted by a voice
vote by the Senate, but with the "reluctan[t]" acceptance of the majority leadership, which stated that
the matter was "controversial" and was being allowed to "pass without comment at this time" to
show a willingness to work with Senator Feingold in the future. 141 Cong. Rec. S9,897 (daily ed.
July 13, 1995) (voice vote and remarks of Sen. Hatch). This is an apparent indication that the
amendment would be revisited as the legislation progressed. At the time this article was written, the
regulatory reform legislation was stalled in the Senate with the failure of a cloture vote to end debate.
141 Cong. Rec. S10,399-400 (daily ed. July 20, 1995) (failure of cloture vote to close debate). See
also 141 Cong. Rec. S10,487-88 (daily ed. July 21, 1995) (remarks of Sen. Roth) (discussing failure
of comprehensive regulatory reform); 141 Cong. Rec. S10,504 (daily ed. July 21, 1995) (remarks of
Sen. Johnston) (discussing "collapse of efforts to enact comprehensive and meaningful regulatory
reform"). Because Senator Feingold revised the proposal when it was introduced as an amendment
to the regulatory reform legislation, references in this article to his proposal are to that Amendment
1536 as reprinted in the Congressional Record. Amendment 1536, reprinted in 141 Cong. Rec.
S9,891 (daily ed. July 13, 1995).
1256. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1988). See generally sections IV.B to IV.D.
1257. S. Rep. No. 253, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1979). See also H.R. Rep. No. 1418, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess. 13-14 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4984, 4992 (explaining that a "mandatory
award was rejected because it did not account for the reasonable and legitimate exercise of
governmental functions and thus might have a chilling effect on proper government enforcement
efforts').
1258. H.R. Rep. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4984,
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is integrated with the fundamental purposes behind the EAJA of deterring
unreasonable government conduct and compensating citizens who successfully
challenge inexcusable government behavior. As both the House and Senate
Reports on the original EAJA stated, the "standard balances the constitutional
obligation of the executive branch to see that the laws are faithfully executed
against the public interest in encouraging parties to vindicate their rights."' 9
As with any compromise,126 the adoption of the "substantial justification"
standard entails costs as well as benefits. The necessity of an inquiry into
whether the government's position was substantially justified unavoidably adds
an element of complexity to the fee phase of the litigation and therefore increases
the costs of dispute resolution.'26' Although some of these costs appear to be
unnecessary and attributable to an unwise allocation of litigation resources by
some government attorneys who fail to appreciate when it is wiser to settle a fee
dispute, 1262 the standard itself unquestionably complicates the inquiry. Never-
theless, the pertinent question is not only the costs of the present standard but
also what costs and consequences would attach to an alternative. In this author's
view, as discussed immediately below, the alternative of automatic fee-shifting
is much less palatable than the admittedly imperfect present approach.
Moreover, this author remains optimistic that the collateral burdens
attributable to the "substantial justification" standard may be reduced through a
more structured and rational inquiry that minimizes the need for "relitigation" of
the case at the fee application stage. 2 63  First, as discussed at length in this
article,' 2" courts should more readily appreciate the interrelationship between
the basis for the decision of the case on the merits and the question of
4985 (describing how earlier fee-shifting proposals failed in part because of "the high projected costs
to the United States"). See also Spencer v. NLRB, 712 F.2d 539, 550-51 & n.43 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(discussing, with citation to the legislative hearings on the EAJA, Congress's fear of "the potentially
huge cost to the government of an automatic fee-shifting provision"), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 936, 104
S. Ct. 1908 (1984).
1259. H.R. Rep. No. 1418,96th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4984,
4989; S. Rep. No. 253, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 6 (1979).
1260. See H.R. Rep. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4984, 4993 (describing the "substantial justification" standard as a "middle ground between an
automatic award of fees and the restrictive standard proposed by the Department of Justice" (which
would have allowed an award of fees only when the government's action was arbitrary or frivolous));
S. Rep. No. 253, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1979) (same).
1261. See generally Krent, supra note 156, at 479-94 (discussing the litigation costs associated
with the government's assertion of substantial justification as a defense to an EAJA award and the
impact of the uncertain standard on the likelihood of settlement).
1262. See id. at 487-91 (finding that empirical data suggest that the money saved by the
government through litigation of EAJA fee disputes was only modestly in excess of the costs incurred
in terms of additional fees paid for the fee phase of the litigation and the value of the government
attorneys time).
1263. See id. at 481 (stating that the "substantial justification standard in effect requires parties
to relitigate their underlying dispute").
1264. See supra section IV.C.
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reasonableness at the EAJA award stage of the litigation. While the substantial
justification analysis cannot be collapsed into the earlier ruling on the merits, the
two nevertheless cannot be divorced from one another. Moreover, under certain
circumstances, the nature of the decision on the merits will lead directly to a
finding of want of "substantial justification.' 265
Second, as also discussed above,' 2" while the "substantial justification"
standard can never be an exercise in mechanical jurisprudence, this author
believes that the process can be simplified and the legal debate sharpened by
identifying the patterns in the case law. The standard of reasonableness is
largely an objective one, and one that is very familiar in the law." Certain
relatively objective factors or circumstances arising in litigation with the federal
government may give rise to a weak inference or a strong presumption that
"substantial justification" has or has not been established.26' While a standard
of reasonableness must always remain flexible, this author believes that a
distillation of the case law over the past decade reveals the emergence of
guidelines to the application of sound judicial discretion. Even after fifteen
years, the EAJA remains a relatively young statute, and further experience may
yet fulfill the promise of a more systematic approach toward the "substantial
justification" inquiry.
b. A Critique of the Proposal to Eliminate the "Substantial
Justification" Requirement
The centerpiece of Senator Feingold's legislative proposal is the elimination
of the "substantial justification" standard, thereby converting the EAJA into an
automatic fee-shifting provision. 2 69 In other words, any eligible party who
prevailed in civil litigation with the federal government within the broad scope
of the EAJA would be entitled to a fee award without the requirement of any
additional showing that the government's position was unreasonable.
270
1265. See, e.g., Federal Election Comm'n v. Political Contributions Data, Inc., 995 F.2d 383, 386-
87 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1064 (1994); Estate of Smith v. O'Halloran, 930 F.2d
1496, 1501-02 (10th Cir. 1991). See generally supra section IV.C.4.
1266. See supra section IV.D.
1267. See Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 568, 108 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (1988) (adopting the
measure of reasonableness as the meaning of "substantial justification" under the EAJA in part
because the fixed meaning associated with this familiar standard better assures "steady and consistent
judicial behavior").
1268. See supra section IV.D.
1269. Amendment 1536, § (f), reprinted in 141 Cong. Rec. S9,891 (daily ed. July 13, 1995).
1270. Interestingly, Senator Feingold's proposal would not lift the parallel "substantial
justification" requirement in the internal revenue fee-shifting statute. See 26 U.S.C. §
7430(cX4)(A)(i) (1988) (placing burden upon fee claimant in internal revenue case to "establish[] that
the position of the United States in the proceeding was not substantially justified'). See generally
section 1.D (discussing exclusion of internal revenue cases from the EAJA and adoption of Section
7430). Thus, while Senator Feingold's legislation would invite those making demands upon the
federal government or challenging government policy decisions to take recourse to the courts with
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This proposal would achieve, not a mere modification of the EAJA, but
rather a revolutionary transformation that would dramatically alter the premises
behind the statute and reshape it into a funding mechanism for unrestrained
growth in litigation against the government. The adoption of such a proposal
would reflect a decided shift toward resolution of policy disagreements in the
courts, inviting those with political grievances to bring them into the courtroom
and, if successful, receive government funding for their efforts. No longer would
the government be liable for attorney's fees only when it has engaged in
misconduct (thereby becoming subject to EAJA fees) or when it has violated
fundamental rights (thereby becoming subject to fee-shifting provisions attached
to such statutes as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act). 1271 Under this proposed
new regime, whenever the government adopted a policy, promulgated a
regulation, or took any action-and was overturned on judicial review for any
reason-its opponent in court would be reimbursed for the legal expense of
instituting litigation.
The dramatic effect of Senator Feingold's sweeping proposal can be
illustrated by considering its application in the context of judicial review of the
promulgation of administrative regulations under the Administrative Procedure
Act.112 As Professor Krent explains, the adoption of general regulatory policy
takes place within "an intricate web of political checks."' 27 3 Especially when
agency policy is adopted formally through notice-and-comment rulemaking,
considerable internal debate generally occurs, interested private parties are
afforded an opportunity to be heard and to influence the process, and congressio-
nal committees may learn of policy initiatives before they are implemented. 2 74
After the fact, Congress, of course, always retains the power to correct what it
believes are mistaken agency policy decisions. Nevertheless, under Senator
Feingold's proposal, those who are dissatisfied with the political process and
choose to pursue policy goals in court and succeed in litigation would be
compensated for their efforts, notwithstanding how closely balanced the issues
may have been or how reasonably, albeit mistakenly, the government agency
may have acted. The general availability of fees to prevailing parties in civil
litigation with the government would provide a potent incentive for frequent
the prospect of recovery of attorney's fees if they win on the merits, the ordinary citizen who is most
likely to encounter the federal government through the tax collector would not be relieved of the
existing obligation to prove unreasonable conduct before securing a fee award.
1271. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). See generally Sisk, supra note 33, at
769-70 (discussing awards of attorney's fees against the federal government under the Civil Rights
of 1964).
1272. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1994).
1273. Krent, supra note 156, at 468.
1274. Id. at 468-69. See generally Alfred C. Aman, Jr. & William T. Mayton, Administrative
Law §§ 2.1.1-2.1.4, at 47-58 (1993) (discussing public participation and opportunity for comment in
agency rulemaking decisions); id. §§ 16.1.1-16.1.2, at 607-11 (discussing political and statutory
controls on agencies imposed by Congress)..
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resort to the lawsuit as the preferred means toward political ends. 12 75 Indeed,
by creating such a powerful incentive for litigation, this proposal would lure
many toward the romantic venue of the court battle and away from the less
exciting and more difficult, yet essential, labor of democratic government. While
judicial review should remain available as a check on agency error, the public
should not subsidize resort to litigation by those who fail to get their way in an
open administrative process.
In the wake of such a tectonic shift in policy, we could expect a proliferation
of "public interest," trade association, and other assorted litigation groups. Each
success in the courts would result in an influx of funds to these organizations,
through automatic fee-shifting awards, thereby enhancing their ability to expand
litigation efforts in the future. 276  Moreover, individual attorneys would be
able to establish economically viable practices devoted to federal government
litigation, depending upon fee-shifting awards in successful cases to bridge the
gap when fee-paying clients are inadequate to keep the practice afloat. Indeed,
because potential parties to litigation with the federal government may not have
incurred any direct injury, "the strongest incentive to sue [may be] the attractive
likelihood of recovering litigation expenses."'2 77 A broad automatic fee-shift-
ing statute thus would encourage entrepreneurial attorneys to explore potential
lawsuits, prepare claims, and then search for an individual to play the nominal
role of party. If Congress determines that it truly desires to provide financial
encouragement through public funds to those pursuing policy goals through
litigation, it might better achieve that end through a direct and targeted subsidy
to legal aid organizations rather than through the inefficient and haphazard
mechanism of fee-shifting.
12 7
As a further and related consequence, the budgetary impact of a revolution-
ized EAJA might be substantial and continue to accumulate as the incentive to
litigate takes concrete effect and the availability of the litigation fundraising
mechanism becomes known in the legal community. Professor Krent reports that
while the federal government pays almost 2,000 EAJA awards in a typical year,
the government loses an estimated 18,000 civil cases a year.'27  Although
many of the prevailing parties in such cases might not meet the eligibility
1275. See Bruce Fein, Citizen Suit Attorney Fee Shifting Awards: A Critical Examination of
Government-"Subsidized" Litigation, 47 Law & Contemp. Probs. 211, 231 (1984) ("Awards of
attorney fees greatly increase policy-oriented litigation, thus affording unaccountable judges greater
opportunity to make decisions more appropriately made by elected branches of government.").
1276. See id. at 218 (observing that special interest groups, through the availability of fee-shifting
with low entitlement standards, "are able to increase immensely the amount of litigation they
undertake because the government effectively 'subsidizes' their suits').
1277. Id. at 213.
1278. See Dan B. Dobbs, Awarding Attorney Fees Against Adversaries: Introducing the Problem,
1986 Duke L.J. 435, 489-90 (1986) (suggesting that the costs in money and adjudication resources
associated with fee-shifting should prompt serious consideration about the alternative approach of
enhancing legal aid offices with public funds).
1279. Krent, supra note 156, at 458-59 & n.5.
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standards of the EAJA,' 0 there nevertheless can be no doubt that adoption
of an automatic fee-shifting provision would multiply the number of EAJA
awards several-fold. Moreover, the EAJA also covers certain types of
administrative proceedings,'"8 and Senator Feingold's proposal would lift the
"substantial justification" limitation in that context as well."" The present
EAJA, with its "substantial justification" standard, has not resulted in major
demands upon the public treasury, 3 in large part because the vast majority
of the awards have been made in Social Security cases where the claims are
relatively small.M Under a revolutionized EAJA, however, an increasing
number of cases involving more complex litigation, and therefore higher legal
expenses, would conclude with successful fee petitions. The prospect of a
mandatory award upon prevailing would encourage litigants to devote greater
legal resources, thereby enhancing the size of later fee applications, due to the
more favorable prospect of success. In sum, under Senator Feingold's
legislation, both the number and size of fee awards likely would grow exponen-
tially.
Elimination of the "substantial justification" standard would simultaneously
eviscerate some of the original purposes behind the EAJA. One of the key
purposes behind the statute, which this author believes has achieved at least some
marginal success,' is to cause government officials to "stop-and-think" and
thereby avoid ill-considered or arbitrary exercises of power. Congress sought to
deter wrongful behavior by federal officials and regulators, "anticipat[ing] that
the prospect of paying sizable awards of attorneys' fees when they overstepped
their authority and were challenged in court would induce administrators to
behave more responsibly in the future.' 28 6 Indeed, the EAJA makes fee
1280. Id. at 459 n.5.
1281. Under 5 U.S.C. § 504 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), fee awards are available on essentially the
same terms as the court EAJA in "adversarial adjudications" conducted pursuant to the Administrative
Procedure Act in which the United States is represented by counsel or otherwise. 5 U.S.C. §
504(b)(1)(C) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). See generally sections I.B.2 (outlining the Section 504
administrative version of the EAJA) and lII.A.2.b (discussing prevailing party status in the unique
context of Social Security claims).
1282. Amendment 1536, § (f)(1), reprinted in 141 Cong. Rec. S9,891 (daily ed. July 13, 1995).
1283. In 1992, the Administrative Conference reported that the federal government has paid about
$5 to $7 million in EAJA fees annually in recent years. Recommendations of the Administrative
Conference Regarding Administrative Practice and Procedure, 57 Fed. Reg. 30,101, 30,108 (1992).
1284. Professor Krent's study found, based upon reports from the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts, that only a small percentage of EAJA applications did not arise out of Social
Security benefits litigation, but that the median award for successful applications in this non-Social
Security group of cases was $40,000 and the mean award was $48,000. Krent, supra note 156, at
485. By comparison, Professor Krent found the mean award for successful EAJA applications
reported by the Social Security Administration was $3,244. Id. at 487-88. An automatic fee-shifting
provision likely would result in more cases being filed, more claims being made, and more awards
being granted in the non-Social Security category of cases.
1285. See supra section VII.A.2 (discussing whether the EAJA has achieved its purposes).
1286. Spencer v. NLRB, 712 F.2d 539, 550 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 936, 104 S.
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awards under Subsection (d) payable from agency funds to further the statute's
purpose in deterring unreasonable government conduct.
12 7
However, if a fee award would be automatically paid whenever the govern-
ment's position failed in court, regardless of the reasonableness of its conduct,
then deterrence of wrongdoing would disappear. Government decision-makers
would be left with no safe harbor to avoid a fee award-other than the
unrealistic one of always being right or possessing the gift of prophecy with
respect to the rulings of the judiciary. Government officials might not be chilled
from taking initiative by the prospect of a mandatory fee award, 288 but even
the modest deterrent effect of the present EAJA would be lost if fee awards are
not linked to a finding of fault. In other words, if everyone is punished, then no
one is punished. Payment of fees would become a routine and largely
unpredictable part of doing government business. In fact, the chilling effect of
a revolutionized EAJA would flow, not only from the cost of an award of
Ct. 1908 (1984). See also 131 Cong. Rec. S9,992 (daily ed. July 24, 1985) (remarks of Sen.
Grassley) (stating that "the purpose of the Equal Access to Justice Act is to make Government
bureaucrats think long and hard before they start an enforcement action").
1287. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(4) (1988). As Professor Krent explains, "if fee awards come out of
the implementing agency's budget, as they largely do under the EAJA, then the possibility of
deterrence increases. Agency officials, like managers in private firms, are then forced to internalize
the costs of their actions more fully, for they recognize that adverse fee awards may prevent them
from pursuing other policy objectives." Krent, supra note 808, at 2066 (footnote omitted).
Oddly, Senator Feingold's revised legislation expressly mandates continued payment of EAJA fees
from agency resources, by precluding payment of fees from the general "Judgment Fund" established
in 31 U.S.C. § 1304 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Amendment 1536, § (d), reprinted in 141 Cong. Rec.
S9,891 (daily ed. July 13, 1995). Senator Feingold holds onto this punitive provision, notwithstand-
ing his proposed elimination of the "substantial justification" standard, and with it the deterrence
purpose of the statute. If the "substantial justification" standard were to be removed, and thus
liability for fees would no longer turn upon the fault of the agency, then there would no longer be
any basis for imposing the burden of fee awards upon the individual agency. If the EAJA is
transformed into an automatic fee-shifting provision, then fees payable under EAJA Subsection (d)
should be payable from the Judgment Fund, just as are fee awards against the federal government
under EAJA Subsection (b), which makes the federal government liable for fees on the same basis
as a private party. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(c)(2) (1988) (providing that awards of attorney's fees made
pursuant to Subsection (b) are payable by the United States, unless the award is based upon the
common-law rule permitting fees for bad faith conduct. in which case the award must be charged
against agency funds).
1288. See Krent, supra note 156, at 475-76 (arguing that government officials would likely not
be overdeterred from taking action by an automatic fee-shifting provision). However, while
administrators may not be overdeterred by the elimination of the "substantial justification" standard,
the preservation of the peculiar rule requiring payment of any award from agency funds would create
a destabilizing source of overdeterrence. See supra note 1287. By punishing an agency without a
finding of fault (such as occurs by application of the "substantial justification" standard), government
officials would be deterred, not from misconduct, but from any activity that might lead to litigation.
In other words, agencies would be deterred not from taking unreasonable action as such, but rather
from losing lawsuits. And since the outcome of litigation is often unpredictable, the safest course
may be an abundance of caution and studious avoidance of any vigorous action that could lead to
litigation. But see infra note 1289.
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attorney's fees, but rather from the unrestrained growth in lawsuits against
agencies and administrators that would follow from the powerful incentive
created by an automatic fee-shifting provision. Because even unsuccessful
litigation may substantially delay administrative action, and successful litigation
raises the specter of judicial intervention in policy decisions, the transformed
EAJA might well encourage administrators to forgo vigorous enforcement of the
law and eschew controversy to avoid being hauled into court." 9
In addition, the claim of the citizen for full compensation for the necessary
costs of initiating litigation is at its zenith when resisting government overreach-
ing and contesting inexcusable behavior. When the government is found under
the. EAJA to have acted without "substantial justification," the legal expenses
incurred by the private party cannot be dismissed as the customary costs of legal
action properly borne by every litigant. The "substantial justification" standard
gives added force to the principle of corrective justice in the context of the
EAJA.1290
Finally, Senator Feingold's proposal would also eliminate the statutory
exception authorizing denial of a fee award when "special circumstances make
an award unjust."1 29'  The accompanying statement by Senator Feingold
provides no explanation for removing this provision, 129 2 which grants the
courts the equitable power to refuse to grant a fee award to a party that has
engaged in egregious misconduct or for other exceptional reasons. 2 93 Instead,
it appears that the "special circumstances" provision was inadvertently swept
along with the proposed elimination of the "substantial justification" standard
simply because both provisions are included in the same sentence of the
EAJA. 1294 In any event, this additional suggested alteration, intended or not,
further suggests that legislative revision of the EAJA should be carefully
considered through the congressional committee process and not by hasty
amendment on the floor.
1289. Even this strategy might prove unavailing, as special interest groups desiring greater
government regulation or involvement in an area could seek judicial injunctions commanding the
government to affirmatively intervene.
1290. Rowe, supra note 22, at 657 (stating that a "party subjected to a baseless suit, forced to run
up legal fees to overcome a groundless defense, or subjected to unjustified tactics in litigation, has
an appealing claim for recompense of legal fees he should not have had to spend.").
1291. Amendment 1536, § (f)(2), reprinted in 141 Cong. Rec. S9,891 (daily ed. July 13, 1995)
(proposing deletion of language from 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1988) providing that attorney's fees
should be awarded "unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially
justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust").
1292. See 141 Cong. Rec. S9,892-93 (daily ed. July 13, 1995) (remarks of Sen. Feingold).
1293. See generally supra section IV.F (discussing the "special circumstances" exception).
1294. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(l)(A) (1988) (providing that attorney's fees should be awarded
"unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special
circumstances make an award unjust").
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3. Revising Fee-Shifting in the Unique Context of Social Security Claims
Although Senator Feingold cites Professor Krent's study in support of his
proposal to convert the EAJA into an automatic fee-shifting provision,1
9 5
Professor Krent ultimately concludes that the arguments for expanding
fee-shifting against the government in general are "shaky."' 2" Professor
Krent, 297 and the Administrative Conference, 298 instead more modestly and
appropriately recommend that automatic fee-shifting be adopted for individual
benefits claims cases, such as those arising under the Social Security Act.'299
This author agrees that, in this unique context, an automatic fee-shifting
provision is preferable as a matter of theory and practice, to the present EAJA
regime. Moreover, whereas automatic fee-shifting introduces an excessive
incentive to resort to litigation in contexts where there are other vehicles for
political participation, the unrepresented claimant for government benefits has
little meaningful opportunity to participate in an open governmental process and
subsequent litigation may be necessary both to secure the entitled benefit and to
uncover governmental wrongdoing.
Professor Krent summarizes the argument for automatic fee-shifting for
claims by individuals seeking government benefits as follows:
Automatic fee shifting would provide incentive for parties to bring
small, strong claims that might not otherwise attract counsel. Moreover,
there is greater need to deter government officials who make fact-speci-
fic judgments due to the absence of internal political checks safeguard-
ing enforcement choices. Automatic fee shifting would also lessen the
temptation of private attorneys to bypass the EAJA and collect their fees
from back benefits awards to the detriment of their clients. At the same
time, the deferential standard of review afforded individual benefits
1295. 141 Cong. Rec. S9,892-83 (daily ed. July 13, 1995) (remarks of Sen. Feingold); 141 Cong.
Rec. S3,896-97 (daily ed. March 14, 1995) (remarks of Sen. Feingold).
1296. Krent, supra note 156, at 495.
1297. Id. at 495-501.
1298. Recommendations of the Administrative Conference Regarding Administrative Practice and
Procedure, 57 Fed. Reg. 30,101, 30,109 (1992).
1299. Professor Krent's proposal would apply to all individual benefits claims brought directly
under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1988), the provision authorizing judicial review of Social Security claims,
and other individual benefits statutes that cross-reference Section 405(g), such as the Medicare Act,
42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(b) (1988). Krent, supra note 156, at 495 n.127. By contrast, Professor Krent
would not extend automatic fee-shifting to applications for fees arising out of class actions
challenging Social Security Administration regulations, because these actions "typically challenge
policy formulated or implemented by the agency" rather than involving disputes arising from a
particular benefits determination. Id. at 497 n.136. The recommendation of the Administrative
Conference is the same. Recommendations of the Administrative Conference Regarding
Administrative Practice and Procedure, 57 Fed. Reg. 30,101, 30,109 (1992).
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determinations minimizes the potential chilling of conscientious govern-
ment action. 3°°
As a practical matter, the EAJA virtually is an automatic fee-shifting statute
in the Social Security claimant context. Although reporting slightly different
results based upon different sets of data, both Professor Krent's study 30 ' and
Professors Mezey's and Olson's study 30 2 found that the overwhelming
majority of Social Security claimants who filed EAJA petitions after prevailing
in court were successful in obtaining awards, notwithstanding the substantial
justification standard. Thus, a transition to an automatic fee-shifting approach
with respect to these cases should be smooth and without significant increase in
costs to the government.
As a matter of legal theory, this author concludes on the basis of the analysis
in this article that attorney's fees under the EAJA should indeed be uniformly
awarded in Social Security disability cases. As addressed in this article, 30 3
when the standard for judicial review on the merits parallels the standards of
reasonableness for an EAJA award, the inquiries frequently "will overlap and the
answers coincide."' 3°  Because Social Security disability cases are generally
reviewed under a "substantial evidence" standard,"3 °' this is an area of almost
complete overlap with the "substantial justification" standard. As discussed at
some length earlier in this article, 3°' the "substantial evidence" standard has
frequently been defined as a test of reasonableness, which is precisely the
formulation adopted by the Supreme Court for application of the EAJA
"substantial justification" standard. 3 7  Indeed, in Pierce v. Underwood 30 8
the Court expressly cited the example of the "substantial evidence" standard in
support of its conclusion that the term "substantial justification" meant "justified
to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person."''  As Judge Ruggero
Aldisert has argued, when a claimant for benefits wins because the government
cannot satisfy the reasonableness test inherent in the standard of "substantial
evidence," it is impossible to "parse this legal determination in metaphysical
1300. Krent, supra note 156, at 461 (footnotes omitted).
1301. Id. at 487-88 (finding, on the basis of data from the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts and the Social Security Administration for a one-year period from 1989-90, that EAJA
awards were granted to at least 85% of fee petitioners Social Security disability cases).
1302. Mezey & Olson, supra note 230, at 18 (finding, on a database of all reported district court
and appellate court decisions in even numbered years from 1982 to 1988, that Social Security
claimants appeared to be at least partly successful in 69% of EAJA applications).
1303. See supra section IV.C.
1304. See United States v. One Parcel of Real Property, 960 F.2d 200, 209 (1st Cir. 1992).
1305. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1988).
1306. See supra section IV.C.3.
1307. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 563-68, 108 S. Ct. 2541, 2549-51 (1988).
1308. Id. at 552, 108 S. Ct. at 2541.
1309. Id. at 564-65, 108 S. Ct. at 2549-50. See generally supra section IV.C.3.
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terms" to explain the denial of an EAJA award when applying the identical
measure of reasonableness at the fee application stage.""
Although a Social Security disability determination by the agency may be
reversed for reasons other than the court's conclusion that the denial of benefits
is not reasonably supported by the evidence,131' the high rate of successful
EAJA application provides at least some confirmation of the conclusion that most
cases resolved against the government turn upon what is essentially a rational
basis review. When a case on the merits involves true rationality review, under
which the government action is overturned precisely because it is unreasonable,
then an award of fees under the EAJA should ineluctably follow.' 2 Security
benefits cases appear to fall into this category more often than not, and therefore,
theory, as well as practical experience, would justify application of an automatic
fee-shifting provision.
Moreover, Social Security cases and the unique problems that they generate
have distorted the interpretation and implementation of the EAJA in other ways.
Most significantly, the idiosyncratic disjunction of the Social Security judicial
review provision with the EAJA fee provision has caused the Supreme Court to
depart from sound principles for determining whether and when a party has
prevailed in order to be eligible for an attorney's fee award.'3' 3 As outlined
at length in this article, 314 several aspects of the Social Security adjudication
process combine with the requirements of the EAJA to make the "prevailment
question" awkward in this peculiar context. A Social Security benefits claimant
cannot obtain an award for legal expenses incurred at the administrative
level131 5 and thus is limited to an award for the court proceedings on judicial
review. 316 Moreover, the EAJA requires a party to file an application for fees
"within thirty days of final judgment in the action."'' 7 Accordingly, since a
court judgment remanding a Social Security case for further administrative
proceedings ordinarily is one that terminates the civil action and brings about a
final judgment, 3 ' a claimant has only thirty days after all appellate rights
have expired to request an award.
In sum, the interaction between the Social Security Act's provision generally
requiring the entry of a court judgment upon a remand and the EAJA's
requirement that an application for a fee award be made within a short period
1310. Washington v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 959, 969 (3d Cir. 1985) (Aldisert, C.J., concurring).
1311. See supra section IV.C.3.
1312. See supra section IV.C.5.
1313. See supra section III.A.2.b.
1314. Id.
1315. Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877, 891, 109 S. Ct. 2248, 2258 (1989) (holding that Social
Security administrative proceedings are not "adversarial adjudications" for which fees may be
awarded under the administrative EAJA, 5 U.S.C. § 504 (1988)).
1316. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1988) (providing for award of fees in "proceedings for judicial
review of agency action").
1317. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B) (1988).
1318. See Shalala v. Schaefer, 113 S. Ct. 2625, 2628-31 (1993).
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after entry of judgment effectively dictates that attorney's fees be awarded at the
time of the initial remand judgment-or not at all. For these reasons, the
understanding that a claimant for government benefits does not become a
prevailing party until benefits are actually awarded is "at war" with the Social
Security Act's provision that a remand to the agency is a final judgment." 9
To avoid this anomalous result, the Supreme Court in Shalala v. Schaefer
deemed the Social Security claimant to be a prevailing party eligible to apply for
EAJA fees at the time of the remand. 1320
While this outcome is the only reasonable one under the unique "Catch-22"
circumstances presented here, the result is nevertheless unsatisfactory both in
terms of a general understanding of the prevailing party requirement and in
practical terms of extending the full benefit of the EAJA to successful Social
Security claimants. The traditional and most appropriate rule has been that a
party seeking government benefits or funding does not prevail until he has
received the particular substantive relief requested.13 2 ' A mere procedural
victory, followed by a remand to the agency, is insufficient to qualify a person
as a prevailing party, unless and until the benefits or funding are secured on
remand. If the claimant should in the end fail to obtain an award of benefits,
even after a remand, then he should not receive any fee award for having
achieved only a technical. victory in one battle on the way to ultimate defeat in
the war. Moreover, a Social Security claimant who has obtained only a remand
is likely to have a weaker claim for EAJA fees at this premature stage than he
would later have upon obtaining a victory on the merits upon the remand.
Finally, although a claimant obtaining a remand may obtain an EAJA award for
legal expenses attributable to the judicial proceeding, he may not recoup legal
expenses incurred in the post-remand administrative proceedings made necessary
by the government's unjustified position. 3 22
For these reasons, the difficulties created by the Social Security category of
cases demand legislative attention.3 23  Probably the best resolution of the
matter is to remove Social Security cases from the scope of the EAJA and
fashion a separate attorney's fee provision responsive to the unique needs and
concerns raised in this context. The separate Social Security fee-shifting
provision could, in addition to eliminating the "substantial justification" standard,
authorize retention ofjurisdiction by the court pending a remand of claims to the
agency to allow a subsequent award of full compensation for fees when a
claimant obtains the benefits after remand. 3 24  Not only would this revision
1319. Id. at 2630 n.3.
1320. Id. at 2631-32.
1321. See generally supra section III.A.2.b.
1322. Schaefer, 113 S. Ct. at 2631.
1323. See supra section II.A.2.b.
1324. The Administrative Conference has suggested that the EAJA be amended to provide for
consideration of a fee application only after "final disposition," which it would define as occurring
only after completion of any remand to the agency and entry of a final unappealable order.
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address the special case of Social Security litigation, the extraction of Social
Security cases from the EAJA would set the stage for restoration of the
traditional and better reasoned approach to prevailment under the EAJA and
other fee-shifting statutes.
4. Streamlining the Process and Rules for Measurement of the EAJA Fee
Award
Several commentators have wisely proposed revisions to the EAJA to
streamline fee litigation and thereby reduce the expense of administering the
EAJA in the courts and administrative agencies.
a. Excision of the "Special Factor" Enhancement to the Statutory
Rate Ceiling
Professor Krent, 325  the Administrative Conference,132 6  and Senator
Feingold 327 have suggested eliminating the provision for a "special factor"
increase in the fee award above the statutory rate ceiling. 32 s  The "special
factor" provision has been attacked as creating uncertainty and unnecessarily
complicating the fee calculation.
32 9
Recommendations of the Administrative Conference Regarding Administrative Practice and
Procedure, 57 Fed. Reg. 30,101, 30,109 n.1 (1992). Although this proposal makes sense in the Social
Security case context, which prompted the Administrative Conference's suggestion, 57 Fed. Reg. 30,
109 (1992), it is not the appropriate general rule for the broad range of civil litigation covered by the
EAJA. As discussed at length in this two-part article, prevailment must be analyzed in each case in
terms of the nature of the underlying statutory cause of action, the purpose of the lawsuit, and the
importance of the outcome. See supra section 1lI.A.2. When a party is seeking primarily procedural
relief pursuant to a statute designed to structure the procedures for governmental action, as may be
the case in many actions for judicial review of general administrative policy-making decisions, then
a judicial decision directing the agency to reexamine a decision under the correct procedures may
constitute significant relief on the merits qualifying the litigant as a prevailing party. Id. Thus, a
remand to the agency, in contexts other than government benefit.claims, may constitute a meaningful
victory that in and of itself establishes the litigant as a prevailing party as of the time of the remand
order. Id.
1325. Krent, supra note 156, at 505-06.
1326. Recommendations of the Administrative Conference Regarding Administrative Practice and
Procedure, 57 Fed. Reg. 30,101, 30,108 (1992).
1327. Amendment 1536, § (c), 141 Cong. Rec. S9,891 (daily ed. July 13, 1995) (raising the
hourly rate to $125 and allowing only for a cost-of-living adjustment).
1328. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A) (1988) (providing that a fee award is limited to $75 per hour
unless "a special factor, such as the limited availability of qualified attorneys for the proceedings
involved, justifies a higher fee"). See generally supra section V.C.
1329. See Krent, supra note 156, at 505 (stating that "the enhancement provision creates
uncertainty, diminishing the likelihood of settlement and increasing overall litigation costs'");
Recommendations of the Administrative Conference Regarding Administrative Practice and
Procedure, 57 Fed. Reg. 30,101, 30,108 (1992) (stating that the "enhancement provision breeds
uncertainty, costs money to litigate, and makes a settlement more difficult to obtain"); 141 Cong.
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This author agrees that the marginal benefits of this provision are not worth
the candle.' 3  As discussed in this article, 3  the "special factor" allow-
ance must be strictly construed to preserve the integrity of the statutory rate
ceiling upon fee awards. The single example of a "special factor" set out in the
EAJA is the "limited availability of qualified attorneys for the proceedings in-
volved."" As analyzed at length earlier in this article, 333 this factor must
also be narrowly interpreted and stingily applied, so that the statutory rate cap
does not disintegrate through perfunctory enhancements that largely restore the
award to the prevailing rate level. Even in those rare cases where a "special
factor" enhancement might be justified, the standards that must be satisfied to
make a sufficient showing are complex and burdensome. 334
The provision for an increased fee in the event of "the limited availability
of qualified counsel" has always rested uneasily in the same statutory subpara-
graph as the ceiling on the hourly rate. In simple economic terms, the
availability of legal services to a client depends upon the client's ability to pay
the rate established by the market. Holding a fee below the market rate serves
directly to restrict the availability of legal counsel. In other words, the rate cap
necessarily limits the availability of counsel, yet the statute simultaneously
includes an exception for the limited availability of qualified counsel. Accord-
ingly, these somewhat contradictory directions must be reconciled by a strict and
Rec. S3,896 (daily ed. March 14, 1995) (remarks of Sen. Feingold) (stating that "eliminating [the
"special factor"] provision simplifies the process").
1330. With the possible exception of a "special factor' enhancement for exceptional delay by the
government in the litigation. See generally supra section V.C.3. When the government has
deliberately instigated or negligently caused egregious delay in the resolution of the dispute, thereby
adding further injury to the private party through the erosion of the value of the later fee award
through inflation and lost investment opportunity, the government should be held to account. Under
the current provision for a "special factor' enhancement, the courts remain divided on whether even
exceptional delay qualifies and, if so, whether an enhancement is proper when the government is not
at fault for the delay. See Marcus v. Shalala, 17 F.3d 1033, 1039 (7th Cir. 1994) (rejecting any
increase in the award even for egregious delay as an impermissible award of pre-judgment interest);
Oklahoma Aerotronic, Inc. v. United States, 943 F.2d 1344, 1349-50 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (affirming
enhancement for an unusual lapse of time caused by the mishandling of a fee application by the
courts, not by the government); Jean v. Nelson, 863 F.2d 759, 776 & n.13 (1lth Cir. 1988)
(remanding an EAJA dispute to a district court to consider, inter alia, whether a special factor
enhancement was appropriate because of the government's unusually litigious position causing delay),
aff'd on other grounds, 496 U.S. 154, 110 S, Ct. 2316 (1990). However, even the exceptional delay
enhancement would be unnecessary if the Administrative Conference's proposal to calculate the
cost-of-living adjustment as of the time of judgment were adopted, as this provision would create a
pre-judgment interest equivalent and partially compensate parties for delay. Recommendations of the
Administrative Conference Regarding Administrative Practice and Procedure, 57 Fed. Reg. 30,101,
30,108 (1992). See also infri section VII.B.4.b (discussing possible legislative revisions to
cost-of-living adjustment provision).
1331. See generally supra section V.C.1.
1332. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A) (1988).
1333. See supra section V.C.2.
1334. See generally supra section V.C.d.
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awkward construction of the exception. Thus, the application of this "special
factor" allowance requires thinking about "availability" in a very narrow sense
(that is, when does the supply of counsel fall almost to zero) and "qualified
counsel" in terms of fairly minimal competence (appreciating that a minimally
competent, but not outstanding, attorney might be available at a rate below the
average set by the market for all attorneys practicing in that field)." In sum,
to prevent the statutory rate ceiling from collapsing into a prevailing rate
provision, "the limited availability of qualified counsel" exception must be given
an artificial construction, one that is removed from the real world of supply and
demand for legal services which otherwise would determine the rate necessary
to ensure availability of qualified counsel.
Moreover, because it is ordinarily difficult to predict beforehand that a party
involved in litigation with the federal government will both achieve victory on
the merits and be able to establish that the government's position was unreason-
able, the remote prospect of an EAJA award, at whatever rate, will not generally
affect the availability of counsel. In addressing the similar issue of whether a
given party would have experienced difficulties in obtaining counsel without a
contingency enhancement of a fee award,336 the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found the inquiry impossible to
conduct. 337 To quote the crucial analysis in that decision, substituting the
"limited availability of qualified counsel" special factor for contingency
enhancement:
The inquiry is quite artificial, because, by definition, the plaintiff stands
before the court with counsel. And since counsel could not possibly
know whether a [special factor] enhancement was in the offing until a
court decides the question years later, our inquiry is circular....
[W]hether a plaintiff would have faced substantial difficulties absent the
possibility of a [special factor] enhancement is essentially unknowable
when the most critical assumption necessary to make such a counterfac-
tual judgment is itself the issue before the court. 338
Accordingly, the "special factor" provision may be excised from the EAJA
with no loss in the efficacy of the statute and much gain in both analytical clarity
and the simplification of the process. The ability of deserving parties to find
counsel could be enhanced more directly, as proposed by the Administrative
Conference and endorsed by Senator Feingold, through an increase in the
1335. See generally id.
1336. See generally Sisk, supra note 33, at 757-59 (discussing upward enhancement of the
lodestar fee for the contingent risk of loss and the Supreme Court's decision in City of Burlington
v. Dague, 112 S. Ct. 2638, 2643-44 (1992), rejecting the possibility of a contingency enhancement).





statutory rate ceiling "to approximate more closely the prevailing market rate for
attorneys." 339
b. Confirming the Rules for Cost-of-Living Adjustments to the
Statutory Rate Ceiling
The EAJA's allowance for a cost-of-living adjustment to the statutory rate
cap has generated interpretive problems that could easily be eliminated by
express language in an amended statute, although many of these issues likely
would be resolved by the courts through the application of traditional tools of
statutory construction.
340
To begin with, the courts repeatedly have been confronted with the question
of whether changes in the cost of living should be measured for EAJA purposes
by the general Consumer Price Index (CPI) or instead by the subcategory for
personal expenses including legal service fees.' 34' Although this particular
issue seems to have been resolved by the appellate courts, which have uniformly
ruled that changes in the "cost of living" be measured by the composite
CPI, 342 most courts have yet to address the similar indexing question of
whether to measure inflationary changes on a national, regional, or local
scale. 343  Although this author believes that the text and fiscal protection
purpose behind the statutory rate cap lead to the conclusion that a uniform
national measure must be applied,' 31 legislative clarification would confirm
the answer and remove any lingering uncertainty. By expressly adopting the
national CPI for all items as the standard, as has been done in other statutes that
include cost-of-living escalators, 345 Congress could simplify the fee applica-
tion calculation. Professor Krent and the Administrative Conference have also
suggested that the proper index be specified by Congress.
3 46
1339. Recommendations of the Administrative Conference Regarding Administrative Practice and
Procedure, 57 Fed. Reg. 30,101, 30,108 (1992). See also Amendment 1536, § (c), reprinted in 141
Cong. Rec. S9,891 (daily ed. July 13, 1995) (raising the hourly rate set in the statute to $125).
However, as Professor Krent advises, the statutory rate should remain at "the low end of the spectrum
of market rates for attorneys," so that a bright-line is established and the government has little
incentive to argue that the prevailing market rate is in fact lower than the capped rate. Krent, supra
note 156, at 506 n. 175. Moreover, there is a public interest in controlling the cost of legal expenses
exacted from the public treasury.
1340. See generally supra section V.B.
1341. See generally supra section V.B.2.
1342. Id.
1343. See generally supra section V.C.3.
1344. Id.
1345. Id.
1346. Krent, supra note 156, at 506; Recommendations of the Administrative Conference
Regarding Administrative Practice and Procedure, 57 Fed. Reg. 30,101, 30,108 (1992). Senator
Feingold's proposal does not address this issue. See Amendment 1536, reprinted in 141 Cong. Rec.
S9,891 (daily ed. July 13, 1995).
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Professor Krent, 31 7 the Administrative Conference, 3 " and Senator
Feingold 349 have suggested that specification of the date upon which the
cost-of-living adjustment is to be made would "narrow the issues for litigation
and enhance the prospects for settlement."'" 0 Although there had been some
division among the lower courts on this issue, the appellate courts now appear
to be in harmony in directing that the cost-of-living adjustment to the statutory
rate ceiling be calculated as of the time the attorney performed the work, and not
the date of the later award."" These courts have reasoned that using current,
rather than historic, cost of living indices amounts to awarding pre-judgment
interest, in violation of the traditional rule that interest is not available against the
United States in the absence of a clear waiver of sovereign immunity by
Congress. 1352
Such a limitation, of course, may properly be lifted by Congress. The
Administrative Conference has made a proposal, which Senator Feingold has
endorsed in his legislation,' 313 that the cost-of-living adjustment be calculated
as of the date of final disposition of the fee application, thereby both "creat[ing]
a bright-line rule that should simplify the calculation and compensat[ing] a
private party to a limited extent for the delay in payment.'1 354  In terms both
of efficiency and equity, this is a wise proposal.
This author also suggests that the cost-of-living adjustment language in the
EAJA be revised to remove discretion from the court in determining to make the
enhancement. 355 As discussed in this article, 1356 the adjustment of the stat-
utory rate cap for cost-of-living increases should be routinely granted. Unfortu-
nately, a few courts have declined requests for adjustments, even when presented
with proper evidence of changes in the cost of living, with little or no analysis
or reasoning to support the denial. 35 7 Other courts properly have recognized
1347. Krent, supra note 156, at 506.
1348. Recommendations of the Administrative Conference Regarding Administrative Practice and
Procedure, 57 Fed. Reg. 30,101, 30,108 (1992).
1349. Amendment 1536, § (c), reprinted in 141 Cong. Rec. S9,891 (daily ed. July 13, 1995).
1350. Krent, supra note 156, at 506.
1351. See generally supra section V.B.4.
1352. Id.
1353. Amendment 1536, § (c), reprinted in 141 Cong. Rec. S9,891 (daily ed. July 13, 1995).
1354. Recommendations of the Administrative Conference Regarding Administrative Practice and
Procedure, 57 Fed. Reg. 30,101, 30,108 (1992).
1355. Senator Feingold's proposal would continue to phrase the cost-of-living adjustment
provision as a matter committed to the determination, and thus the discretion, of the court. See
Amendment 1536, § (c)(2), reprinted in 141 Cong. Rec. S9,891 (daily ed. July 13, 1995) (providing
that the statutory rate is $125 per hour unless "the court determines that an increase in the
cost-of-living ... justifies a higher fee").
1356. See supra section V.B.l.
1357. See, e.g., Begley v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 966 F.2d 196, 199 (6th Cir.
1992); May v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 176, 177-78 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1038, 112 S.
Ct. 887 (1992); Headlee v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 548, 552 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 979, 110
S. Ct. 507 (1989); Burgess v. Sullivan, 771 F. Supp. 1161, 1163 (E.D. Okla. 1991). See generally
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that, in light of Congress's intent of ensuring adequate legal representation to
parties challenging unreasonable government conduct, "it seems difficult to
envision a situation in which a district court would not adjust the cap upward for
inflation.""35  To eliminate the disparity and prevent arbitrary denials of
cost-of-living adjustments, the EAJA should be revised to provide for an
automatic inflationary escalation of the statutory rate ceiling. The statute should
state simply that attorney's fees may not be awarded in excess of a stated rate
as adjusted by an increase in the cost of living, together with specification of the
index and the date for calculation.
c. Encouraging Settlement Through an Offer of Judgment Procedure
Professor Krent"5 9 and the Administrative Conference,"' 6° followed by
Senator Feingold," 6' recommend adoption of an offer of judgment device to
encourage the amicable resolution of fee disputes without litigation over the fee
application. Patterned after Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68,362 a formal
offer of settlement by the defendant "exposes the other party to financial
penalties for rejecting offers the value of which are not recovered at trial."" 63
The Administrative Conference explains the proposed procedure in the EAJA
context:
Upon receiving a private party's fee application, the government could
make an offer of judgment as to the fee award. If the private party
rejects that offer and ultimately recovers no more than the offer, it could
not recover any fees or expenses incurred for services rendered after the
offer was rejected. The offer-of-judgment device should encourage
settlement, thereby saving both parties the expense of litigating fee
disputes; while the government party gains leverage by extending an
offer of judgment, the private party benefits from the opportunity to
obtain prompt payment of fees) 36
Although this provision would shift some power to the government to force a
private party to seriously consider and accept a settlement, or instead accept
potential adverse consequences, it would reduce overall litigation costs and
supra section V.B. 1.
1358. Meyer v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 1029, 1034 (11th Cir. 1992). See also Johnson v. Sullivan,
919 F.2d 503, 505 (8th Cir. 1990).
1359. Krent, supra note 156, at 501-04.
1360. Recommendations of the Administrative Conference Regarding Administrative Practice and
Procedure, 57 Fed. Reg. 30,101, 30,108 (1992).
1361. Amendment 1536, § (e), reprinted in 141 Cong. Rec. S9,891 (daily ed. July 13, 1995).
1362. Fed. R. Civ. P. 68.
1363. Krent, supra note 156, at 501.
1364. Recommendations of the Administrative Conference Regarding Administrative Practice and
Procedure, 57 Fed. Reg. 30,101, 30,108 (1992).
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demands upon judicial resources. Moreover, if adopted as a package with an
increase in the statutory fee rate and perhaps a more explicitly mandatory
cost-of-living adjustment, private parties would secure an overall gain. 365
C. Conclusion
Despite its flaws and the failure to fully achieve the ambitious goals of its
original authors, the Equal Access to Justice Act in one or another form is likely
to retain a permanent place on the statute books. Because of its potential, even
if limited, for controlling government misconduct and the powerful appeal of the
principle that the government should be held responsible for litigation costs
attributable to its wrongdoing, the statute will and should be preserved.
Legislative revision could strengthen, clarify and modify its provisions, and
thereby alleviate the collateral costs in judicial, governmental, and private
resources for implementation of its directives. As asserted at the beginning of
this article,' 36 the EAJA has become a bright star fixed in the firmament of
attorney's fee-shifting provisions. With thoughtful and modest reform, that star
may shine even brighter.
1365. See Krent, supra note 156, at 502 n.160 (stating that, while the offer of judgment rule
benefits the government, "[a]s a package with the change to automatic fee shifting in social security
cases, ... or with an elevation of the fee cap, private parties would benefit overall").
1366. See supra section I.A.
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